Previous| Next | Content| Main |Home 

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development: Prospects and Challenge

Dejene Aredo*

1. Introduction

African economies, in general, have been performing badly over the years. According to the ECA's Report of 2003, economic growth in Africa has gone down from 4 to 3 percent in 2001 to 3 to 2 percent in 2002. All but five of the 53 countries in Africa are unable to meet the 7 percent annual growth of GDP required to meet the Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty by 2015.

The state of poverty and underdevelopment in Africa is alarming by any standards. It may take Africa south of the Sahara two generations to reach the average living standard it enjoyed in the mid-1970s. As a result of AIDS, the average life expectancy has fallen by 10 years in some countries. Access to public services in the region has dropped by 50 percent since 1980. The number of Africans living in extreme poverty (under US $ 1 per day) rose dramatically from 89.6 millions in the late 1960s to 233.5 million in the late 1990s (UNCTAD 2002; Development and Cooperation 1999; Ben-Ari 2002). Africa starts the 21st century as the poorest, the most technologically backward, the most debt distressed, and the most marginalized region in the world, in terms of trade, foreign investment, and technology. Moreover, its resources are drained off in the form of financial capital flight, loss of human capital, and through commercial logging and mineral exploitation.

Ever since independence, various initiatives have been launched to deal with Africa’s economic problems. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is another initiative launched in the context of the globalization process. This brief article attempts to undertake a review of the salient features of NEPAD with a view to appreciating the prospects and challenges for its implementation. The article argues that NEPAD is far from being what it claims to be. The article first presents an overview of NEPAD and then discusses major issues associated with its implementation.

2. An Overview of NEPAD

The origins of NEPAD can be traced to September 1999 when the Millennium African Recovery programme (MAP) was presented at OAU Extraordinary Summit held in Sirte, Libya. Since then, it has gone through, at least, 25 events, which are summarized, in table 1.

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which was initiated by South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Senegal, and Egypt (i.e., the largest economies in Africa and the ones relatively integrated into the global economy, except Senegal), is often interpreted by different people in different ways. According to its advocates, NEPAD is a holistic, comprehensive, integrated strategic framework for the socio-economic development of Africa. It is a plan that has been conceived and developed by African leaders. That is, it is African-owned. It is a comprehensive integrated development plan that addresses key social, economic and political priorities in a coherent and balanced manner. It is said to be a commitment of African leaders to accelerate the integration of the continent into the global economy. As such, it is said to be a framework for a new partnership with rest of the world.

Table 1. Dateline NEPAD

According to official documents, the goals of NEPAD are to: i) promote accelerated growth and sustainable development; ii) eradicate poverty; and iii) halt the marginalization of Africa in the globalization process. Among its specific objectives, NEPAD has envisaged: i) an average GDP growth rate of over 7 percent per annum over a period of 15 years; ii) increased investment from both domestic and foreign sources; and iii) promotion of sub-regional and continental economic integration. Regarding the last point, NEPAD attempts to ensure that there is capacity to accelerate implementation of major regional development cooperation agreements and projects already approved or in the pipeline. Another specific objective of the initiative is to ensure that there is capacity to lead negotiations on behalf of the continent on major development at a continental level.

One of the central elements of NEPAD is the creation of a peer-review process aimed at improving standards of human rights, economic management, conflict resolution and democratic decision-making on the continent. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), as it is called, is considered to be at “the heart of the initiative” (OECD & ADB 2002/2003,43). The APRM envisaged four types of reviews, namely i) base review, ii) periodic review, iii) country-requested review, and iv) crisis-induced review. According to OECD & ADB (2002/2003), a dozen African countries have volunteered to being subjected to review in the initial stage.

According to the donor community, the unique strength of NEPAD is that mandated (i.e., democratic) African leaders lead it. The new generation of leaders are expected to use their credibility and political weight to forge new paths or to unlock existing ones in achieving Africa’s “regeneration”.

The sectoral priorities of NEPAD include: infrastructure, information and communication technologies, human resource development (including the “reversal of the brain drain”), agriculture, environment, and culture. Industry is not mentioned as a priority. Resources for the priority sectors are expected to be mobilized from the capital flows initiative (i.e., increased domestic resource mobilization, debt relief, ODA reforms, private capital flows, and the “market access initiative” (such as production diversification, tourism, services, export promotion, etc.)

NEPAD was launched in 2001 with a view “towards finding a lasting solution” to the development challenges facing Africa (OECD & ADB 2002/2003, 42). The first meeting of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee, as mandated at the OAU Summit in Lusaka on 11th June 2001, was held in Abuja Nigeria on 23rd October 2001. The G8 countries, the major foreign partners, have pledged to increase their aid to Africa. A series of conferences and workshops have been held to launch NEPAD activities. Some of the activities included the following: 1) at a conference held in Dakar in April 2002, some 89 regional and transcontinental projects were discussed by representatives of the private sector; 2) the African Development Bank brought together experts to prepare a number of programmes in infrastructure and it organized a workshop for regional economic communities in Abidjan in June 2002; and 3) a number of other conferences and workshops have been organized to launch NEPAD. The initiative has given special attention to the African Peer Review Mechanism, which has entrusted the political responsibility (for the review) to the African Union (AU).

According to the official documents of NEPAD, the African Union (AU) is the political umbrella of NEPAD. It is clearly stated that NEPAD is a project of AU. The Implementation Committee of NEPAD has to report annually to the AU Summit. The AU Chair is an ex-officio member of the Implementation Committee of NEPAD. The AU Secretariat participates at steering committee meetings.

NEPAD is expected to be the socio-economic development blueprint for the AU to implement its objectives. Further, NEPAD has been envisaged as a mechanism for accelerating the implementation of the Abuja Treaty. But, in some respects, one may wonder why NEPAD attempts to undertake activities that should have been left to the AU or to other groupings, or movements. For example, it is not clear why NEPAD aspires to lead international negotiations on major development programmes on behalf of the continent. Is it not possible to leave the choice of representatives to African countries? In the current WTO negotiations, African countries are represented by Kenya and South Africa, which joined Brazil and India, the other two representatives of the Group of 77. NEPAD has put no mechanism in place to liaise with AU. In short, one may wonder whether NEPAD is there to undermine the AU.

NEPAD is said to be closely related to regional economic communities (RECs). The secretariats of RECs will participate in the NEPAD programme development through workshops and consultations. As stated elsewhere in this article, one of the objectives of NEPAD is the promotion of sub-regional and continental economic integration, but nowhere does NEPAD provide concrete and workable programmes to overcome the major problems encountered by African RECs. For example, one wonders how and from which source NEPAD will mobilize required funds for integration programs and how it could build capacities of RECs in mobilizing funds from external sources.

Discussion of Some Issues

NEPAD notes that many fine initiatives have been developed for Africa in the past (such as the Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty), but have failed due to three domestic reasons: i) timing; ii) a lack of capacity for implementation; and iii) a lack of genuine political will. But NEPAD fails to answer why these initiatives really failed. Africa’s initiative, the Lagos Plan of Action, failed largely because of strong resistance from the West and the sway of neo-liberalism since the early 1980s (Ake 1996).

NEPAD, consistent to its liberal views akin to those of the Bretton Woods institutions, blames domestic factors for the failure of all past initiatives. NEPAD is silent on the historical past of Africa and the challenges of the globalization process. NEPAD’s main concern is how to integrate Africa into the world economy. For NEPAD, the way to integration is to rectify domestic problems using the “credibility” and “political weight” of the new generation of leaders. Some of these leaders are already subjected to what Phoebe Griffith calls “globalized dependency”, a situation where “African governments are more accountable to the outside than to their own people” (Versi 2003). Globalization has already eroded national sovereignty in poor countries.

Interestingly enough, the sponsors of NEPAD themselves do question the “credibility” and “political weight” of most African leaders as indicated in one of recent publications of the agencies of globalization (OECD & ADB 2002/2003). Using the corruption Index of Transparency International (CITI) as a proxy for the stance of governance, it has been observed that only four countries (i.e., Namibia, Ghana, Cameroon and Tanzania), out of the 17 fully-rated African countries, are improving their governance stance. Even those countries that have initiated NEPAD are not among those improving their governance stance. Of the 17 fully-rated countries, seven have experienced an increase in corruption. There are still cases where “democracy is superficial and based on ethnic elections”. Thus, a joint publication of OECD and ADB (2002/2003,47) concludes that:

On the whole, African governments still need to work at improving issues related to the prevalence of corruption and bad economic governance. This is necessary not only to improve their image and, therefore, attract more foreign aid and capital, but also to enhance the credibility of their poverty-reduction programmes.

However, to the extent that Africa is concerned, solid evidence suggests, that foreign capital is not responsive to improved governance stance and liberalization. Two decades of liberalization have not saved Africa from being marginalized in the global economy. A UN body, the UNCTAD released its latest report that revealed that Africa received only 2 percent of the total FDI flows to developing countries. On the other hand, China, the only country in the world for which FDI flow increased in 2003, received more than 85 percent of all the FDI flows to developing countries (BBC news, 5th September 2003).

In their meeting in Kananaskis, Canada, members of the G8 Summit failed to make concrete and meaningful concessions on the key issues that affect North-South economic relations such as trade and debt (Graham 2002).

No doubt, NEPAD has been severely criticized and even rejected by civil society organizations, trade unions and some African scholars, who consider the initiative as something not different from other initiatives endorsed by the well-known forces of globalization. The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESREA) and the Third World Network-Africa criticized NEPAD for promoting “the inappropriate integration of our economies in the global order”. They perceived NEPAD as a “neo-liberal economic policy frame-work at the heart of the plan, which repeats the structural adjustment policy packages of the preceding two decades and overlooks the disastrous effects of those policies”. Also, the Organization of African Trade Unions complained that NEPAD seems to hinge heavily on neo-liberal perspectives. In a similar fashion, forty African civil society and human rights groups rejected NEPAD outright maintaining that it “accepts the fundamentals of the neo-liberal” framework underlying structural adjustment programmes. Similarly, the South African Council of Churches complained that “NEPAD’s vision is blurred by fixing its sights on increased global integration and rapid private sector development”.

In a large conference organized by a think tank body in South Africa, 300 participants concluded that “the NEPAD initiative was located within the Washington consensus and as a result was likely to perpetuate and reinforce the subjugation of Africa in the global system” (Graham 2002).

Advocates of NEPAD do admit that NEPAD envisages Africa’s greater integration into the global economy, but they point out that the initiative incorporates several elements that do not figure in structural adjustment programs. These include a strong role of the state in facilitating the development of infrastructure; the diversification of agricultural and industrial production; and greater regional integration within Africa. Regarding the last point, studies of integration arrangements in Africa have found no concrete mechanisms by which NEPAD can promote African economic communities.

Some civil society organizations view NEPAD’s references to human rights, democracy and good governance as largely rhetorical. They regard them as a declaration of principles put forth by some African political leadership accused of being part of the problem.

NEPAD has also been criticized for not paying enough attention to Africa’s problems of mobilizing financial resources for achieving the 7 percent growth rate required for meeting the Millennium Development Goal of halving the number of people living in poverty by 2015. NEPAD is not committed to mobilizing sufficient external resources for Africa’s development; it rather argues that African countries themselves should mobilize domestic resources to cover most of the annual resource gap (amounting to $64 billion) through increased export earnings and FDI and by reversing the direction of capital flight from Africa. But, no mechanisms are put in place to achieve these objectives. Similarly, NEPAD only mentions the need for reversing the brain drain from Africa, but provides no concrete mechanisms to implement it. Nor does the initiative have any concrete mechanisms (except AGOA and the like) to boost Africa’s export earnings by improving trade and agricultural policies of the North. Thus, Adesina (2002) notes that:

Precisely because it is donor-focused, NEPAD has not been able to address some important issues regarding trade regimes and policies when about 50 percent in net resource loss to Africa is trade-related.

Many African scholars have expressed their concern or rejection of NEPAD. In his short article, “Africa from Lagos Plan of Action to NEPAD” Adebayo Olukoshi (2002), Executive Director of CODESRIA, notes that NEPAD’s framework and the World Bank’s perspective almost represent a unified pole. Taylor (2002) goes further and defines NEPAD as a strategic choice designed by the West to defend world-wide neo-liberalism from an envisaged populist resistance as well as an essential acceptance of the ongoing world order. Similarly, Adesina (2002) notes that NEPAD adopts existing initiatives of the Bretton Woods institutions for poverty reduction.

Some scholars doubt whether NEPAD is actually “new”. For example, Kwasi Anymedu (2002) of Third World Network underlines that NEPAD is no way different from earlier development initiatives that failed to secure economic independence for Africa.

Regarding sectoral priority, NEPAD has been accused of neglecting agriculture, a sector that provides employment opportunities for the bulk of the people of sub-Saharan africa. For example, Moyo (2002) argues that NEPAD, by subscribing to the prescriptions of the Bretton Woods institutions, has paid limited attention to agriculture.

NEPAD, has also been criticized for not paying enough attention to the gender dimension of development. Thus, Randriamaro (2002) argues that NEPAD does not recognize the fact that gender inequalities mediate relationships between macroeconomic policies and poverty reduction strategies.

Can NEPAD harness the African Diaspora? Although, NEPAD recognizes the need to turn the brain drain into brain gain, it has not provided any concrete mechanisms to achieve this objective (Chikezie 2002).

Even these who laud NEPAD as a “home-grown initiative" of emense potential express their concern about its efficacy. For example, Mr. Omiar Kabbaj, president of African Development Bank who acclaimed NEPAD as “an important initiative that has a high potential to give new boost and direction to the development of African countries”, notes that “the initiative faces a number of challenges that would threaten its success” (Kabbaj 2003, 91). He identifies three areas of concern. His first concern is whether African leaders respect the economic and political ideals they have set. This is inspite of the availability of a monitoring system to be effected through the African Peer Review Mechanism.

His second concern is about the ownership of NEPAD, i.e., the extent to which the private sector and civil society organizations are involved in the design and implementation of NEPAD. No doubt, NEPAD, among other things, lacks popular support and participation. By adopting the top-down approach, NEPAD may remain a top-heavy creature standing on a lean support.

The third concern of the president of African Development Bank was about the credibility of the declared support of the international community. Kabbaj noted that “the success of NEPAD will depend on the degree to which the international community will continue to provide support to African countries” What is expected from the international community is to give more aid, provide meaningful debt relief, and allow improved market access for Africa’s exports. It is well-known that donors often fail to implement pledges they have already made, let alone make substantial pledges for Africa’s development.

Why the Group of 8 is so enthusiastic about NEPAD and not about previous African initiatives like the Lagos Plan of Action is, perhaps, because rich countries believe that NEPAD serves their own interests. In a seminar organized by Development Policy Management Forum, it was noted that the principles which were critical to all other initiatives of Africa were missing from NEPAD. These are: i) self-reliance, ii) the goal of economic equality, iii) strong role for the public sector, and iv) the struggle for a new international economic order (DPMF & EIIPD 2002)

4. Concluding Remarks

The basic issues about the prospects of NEPAD boil down to three questions: i) whether it is new; ii) whether it is a genuine partnership between Africa and the North; and iii) whether it can bring about a “lasting solution” to Africa’s problems of development. The answers to these questions depend on the implicit assumptions that NEPAD makes. These are i) globalization provides Africa with unprecedented opportunities; ii) liberalization is a panacea for the ills of African economies; iii) the West always knows what is good for Africa; and iv) the crises of African economies are almost wholly explained by internal factors. However, these assumptions are based on shaky foundations. Anyone familiar with the historical background, nature and content of African economies will be tempted to remark that NEPAD is not much different from a host of past initiatives, except that it provides a potential framework to discipline African leaders. Today, one major obsession of the West is to find ways to prevent African leaders from reversing the donor-imposed policies of economic liberalization. No doubt, NEPAD is conceived to “lock in” policy reforms and to further contain any sorts of non-compliance with structural adjustment policies.

“Partnership” between the West and Africa, which began with the slave trade, has taken different forms over the decades, including direct colonialism and neocolonialism. Every student of African history (and economy) knows what past “partnership” with the West has meant for the continent. NEPAD has not provided any convincing evidence that it is a different and genuine type of partnership worked out to regenerate African economies. Thus, NEPAD is unlikely to substantially reverse the current trends in African economies and save the continent from being marginalized in the world economy.

Therefore, NEPAD has to reassess itself and be sensitive to the needs of the African People. In particular, it has to redefine its relationship with the African Union (AU).

References

Adesina, J. 2002. NEPAD, the post-Washington consensus. African Agenda 5, no. 2 & 3.

Ake, C. 1996. Democracy and development in Africa. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd.

Ben-Ari, N. 2002. Poverty is worsening in Africa LCDs. Africa Recovery 16, no. 2 & 3.

Chikezie, C.E. 2002. Can NEPAD harness the African Diaspora’s resources? African Agenda 5, no. 2 & 3.

Development Policy Management Forum and Ethiopian Internal Institute for Peace and Development (DPMF & EIIPD). A Conference on Ethiopian National Development within the Framework of NEPAD, held on 15th July 2002, Sheraton Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Graham Y. 2002. From liberation into NEPAD. African Agenda 5, no. 2 & 3.

Kabbaj, O. 2003. The challenge of African development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Keet, D. 2002. NEPAD: Regional or global integration of Africa? African Agenda 5, no. 2 & 3.

Moyo, S. 2002. NEPAD’S agricultural strategy further erodes state intervention. African Agenda 5, no. 2 & 3.

Olukoshi, A. 2002. Africa from Lagos Plan of Action to NEPAD. African Agenda 5, no. 2 & 3.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and African Development Bank. 2002/2003. African economic outlook. Paris: OECD.

Randriamaro, Z. 2002. NEPAD and women’s poverty. African Agenda 5, no. 2 & 3.

Taylor, l. 2002. NEPAD: Towards the African century or another false start? African Agenda 5, no. 2 & 3.

UN Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD. 2002. Least developed countries. New York: United Nations.

Versi, A. 2003. Who Rules Africa? African Business, no. 290 (Aug/Sept).

Back| Next | Content| Top| Main