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Thabo Mbeki’s Conundrum: South Africa - Zimbabwe Foreign Policy Revisited
This paper focuses on President Mbeki’s foreign policy, and particularly on the apparent contradictions within that policy. Specifically, the paper examines the peace and security dimensions of the policy and the controversy it has generated both within and outside the country.
Various scholarly works have been devoted to South Africa’s (SA) foreign policy on Zimbabwe. Though the broad philosophy underlying Mbeki’s foreign policy is known, little attempt was, however, made to factor it in the analysis of the Zimbabwe political situation. As we revisit African Renaissance (AR) and the policy document of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad), the conundrum that is a hallmark of Mbeki’s foreign policy will become crystal clear.
Nepad is premised upon another important principle, that of human security. The latter informs and is the foundation on which the African Union itself is built. As we proceed with this analysis we will demonstrate how interconnected AR and Nepad are and how security is a critical element in the renewal of the African continent.
Having stripped the philosophy underlying SA - Zimbabwe foreign policy bare, including the contractions therein, what would be the way forward? What should be done? In the last part of the paper, a number of recommendations will be made to assist the current Administration out this policy cul de sac.
To facilitate a thorough understanding of the issue at hand, it is worthwhile to trace the contours of SA Foreign Policy from the 1980s to the present. In doing so, we will illustrate how personalities and leadership styles of successive regimes have fundamentally influenced the ebb and flow of policy.
The Apartheid Years
Apartheid South Africa had a lot in common with its northern neighbor, Rhodesia, as Zimbabwe was known then. Both had powerfully entrenched white minorities who unabashedly appropriated most of the wealth. Their institutionalized racism became a focus of sharp international attention after World War II.
As they came under increasing pressure to reform, both governments resorted to intense repression to thwart indigenous pro-independence movements. In SA the regime simply outlawed them, while in Rhodesia, Ian Smith opted for unilateral independence. Being effectively pariah states, they turned to each other for consolation. Thus, it was during this period that trade between these countries increased considerably. They also collaborated in the battlefield. Military cooperation became a defining characteristic of their relations. It was not uncommon to encounter their troops in respective war theatres. With superior wherewithal at their disposal, they invariably came tops out of most battles.
Observing this trend, it came as no surprise that the former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, issued the now infamous Resolution 55. Despite the fact that these regimes denied their people the most basic of human rights, the USA government, and Kissinger in particular, was willing to support and protect them at any cost. When it became clear that Ian Smith could not withstand the guerilla onslaught any longer, the apartheid regime changed its tactics and strategy completely. Whereas the Limpopo frontier had forestalled incursions into SA territory, the 1980 Zimbabwe independence stripped that protection away, and for good. Pressure on SA became immeasurable and intense. A more robust military strategy had to be found and executed. It was then that PW Botha came onto the scene.
Until resuming power in 1986, P. W. Botha had served as Defence Minister for many years. Therefore he had very intimate knowledge about how the military had fared in Rhodesia. Perhaps this made him realize the futility of a military strategy to a political problem, hence his Total Strategy.
Essentially the thrust of the Total Strategy was to turn SA neighbors into vassals, inevitably always at the beck and call of Pretoria. At this point PW mooted the creation of a Constellation of Southern African States (Consas) to institutionalize this idea. Through Consas, the South African leader was also hoping to foist upon his neighbors the Bantustans, some of which were, by now, claiming to be “independent states”.
To counteract this onslaught, the Southern African Development Coordination Committee (SADCC) was established. With Tanzania in the lead, another counterweight to Botha’s shenanigans became the semi-formal organization, the Frontline States (FLS). Whereas the SADCC focused mainly on coordinating regional economic (development) and political affairs, the latter was an incipient defense and security mechanism. Years later, the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS), a security/defense arm of the SADC, would be founded on the FLS invaluable experience.
These initiatives did not go down well with Pretoria. In fact the regime was being undermined considerably. Such self-assurance, confidence and strategic acumen by Southern African leaders ran counter to apartheid mythology. Subsequently, Botha unleashed an unwarranted military and political campaign in the region. In essence, the campaign was meant to undermine and reverse the national and collective achievements in the region. As a consequence, bridges were destroyed, rails blown up and human lives lost. Fear and insecurity became the order of the day.
As Pretoria’s destructive policies became strident, opposition inside the country became more vocal. On the international scene far-reaching political developments were taking place. Within a short period these would overwhelm the Botha regime and undermine its ideological grandstanding.
Commencing within the ruling party itself, notable fissures became apparent. It increasingly became clear that apartheid was no longer justifiable and tenable in the fast changing world. Unable to come to terms with this reality, Botha had to go. He was replaced by the more verlig FW de Klerk. Though he saw the writing on the wall, the new leader thought he would sweep back the political tide with a broom. Was he hoping for a kind of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia political settlement? Given the wanton violence and conduct of his government, it is not difficult to conclude that de Klerk was, to all intents and purposes, hoping for such an eventuality. This was evident during the constitutional talks at Kempton Park. In this regard one is reminded of how Nelson Mandela berated de Klerk, not once but twice. Nonetheless de Klerk set the stage for an eventual political settlement. In 1994 Mandela became the President of a new democratic South Africa.
By now Mandela was revered and looked upon as a living legend. Through him, South Africa became a toast in many international fora. This bestowed upon the country unsurpassed moral authority. SA was increasingly expected to champion the course of the downtrodden in general and human rights in particular. In fact these noble principles became the cornerstone of our democracy. They also became the foundation of our foreign policy. Before leaving this section, we need to briefly mention Mandela’s rather frosty relationship with President Robert Mugabe. In our opinion, this could explain Mbeki’s conundrum.
It would appear that of all the leaders in the region, Mugabe was the least fazed by Mandela’s legend and popularity. Matters came to a head over the deployment of the Organ for Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS) in the Congolese civilian war. As Chair of the SADC, Mandela assumed that he had the last word over this matter. Mugabe, Chair of the Organ, had a different opinion. At his behest, the SADC became embroiled in the Congolese fratricide. Consequently, Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe sent their respective troops to fight alongside the Laurent Kabila army. Though Mandela later somersaulted and endorsed Mugabe, the Organ was suspended. But it was only after a lengthy deliberation by a specially constituted Task Team that the Organ was reconfigured and placed under the direct command of the SADC Chair.
Thabo Mbeki and SA Foreign Policy
When he came to power in 1999, Thabo Mbeki pledged to build on the policies of his Party, the African National Congress. True to his word, he did exactly that. During his tenure as Deputy President, he had spoken repeatedly of the African Renaissance (AR). This eventually became the rallying cry of his Presidency. His foreign policy would also be premised upon the need to rebuild and rejuvenate the African continent. In his exhortation, the 21st century would become the African century.
For Mbeki (1999), AR in practical terms would mean “an African continent in which the people participate in systems of government in which they are truly able to determine their destiny”. In the same speech he further contended that “when elections are held, these must be truly democratic, resulting in governments which the people would accept as being genuinely representative of the will of the people” (Ibid). This exhortation resonated throughout the continent and found fertile ground in the corridors of the Organization for African Unity (OAU). When that body was reconstituted in 2002, its underlying principles, values and norms reflected and encapsulated much of what AR was aspiring for. Most importantly, the African Union (AU) signaled its intention to set aside some Westphalian practices. In this vein, the Constitutive Act boldly stipulated the “right of the Union to intervene in a Member state …in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”.
For the new leader, sound economic management would have to accompany good governance in the political front. Perceptively, Mbeki realized that economic prosperity could not take place in conditions of marked instability. Security is thus integral to economic growth. Subsequently, very early in his term, he devoted considerable time to what eventually became a continental macroeconomic blueprint, New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad).
Nepad and Security
Needless to say, Mbeki is one of the principal architects of Nepad. Not only his Economic Adviser chairs Nepad’s Interim Secretariat, but South Africa is also hosting that organ. From their experiences, African leaders proclaimed that “peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable development” (Nepad 2001, 16).
Security is not just conceived of in parochial traditional terms. It embraces all aspects: economic, political and social dimensions of individual, family and community, as well as local and national life (Matheba 2003, 7-8). In this broad definition, security should translate into individual citizens having untrammeled access to basic necessities, including political freedom. Economic growth and security are, in this sense, indivisible. An individual cannot have one without the other.
In a policy speech at the SA Institute of International Affairs in 2001, Minister N. Dlamini-Zuma not only reiterated that AR was the philosophy underpinning Mbeki’s foreign policy, but she went on to extol the virtue of taking pride in learning from the “dark side of our history”. It is out of this that we could learn valuable lessons. Our past, she contended, defines and shapes our present and future (2001, 22).
In that gathering in Johannesburg, the Director-General of Foreign Affairs laid bare the specific vision of his Department, and the government of Thabo Mbeki. Sipho Pityana (2001, 35) said that “South Africa shall strive for peace, stability, democracy and development in an African continent, which is non-sexist, prosperous and united, contributing towards a world that is just and equitable”. The mission of the Ministry, he stated, is to “promote South Africa’s national values, the African Renaissance and the creation of a better world for all”. Naturally, these profound words raised expectations.
Many thought that the work of the predecessor government would be preserved and enhanced. So far, the stalemate in Zimbabwe and his handling of the situation in Zimbabwe raises serious doubts on South Africa’s policy of quiet diplomacy. From that perspective, President Mbeki’s policy of quiet diplomacy has received vocal criticism from within and outside the country.
There are several possible reasons why Mbeki has decided to court huge criticism in defense of his Zimbabwean counterpart. These include among others:
The persona of President Mugabe;
Post - independence imperatives;
Black solidarity, and
The MDC challenge.
We will elaborate on each factor below.
The Persona of Mugabe
Mention has been made of how Mandela found Mugabe a difficult person to deal with. Their very public disagreement over the OPDS and the handling of the war in the DRC exemplified how uneasy and difficult their relationship was. Rupiya observed that the relationship between the two leaders was, at best, characterized by “tension” and at worse, by “brinkmanship and frustration” (2002, 167).
Until the advent of democracy in South Africa, Zimbabwe had been a leading economic power in the region. Being in the frontline, its leaders also enjoyed unprecedented power and prestige. Mugabe may have expected SA black leaders to give him recognition for his success at removing minority rule.
In Zimbabwe and other parts of the continent, there is a perception that white South Africans still hold the balance of power. In other words, SA has not really vanquished minority rule, thus a black government should not be taken seriously.
Realizing that the Zimbabwean leader cannot be turned around, Mbeki may have decided that the best way is to accommodate him as far as possible (Parsons 1999), and in the meantime, quietly goading him in the right direction. This seems to be the same position adopted by other regional leaders. Meanwhile, the political situation in Zimbabwe has deteriorated further and famine is now stalking most Zimbabweans. Formerly a breadbasket, Zimbabwe is now relying on food imports.
The Post- Independence Imperatives
From the point of view of the ruling party, ZANU-PF, the root cause of the current crisis is the land issue, particularly the transfer of the land to the formerly disadvantaged masses in that country. They blame Britain for not honoring the Lancaster Agreement. In the terms of that agreement, the United Kingdom was supposed to have availed funds to purchase land and redistribute it to the landless. After twenty years of independence most of the land was still held by a tiny minority of commercial farmers, a great majority of whom were nogal, absentee landlords. It is alleged that whites were also not willing to sell, and when they did, the price was inevitably exorbitant. Losing patience with the slow pace of land redistribution, Zanu-PF supporters took matters in to their own hands, and a sustained campaign of land-grabbing began. Having failed to address this legitimate problem timeously, Mugabe reacted opportunistically, and used it to tarnish his political opponents. These also happened to be fellow citizens complaining about the rapidly deteriorating economy and Zanu-PF misrule.
Those of us sitting on the sidelines are hard pressed and cannot rebut the argument that black Zimbabweans should have a stake in the economy of their country. As the most important element in this equation, the land cannot be isolated and treated separately. It is precisely for this reason that Mugabe has won the support of his counterparts in the region, the leaders of the SADC. For them, the Zimbabwean leader is delivering on one of the most vexing and key component of the post-independence mandate, the land.
Black Solidarity
The ANC believes in the collective approach or multilateralism to resolve international problems. To a large degree, opposition to the recent Iraqi war stems from that policy tradition. Mbeki has repeated this mantra on more than one occasion. Bitter experience in (and failure at) attempting to resolve African problems alone (as in the case of Abacha and Mobutu), weigh far too much for the SA government.
His support for Mugabe is informed by practical realities; for he realizes that without the backing of other African leaders, Nepad would not go anywhere (Bond 2002).
Though Mbeki has declared finding solace and comfort in the collective action, he has, more than any other leader, gone out of the way to protect Mugabe. It was only after his staunchest ally, President Obasanjo, had endorsed the decision that he accepted the decision that the Zimbabwean leader could not be invited to the Commonwealth conference in Abuja, Nigeria, next year. The last factor to consider is the threat of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) to the SA new ruling elite.
The MDC Challenge
MDC is the main opposition party in Zimbabwe. It is led by Morgan Tsvangirai, a former trade unionist.
Before his untimely death two years ago, Minister Tshwete made a startling claim on national television. He alleged that certain ANC leaders were harboring presidential ambitions. Though he apologized for this flippancy, Tshwete’s message had struck home, that Mbeki has little gumption about pretenders to his crown. Less publicized was how the ANC leadership berated and admonished certain trade union leaders. Like Ramaphosa, Sexwale and Phosa, Willie Madisha and other leaders of the Congress of SA Trade Unions (Cosatu) were said to be, just like Tsvangirai, were eyeing the highest office in the land. Though the claim could be spurious, for the SA ruling elite, however, there is a definite correlation in the political fortunes of the two countries. For now, formerly a trade union leader Tsvangirai, and his party epitomize Mugabe’s Waterloo.
Perhaps that explains why the ANC has not warmed to the MDC. Their encounters are not frequent, and when they take place, they usually are very low-key. Tsvangirai has not pretended otherwise. On numerous occasions, he has publicly (and viciously) attacked the ANC leader for his stance on Zimbabwe. “Quiet Diplomacy” has so far failed to bring Mugabe to the bargaining table with the opposition MDC. Given this scenario, what should be done? What is the best way forward? Before we come to some policy recommendations, we should explore and evaluate Quiet Diplomacy.
Quiet Diplomacy
Except for the analysis by Kuseni Dlamini (2003), in-depth scholarly work on the subject of Quiet Diplomacy by SA scholars is sparse and hard to come by. The principal architects of the policy have not shed much light on this matter either. For the SA government, quiet diplomacy happened to be one amongst several policy options open to it in as far as the Zimbabwe crisis is concerned. It reflects a combination of factors, amongst which is Mbeki’s penchant to avoid confrontation and, as much as possible, “fudge both issues and their solutions” (Parsons 1999, 99). This particular policy has generated a lot of public debate. Unfortunately, it has won the SA government few supporters and friends.
What is the rationale for Quite Diplomacy?
Several reasons have been given, principal among them being the view that Zimbabwe is a sovereign state. In this regard, South Africans are often reminded that Zimbabwe is not a tenth province of the Republic of South Africa. That being the case, SA has no right whatsoever to intervene in the internal affairs of Zimbabwe, and that to do so would be flying in the face of both the African Union’s founding Charter and international practice.
While military intervention is not an option, SA does not support the imposition of “soft sanctions” either. It came as no surprise, therefore, that Mbeki went out of his way to condemn the European Union, the United States, and lately, the Commonwealth, for slapping Mugabe and his top leadership with travel restrictions. But the fact remains that, in spite of his softly-softly approach, extensive human rights abuses have persisted in Zimbabwe.
SA’s cautionary approach also reflects her loaded and potentially explosive Domestic agenda, the Land Question in particular. Outright condemnation of his counterpart, it is said, would imperil resolution of this problem in SA itself. In the light of the foregoing, is Quiet Diplomacy the best possible option?
Quiet Diplomacy Condemned
Let us start with the land redistribution issue. While this is a top priority, the ANC government has carried it out with utmost caution. Neither has the process been haphazard nor lawless as in Zimbabwe. Therefore, South Africa has demonstrated that even an emotive issue as this one could be undertaken in an orderly fashion. Across the Limpopo, by contrast, there is general economic meltdown. To compound matters further, the economic meltdown brought other problems forth. Of note is political instability and the massive braindrain. These have now spilt over in the region. In Botswana and South Africa, their repercussions are manifest xenophobia. As a consequence of constant harassment and racial assault, Zimbabwe commercial farmers have migrated to Mozambique, Angola and other countries. Since the onset of the crisis, foreign direct investment to the region has slowed down significantly; so has tourism. Unemployment is therefore on the increase everywhere. This state of affairs suggests that the situation in Zimbabwe is impacting negatively on the entire region.
The Way Forward
Although it has not yet come to pass, it appears that President Mugabe is ready to retire. Mbeki has said so; but the problem is, timing. This then could open up a new chapter in SA/Zimbabwe relations. Our government should therefore ready itself for a post-Mugabe era.
Rapprochement with the ruling party and opposition
If that is the case, both the ANC and the SA government should spare no effort in seeking rapprochement with both the ruling party and the opposition. Instead of mutual denouncement and vilification, both parties should be encouraged to seek a way of establishing a healthy working relationship.
When contact is made, as it must, it should be at a higher level than has been the case so far. In seeking to find lasting solutions, SA should help facilitate talks between and amongst all Zimbabweans. However, this could be fruitful only when the efforts are transparent and non-partisan. Most significantly the people of that country should take charge and own the negotiations process itself. From our own experience, the legitimacy of the process should not be compromised, neither should foreigners foist preconceived ideas and solutions upon them.
Taking leave out of Haysom’s proposals (2002), the following could be done:
- use time-frames to avoid an endless negotiation process;
- devise effective deadlock-breaking mechanisms;
- develop mechanisms for dealing with intra-party divisions; and
- mount a fund raising campaign in order to implement the Agreement most efficaciously.
Apart from these general principles, Zimbabweans would be better served by transforming and reconfiguring the current government institutions (constitutional reforms). Whether these are retained or not, they must be seen to serve all citizens fairly, without discrimination whatsoever.
Help revitalize the Zimbabwean economy
Because of Zimbabwe’s of status as a major trading partner to SA, our government should help rebuild and revitalize Zimbabwe’s economy. In this regard, the work of the Bi-National Commission should be reinvigorated. SA should also help mobilize foreign direct investment to the region and to Zimbabwe in particular. In strengthening the regional trade, security and other political networks and apparatus, there is no doubt that Zimbabwe cannot play a leading role. This will not just be in the interest of that country and the region, but for SA itself. SA cannot afford a floundering Zimbabwe.
Conclusion
After exploring the ebb and flow of SA-Zimbabwe relations after the Second World War, the paper focused on the foreign policy of a new South Africa after 1994. Here the difficulties arising from the differences between Mandela and Mugabe were highlighted. President Mbeki decided to employ a strategy different from his predecessor in dealing with the Zimbabwean President. This was necessitated by the prerogatives of his foreign policy, especially the AR and Nepad. These, then, forced him to adopt a policy of Quiet Diplomacy. The latter, however, has not earned him a lot of accolades. Critics say that he is too soft on Mugabe. Bearing his political programme in mind, the critics contend, he should have taken stronger action, more so in his capacity as AU Chair and leader of a leading economy in the region and the continent. Thus, they question Mbeki’s commitment to human rights, good governance and sound economic management. Quiet diplomacy has not just emboldened Mugabe but betrays the lofty ideals underpinning AR and Nepad.
In order for the SA leader to help break the political stalemate in Zimbabwe, certain policy recommendations were made. Among them were that SA should gear for a post-Mugabe era sooner rather than later. Given what transpired in Liberia recently, an “exit” strategy for the beleaguered leader should be devised. SA should reconcile itself with the fact that MDC cannot be wished away. Thus, rapprochement with that Party and its leader should also be pursued.
In transforming the current constitution and other institutional mechanisms (by negotiation), concerted efforts should be made to enhance the participation of all stakeholders, set time frames and devise a deadlock breaking mechanism for a national convention that would address the problems facing Zimbabwe. Lastly, SA should help revive and revitalize the Zimbabwean economy.
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* Randse Afrikaans University - Soweto, Dept. of Politics and Governance, Private Bag X09, Bertsham 2013, South Africa. E-mail: matha-g@rau.ac.za