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What will it take to create an effective African Union?

Medhane Taddese^*

Introduction

The design of the African Union (AU), and the rapidity with which it was set up, reflect the tremendous urge towards unity present across Africa. Indeed Africa has a rich history of political projects for the unity of the continent. Many African leaders among the independence pioneers shared this vision, the most famous and influential of which was the pan-Africanism of president Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. The outcome was the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, which came as a compromise by bringing together the Pan Africanist ‘Casablanca Group’ and the more conservative and pro-Western Monrovia Group. Then after almost forty years, African Heads of State committed themselves to the establishment of the African Union, which was launched in Sirte, Libya, on the 2nd of March 2001, to be followed by the Lusaka and Durban summits of 2001 and 2002, respectively. Understandably the project of building the African Union has one immense asset, i.e., popular demand.

African unity is the culmination of a long history of attempts to promote common political entity across the continent, and a deep desire in all parts of Africa for political, economic and social unity. This popular demand for integration is perhaps the strongest factor in support of the success of the AU. No doubt, the architects of the African Union have sought a blueprint inspired by the strongest and most effective model of regional unification that exists to date, namely, the European union (the Architecture and Capacity of the African Union 2002, 2). But it is worth noting that the economic, institutional and political factors that led to Europe’s success are absent in the African landscape. While the formal structures of the African Union replicate those of the European Union, the conditions under which African countries are moving towards integration are very different from those prevailing in Europe.

This paper argues that the African Union has inherited some of the problems of the OAU and that there are formidable obstacles and many reasons for caution, though without denying the presence of tremendous opportunities. Building the African Union is an ambitious project undertaken under adverse circumstances. This article is intended to identify some of these adverse circumstances. The challenge that the AU faces is very diverse and it is inviting trouble to simplify its many manifestations. One problem the AU faces is that, to a measurable degree, it inherits the structures and capacity of the OAU, which were weak and chronically burdened by financial deficit (Abdul 2003, 1). It also replicates the overlap of regional institutions such as that of the OAU. But at present the main challenge is the issue of peace and security and the mechanisms and modalities available to deal with it. The main question is: can Africa’s existing intergovernmental institutions play a leading role in promoting a security and economic community (or communities) in the continent?

The Challenges Ahead

Currently, the process of creating the African Union involves a number of intergovernmental initiatives, including (at a regional level) the OAU Conflict Management Center; the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA); and the peace and security component of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). At a sub-regional level, sub-regional organizations, also known as Regional Economic Communities (RECs), have taken the de facto lead in promoting peace and security.

The relationship between the OAU and sub-regional organizations has not been clear at all. To date, there has been no coordinated approach to managing these relationships. Although the very multiplicity of institutions and initiatives indicates the high degree of concern about both economic integration and peace and security in Africa, it is unfortunate that they compete against each other. One good case in point is the CSSDCA and its pre-cursor the African Leadership Forum (ALF) and NEPAD with its peace and security component. The former is almost exclusively Nigerian and the latter South African. To this could be added former Nigerian-led initiatives like the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action and the treaty for the establishment of the1991 African Economic Community. How to interface the Abuja Treaty with its sub-regional subsidiaries, i.e., the RECs on the one hand and the NEPAD framework on the other, still remains a challenge. Reconciling Mbeki’s NEPAD (with its South African tag) and Obasanjo’s CSSDCA (with its Nigerian imprint) remains to be one of the inconveniences African leaders face at this time.

Both initiatives have all sorts of components, political, economic, security, etc. As these lines are being written, this issue has not been resolved while each side eagerly wants to show its own cannon of scholarly works attached to personal glory, consolation and national pride. Hence, the roles and responsibilities of Africa’s leading powers need examination. How should these countries be simultaneously empowered to play a larger positive role, while also being constrained from exercising hegemony? This could also matter a lot as an objective precondition for promoting security in Africa. Both economic integration and peace and security are imperatives on which the survival of the future AU depends. Both the 1991 Abuja Treaty and the OAU Conflict Management have made remarkably little progress over the last ten or so years partly because of the weak institutions in place to promote it, and partly because governments have remained jealous of their sovereignty (ibid).

The issue of conflict management has been at the top of Africa’s political agenda since mid-1993. And most African wars are civil wars. The OAU’s sacrosanct doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states effectively precluded collective action to address civil wars. Sovereignty has not been seen as responsibility (Deng and Zartman 1996).

Although there has been a slight doctrinal shift on “non-interference” with the military intervention of ECOWAS in Liberia in 1990, the restrictive meaning of sovereignty still remained a barrier for dealing with internal conflicts (Cohen 1997, 2). No doubt most African leaders remained highly suspicious of the Early Warning System of the OAU Conflict Management. The OAU was unable to exercise leadership in the management of internal conflicts because its structures militated against its playing such a role (Mwagiru 1995, 3). The same is true with the AU. Yet, many African governments are possessive of their sovereign privileges and are thus averse both to surrendering any powers and to the implications of ‘variable geometry’ approaches to inter-state activities. There seems to be a strong interest in the AU’s not developing sufficient autonomy to exercise real influence.

As such the formal mandates and resolutions of Africa’s organizations are not matched by genuine collective commitments and capacities for monitoring or implementing these resolutions. Addressing this issue in a legal and institutional way should be one of the immediate priorities. If pushed vigorously, Peer Review could be instrumental in this regard. The old argument of non- interference in the internal affairs of African countries, already largely discarded, must be abandoned altogether. As stipulated in the NEPAD framework, governments that are clearly failing to live up to the expectation of the envisaged standards (for example on governance) are not merely harming themselves but are damaging the prospects for the whole continent (NEPAD Plan of Action 2001,13). The issue of sovereignty versus responsibility needs to be redefined. This should include setting continental standards clearly defining the hierarchy, roles and mandates of different sub-regional, regional and international organizations. After all, integration of all sorts necessitates similar value and political systems.

A largely neglected and unresolved issue related to the daunting task of ensuring peace and security is the chronic problem of the nation-state in Africa. At the peak of the decolonisation period, the new African elite, in tandem with the colonial powers, endorsed hastily negotiated constitutions that entrenched the ideology of Western state-centered nationalism - the nation-state - as a political organization. The relationship between nationalism and democracy has never been properly defined in post-colonial Africa. The most vital issue which confronted the African state is the absence of a viable socio-cultural contract to govern the relations among the diverse units within the state, while recognizing and ensuring each unit’s need for identity, security, and participation. By suppressing these identities, the artificial African state has, in fact, continued to politicize them.

The outcome is that, at this stage, most African governments could not enjoy legitimacy and exercise sufficient political power to manage the affairs of the state. Without addressing the internal contradictions of the nation-state it is difficult to imagine peace and security in each country, and African unity is just a hollow phrase. This will have a negative trickle-down effect on the peace and security component of the AU. In this regard, some relevant questions are begging for attention, namely: What are the preconditions in terms of internal peace within states that are part of a security community? Specifically, is prevailing internal peace an essential precondition for an inter-state security order? Can internal conflicts be bypassed, or perhaps internal peace and inter-state security should be developed simultaneously? And, secondly, should internal conflicts within states be regarded as solely a domestic issue or as a question of international concern and engagement?

Not surprisingly, the Constitutive Act of the African Union is silent on the mechanisms for regional peace and security (The AU and Peace and Security 2002, 10). Although focus is put on peace and security by the AU, no details are spelled out either to dismantle, revitalize or dramatically alter existing OAU capacities in this area, including the Conflict Management Centre and the Central Organ. Hence, developing a robust framework for regional peace and security in Africa is a major challenge. The drafters of the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) need to move beyond purely military definitions of security to more comprehensive and strategic visions. In particular, the momentum should be stepped up regarding the envisaged African Standby Force.

What Should Be Done?

One of the priorities for security in Africa is creating a synergy between the existing institutions, enabling them to complement and support one another. More than any thing else, this entails linking regional peace and security to internal conflict resolution and governance in African states as well as utilizing the existing architecture of regional and sub-regional organizations as a key component. In this regard, linking the AU to existing peace and security systems figures prominently. Besides, the AU should be encouraged to bring coherence to these sub-systems.

Alas, due to lack of real power in regional and sub-regional organizations, much of the focus must be on developing the subjective conditions for security cooperation, namely, developing common understandings of security and enriching the moral consensus against armed conflict and the unconstitutional means of acquiring power. This exercise should involve setting continental standards for security cooperation. Already the OAU/AU has resolved that unconstitutional transfers of power will not be recognized. Standards for constitutional rule as well as the so-called legitimate security concern, which justifies involvement of some countries in the affairs of their neighbours, need to be set and continually raised.

Given the absence of real modalities for enforcement in the hands of African institutions, may be other mechanisms should also be tried. After all, it is important to note that European security was driven by the concerns of two dominant European states: Germany and France, under the umbrella of NATO, led by the USA. Do African countries recognize and accept a comparable role for two or four hegemonic states or sub-regional powers? Besides, a doctrine of military intervention does not yet exist at a continental level, which was at the back of the political problems as well as difficulties in seeing operations (like that of ECOWAS and SADC) through to a successful conclusion (OAU 1998, 24).

The same could be said about economic integration. The roles of Africa’s more powerful countries must be analyzed with care. Relations between Africa’s leading national economies and their smaller neighbors will be a critical factor in the success or otherwise of regionalization. The complementarily of existing institutions and the issue of critically interfacing the AU and NEPAD with the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action, the 1991 Abuja Treaty and the REC’s, will mainly determine the success of both economic integration and the AU.

Last but not least is the issue of leadership. There is a high level of political demoralization across the continent and a clear lack of confidence in political institutions and political leaders. On the other hand, there is a strong feeling for unity and a sense of common identity across Africa. The OAU was one of the few regional organizations in the world that managed to hold annual summits and regular meetings, a telling commentary of the powerful impulse towards unity. But this political will has rarely been translated from rhetoric into action. To this effect, the leadership of the AU in particular and of its institutions in general is very crucial.

Some rightly argue that the African Union needs talented people to lead its institutions. Leaders should be selected based on their merit and commitment and in a transparent manner. No doubt Africa needs inspiring, consistent, high-level political leadership that repeatedly emphasizes the imperative of unification (Mohammed 2003, 3). So, in terms of capacity, effective leadership and institutions figure prominently.

Conclusion

Africa has embarked upon its most ambitious regional initiative ever made. This initiative cannot afford to fail. In order for this to work, careful attention must be paid to the requirement of institution building; the creation of synergy between the existing institutions, enabling them to complement and support one another; imaginative ways of addressing intrastate conflicts, building workable institutions to deal with them; clarifying the role of a regional hegemony, and on how the dominant state and its neighbours handle their political interests and actions. Certainly, the upcoming Maputo summit will raise these issues but whether it will meaningfully address them remains to be seen.

References

Cohen, Herman. 1997. Conflict management in Africa. CSIS Africa Notes, 181 (September): 1-7.

Deng, Francis M., and Zartman, I. William. 1996. Sovereignty as responsibility: Conflict management in Africa. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Inter Africa Group and Justice Africa. 2002. The Africa Union and peace and Security. Issues Paper for the African Union Symposium, organised by the African Development Forum and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa.

_____. 2002. The architecture and capacity of the African Union. Issues Paper for the African Union Symposium, organised by the African Development Forum and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa.

Mohammed, Abdul . 2003. Towards an effective African Union. Addis Ababa, January 27.

Mwagiru, Makumi. 1995. Beyond the OAU: Prospects for conflict management in the Horn of Africa paradigms. The Kent Journal of International Relations 9, no. 2.

NEPAD Plan of Action. October 2001.

Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU). 1998. Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Addis Ababa, OAU.

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