“The more things change the more they remain the same” claims an old French proverb; and as cliché as this phrase is, I believe it captures best the nature of development as it has been experienced by the so called “underdeveloped” world. In fact I believe this phrase also demystifies the nature of development as a social reality. Although “development” as a concept and a social reality is over a half a century old, on the ground I maintain that there is little that has changed for the intended beneficiaries, i.e. the “underdeveloped” world. I will present a critical evaluation of the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and thereby demonstrate a number of points. The first of the eight goals, which is the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, will be given especial attention, with an outline of the historical and current experiences of South Africa with development to contextualize the process of social transformation. The term “Development” is put in inverted commas to indicate the illusive nature of the concept, which Ferguson (1990), Esteva (1992) and other authoritative voices have declared difficult to define.

The main argument this paper makes is that, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals sound good and necessary. But owing to the unjust means of administration and the dubious reputation of the “development” industry as well as the world’s experiences with social change, the MDGs suffer from too many pitfalls, which could make them repeat the Development Decades and Health for All by the Year 2000 and other failed programmes.

The MDGs were formulated from the Millennium Declaration and put together in September 2000, by the international heads of state (http://www.undp.org/mdg/abcs.html). The Millennium Development Goals are seen as a strategy towards implementing the Millennium Declaration and most of these goals are set for 2015, with 1990 having been set as the benchmark. There are eight MDGs altogether which are listed below as they appear on the UNDP Website: http://www.undp.org/mdg/abcs.html.

1. Eradicating Extreme Poverty and Hunger

Target for 2015: Halve the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day and those who suffer from hunger.

More than a billion people still live on less than US$1 a day: sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and parts of Europe and Central Asia are falling short of the poverty target.

2. Achieve Universal Primary Education

Target for 2015: Ensure that all boys and girls complete primary school.

As many as 113 million children do not attend school, but the target is within reach. India, for example, should have 95 per cent of its children in school by 2005.

3. Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women

Targets for 2005 and 2015: Eliminate gender disparities in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015.

Two-thirds of illiterates are women, and the rate of employment among women is two-thirds that of men. The proportion of seats in parliaments held by women is increasing, reaching about one third in Argentina, Mozambique and South Africa.

4. Reduce Child Mortality

Target for 2015: Reduce by two-thirds the mortality rate among children under five

Every year nearly 11 million young children die before their fifth birthday, mainly from preventable illnesses, but that number is down from 15 million in 1980.

5. Improve Maternal Health

Target for 2015: Reduce by three-quarters the ratio of women dying in childbirth.

In the developing world, the risk of dying in childbirth is one in 48, but virtually all countries now have safe motherhood programmes.

6. Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases

Target for 2015: Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.

Forty million people are living with HIV, including five million newly infected in 2001. Countries like Brazil, Senegal, Thailand and Uganda have shown that the spread of HIV can be stemmed.

7. Ensure Environmental Sustainability

Targets:

More than one billion people lack access to safe drinking water and more than two billion lack sanitation. During the 1990s, however, nearly one billion people gained access to safe water and the same number to sanitation.

8. Develop a Global Partnership for Development

Targets:

One of the strong points of the MDGs is the fact that they acknowledge the importance of the context within which “development” takes place and has been happening in the past. This is indicated by the recognition that if the MDGs are to be realised the global economic playing field first needs to be levelled. Thus trade barriers need to be reduced or removed; the free movement of goods and services should be promoted, and the debt problem burdening the “underdeveloped” world and preventing poor countries from investing in education, health and social services should be lifted if the MDGs are to be achieved (http://www.undp.org/mdg/abcs.html). These global exigencies have often been highlighted as some of the major reasons “development” programmes fail in the “underdeveloped” world. Esteva (1992; 22) argues along the same lines that, “…even those still convinced that development goals [here not referring to the MDGs] are pertinent ideals for the so-called underdeveloped should honestly recognize the present structural impossibilities for the universal materialization of such goals”. Elaborating on this Esteva (1992, 11) argues that underdevelopment is believed to be caused by internal and external factors, such as terms of trade, unequal exchange, dependency, protectionism, imperfections of the market, corruption, and lack of democracy or entrepreneurship.

Many studies by various scholars have shown how the powerful countries have utilised the “development” industry using such forces, for their benefit at the expense of the “underdeveloped” world, the Latin American dependencia theorists and African followers of Walter Rodney and Samir Amin being the main examples. It has even been suggested that the aid industry, which is one of the central forces in the field of “development” was set up for such purposes (Ferguson 1990, 11). Even today there are still those who suggest the sudden debt cancellation for certain African (Highly Indebted Poor) countries has not been decided without consideration of advantages to the EU and the United States (http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/). Sanjay Suri (ibid) puts this point more clearly saying that, “when you write off the debts of the poorest countries, you enable them to that extent to buy agricultural produce from the EU and the U.S”. So if the United Nations was aware of these facts, and did really wish to change them, then the MDGs stand a chance to benefit everyone, both the “developed” and the “underdeveloped” world, instead of just a few. Unless this is done, how can we possibly expect success?

Although the UN plans outlined in the previous paragraph; all sound good and promising, one can only wonder whether it is not too good to be true. The road to hell, we are told, is paved with good intentions similar to the MDGs; that is where many poor countries debt burdens came from, previous attempts to achieve “development”.

The “developed” countries are well known for monopolising the decision-making in global institutions such as the UN, in such a way that such institutions work for the benefit of the “developed” countries to the detriment of the “underdeveloped” countries. Thus, some authorities have argued that even the good intentions of the powerful Western nations, committing themselves to developing Africa in order to make poverty history, should be treated with caution. To all intents and purposes it may well be a strategy for the “developed” world to expand the market for their goods, financial services and development expertise (http://www.sarpn.org.za/newsflash.php#3166).

Furthermore, when the “developed” countries fail to influence the decision making in these institutions, they tend to undermine the very authority of such institutions. A good example would be the United States’ unilateralism over the war on Iraq and Afghanistan, which not only showed great disrespect for the UN system and international law but may have unleashed political and economic repercussions which America could not control (hence the belated attempt to obtain Syrian and Iranian help in pacifying Iraq) and also affect many innocent countries. Therefore it would not hurt for the so called “underdeveloped” countries to be careful not to be used as mere stepping stones by the “developed” countries through the abuse of the international institutions they control. It is about time African countries in particular worked out their own ways of attaining a better life for all their citizens and not believe that the poor Africa will always be with us. After all, demographers suggest that the European donor will not always be there to help.

The UN system does not seem to realise that context is not the only significant aspect to be considered for the successful implementation of the MDGs. Implementation strategies of any “development” project in general are also significant, as they tend to determine the outcomes. This point is highlighted by Budlender (2000; 138) who noted that for South Africa’s local development strategy, the problem is not that the funds are not available (which is often the case for “development” funding in the “underdeveloped” world) but that the “implementation is patchy” in relation to the development of the health care, education, policy and welfare services. Similarly, though the UN might have all the plans on paper, if implementation is left to the proven dysfunctional development industry, then the plans are not likely to succeed.

The MDGs reek of “development discourse” even from the title. This could present a very serious challenge for the success of the goals, as “development” has managed to earn itself, or some people have managed to award it a very negative reputation in the world. This is more especially so with the so called “underdeveloped” world and a number of academics sympathizing with the “underdeveloped” world’s “development” predicament. One of the major challenges could be resistance to another invasion by “development.” The “redevelopment” strategies that were implemented in the “underdeveloped” nations in the early 1990s offer a good example as they were seen as launching of an assault against the resistance that development and economy were facing in the South (Esteva 1992; 16). Such resistance can also be seen from the general attitudes to “sustainable development”. Some authors view it as an attempt to maintain “development” after it has been uncovered as the main cause of “underdevelopment”, rather than a strategy to preserve the world’s diversity for the future generation, which is the mainstream interpretation of it (Esteva 1992; 16). Thus the MDGs can be seen as a strategy to push “development” into the corners of the “underdeveloped” world, which have been resisting it, or have uncovered its hidden agendas and now are trying to resist it. [Editor’s Note: see the next article on fragile states for a discussion of the idea that if donors find them difficult to work with then states are by definition fragile]

“Development” has a track record of a series of failed interventions and unexpected outcomes which should warn us not to take the MDGs at face value. The 1960s were the UN’s first Development Decade and they coincided with independence for many African countries, economic nationalism and advice from World Bank economists that nationalising the commanding heights of the economy was all right. Political scientists of the modernisation school argued that military dictatorships were fine as long as the officer corps constituted a modernising elite and it was okay to set up soda pop bottling factories as this was import substitution industrialisation and essential for modernisation. The 1970s were meant to be the second decade of development (Esteva 1992; 14) but they turned out to be dominated by oil prices and rising debt. African countries have still not recovered from the two development decades where the leaderships allowed others to do the strategising for them. The Lagos Plan of Action gathers dust on government shelves and a similar fate may befall the NEPAD strategy as Mr Tony Blair’s African initiative steals the thunder from local attempts to create a better life for all and reinforces the view that only Europe can transform Africa. Four hundred years and still waiting!

It should be obvious by now that “development” is not something you do with your eyes closed and African governments really ought to do more to take responsibility for charting the way ahead and mobilising the local resources to achieve the future.

The 1970s also saw the collapse of import substitution industries which had relied on imported technology, raw materials and even factory managers. The resulting mass unemployment of both labour and capital saw the ILO borrow Keith Hart’s notion of the informal economy and turn it into a panacea for unemployment. The 1975 Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, which then led to the conference on Employment, Income Distribution and Social Progress in 1976, tried to provide answers to the new challenges (Esteva 1992; 16). These strategies were followed by a continuous stream of concept papers and new approaches as the economists bombarded the politicians with new ways of doing the usual work of making ends meet. Thus sustainable development in the 1990s, which came out at the same time as the publication of the UNDP’s first Human Development Report in 1990 (ibid).

The MDGs are the latest “development” strategy to have been formulated. The work of Esteva (1992; 22) attests to the point, as he argues that the development metaphor opened up a new field of knowledge and for a while gave scientists something to believe in. After some decades, it is clear that this field of knowledge is mined. Esteva argues that neither in nature nor in society do we find evidence of evolution and transformation towards “ever more perfect forms” because real life is notorious for throwing surprises and laying booby-traps that have so far prevented modernising man from becoming God. Engineers, more than economists have always been aware and warned of the limits to growth and now with the threat of irreversible climate change looming large in everybody’s nightmares, “development” does not sound so grand after all. So why are we still committed to implementing “development” in the form of the 2015 MDGs?

One reason could be that the MDGs appear like a change of strategy in approaching “development”. The MDGs entail for one thing focus on outcomes rather than inputs that go into the “development” programmes” (http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/MDG/homePages.do). The UN also plans to focus more on partnership based “development” interventions (http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/MDG/homePages.do). These new approaches serve as a sign that the UN experts have realized that “development” has so far failed to deliver and in this sense the new MDGs are thus an admission of previous failures.

“Development” has not only been defined by failure, it has also been struggling with progress, meaning solving the problems that it aims to solve and moving on to tackle new challenges. The issues that are listed in the MDGs indicate that “development” has not made any significant progress, as they reflect more or less the same issues that “development” has been grappling with in the past, that is, if it ever aimed to change or challenge such issues at all. All these approaches (listed in the paragraph focusing on the failure of development) had human-centred development and basic needs-approach as their main objectives, which is more or less the same for the MDGs.’ This is more so for the 1976 approach, which (as with the MDGs) was planned to be universally applicable but also country specific (Esteva 1992; 15).

Ferguson ( 1990; 16) argues that “development” does not bring about any improvement in the lives of the poor, and I see “development”, as a process that has been addressing poverty for many years, working on poverty with the same people, the “underdeveloped” countries and yet the problem of poverty getting worse. Admittedly there are World Bank reports that concede that this failure was only in Africa and only in fragile states resisting structural adjustment. But what cannot be doubted is that although the resources exist to make poverty history, this has so far not been achieved.

May (2000; 7) makes a similar point when stating that poverty has been the focus of “development” for so long that most people now believe that “development” is mainly about poverty (indeed “development” planning has now given way to poverty reduction strategising), which I believe spells lack of “progress” in “development”. This could pose a dangerous threat to the MDGs, as it would reflect on “development” as a failing and futile project, which would then lead to the MDGs, like the structural adjustment programmes, being doubted from the start and treated with suspicion as just so many more new bricks with which to pave the highway to hell.

According to the dependency school of thought, development and colonialism are the same, as they have led and perpetuated the “underdevelopment” of the “underdeveloped” world by the “developed” world for its “development” world Esteva (1992; 11). They base this on the idea that, on the one hand benefactors of slavery and colonialism are the same as those of development; whereas on the other hand the victims of slavery and colonialism are the same as those of “development”. (Escobar1990; 248). This is supported by Esteva (1992; 7), who argues that development is a process of manipulation, subordination and disempowerment of the people of the “underdeveloped” world for the benefit of the “developed” world. Thus, although these forms of social reality came at different times, they were planned to do the same thing, produce the same results. Will the MDGs repeat the process of exploitation of the South by the North or will they break the cycle and allow Brazil, China and India to join the ranks of the powerful countries? And where will that leave Africa? We cannot expect the UN to answer this question, it is up to the African leaders to make NEPAD and the renaissance work for them and their people.

The UN system played a major role in the professionalisation of “development” after the Second World War (Escobar 1990; 431) and today the UN professionals have created the MDGs together with other professionals in World Bank, the IMF, the OECD, and other specialized “development” agencies (http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/MDG/homePages.do).

One major fault of development discourse is the tendency to try and de-politicise social transformation and reduce it to a mathematical formula. There are gross injustices in the world economy today, not just low incomes. Jeffery Sacks’s 2007 BBC Reith Lectures have revealed just how chaotic, unconvincing and partisan the business of development is and emphasised that one would have to be very naïve to expect the MDGs to be implemented by disinterested technocrats. Development has always been about power and politics and selfish group interests.

We can already see that the MDGs seem to perpetuate and strengthen the North-South unequal power relations, as the poor countries are expected to rely on additional support from the rich countries (http://www.undp.org/mdg/abcs.html). No attempt has been made to theorise a self-reliant Africa, not even by NEPAD for example, the crucial role is reserved for the northern donors and the horse-rider partnership. This is very problematic because we know that precisely such support, being conditional and non-negotiable, got many countries entangled in endless debt thereby actually perpetuating colonial domination. Is it not strange that Africa’s salvation should be dependent entirely upon foreign aid, foreign markets, foreign experts and foreign “development” concepts?

That is why it is often argued that “development” is a strategy of spreading Western capitalism through out the world. Such an argument is based on the idea that “development” is essentially Eurocentric in nature; anything that comes under the name of “development” is an attempt to “Westernize” the world for the benefit of the “developed” world, thus it is a Western assumption (Esteva 1992; 11). As if the whole of humanity cannot offer an alternative, development persists in following only a capitalist logic (Ferguson 1990; 11) to the detriment of the majority. Escobar (1990; 146) quotes Sachs (1992, 2) who highlights the same point, that development is a strategy which offers the world a thinly veiled Westernization, which is misguiding the “underdeveloped” world. The MDGs are thus good intentions but the method by which they will be achieved is one that has in the past delivered much misery. It is not too late to re-think, though judging by the enthusiasm the global market has for the Western way of life, only climate change and the threat of imminent global disaster may yet force the redefinition of “development”.

Escobar (1988; 439) is critical of “development” mainly rejecting it on the basis of its narrow economic focus, at the expense of ecological, peace-related, women and gender issues or the rights of indigenous peoples. We should do more to promote the use of local knowledge (Escobar 1988; 439) than the MDGs have shown, focused as they are on combating the economic problem of poverty which in the MDGs is defined in monetary terms (http://millennuimindicators.un.org/unsd/mi/teachgroup/goals_2004/Goals):

The economy-focused understanding of poverty in the MDGs could be one of their hazardous weaknesses. Such an understanding of poverty is obviously too shallow. Chambers, (1985; 185) suggests that such a definition is “reductionist in nature, as this single-entity socio-economic indicator is often the most inaccurate, due to the fact that [it] simplifies what is complex and varied because what is measurable and measured then becomes what is real, standardizing the diverse and excluding the divergent.”

The Cape Metropolitan Council (1998) similarly states that poverty is more than a lack of income. Poverty exists when individual’s or households’ access to income, jobs or infrastructure is inadequate or insufficiently unequal so as to prohibit full access to opportunities.

Esteva (1992; 12) makes the same point when arguing that, understanding development as a simple increase of income per person in the economically underdeveloped areas is to hold a reductionist perception, as it ignores the social components. The author also elaborates on this, arguing that “after the failure of the First Decade of Development by the UN, it proved that economic growth does not lead to “development”, which then required a change in approach for the following decade”. Hulme and Slipeherd (2003) argue along the same lines that: a clear understanding of poverty can be formulated from a more nuance understanding of poverty dynamics based on disaggregating the poor and recognizing a heterogeneous group of people experiencing different types and depths of poverty.

According to Wilson and Ramphela (1989;14), poverty has different faces, which could have different root causes, thus requiring one to be sensitive in their treatment of poverty, as it is not always clear and easy to differentiate between the signs and the root causes of poverty, due to the complex relationship that exists between the causes and effects of poverty, which then makes it difficult to draw a clear picture of the state of poverty. Sen (1981; 20) clarifies this point by suggesting that:

Wilson and Ramphela (1989;16) also refers to the work of Beckerman (3, 10), arguing that it is pointless to keep measuring poverty, when there are so many people that are living under the established standard. Esteva (1992; 18) also notes that “establishing economic values requires the disvaluing of all other forms of social existence, as skills turn to lacks, commons into resources, men and women into commodified labour, tradition into burden, wisdom into ignorance, autonomy into dependency”. With evidence like this, one is left with no choice but to believe that the UN professionals either did not do their homework very well, or they chose to ignore the real problem for the easy “development” options.

Tjonneland (1996; 2) shows just why it is important to avoid “one size fits all” approaches when he suggests that poverty is seen from different perspectives, because different measures of poverty highlight different ideas, thus using one measure and not the other would indicate a very specific way that one looks at poverty as well as the intentions of that particular person. To illustrates this point he suggests:

Thus all this goes to show that a universal definition would not be appropriate to capture the complex picture of poverty. A single definition would only highlight some situations at the expense of others, and in relation to the MDGs, this would only result in misleading definitions of the problem and inappropriate solutions.

The carelessness that is demonstrated by the UN’s definition of poverty could have far reaching impact in relation to the image of poverty around the world, as it would produce false pictures. As has already been noted “For the poorest countries many of the goals seem far out of reach. Even in better-off countries there may be regions or groups that lag behind. Countries need to set their own strategies and work, together with the global partners, to ensure that poor people are included in the benefits of development” (http://www.undp.org/mdg/abcs.html).

Although statements like these sound good as they reflect the fact that the UN considers the importance of context, as the different countries of the world are expected to use their own strategies to achieve the goals, I still believe that the fact that a list of goals has been drawn up as the main target for all suggests universal scientific criteria for defining “development”. And of course, all alternatives will be considered irrelevant to the UN sanctioned global agenda of “development” as the implementation of the MDGs. Such a conclusion is also supported by the fact that all the goals that are listed are problems that are burdening the “underdeveloped” world, as most of them have been achieved by the “developed” world. Thus with the MDGs we are seeing yet another strategy to force the rest of the world to follow the steps that the “developed” world has gone through to achieve its “developed” status. The “underdeveloped” world is obliged to commit to the ideals of the “developed” world. This approach has been criticized with the argument that it has negative implications, as for the underdeveloped, to escape the undesirable situation; they need to enslave themselves to the experiences, dreams (and nightmares) of others (Esteva 1992; 10).

Let me now outline the experiences of South Africa with “development” to demonstrate the points that this paper has made in relation to the MDGs’. It draws mainly on the historical and the current experiences of the country.

In this paper the pre 1994 period of South Africa’s history is treated as the period that constitutes the historical experiences of this country, and the post 1994 period is considered as the current history of the country. This break might be arbitrary, but it is based on the fact that a lot changed in South Africa in 1994, which affected all spheres of life in the country (Desai 2005:12). This then makes 1994 convenient to use as a break-off point. This break has been used with the acknowledgement of the fact that, all the changes that took place in South Africa in 1994 started to emerge a few years earlier, and the history of South Africa pre 1994 still has a strong effect on the post ’94 period (May 2000; 2) (Wilson and Ramphela 1989; 4, http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000795/index.php), as development in South Africa is still dictated by the effects of the policies of the past (Tjonneland 1996; 3).

The historical experiences of South Africa with “development” make a classic example of the way that “development” has been used by the “developed” nations to “develop” themselves at the expense of the “developing” nations, but on a micro scale. These include the creation of an “underdevelopment” of certain regions of the country and certain groups of people for the “development” of a select few. In the case of South Africa, the divide was along the lines of race, class and gender as the White people were more privileged at the expense of Black people, and women less privileged than men (Wilson and 1989; 25). Such a situation was created and sustained with the formulation of policies that were put in place to ensure the exploitation and “underdevelopment” of the Black people for the “development” of the White people. Evidence for this can be drawn from the fact that the colonial and the union government created policies that resulted in the creation of Black cheap labour for White owned mining companies and agriculture (May 2000; 2). This then was the result of state driven “underdevelopment”, as this creation of cheap labour entailed dispossession and exclusion of the majority of Black South Africans of certain resources that are necessary for “development” (Ibid). This process of underdevelopment, May argues, entailed a loss of assets, such as land and livestock, systematic denial of access to markets, and education and infrastructure development, which would have allowed the development of the assets that the Black people were dispossessed of . Therefore development in South Africa’s past was racialised, and almost 80% of he Black people in South Africa lived in poverty (Wilson and Ramphela 1989; 17). A similar thing happened throughout the colonial world creating a system of apartheid writ large. And so when the MDGs seek to bring about development, should they not first like South Africa try to end apartheid?

The historical situation of South Africa reflects a point made by Escobar (1988; 430) that development has been used as a form of exercising power over certain groups of people, as it was set up from the start to benefit the global elite and oppress the global poor, which then led to the creation of the developed and the underdeveloped. This then demonstrates the point that this paper makes, which is that, the historical experiences of South Africa are not any different from those of the “underdeveloped” world generally.

Thus although South Africa has become a democratic country, and to a certain extent the country’s experience of “development” is changing, it is still reflective of the country’s past. In working to change the face of “development” in South Africa, a number of programmes were created that focus on “development” which are specifically, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme. This section reviews the two programmes to give a clear picture of development experiences of post-apartheid South Africa, as they took centre stage in this country’s “development” endeavours.

RDP was a development plan that was constructed by the African National Congress, when it was still a national liberation movement, to combat the apartheid legacy of poverty for black citizens and bring about economy reconstruction and a better life for all as its main objectives (Tjonneland 1996; 5). As strategies for the promotion of this, five broad programmes were formed which included, the meeting of basic needs, upgrading human resources, strengthening the economy, democratizing the state and the society and making the state and the public sector more efficient” (Ibid).

Although this programme brought about the needed changes in the South African society in relation to education, health care, water and housing sector within its first 500 days, it fell short of its expected goals, as they were set by the ANC and noted by those observing (Tjonneland 1996; 5). The programme only managed to build about 11,000 houses, failed to curb unemployment, as the economic growth that the country showed was never accompanied by job creation (Ibid). Even the school feeding scheme that the programme had started never lasted, as corruption led to its suspension (Ibid). Looking at poverty in general, May (2000; 2) echoes the same message that, despite the fact that South Africa is considered as an upper-middle income country, most households in South Africa are poor or vulnerable to poverty and many have a very limited access to education, water and sanitation, energy and health care services. This shows that the RDP failed to deliver on its promises. The failure of the RDP is believed to have been caused by the ineffective fund expenditure available to the programme, as only 55% of the funds was spent (Tjonneland 1996; 6). So miserably did the RDP fail to deliver what was expected of it that its office was closed down in June 1996 (May 2000; 2).

Tjonneland (1996; 6) remarks that the RDP failed because the ANC and the new leadership took for granted the complexities involved in planning, implementation and administration of development programmes. He recommends the consent and participation of the community, and partnership with efficient public services, the private sector and the non-governmental organizations as the key to the success of development programmes.

Following the collapse of the RDP, the GEAR policy was formulated, with the same objectives as RDP but with a more neo-liberal [approach] (i.e. anti-socialist methodology and ideology (www.polity.orh.za/html/govdocs/policy/growth html). This strategy has also been criticised for not having created as much employment as it aimed and not increasing the labour markets to absorb the entrants (Desai). Hassen (2001) observes that “it is now widely acknowledged that the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) has, despite its name, failed in terms of economic growth, the creation of quality jobs and redistribution towards the poor”.

In 2003 another strategy aimed at addressing HRD, employment equity, enterprise development, preferential procurement and investment, ownership and control of enterprises and economic assets, was formulated under the name of Black Economic Empowerment (South African Year Book 2004/05; 182). The success of this strategy was planned to be measured by considering objectives, such as increase in the number of Black people who have ownership and control of existing and new enterprises, numbers of Black-empowered and Black-engendered enterprises as well as the number of Black people in executive and senior management positions (South African Year Book 2004/05; 182). Although, this strategy is being criticized by some authorities, it is not yet easy to evaluate its success as it is fairly new and still continuing.

The post-1994 period of South Africa also saw the formulation of Affirmative Action Policy aimed at ending the legacy of the past, which promoted unfair discrimination and division on the basis of race and gender, and virtually excluded people with disabilities. Affirmative action makes sure that qualified designated groups (black people, women and people with disabilities) have equal opportunities to get employed and make their contribution to society (http://www.labour.gov.za/basic_guides/bguide_display.jsp?id=5848), thus in this way rectifying the situation that was created by apartheid in the past.

Despite the fact that South Africa has recorded many impressive achievements since its transition to democracy in the past eleven years (National Human Development Report 2003), there are still major problems that this country is grappling with, such as poverty, inequality and unemployment, which are believed to have increased compared with the past (Desai http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001234/index.php). “People are still poor, whatever the type of measurement that is used, as people in urban areas still live in shacks, with poor water access and sanitation, the last problem being the same in the rural areas”. To support this point Desai (Ibid) presents good statistical evidence in relation to poverty that,

The poor remain as large a group as ever and that their experience of poverty is as suffused with suffering as in the past seems to be an intractable feature of post-liberation South Africa. The United Nations Development (UNDP) revealed in its 2004 report that the poverty rate in South Africa stood at 48%.¹⁰ The Taylor Commission reported a poverty rate of between 45 and 55%. Charles Meth holds that there were some 19.5 million people living below the poverty line in 2002, up from the 1997 figure of 17.2 million. Of these people somewhere between 7 and 15 million are living in utter destitution.¹¹ A government agency Statistics South Africa reports that households with less than R670 a month increased from 20% of the population in 1995 to 28% in 2000.¹²”

Furthermore to really prove that poverty and unemployment are serious problems, there is evidence that shows the increased levels of inequality in South Africa. As the Gini coefficient indicates South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world, that is, those that have data available (Desai http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001234/index.php).

The fact that South Africa is experiencing these problems, despite the policies and the development strategies that have been put in place, goes to show that there is a disconnection between development and ground results. This then really proves that South Africa is engaging on an unfavourable development growth path (Ibid), being that growth; however measures is not accompanied by reduction in unemployment and poverty (Tjonneland 1996; 5)

This could pose a potential threat to the achievement of the MDGs in South Africa. This is based on the fact that, if the local strategies of development are not as functional, considering the fact that the MDGs are to be incorporated in the local development strategies, in South Africa the MDGs could suffer that same fate.

Additionally, the people of South Africa have seen so many “development” projects failing, which then could lower their trust in “development” in the future. This could be a problem for the MDGs’, especially so in relation to implementation. In fact I believe the signs of this problem in South Africa are starting to show. Only 30% of the potential voter pitched for this country’s first democratic local government elections in 1995 (Tjonneland 1996; 8). Furthermore, currently South Africa has seen the general public taking to the streets, protesting against what they consider as slow service delivery. This could go the other way as well, being an advantage for the implementation of the MDGs’, as it implies that people would welcome “development”, seeing that they are demanding it at the moment.

Furthermore, I am certain that the policies that have been formed by South Africa in order to rectify the past inequalities, could lay the ground for the achievement of the MDGs’, as the people that were disadvantaged in the past will get a chance to “develop”. Such programmes could be used as channels for implementation of the goals.

To conclude, owing to the reputation of “development” around the world, especially in the “underdeveloped” world in general the MDGs may not be successful. The MDGs come under the burner of “development”, and “development” has been criticised too many times as a “Westernizing” and colonising crusade, the same as its predecessor, colonisation. It has been labelled as a continuation of colonialism; a process of domination fashioned to the benefit of the “developed” world at the expense of the “underdeveloped” world. Although, the MDGs aim to remove, or change the forces central in the “development” field, forces such as trade barriers, free trade of goods and services and the debt problem burdening the “underdeveloped” world, there is little confidence in these, as institutions such as the UN cannot be held accountable for their promises. This is based on the fact that such institutions are renown for being power channels for the “developed” world. That would also make MDGs suspicious as a strategy to subject the “underdeveloped world to the power of the “developed” world.

Furthermore, “development” tends to come as a set of goals to be achieved, which have been achieved by the “developed” nations, thus reinforcing an evolutionary, linear idea of “development, as the “underdeveloped” nations are expected to follow the path of the “developed” nations to “development”, in the process denying them a chance to “development” in their own terms. This could be reinforced by the fact that the “underdeveloped” nations are expected to rely on the “developed” nations for help, which would then mean that the “developed” nations would benefit more from the MDGs compared to the “underdeveloped” nations, as they would open opportunities for their experts.

Moreover, the historical track record of “development” is not so convincing that “development” can or really intends to “develop” those it promises to. There are so many “development” strategies that have been put in place but delivered less than expected. And on top of this these strategies have been dealing with the same problems over and over again, which then means that there is no progress in “development”, that is if any.

Another problem that could present an obstacle to the achievement of the goals is the fact that they are based on an economic approach to “development”. This can be seen from the way that poverty is defined, which is in monetary terms. Such understanding has been criticised so many times, as it draws a misguided picture of poverty. It has been declared homogenizing and reductionist, as it does not consider the different ways of being poor. Such a definition is also believed to be used by those who opt for easy options, as it makes it easy to measure poverty, but fails to draw a clear picture of poverty.

In relation to South Africa, the goals could be a success, as this country is working hard to rectify the historical situation, which has led to the “underdevelopment” of the majority of the country’s population. There are programmes such as the Black Economic Empowerment and Affirmative Action, which have been set up by the new democratic government to change the historical situation of racialised “development”.

The MDGs match the problems that South Africa is focusing on at the moment, which means that it would be easy to incorporate them into the local strategy of “development” as they were originally planned. The only problem, which could pose a threat in South Africa is the fact that, within the ten years of democracy, it has already had a series of “development” policies that have failed already, not delivering on their promises to the people at large. The criticised failure of strategies such as RDP and GEAR all took place in front of the people. In fact South Africa at the moment is faced with the problem of general public protesting against slow public service delivery. Although this could mean people loosing faith in “development”, it could also mean that people would welcome the MDGs as they are calling for “development” at the moment. Mostly these strategies are criticised for having poor implementation strategies, as they have led to a positive economic growth, a milestone for a new democracy in the “underdeveloped”, but such growth was not accompanied by reduction in poverty and unemployment. That would mean then that, without change of such strategies the goals could suffer the same fate. Therefore, with good implementation plans, and maintenance of good “development” strategies, the Millennium Development Goals could be positively achieved.

* Development Anthropologist, University of Cape Town, South Africa.