China’s presence in Africa is growing exponentially yet has been largely ignored by many observers. This is curious because, if trends continue within the next few years China is going to become a major player on the continent and one that is likely to increasingly both threaten traditional Western interests and offer an alternative reading of democracy and human rights that may not benefit the average African. Growing Chinese activity on the continent is thus something which should not be overlooked or viewed with unconcern.

Certainly, China’s economic involvement in Africa is increasing massively. Since 2000 more than 40 agreements have been signed between Beijing and African countries and trade doubled to more than $20 billion between 2000 and the end of 2004. In fact, by the end of 2005 China is widely expected to emerge as Africa’s third most important trading partner after the United States and France and ahead of the United Kingdom. This is a remarkable development given the pace and time frame within which this has occurred.

Beijing’s economic interest in Africa is based on three assumptions. Firstly, Beijing asserts that the macroeconomic situation in Africa is taking a favourable turn. This analysis is based on the belief that African countries have adopted a set of active measures to push forward the pace of privatisation, open up international trade, and reform their economies. China believes this affords great opportunities to Chinese companies. Secondly, Chinese manufacturers and shopkeepers believe that the types of goods which they produce and sell have immense potential in Africa. They believe that the economy in Africa is not yet as developed as in Western nations’ and thus consumers are more receptive to the type of inexpensive products that China typically produces. Thirdly, Africa is perceived by both the Chinese government and by Chinese companies to be rich in natural resources, particularly in crude oil, non-ferrous metals and fisheries.

Indeed, China’s rapidly developing oil requirements have helped propel Sino-African trade in recent years. In 1993, China became a net importer of oil and it is projected to rely on imports for forty-five per cent of its oil use by 2010. As a result, China has been faithfully developing linkages with oil-rich countries in Africa, such as Angola, Nigeria and Sudan. Since around 1995 China has pursued an “outward-looking oil economy” policy. This is for primarily economic reasons as the average production cost of Chinese onshore oil is comparatively very expensive compared to African or Middle Eastern oil. As a result, Chinese oil companies now have a presence in places as diverse as Canada, Peru and Sudan. One way by which this policy has been cemented is to use what China refers to as “special relationships”. Arms sales are one part of this policy, which also help offset costs.

Economic interest in Africa has also been manifested through increased amounts of joint ventures, Chinese investment and economic interaction. An emphasis on trade and economic affairs now dominates Sino-African interaction. Although China’s trade with Africa amounts to around forty per cent of Sino-American trade, it is growing speedily. Traditionally, Sino-African trade has been vastly unbalanced in China’s favour, but recently Africa’s exports have begun to pick up (due almost entirely to oil exports). However, it is important to remember that with the exception of oil exports, Sino-African trade is still very lopsided in favour of Chinese exporters, who are flooding African markets with cheap household products of poor quality. Such imports into Africa most certainly help China’s trade development but do little to encourage indigenous African manufacturing. This somewhat negative aspect of the relationship is arguably worsened by China’s willy-nilly sale of arms to the continent. China is currently the world’s fifth-largest arms exporter and the Chinese government hopes to turn the country’s arms industry into a top global player by 2020. As part of this goal, China is an increasingly important exporter of weapons to Africa. This has not only taken on the guise of providing military supplies and weaponry to the continent but has also involved an active participation in actual conflicts. Remarkably, such involvement has passed by with relatively little international attention.

The classic example of Beijing’s weapons exporting policy in Africa is China’s involvement in Sudan’s long-running civil war, a war which has claimed nearly two million lives so far. Chinese actors have pursued a policy that is entirely based on narrow economic interests and have been keen to supply the Sudanese government with fighter aircraft and an assortment of weaponry. Apart from the profits accrued from these arms sales, the policy helps consolidate and protect Chinese shares in the exploitation of Sudan’s oil reserves. Reliable reports reveal that Sudan has obtained thirty-four new fighter jets from China, and that the Sudan Air Force is equipped with $100 million worth of Shenyang fighter planes, including a dozen supersonic F-7 jets.

The motivation for such supplies is obvious. The state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) owns the largest share (i.e. forty per cent) in Sudan’s largest oil venture. The Sino-Sudanese oilfield project covers 50,000 square miles in the southern non-Muslim region of the country and is expected to produce 15 million tons of crude oil annually. With proven reserves of 220 million tons, the project is amongst the largest China has undertaken overseas. At the same time, Sudanese government forces, armed with Chinese weapons, have used Chinese facilities as a base from which to attack and dislodge southerners in the vicinity of the new oil fields. China, for its part, has cynically deployed its “alternative” reading of human rights to block the United Nations’ action in the country and has consistently opposed any intervention by the United Nations with regard to affairs in Sudan, including the latest violence in Darfur.

China has also provided military training in Equatorial Guinea for equipment that the host country does not even posses. Chinese specialists in heavy military equipment have been sent to the country, presumably in order to sell such weapons to Equatorial Guinea in exchange for oil. Over a three-month period, ending in November 2000, Chinese trainers worked with the local army. Yet Equatorial Guinea has no heavy weaponry. The only guess that one may make is that Chinese arms exporters want to introduce such weaponry to Equatorial Guinea in exchange for either oil concessions or hard currency. This fits with China’s broad economic ambitions in Africa, i.e. profits and oil supplies. Equatorial Guinea appears to be the perfect customer: climbing oil prices have granted the country extra finances and, possibly concerned to defend their oil wells from Nigeria and Cameroon, Malabo has turned to China for military weapons and training.

In other parts of Africa China plays a leading role in the provision of weaponry, often during times of conflict. For instance, whilst Ethiopia and Eritrea were edging towards war, Chinese corporations transferred a substantial share of US$1 billion in weapons dispatched to both countries between 1998 and 2000. In 1995 a Chinese ship carrying 152 tonnes of ammunition and light weapons was refused permission to unload in Tanzania as the cargo was destined for the Tutsi-dominated army of Burundi. And at least thirteen covert shipments of weapons by China were delivered to Dar-es-Salaam, with the final destinations mislabelled and the weapons disguised as agricultural equipment. These were almost certainly destined for the war-torn Great Lakes region.

Turning to politics, a key aspect of China’s policies towards the continent which attracts certain African leaders’ support is its stance on “non-interference in domestic affairs”. Beijing consistently casts talk of democracy and human rights as a tool of neo-imperialism and demands that internal matters remain outside of the concern of external actors. Central to this is the assertion by China that all countries have the right to choose their own definition of human rights. Beijing has gone so far as to state that good governance conditionalities, which include discussion of democracy and human rights, constitute a violation of the human rights of the receiving country. It is axiomatic that such a stance grants the rulers of each country the right to decide what are or what are not “human rights” and also, how such rights should be protected (or not, as the case may be). Furthermore, China rarely attaches any political strings to its assistance to Africa and is largely unconcerned about democracy or civil liberties in the countries where it does business. This has opened up space for China to deal quite profitably with some of the more heinous regimes on the continent. It is no coincidence for example that Sudan and Zimbabwe now play host to a very large Chinese economic presence. In short, by advancing the theme of non-interference in domestic affairs and promoting a culturally relativist notion of human rights, China has been able to appeal to numerous African leaders. At the same time it secures African support for Beijing whenever China’s own human rights record is put under the spotlight in forums such as the United Nations.

What benefits might Africa expect from Chinese expansion on the continent? Firstly, it is doubtful whether a more active Chinese trade policy towards the continent will help African countries in the long-term. Simply put, for many countries on the continent the greatest barrier to trade is the fact that they just don’t have much other than oil to sell to China. From China’s perspective, much of Africa’s primary commodities can be sourced cheaper from within Asia. Equally problematic however is China’s casual stance towards arms sales to Africa. There is a very real danger that Beijing’s supposed “non-political” stance merely masks its bottom line: the chase for profits and oil. Unmoved by ideological concerns and without fear of political consequences, the Chinese government seems willing to both fuel a small arms race in Africa and cosy up to discredited autocratic regimes as a means to generate profits. Unlike virtually any other power involved in Africa, China has no civil society worth talking about that might protest against such initiatives. Curiously, Beijing does not seem to realise that political instability and a lack of accountability sabotage the long-term possibilities of a sustained Sino-African partnership. For such reasons, China’s expansion into the African continent needs to be watched closely, if not with growing concern.

* University of Stellenbosch, South Africa/Mbarara University of Science and Technology, Uganda