This paper aims to provide understanding about the determinants of the performance of horizontal accountability in Argentina and Kenya and the institutional conditions under which we could expect to see more or less horizontal accountability.

Horizontal accouility (HA) between different branches of government has been shown to enhance the performance of state institutions through the provision of effective oversight and a valuable check against the concentration of executive power. However, relatively little is known about the drivers and challenges of horizontal accountability. This paper aims to provide understanding about the determinants of the performance of horizontal accountability in Argentina and Kenya and the institutional conditions under which we could expect to see more or less horizontal accountability.

The researchers analyse the mechanisms through which formal and informal institutions shape the incentives of state actors to fulfil their HA mandates, as well as the capacity of the legislature to make use of constitutionally mandated HA processes. Although Argentina and Kenya have implemented reforms meant to strengthen the role of parliament vis-a-vis the executive, both countries continue to exhibit low levels of horizontal accountability. Identifying the forces shaping HA is therefore crucial; current gaps between the behaviour prescribed by formal institutions and accountability practices are undermining policy outcomes that affect the lives of millions of citizens.

This investigation finds that creating incentives through regulation and formal institutions is necessary but not sufficient for improving horizontal accountability. Changes in informal institutions and strengthened capacities are also required to achieve better outcomes in Argentina and Kenya. Only after profound reforms in these two aspects, will it be possible to foster the effective use of HA mechanisms. In the long run, better incentives will improve the functioning of HA mechanisms, which are critical to improving the quality of governance.

Authors:

Paschal B.Mihyo, Truphena E. Mukuna, Natalia Aquilino, Agustina Suaya, Sofía Estevez

• 
  
  Horizontal Accountability of the Executive to the Legislature in Africa: A Case Study of Kenya
  This paper assesses the legislative, representative, financial control and oversight roles played by parliaments in Africa, with Kenya as the main case study in a context of accountability. The need to strengthen accountability is premised on the importance of having checks and mechanisms for parliaments to exercise their representative, legislative and oversight functions in a manner that ensures the prevention of abuse of power and subjects the Executive bodies to processes that open up their activities to public scrutiny with the possibility that in case they overstep their mandates they can be subjected to sanctions. The paper examines gaps in accountability and the factors that sustain those gaps. The regional focus includes all the countries of East Africa; and Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda for a more detailed regional overview.

Objectives of the study

• This paper assesses the legislative, representative, financial control and oversight roles played by parliaments in Africa, with Kenya as the main case study in a context of accountability. The regional focus includes all the countries of East Africa; and Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda for a more detailed regional overview. The need to strengthen accountability is premised on the importance of having checks and mechanisms for parliaments to exercise their representative, legislative and oversight functions in a manner that ensures the prevention of abuse of power and subjects the Executive bodies to processes that open up their activities to public scrutiny with the possibility that in case they overstep their mandates they can be subjected to sanctions. The paper examines gaps in accountability and the factors that sustain those gaps.

Methodology

The main question addressed in this paper is: what are the determinants of the low performance of horizontal accountability mechanisms in Africa in general and in Kenya in particular? Our main hypothesis is that in Africa in general and in Kenya in particular, the low performance of horizontal accountability mechanisms results from deficits in legislative and Executive capacities, as well as a lack of incentives for both branches of power on the one hand, and the complex interplay between formal and informal institutions on the other. We examined a number of horizontal accountability mechanisms and assessed the extent to which these effectively work. Based on the African Parliamentary Index (API) (Parliamentary Centre 2011) and instruments and indicators of independence and accountability of independent agencies by De Vrieze F. and Ieseanu L. (2011), we focused on the following indicators: the existence of a budget review procedure; the time frame available for parliament to review the budget; room for public hearings on the budget; whether committees work together on the budget proposals of government; whether parliament can amend the proposed budget; whether it can send back the budget to the Executive; the level of details of expenditure in the budgets and whether the committees access information on defence and security services budgets; the existence of a Budget Act, a budget office and office of the Auditor General and the access to information these offices have on budgets and finances. Also considered is the nomination process of the Executive, its performance, assessment, reporting, transparency, system of appeals and consultations and coordination.

AUTHORS:
Paschal Mihyo
Herman Musahara
Truphena E. Mukuna

The Deficits in Horizontal Accountability in Argentina: A Tale of two worlds

This paper looks at the cornerstone of the institutional weaknesses in the Latin America, namely, the executive-legislative relationship and horizontal accountability (HA). What are the determinants of the low performance of horizontal accountability mechanisms in Latin America and especially in Argentina? In order to address this central question we studied a set of accountability mechanisms using a mix methods approach. The research is organized in two parts: the first explores definitions of horizontal accountability and its mechanisms and determines the extent to which HA mechanisms are useful fit for our case studies. The objective of this first part is to identify whether there is a gap between what is stated in law and what actually takes place, and what the consequences are for non-compliance. The second part aims to understand the determinants that help explain levels of low accountability.

SUMMARY:  

While there are some drawbacks1 in specific countries, democracy has become the ‘only game in town’ in Latin America. The most unequal region of the world has succeeded in guaranteeing democratic rules regionwide. However, several weaknesses remain; among them, how to develop not only good institutions, but also institutional capacities that work respecting the law. This paper looks at the cornerstone of the institutional weaknesses in the region, namely, the executive-legislative relationship and horizontal accountability (HA). What are the determinants of the low performance of horizontal accountability mechanisms in Latin America and especially in Argentina? In order to address this central question we studied a set of accountability mechanisms using a mix methods approach. The research is organized in two parts: the first explores definitions of horizontal accountability and its mechanisms and determines the extent to which HA mechanisms are useful fit for our case studies. The objective of this first part is to identify whether there is a gap between what is stated in law and what actually takes place, and what the consequences are for non-compliance. The second part aims to understand the determinants that help explain levels of low accountability. So far there has been little research in Latin America that looks specifically at this question. What appears to be the case is that even though the region is making good progress in terms of institutionalizing democratic processes and improving social indicators, there is still much more to do to ensure better horizontal accountability outcomes. Specifically, the executive’s answerability to the Legislative has only slightly improved during the last decade, and this is the case for the whole region. It is also the case that Latin America still lacks good quality data, and this affects not only the decision making process but also the oversight capacity of Congress. In this context, Argentina appears to be an interesting case to conduct an in-depth analysis with a view to increase our understanding of the research question. This case is particularly relevant as Argentina is among the most developed countries in Latin America, but at the same time presents low levels of institutional capacity. Therefore, it may highlight specific factors that have blocked the development of accountability capacities, despite the existence of comparatively higher levels of economic development. The findings from the Argentine case may throw up important lessons for capacity building in other cases as well.

AUTHORS:
Natalia Aquilino
Julia Pomare
Agustina Suaya
Maria Page

• Learning Alliance on Horizontal Accountability - Report of the Study Tour to Argentina (October 31st to November 7th 2016) - by CIPPEC

This document is a report of the Study Tour on Horizontal Accountability to Buenos Aires, Argentina, held between October 31st and November 8th 2016. The Study Tour was the culmination of the ELLA Learning Alliance on Horizontal Accountability. This Learning Alliance was in operation from May to August 2016, and provided a platform for learning and discussing actions directed at

strengthening the capacity of legislative and executive bodies to make them more effective in exercising their horizontal accountability mandates – based on a comparison of Latin American and African experiences. The contents of both the Learning Alliance and the Study Tour were structured around collaborative research produced by CIPPEC and OSSREA.

The key objective of the Study Tour was to offer participants the opportunity to learn first-hand about the performance of horizontal accountability mechanisms within the legislative and executive powers in Argentina. By observing local practices and comparing these with the experience in their home countries, participants generated useful lessons that can be translated into action in their own contexts.

The objectives were:

· To understand and compare how accountability mechanisms in Argentina and Kenya work

· To meet and exchange with civil servants responsible for horizontal accountability mechanisms in Argentina

· To exchange views about possible strategies and tools to improve these mechanisms in their own contexts

· To exchange ideas about South-South cooperation and strengthen the link between Africa and Latin America

· To reflect on the lessons learned during the tour (through meetings, presentations, field visits etc.) and develop a post-Study Tour Action Plan (supported by peer review and technical assessment) to put the acquired knowledge into practice.

Each participant came with a personal learning goal related to his/her work, and an intention to follow-up on the lessons learned on the Study Tour upon their return home. Throughout the course of the study tour, there was an on-going discussion about implementing changes in their own contexts as a result of the knowledge gained on the Learning Alliance and Study Tour.

We envisioned the Study Tour as an opportunity to generate durable lessons and strong links between participants in order to assist practitioners, researchers, government officials, and/or local institutions to improve the execution and deepen the study of horizontal accountability mechanisms. 

---

Report of the Study Tour to Argentina - by OSSREA

DATES: 31st October - 7th November, 2016

 The study tour to Argentina was a culmination of an Online Learning Alliance that begun on 23rd May, 2016 and was concluded in August, 2016. The overall goal of the Learning Alliance was to learn and discuss actions directed at strengthening the capacity of legislative and executive bodies to make them more effective in exercising their horizontal accountability mandates based on a comparison of Latin American and African experiences. The moderation of the Online Learning Alliance on was led jointly by CIPPEC from Buenos Aires, Argentina and Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA ) from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The study tour was conducted on 31st October- 7th November, 2016 in the City of Buenos Aires in Argentina. The purpose of the study tour was to provide an opportunity to participants to: 

• Understand how the accountability mechanisms in Argentina and Kenya work
• <span ">Visit the people who perform horizontal accountability in Argentina
• Visit the buildings where accountability takes place
• Exchange views about possible tools to improve the mechanisms with professionals
• Learn and improve participants Action Plans through peer-review and technical assessment <span "> 

Download the FULL TEXT by clicking on the image above.

---