Previous| Next | Content| Main |Home 

Advocating Stronger Legislatures as a Precursor to Stronger States in Africa

Marshall W. Thompson*

Abstract

Francis Fukuyama (2004, 17) states that, “weak or failed states are close to the root of many of the world’s most serious problems, from poverty and AIDS to drug trafficking and terrorism”. Similarly, Richard Joseph (2003, 159) suggests that “Africa will not make sustainable progress in building democratic systems and fostering economic development until the continent acquires coherent, legitimate, and effective states”.

Extreme cases of state failure in Africa have formed the basis of newspaper headlines over the past fifteen years or so. However, there is a considerable amount of variance within Africa as to the strength of Africa’s states. Strong, well institutionalized states such as Botswana form a stark contrast with the disasters of Liberia and Sierra Leone. It is incumbent upon the political science community to investigate patterns of state failure and state consolidation and to articulate any generalizations that can be found.

In this paper I identify three interrelated political determinants of state strength. There are, of course, other determinants. Demographics have played, and continue to play, a large role in determining a state’s ability to consolidate its power and its predominance in society. States with lower population densities, for instance, generally have a more difficult time consolidating their leadership position within society (see Herbst 2000 for a review of this literature). Moreover, states which can generate significant revenue from geographically concentrated natural resources often fail to strengthen the large number of institutions which are not related to resource extraction (Skocpol 1982, 44).

The political determinants identified herein are: 1) the strength of the legislature, 2) the extent of collective representation, and 3) the extent of mass party characteristics in the polity. I argue below that positive changes in these variables will positively affect state strength. Strengthening the legislature provides an opportunity to create constitutional powers of defense. Furthermore, the government can best deliver functional and descriptive representation with the legislature. Collective representation and mass party characteristics will both help constrain patronage and corruption. Before articulating the rationale for this argument I will briefly discuss state consolidation within a framework of political development.

Durkheim viewed political development as an increase in the number and type of interactions people participate in. Generically, such a definition of political development could be employed to study any type of social/political community: one that is geographically defined, such as a country, or one that is geographically dispersed, such as a transnational ethnic group, or some such. However, the concern of the present work is state consolidation; thus, the interactions we are concerned with are geographically defined. The control and coordination of these interactions comprise the “penetration” of society which Bendix (1968) discusses. He stipulates the “continuous and direct penetration of a settled community by a single authority” (p. 71) as a co-requisite, if not a prerequisite, for the construction of a sovereign, absolutist state.

Bendix also notes the need to emasculate any traditional authorities who mediate the relationship between the state and its inhabitants and/or citizens (Ibid, 9). With this perspective, less developed political systems may rely upon social figures that are granted respect and influence by way of tradition and culture. Such traditional leaders exploit their personal relationships with the state elites and with societal actors to both enforce state edicts and to mobilize support for the central state. However, this view maintains that, to develop an autonomous and modern state, the institutions of state must be separated from internal (and external) societal forces and not depend on particular societal groups for its existence. Indeed, Weberian administration (the widely recognized model of efficient bureaucracy) demands fair and impersonal interactions between state agencies and all persons. Moreover, this change, from personal to impersonal relations, is a seminal moment on the path of political development.

Hence, in Eckstein’s (1982) articulation of a political development theory he begins with a discussion of a dimension of “political time.” At the poles of this dimension rest a primitive “social polity” and an advanced “political society.” In the former there are only the most basic forms of leadership: headship, chieftaincy, etc.; the state’s public sphere of formal activity is minute with little active management by a central state apparatus, and there is no “subsociety” of Weberian administration. In the advanced political society, by contrast, the public domain has wholly preempted private relations; furthermore, government institutions are highly differentiated, they form a large subsociety, and institutions are largely independent of social actors (p. 470).

Thus, state consolidation may be viewed as: 1) the increasing penetration of a geographically defined society by a single authority, 2) an increase in the number of, control of, and coordination of interactions within a society, and 3) the replacement of personal administration with impersonal administration. Consequently, if consolidation is the formalization of political activity then we are left with the question: On what basis should politics be formalized? Therefore we must confront the “regime question,” one of the great questions of political science. By what institutions and procedures should authoritative decision-making and political competition be regulated? We must immediately recognize that there is no “one-size-fits-all” answer to the regime question. Different countries, with different socio-economic, demographic, and historical realities, will require different institutional solutions to political competition and conflict. However, these differing experiences do not preclude careful and nuanced generalization.

The vast majority of African states use presidential systems of government and, significantly, presidentialism is inherently majoritarian, at least within the executive branch. The president is elected from a single district, thus disproportionality may be quite high as voters who vote for losing candidates may lack any representation within the presidency; the deviation from proportionality is usually above 40 per cent (Lijphart 1999). Contrarily, disproportionality in the legislature will be considerably lower due to the fact that minority parties will have some representation there.

Moreover, we know that political campaigns are fiercely contested, particularly in less economically advanced countries where control of state resources is often viewed as one of the few viable paths toward material comfort. Under such circumstances, a strong unitary presidency may fuel the “winner-takes-all” approach to politics (Linz 1987). The desire to control state resources is heightened by the executive management style which obtains in many developing countries. O’Donnell (1994) suggests that presidential systems will lead to strong executives which will overawe the legislature. Making a distinction between his delegative democracy and representative democracy, he states that in the latter, “accountability runs not only vertically…but also horizontally.” Vertical accountability refers to politicians’ accountability to voters; horizontal accountability refers to the accountability of state institutions to one another. Without such horizontal accountability the executive branch, which usually has vast discretion over appropriations, appointments, and other affairs, is free to pursue its own agenda, which may be rather narrow. The experience of post-independence Africa has largely been one of executive dominance. Le Vine (1997) informs us that many post-independence governments were bereft of legislative influence; and cabinet members were entirely responsible to the executive branch.

Consequently, presidentialism and majoritarianism in general may increase the risk of alienating and/or threatening the security of large segments of a country’s population. Furthermore, because the African state is often highly personalized, alienation from a particular administration can lead to alienation from the state itself. Any amount of alienation is made more dangerous to political stability by the fact that, with some exceptions, partisan cleavages and ethnic cleavages tend to run along one another in Africa. With socio-economic advancement cross-cutting cleavages will increase in number and in salience due to a greater diversity of economic interests. Until sufficient economic advancement occurs however, ethnicity and partisanship will remain heavily associated with one another. Thus, one does not need to argue for a unique role for ethnicity in Africa; one only needs to understand that in the eyes of many citizens, ethnicity and/or regionalism remain the most obvious rallying points around which to center political organization.

One of the most influential politician-theorists, James Madison, discussed at length theories of republican government and the potential for a tyranny of the majority. Madison was concerned with the vices of “faction” and the possibility that a majority might use their authoritative state power to infringe on the rights of a minority. Arguing that republican government enshrined majority rule with minority rights, Madison sought institutional structures that would guarantee the security of those outside the majority.

Madison stressed the protection of minority rights from a perspective which viewed republicanism as government by consent. Authoritative decisions are made via majority rule in a republic; however not all interests are effected equally by such decisions. Thus, moderation in policy output is necessary to ensure government by consent rather than by force; to depend on force would be contradictory to republican principles. To achieve such moderation Madison turned to the construction of institutions. Long before the words “institutions matter” became a catch-phrase within political science, Madison stated that the protection of civil liberties depended on institutions and not on the morality or proper socialization of men (Morgan 1974, 857). He did not believe that regard for the “common good” would restrain the actions of the majority. Moreover, religious and moral instruction would also fail to restrain those with the power to repress others; indeed, religion had often been the fuel or rationale for oppression. Politicians, he argued, would promote themselves by mobilizing majorities to any possible cause, whether it be a genuine one or a charade. Thus, a reliance on social constraints was not likely to produce moderate governance and respect for minority rights; institutional constraints were necessary.

What is noteworthy is Madison’s belief that a stable republic required that “every peculiar interest [be given] a constitutional power of defense” (cited in Jefferson 1907, 332). Hence republican liberty, moderate governance and the protection of minority rights, demanded a deliberate and thoughtful system of representation. Thus a stable and just republic, in Madison’s view, depended upon a system of representation which would bring about institutional constraints on the majority.

Because presidentialism is the norm in Africa and presidentialism is majoritarian; and because minority rights must be protected to reduce any perception of marginalization, and because social constraints are ineffective, African states must enshrine institutional constraints on the executive branch in law and in practice. Such constraints come largely from the legislative branch, the judicial branch, and autonomous state agencies. While parliamentary systems may, in theory, be less majoritarian, there remains the possibility of a permanent majority dominating the legislature; hence there is a need to constrain majorities under parliamentary regimes as well.

We are now prepared to assert basic hypotheses about the consolidation of states in Africa:

Hypothesis 1: Increasing horizontal accountability will increase state consolidation.

Hypothesis 2: Increasing collective representation will increase state consolidation.

Hypothesis 3: The acquisition of mass-party characteristics will increase collective representation.

The largely negative consequences of executive dominance are clear. Presidencies are inherently majoritarian; voters whose preferred candidate was unsuccessful have no representation in the executive branch that is responsible to them. There is likely to be some descriptive representation – the inclusion of various ethnicities and nationalities, etc. (although even this is not always the case) - but this alone will likely fail to deliver sufficient relevant policy outputs. This reality furthers the “winner-takes-all” approach to politics, where control of the executive branch is the object of most political activity. With ethnic and partisan cleavages often running along one another, elections often amount to ethno-regional competitions. Subsequently, myopic desires by politicians to control the executive branch may result in mobilization for and against the government by ruling party supporters and opposition supporters, respectively. Due to neo-patrimonialism and the personalized nature of politics in many states, mobilization against the government may evolve into mobilization against the state. If that mobilization is along ethnic lines then conditions are ripe for a political disaster.

Clearly, decreasing the stakes of elections makes it more likely that the losers will accept the results, and that opposition parties will at least acquiesce to remaining in the opposition. The stakes of elections can be reduced by decreasing the vulnerability of those in the minority and those outside of government. Reducing their vulnerability may be achieved by limiting the power of the executive to overawe other institutions of government, namely the legislature, the judiciary, and autonomous state agencies. When the relevance of institutions other than the executive is enhanced, opposition politicians will have more numerous opportunities to influence policy outputs and outcomes. Whereas executive dominance may destabilize polities, the empowerment of other institutions allows them to reach their stabilizing potential. Constraining the executive grants various parties and communities “a constitutional power of defense,” as Madison (Jefferson 1907) called it. Since we cannot depend upon proper socialization or morality to produce just and moderate leadership, justice demands that the men and women in power be constrained, and it is only institutions that can achieve this.

Even a relatively powerless legislature provides a superior forum for descriptive representation than the executive branch. Officials in the cabinet are chosen by the executive, while officials in legislatures are chosen by the communities they represent. If nothing else, this allows officials in the legislature to speak on behalf of their communities without fear of termination by officials from “other” communities. Further, giving the legislature a real capability to shape government policies and to oversee the bureaucracy permits the conduct of functional representation – the provision of policies and services which are requested by and are relevant to constituents. Functional representation is possible within neo-patrimonial systems; however, institutionalizing functional representation with legislative empowerment and horizontal accountability allows the formally institutionalized political system to acquire legitimacy and an aura of effectiveness and justice. This follows Eckstein’s (1982) view that in more advanced polities the public domain supersedes private relations.

Both descriptive and functional representations have a role in the consolidation process, yet long term stability requires effective delivery of public goods and services. Descriptive representation and open deliberation lend some legitimacy to the political system and may help integrate society. An institutionalized legislature is likely to “embody many of the national symbols (and it can) confer those symbols upon both the regime and the policies” which are enacted (Mezey 1979, 21). Furthermore, Packenham (1979) states that simply by meeting and deliberating, the Brazilian Congress impressed upon the people “the government’s moral right to rule.” It is likely that meeting and deliberating openly, with all key segments of society present, will allow the legislature, and the political system, to acquire a “patina of sacrality” (Le Vine 1997, 203) over time, furthering the institutionalization of the legislature and the state itself.

Nonetheless, in the long term it is doubtful that meeting and deliberating would be sufficient to maintain citizens’ appreciation for their political system. For this reason the legislature must be capable of producing tangible benefits for society. Hence, Mishler and Hildreth (1984, 39) argue that increasing legislative autonomy (they call it effectiveness) will increase regime stability. Moreover, Moore (1966, 95) states that successful penetration of society requires genuine two-way influence rather than merely ritual participation. Further, citizens must have clear-cut channels of influence over the state (ibid., 113). This reciprocal influence between society and state is what permits the continuous mobilization of citizens; without reciprocal influence citizen apathy will grow and citizens will become estranged from the regime. Thus, it is descriptive and functional representation which, together, legitimate state policies and agencies, maintain citizen mobilization and aid the penetration and integration of society.

One must bear in mind, however, that empowering the legislature may open the door to increased patronage and corruption. Politicians may collude with one another; even ruling parties and opposition parties may collude with one another to sustain a patronage machine that allows (at least a large portion of) the political elite to benefit. These forms of rent-taking are inimical to state consolidation in that they directly undermine formal institutions. Grand corruption diverts resources away from their official, publicly stated purpose. In so doing, the general statutes are undermined by government officials; the budget itself is undermined; regulatory agencies, some of which are ostensibly autonomous, are undermined. This corruption results in government projects and programmes being starved of resources; regime legitimacy decreases as a result of the decreasing quality of service delivery. Furthermore, even petty bureaucratic corruption increases the cost of government services and decreases the perceived fairness of the citizen-government relationship. Moreover, even mild patronage, in the form of constituency projects, can create economic dislocations by diverting state resources away from the most productive projects. Patronage and corruption amount to a penetration of the “public domain” by “private relations” (Eckstein 1982). Therefore, for the sake of this discussion, I will equate an increase in rent-taking to a decrease in state consolidation.

A primary cause of grand corruption and patronage is the political power of regional elites. In most African states, the state does not directly mobilize the population. The central state allies itself with local barons who, in turn, secure the support of the local community. The power of regional barons is enhanced by the homogeneity of constituencies; the ease with which local politicians often win office is an indication of the bloc voting pattern that local elites can use for or against the central state. Consequently, ethno-regional voting blocs can be traded for power and/or resources from the central government; the result is that politicians who command the loyalty of significant groups of voters often have easy access to rents from the state. Thus the system of representation which is predominant in Africa is one of dyadic representation rather than collective representation. Whereas dyadic representation is the notion that a legislator is to represent his or her constituency, collective representation is the notion that a legislator is to represent the entire nation. It is argued here that increasing collective representation will decrease rent-seeking and rent-taking, and thereby increase state consolidation.

That dyadic representation is dominant in Africa is to be expected. Constituencies are largely homogenous, at least to the extent that the ethnicity of the legislator to be elected is not in doubt. Caldwell (1969) finds a “positive feedback” relationship between the elite urban members of an ethnicity and their rural kin. Building on this relationship, Bates (1974) states that “ethnic groups represent a successful mechanism for generating expanding benefits in the modern era” (p. 474). Elite status is granted by communities in return for community benefits (monetary remissions, employment, etc.); this relationship holds among families, village neighbors, and legislators and their constituents. The result is the type of parochialism and informally institutionalized patronage that scholars have observed (i.e. Weinbaum 1977; Collins 2004). Furthermore, the neo-patrimonial politics, which almost always exists at the local level, applies pressure on the central government to govern in a similar fashion (Le Vine 1980).

Hence, much of the process of African politics veers away from the Burkean mission of discovering the “objective national interest,” presumably the maximization of national income and social-welfare. Instead, African politics, like politics in many places, largely takes the form of group conflict over resources. However, in Africa, where material resources are scarce and political arrangements weaker, the danger posed to the state’s existence by group conflict is greater. It is the dual role of the politician as political entrepreneur and ethnic entrepreneur that forms a primary threat to the African state. The ability of politicians to mobilize the public on explicitly ethnic grounds is an ever-present danger to the political system. Collective representation would reduce the role of the individual legislator, and in so doing reduce the threat of ethno-regional insurrection against the state. Moreover, collective representation would reduce patronage, again by reducing the role of the individual legislator. Indeed, Weissberg (1978) asserts that “Collective representation will never be worse than dyadic representation” in its ability to maximize social-welfare (p. 547). The question that now arises is: How does one induce collective representation?

Dyadic representation continues to flourish largely because of the legislator’s role (and the role of other local elites) as an intermediary between the state and the citizens. “Patron,” “cadre,” or “parties of personalities” are the norm; party machineries do not go all the way down to the grassroots; instead they stop with local notables. On the other hand, mass parties attempt to enrol every man, woman, and child that they can; they establish local branches with local headquarters and hold regular meetings and elections for party officers (Schachter 1961, 295). Additionally, mass parties frequently have auxiliary structures, such as women’s organizations and youth organizations, which add to their mobilizational capability. Mass parties are thus more capable of limiting the role of local elites as intermediaries. Because the state, through parties, speaks directly to citizens, the patronage relationship between the population, the relevant legislator, and the state can be limited. Furthermore, mass parties are usually driven by a well-articulated (often times revolutionary) ideology (Schachter 1961; Moore 1966, 91), while patron parties are less articulate – their main goal being the receipt of patronage.

Hence, we can expect mass parties to be more programmatic and more disciplined – the legislator no longer has “control” of a voting bloc with which he or she can bargain with the center. Therefore, states governed by mass parties allow for the realization of “responsible party government,” where the party elected represents a national majority and the representative relationship is non-dyadic (Weissberg 1978). Such a state should more closely approximate the Burkean goal of pursuing the objective national interest.

Fallers (1968) notes that state reliance on intermediate authorities to manage the state-citizen relationship is a characteristic of less advanced political systems. Thus, politicians who assume the persona of ethno-regional champions are a direct impediment to state consolidation. The state and party are strengthened when the dyadic relationship is broken. Strong parties and states can reduce patronage and other forms of rent-taking. On the other hand, Africa’s patron parties have generally coexisted with “feckless pluralism” (Carothers 2002), where pluralism is chaotic and the state is reduced to a collection of “agencies and offices to be captured and manipulated.” A comparison of mass-party countries (i.e. Ethiopia and Tanzania) with patron party countries (Kenya and Nigeria) will illuminate this point.

Discussing legislative effectiveness and autonomy, Carey et al. (1999) define effectiveness as the legislature’s ability to make “informed decisions,” and autonomy as the “capacity to gather information, cultivate policy expertise, and make decisions – independently from other institutions.” Morgenstern (1999), in his discussion of pure presidential systems, describes strong legislatures as those which can review, amend, pass, and/or reject legislation without following directives from the executive branch. Additionally, such legislatures must be able to independently oversee the activities of government arms. The size of most legislatures makes the review of pending legislation and oversight of the administration by the full chamber unfeasible; the amount and complexity of legislative business is prohibitive. Consequently, legislative committee systems are constructed to facilitate the orderly execution of business. Hence, effective committee systems provide one element of strong legislatures; the other primary element is professional staffing. DeGregorio (1994) describes a hierarchy of services the staff deliver to their Chairs: the provision of factual and political information, and protection from surprises. For the legislature to be truly autonomous its staff must be hired and employed by the legislature itself; staff seconded from ministries will likely be loyal to the executive branch.

In this paper I have attempted to outline some ideas about strengthening African states by empowering political institutions outside of the executive branch. I have integrated several arguments regarding the role of legislatures in providing descriptive and functional representation and thereby building legitimacy. One must bear in mind that increasing horizontal accountability does not preclude corrupt collusion on the part of political actors. For this reason, parties themselves need to be strengthened in such a way that individual legislators will lose undue influence over decision-making processes. The empowerment of parties over legislators will promote the practice of collective representation and promote social-welfare maximization for the benefit of the African citizen.

Bates, Robert H. 1974. Ethnic competition and modernization in contemporary Africa. Comparative Political Studies 6(4), pp. 457-484.

Bendix, Reinhard. 1968. State and society. Boston: Little, Brown.

Caldwell, J.C. 1969. African rural-urban migration: The movement to Ghana’s towns. New York: Columbia University Press.

Carey, John M., Frantisek Formanek and Ewa Karpowicz. 1999. Legislative autonomy in new regimes: The Czech and Polish cases. Legislative Studies Quarterly 24(4), pp. 569-603.

Carothers, Thomas. 2002. The end of the transition paradigm. Journal of Democracy 3 (1), pp. 5-21.

Collins, Kathleen. 2004. The logic of clan politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories. World Politics 56, pp. 224-261.

DeGregorio, Christine. 1994. Congressional committee staff as policy making partners in the U.S. Congress. Congress & The Presidency 21, pp. 49-66.

Durkheim, Emile. 1984. The division of labour in society. New York: The Free Press.

Eckstein, Harry. 1982. The idea of political development: From dignity to efficiency. World Politics 34 (4), pp. 451-486.

Fallers, Llyod. 1968. Political sociology and the anthropological study of African politics. In Reinhard Bendix (ed.) State and society: A reader in comparative political sociology. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Fukuyama, Francis. 2004. The imperative of state building. Journal of Democracy 15 (2), pp. 17-31.

Herbst, Jeffery. 2000. States and power in Africa. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Jefferson, Thomas. 1907. The writings of Thomas Jefferson, edited by Albert Ellery Bergh. Washington, DC: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association.

Joseph, Richard. 2003. Africa: States in crisis. Journal of Democracy 14 (3), pp. 159-170.

Le Vine, Victor T. 1980. African patrimonial regimes in comparative perspective. The Journal of Modern African Studies 18(4), pp. 657-673.

____. 1997. The fall and rise of constitutionalism in West Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies 35(2), pp. 181-206.

Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries. New Haven: Yale University Press, Ch. 6-7.

Linz, Juan J. 1987. Democracy, presidential or parliamentary. Unpublished.

Madison, James. 1961. The size and variety of the union as a check on faction. In Benjamin Fletcher Wright (ed.), The federalist. Cambridge. MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Mezey, Michael L. 1979. Comparative legislatures. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Mishler, William and Anne Hildreth. 1984. Legislatures and political stability: An exploratory analysis. The Journal of Politics 46(1), pp. 25-59.

Moore, Clement Henry. 1966. Mass party regimes in Africa. In Herbert J. Spiro (ed.) Africa: The primacy of politics, New York: Random House.

Morgan, Robert J. 1974. Madison’s theory of representation in the tenth federalist. The Journal of Politics 36 (4), pp. 852-885.

Morgenstern, Scott. 1999. U.S. models and Latin American legislatures. In Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif (eds.), Legislatures in Latin America, Unpublished.

O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1994. Delegative democracy. Journal of Democracy 5(1), pp. 55-69.

Packenham, Robert A. 1979. Legislatures and political development. In Allan Kornberg and Lloyd D. Musolf (eds.), Legislatures in developmental prospective, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Schachter, Ruth. 1961. Single-party systems in West Africa. The American Political Science Review LV (2), pp. 294-307.

Skocpol, Theda. 1982. Rentier State and Shi’a Islam in the Iranian revolution. Theory and Society 11 (3), pp. 265-283.

Weinbaum, Marvin G. 1977. The legislator as intermediary: Integration of the center and periphery in Afghanistan. In Albert Eldridge (ed.), Legislatures in plural societies. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Weissberg, Robert. 1978. Collective versus dyadic representation in congress. American Political Science Review 72(2), pp. 535-547.

* PhD Student, Dept. of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, USA. E-mail: mwthompson@wustl.edu

Back| Next | Content| Top| Main