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The Role of Civil Society Organisations in the African Union’s Post-conflict Policy: Towards Peace, Post-conflict Reconstruction and Sustainable Development in Africa

Statistics from six African countries considered to be emerging from “conflict and in post-conflict situations” in a synopsis of a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) study show that over eight million Africans were killed, wounded, or disabled in the six countries and sixteen million and one hundred thousand were either refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs).² The Sudan has in excesse of 2,300,000 dead, wounded and disabled whilst 6,600,000 are refugees and IDPs. The rest of the countries in the study also typically had declining Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP per capita.³

Civil society organisations (CSOs) and post-conflict situations are two closely related issues that almost always go together. John Paul Lederach refers to civil society as “a web of human relationships made up of individual people, their networks, organisations, and institutions around which social and community life is built”.⁴ The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSSOC) of the African union complements this definition by stating that that CSOs comprise social groups; professionals; non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community based organisations (CBOs and voluntary organisations; and cultural organisations, amongst other segments in which women, the youth, children, national Diasporas, and the private sector are specially identified) form the myriad composition of what are called CSOs.⁵

However, what are objectively regarded as CSOs and how they are actually perceived are not always in synch. Civil Society Organisations on the African continent have generally been considered as an anathema to the development of countries on the continent, especially when they are seen as lacking capacity.⁶ And even when they have had adequate capacity, this has often been rented from those who are more than likely to seek to dictate the course to be taken, thereby living up to the English saying: “He who pays the piper, calls the tune”. ⁷

Yes, this is a rather harsh description of what may in a number of instances be the only viable institution to provide some sort of support enabling the survival of society itself. The post-conflict environment derives from intense political instability, usually a civil war or a war of liberation and in some cases both. Often such conflict may so negatively affect neighbouring countries that they too become post-conflict countries and should indeed be regarded as countries emerging from conflict. The post-conflict environment is very fragile and in dire need of timely and urgent intervention to prevent relapses. It has been emphatically stated that countries emerging from conflict have often returned to conflict within five years of ending their conflicts. Here therefore lies the challenge of today, one that all African countries must confront and which demands the urgent response by both the African Union and African CSOs. They must take leadership and establish ownership in order to ensure the direction and pace of post-conflict reconstruction is not derailed by lack of commitment. As is evident from the PCRD policy, the AU holds both local and foreign CSOs in high esteem and therefore considers them a critical partner. A United Nations publication said this of CSOs:

CSOs have emerged in emerged from the 20^th century as key players in the efforts to prevent, mitigate and resolve armed conflict in Africa. Their rise to prominence has paralleled the increase of intrastate conflict in Africa, and the inability of national regimes to maintain peace….They are potentially more flexible, innovative, participatory, and responsible to local needs. CSOs are particularly well-suited for conflict prevention as they have deep knowledge of national and local issue, cultures, and relationships, and an ability to function in adverse circumstances even, or perhaps especially, where governments cannot.⁸

Lederach complements the UN publication by describing civil society as “dynamic, adaptive, at times nebulous, at times well structured...”⁹ The role of civil society in post-conflict reconstruction is borne of the general acknowledgement that security is no longer adequately explainable within the traditional framework of national security. The emergence of other perspectives such as critical theory raises a myriad of crucial questions: “What is the object of security? What is the nature of the threat? Who is to provide security? And by what means?”¹⁰ This paper will argue that the challenge facing CSOs in post-conflict reconstruction situations is enormous and that they must be adequately resourced if they are to succeed.

That PCRD is a single entity that must of necessity be tackled as such is not disputed. This paper is mindful that the examination of the whole does not fall into the dilemma of a blind person led to one part of an elephant where she feels it and consequently leaves with a distorted view of what the gigantic animal really looks like. Here is how the paper endeavours to avoid this dilemma.

The paper discusses the African Union post-conflict reconstruction programme by engaging in the discourse of the continental policy but with a specific focus on how it relates to CSOs. The paper begins by following the trajectory of the genesis of the African post-conflict programme in order to determine the extent of CSOs participation in the programme. It then examines the major components of the African PCRD policy before examining the space for civil society in the policy and later takes an introspection of the space for civil society in the policy. The critical path for CSOs is further stressed in the interrogation of the challenges given by the African Union Executive Council for CSOs and ends by examining what the future holds for the African continent

In narrating events of a journey one normally commences with the first steps. This is not so for the drive towards the creation of an African Union policy on post-conflict reconstruction. The paper has chosen 2005 as the year to begin narrating the road to the African policy aware that the continental body has in fact been sensitive to issues of post-conflict ever since the dawn of independence on the nascent states of Africa. After all independence for many African countries was a post-conflict situation because colonialism was a violent system of oppression and because political emancipation on the continent was in the majority of cases a result of violent liberation struggles. Post-conflict strategies were thus automatically part of the process of independence. The Declaration on the establishment, within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in June 1993 is a case in point. ¹¹

One can even go further in history and take individual sub-regional examples such as Southern Africa where structures like the Front Line States and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) had built–in mechanisms to meet the challenges of refugee populations and social reconstruction, albeit on a smaller scale than what prevails today. Yet other indicators of earlier involvement in post-conflict issues include the Algiers Decision of 1999 and Lome Declaration of 2000 on unconstitutional changes of government and more crucial Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and some other of its provisions as being instructive on the matter of post-conflict issues. Even more instructive is the Peace and Security Protocol through some of its Articles, particularly Article 6 in which the Protocol gives the Peace and Security Council among its functions, that of “peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction; humanitarian action and disaster management”¹²; Article 13 (3)(e) & (f) providing the African Standby Force such functions as “peace-building, …post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation and humanitarian assistance”¹³ and in Article 14(1) in which the Council is instructed to “assist in the restoration of the rule of law, establishment and development of democratic institutions”,¹⁴ among other democratization processes.

The years 2005 to 2006 have been the most active years in the development of the AU policy on post-conflict reconstruction. Commencing with the AU Summit in Sirte, Libya from 28 June to 2 July 2005 where the African Union Commission was mandated to develop an AU Policy Framework on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), premised on the some Articles of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union and the knowledge thus far gained in the continent. Following the mandate, five events that followed prior to the actual approval of the PCRD policy at the Banjul Summit in late July 2006: the 4^th Brainstorming Retreat on 4-5 September 2005; the 39^th PSC Meeting on 30 September 2005; the Technical Experts meeting on 7-8 February 2006; the AU/CSOs Meeting on 5-7 April 2006; and Government’s Experts Meeting on 8-9 June 2006 other than their preoccupation with PCRD hold a common position on the role of CSOs in post-conflict and hitherto an indication of the AU’s sensitivity towards CSOs. The Durban meeting remains the major event and the rest reactive to that meeting.

The 4^th Brainstorming meeting in Durban, South Africa, principally for the PSC but also attended by Members of the Permanent Representatives, the UN, EU, World Bank and some members of civil society, occupies a pivotal position in the discourse of PCRD because it was the first comprehensive debate on the matter with a view of contributing to developing a continental policy. Equally instructive is that the meeting, albeit numerically dominated by representatives of governments, was nonetheless mindful of the critical role of CSOs and related to this, the importance of Africa regaining responsibility of its problems. One of the pertinent issues that arose in the discourse was the need for African ownership of PCRD processes and in particular the inclusion of civil society as well as government since more often than not local African NGOs that “are totally ignored during peace processes and during PCRD, while international NGOs flood such situations and dictate the rules of the game”¹⁵. The value of local NGOs was seen in their local knowledge and expertise; their ideal for sustained activities premised on the fact that they remain domiciled in the countries affected; and even cost less than international NGOs; as well as the undeniably fact that local NGOs build local capacity.¹⁶ Continuing with the theme of CSO participation in post-conflict reconstruction issues, the one gathering that follows the Durban meeting in so far as involvement of NGOs are concerned is the technical experts meeting that took place in Addis Ababa from 7-8 February 2006. It is nonetheless important to mention that the other meetings, for instance the 39^th PSC meeting in Addis Ababa on 30 September 2005 not only endorsed the Durban meeting but also the relevance of CSOs participation in the efforts to develop the post-conflict and reconstruction framework. The AU/CSO meeting in Abuja from 5-7 April 2006 and the Government’s Experts’ meeting that followed from 8-9 June 2006 just prior to the tabling of the PCRD framework to the Executive Council in Banjul sought the involvement of civil society in the entire program. It thus remained for the technical meeting of the 7-8 February 2006 to elaborate on the Durban meeting’s suggestions.

With participants who included members of the various departments within the AU Commission; members of the AU Peace and Security Council; the African Development Bank; AU specialized technical agencies; UN agencies, civil society groups, and bilateral aid agencies, the Technical Experts Meeting included discussions on the “role of civil society in enhancing governance (such as) the protection and promotion of human rights, justice and reconciliation, particularly in the immediate post-conflict period, when the government can outsource some services to civil society actors, for a limited time, until it attains the capacity to deliver”.¹⁷ The meeting recognized the value in “consultations with civil society to end ensure broad participation in the development and eventual implementation of the policy framework”.¹⁸ However it was evident to that there still remained the challenge of elucidating what the roles and responsibilities of the actors in the PCRD process should be.

There can be no fitting opening gambit to the overview of the PCRD policy transformed as such from a framework presented to the AU Executive Council in Banjul from 25-29 June 2006 than the preamble to the policy itself, which reads:

This African Union (AU) policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) is intended to serve as a guide for the development of comprehensive policies and strategies that elaborate measures that seek to consolidate peace, promote `sustainable development and pave the way for growth and regeneration in countries and regions emerging from conflict. Given the peculiarities of each conflict situation, this policy is conceived as a flexible template that can be adapted to, and assist, affected regions and countries, in their endeavours towards reconstruction, security and growth.¹⁹

The PCRD policy is a guide, recognises the uniqueness of each conflict, and consequently the strategy of post-conflict reconstruction that would need to be undertaken, and therefore the need for it to be a flexible template. Lending credence to the need for this policy is that between 1994 and 2993 there have been 9 million fatalities as a result of intra and inter-state conflicts which translate to over 69% of the world total; 2 million refugees by 2004; and currently 10 million internally displaced persons. Together with ravaged infrastructure, endemic insecurity and the ever present threat of a reversion to conflict (to mention but some factors associated with a post-conflict scenario), underline the motivation for a comprehensive PCRD policy whose objectives are four-pronged. Firstly to consolidate peace and prevent relapse of violence as has been statistically observed by some observers; secondly to help address the root causes of conflict; thirdly to encourage and fast track planning and implementation of reconstruction activities; and finally to enhance complementarities and coordination between and among diverse actors engaged in PCRD processes.

The first part of the PCRD policy contains the rationale, definitions and principles. In this regard, the rationale is that the PCRD policy is a strategic and normative framework which draws on lessons learned from the past and on-going African reconstruction efforts with the aim of reducing pressure on post conflict countries by providing them with a consistent and coherent strategy that will speed up the planning and implementation of quick impact programmes.

In articulating definitions, the policy identifies the central ones, namely PCRD, the trigger-point and the end-state of PCRD; the human security; and socio-economic development. The policy looks at PCRD as “a comprehensive set of measures that seek to: address the needs of countries emerging from conflict, including the needs of affected populations; prevent escalation of disputes; avoid relapse into violence; address the root causes of conflict; and consolidate sustainable peace”.²⁰ The commencement of the PCRD or what may be viewed as the “trigger” is regarded as that point when parties to the conflict show both a willingness to resolve their differences and hostilities have ceased or a peace agreement has been signed while the end-state is characterised by the prevalence of peace as well as law and order. The definition of human security in the policy is drawn from the Common African Defence and Security Policy and as such is considered multi-dimensional, while socio-economic development is from what pertains in the AU vision, AU strategic Framework of 2004-2007, the Millennium Declaration (2002) in terms of improved physical quality of life (PQL), education and enhanced capacity to realise their potential.

What is common in all these definitions that relates very closely to CSOs is their wide-ranging character of the challenges, which (like NGOs) tend to be all encompassing and are therefore able to participate in the multiplicity of issues that confront PCRD. Further suiting the participation by CSOs is PCRD’s centrality to people’s well being and some of their ability to undertake comprehensive analysis of conflict issues and therefore the possibility of finding solutions which would bring about a more peaceful environment. However, although the PCRD as stipulated in the policy is fairly comprehensive, the working environment remains unpredictable. Although the environment before the signing of a peace treaty is crucial in that people in need receive humanitarian assistance sooner, the level of insecurity may be too high to provide the intended humanitarian aid. The period after signing a peace agreement would obviously be relatively safer but nonetheless remains unpredictable since the mere signing of an agreement is no guarantee that the belligerents will honour their word. What is however evident is that PCRD work is too crucial to wait until there is absolute certainty that peace is sustainable for to do so would entail a high price in human terms. As regard the end-state of post-conflict reconstruction, the AU’s preference for the development component, hence PCRD, while clearly long-term in nature, is nonetheless the most certain way of ensuring sustainable peace and stability. This overlaps with the human security and socio-development concepts.

Just as the development component of post-conflict reconstruction work provides a uniqueness of the AU policy, the policy’s five core principles are equally distinctive are reflective of the AU’s determination to take responsibility. The PCRD policy’s five principles: African leadership; national and local ownership; inclusiveness and equality; cooperation and coherence; and capacity building are in this regard very clear. By African leadership, the policy implies African leadership and the need for solidarity. While this is evidently state-centric, the role of the state in meeting the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction is indispensable. As regards the principle of national and local ownership, local needs and aspiration in meeting the challenges of post conflict reconstruction and development are also indispensable while the principle of inclusiveness and equity address exclusion and inequitable distribution of power and wealth, all crucial factors for lasting peace and that of capacity building necessary for enhancing both national and local competence.

The principles of cooperation and coherence in the policy explains and provides dimensions to roles and responsibilities and also ensures optimum utilisation of resources in such a manner that transparency, accountability and shared objectives of participants at all levels result in the growth of trust. This is ultimately expected to improve coordinated action and promote real partnership. The last but by no means the least principle of PCRD is that of capacity building. On the scale of importance one would be inclined to regard this as the most critical in that ultimately it is the extent to which the community, country and region are able to sustain their activities in the post-conflict environment in order to attain sustainable peace. In this regard, through capacity building, the society is not only supported but in the process given some legitimacy. Therefore the policy endeavours to utilize local capacities and invigorate it by seeking assistance from other African capacities beyond the confines of the community, including from the Diaspora. This point will be enhanced further below.

Indicative Elements

The PCRD policy evolves around its indicative elements. These are indicative because depending on one’s geographical location, the composition of these elements would vary. The policy presents six indicative elements considered crucial to the mitigation of post-conflict challenges. These are security; humanitarian/ emergency assistance; political governance and transition; socio-economic reconstruction and development; human rights, justice and reconciliation; and women and gender. Which of these are the most important? This would be a very difficult question to answer because the character of the post-conflict environment is such that the prevailing challenges more often than not require a multifaceted approach. Further yet is that different geographical spaces may have varying degrees of challenges, which would then demand different approaches. What is nonetheless undisputed is that whatever community, country or region, a secure environment would always be a pre-condition for any work designed to mitigate the negative consequences of conflict. As if to stress the special nature of the security dimension, the AU document “Africa, Our Common Destiny” makes reference to “the current widely held view that peace, security and stability, improving political and economic governance and the pursuit of the democratisation process should be placed on Africa’s priority agenda”.²¹ The paper therefore begins the interrogation of the indicative elements with that of the security dimension.

The PCRD policy adopts the definition of security given by the Common African Defence and Security Policy in both its generality and specificity. In the former, the policy adopts human security while in the latter, that is in the context of post conflict it is the “failure to consolidate peace in the post-conflict period as a result of the absence of effective and complete post-conflict demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration and lack of sustained post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction processes”. ²²

Under the security indicative element, the PCRD policy calls for the building of the human resource capacity of the security sector in a variety of ways that enhance the creation of a secure and safe environment for the post-conflict states and their population. These include training and facilitating the use of the emerging security sector in reconstruction programmes, as a way of building the legitimacy of the forces, building trust between them and the communities, they are expected to serve and protect and optimise the use of scarce resources. Yet another way identified by the security indicative element is the training of civil society organisations to be a partner in safety and security cluster activities. This is a critical because unless CSOs have a clear understanding of the workings of security forces, their ability to effectively intercede will be negatively affected.

The critical phase of humanitarian/emergency assistance in post-conflict reconstruction has been identified in the AU draft PCRD policy as particularly crucial in the provision of training and skills development to facilitate the integration of affected populations such as unemployed youths, women, ex-combatants, refugees and IDPs. Without doing this, peace in post-conflict countries is impossible to conceive. Not so urgent but nonetheless crucial for ensuring long-term sustainability of a peaceful environment is the social-economic reconstruction and development indicative element with a clear function of addressing the gap between relief and development, seeks to promote the equitable and sustainable access to management and exploitation of natural resources. Closely related to this element but also one that is often easily seen as the trigger of instability is the political governance and transition.

The role in the political governance and transition indicative element, whose core factors include political participation, transparency, accountability, separation of powers, creation of a civil service, the rule of law and independent civil oversight, is crucial. Equally crucial and one which normally attracts emotional responses far afield from the affected communities, countries and regions is that of human rights, justice and reconciliation. This indicative element is especially crucial in post-conflict countries whose conflict eras were most definitely associated with a lack of human rights and injustice.

However, running through all the elements and yet deserving its own category is the indicative element of women and gender. The nature of conflict in post-conflict countries has tended to show a particularly viciousness towards women and the girl-child. The AU PCRD policy through the women and gender indicative element provides for gender training and sensitisation, amongst other measures, to protect women and the girl-child from abuse in the post-conflict period.

The lengths and breadths of PCRD policy is comprehensive but however tight it may be, the value of the document is the extent to which it is implemented and the positive results seen in countries emerging from conflict. This is where CSOs play a particularly crucial role. A more extensive examination of the Executive Council Decisions may facilitate in this regard.

The Decisions and Civil Society

The question that ought to be posed and answered is this: Given the magnitude of the task at hand, can states alone be able to operationalise the Decisions made by the Executive Council in Banjul? Granted that the states in Africa do not have the capacity needed to meet the challenges at hand, it a fair point that neither does the African CSOs. However a functional partnership of African states, regions and the Commission on the one hand and the African CSOs on the other hand, would go a significant way to tackling the challenges at hand. The AU Decisions are summarized as under:²³

1. Collaboration with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), relevant United Nations (UN) and other institutions and African Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), to take all the necessary steps for the effective implementation of the PCRD Policy;

2. Development of operational guidelines for the adaptation of the Policy Framework at regional and national levels;

3. Development of a database of African experts on PCRD, to be placed at the disposal of countries emerging from conflict;

4. Requirement for the mobilization of the resources for the implementation of the PCRD policy;

5. Enhancement of African capacity, including the use of AU Volunteers (AUVs);

6. Strengthening of the capacity of relevant African NGOs to address post-conflict issues;

7. Establishment of the African Union Standing Multidimensional Committee to provide political support and mobilize all the necessary and available resources for the implementation of the Policy which shall interface with the United Nations Peace Building Commission and be supported by the relevant units within the Commission through the Peace and Security Department.

This paper provides views and makes recommendations on the operationalisation of the AU Decisions and hitherto on the implementation of the PCRD policy, commencing with the establishment of the African Union Standing Multidimensional Committee, hereafter abbreviated as AUSMC. This is working progress to which CSOs views would contribute immensely.

AU Standing Multidimensional Committee

It is not an overstatement that entire PCRD policy will succeed and fail on the basis of how the AU Standing Multidimensional Committee (AUSMC) will perform as the strategic head of the AU effort on post-conflict activities in the continent. In this regard, the manner in which it is structured and the way it will oversee the implementation of the PCRD policy is crucial to the success of the policy.

Operating at the strategic level but with elements that taker operational level missions, the AUSMC is expected to function like the United Nations Peace Building Commission’s (PBC) whose main purpose includes integrated strategies and ensures predictable financing for recovery activities as well as sustained financial investment. The AUSMC will be at the apex of an organizational structure that includes the directorates of Peace and Security; Political Affairs; Infrastructure & Energy; Social Affairs; Trade & Industry; Economic Affairs; Rural Economic & Agriculture; and Human Resource, Science & Technology with a Secretariat located in the Peace and Security Directorate. For ease of reference, an organogram is attached as annex ‘A’.

The make up of the AUSMC is a matter that is crucial importance, no less because post conflict issues require the involvement of actors that are financially and materially able to contribute extensively to the programmes as well as be seen to be comprehensive in its geographical coverage. In this regard, nature of the countries’ contribution to the overall AU budget as well as their contributions to past, present and even potential contribution in the future would be amongst the crucial factors that could determine membership of the AUSMC. Evidently the assumption in this respect would be that the top providers of assessed contributions to the AU budget will bear the largest burden of the PCRD budget.

Contribution to AU Missions would seem to be another credible factor. However to place emphasis on contribution to military contribution to continental missions on the continent may seem somewhat absurd since by definition PCRD is essentially an activity that takes place after a relatively peaceful environment has been attained. The explanation actually rests on the term relative peaceful environment. Post conflict activities interface with peacekeeping and will therefore necessarily include active participation by the military, some of which would be a part of the peacekeeping force on ground or organically linked to the peacekeeping force.

Determination of the regional representation is probably the clearest of the three-tier approach to determination of membership to the AUSMC. Such a factor would maintain equity and solidarity, which the African leadership has thus far strived to attain in its effort to achieve peace and stability. In this regard current Chairpersons of the RECs would appear to be natural members of the AUSMC and consequently likely to make the AU structure not only leaner than the UN Peace Building Commission but with representation from the RECs, arguably more representative. However the bigger challenge would be how the AUSMC would actually be operationalised.

The critical nature of the PCRD issues makes it imperative that there be regular follow-ups on issues. In this regard the recommendation is that the AUSMC meets on every last day of the month at the Permanent Representative Council (PRC) level and quarterly at the Ministerial level (with ministers holding any portfolio in the government since post –conflict issues are regarded as cross-cutting) or as demanded by the situation.

In view of the magnitude and serious nature of PCRD issues, it may be that a PCRD Secretariat working within the Peace and Security Directorate becomes an organic structure within the Directorate serving both the AUSMC and all the Directorates of the Commission on matters of the AU through the AUSMC. In this regard the “AU PCRD Secretariat” would logically fall under the Director of Peace and Security in the same manner as Secretariat of the PSC.

Collaborations with RECs

The policy on PCRD clearly identifies that RECs are an important implementation tool. Regarded as the building blocs for Africa’s peace and security and development agenda and given the regional character and impact of most conflicts, RECs provide the fundamental interlocutor for PCRD work. The PCRD Policy clearly outlines that owing to the RECs proximity to the knowledge of countries emerging from conflict, they are well placed to serve as the regional focal point for PCRD.

It follows from this that there ought to be regional PCRD mechanisms that will provide regional guidelines for the implementation of PCRD. In this regard it will become necessary for the PCRD Secretariat to undertake missions to the RECs to assist them to develop their specific policies and those of a selected group of countries emerging from conflict such as the DRC, Liberia, Burundi and the Sudan. The value of CSOs in providing capacity to the RECS and the states through the former is uncontested in that their ability to source for financial resources to implement the post-conflict challenges as well as their technical capacity in such issues as security sector governance (SSG) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) is generally acknowledged.

Operational Guidelines

The development of operational guidelines for the PCRD is one other AU Decision crucial to the implementation of the PCRD policy. The development of an implementation matrix that takes cognisance of the thematic issues as they are projected in the PCRD policy and projected in a time frame is therefore the necessary step. While the thematic issues are “a given”, the time frame is a function of a given geographical environment. The draft implementation matrix at annex ‘B’ below serves as a working document, which has been derived from the generalities arising from the experiences attained on the African continent. This is an area that CSOs can and should provide their in-depth knowledge of the specific areas – geographically and thematically.

Further consultation beyond some selected members of the Commission and some members of the NGO community is needed. Also required is a more in-depth study of the principles of post conflict matrix development as derived from a variety of experiences all over the world. For this a selected group of AU Commission staff working on post conflict would require to workshop the issue as part of AU capacity-building and preparation for the wide ranging PCRD policy implementation tasks at hand. In view of the specific needs of RECs and countries emerging from conflict, there would be a requirement for the AU Commission to assist them and countries develop tailor-made PCRD implementation matrices for the operationalisation of the AU policy.

Collaborations and Capacity Building

Two key factors that are among the issues crucial for the operationalisation of this policy are collaboration and level of expertise among the key actors. In this regard the Executive Council identified the relationship between the AUSMC and the UN Peace Building Commission (PBC); the AUSMC and the African NGOs; the matter of capacity building; and the necessity of building up a database of African experts required for PCRD activities.

The AUSMC ability to successfully achieve the goals of PCRD policy depends on its collaboration with such other key actors. The UN is one such actor. The PCRD policy and the subsequent Decisions make the case for a functional collaboration between the UN through its Peace Building Commission and the AUSM in the same manner the PSC liaises with the UNSC. Such a relationship allows for the coordination of activities between the global and continental institutions and therefore assists in avoiding unnecessary duplication, which can be costly in both resource terms and adverse institutional relationships. In the same vane the AU PRCD Secretariat too should create and maintain a close working relationship with the PBC Secretariat to enhance the cooperation. The nature of these relationships is matters that can be intensively analysed by CSOs working in peace and security architectures.

The collaboration between the AUSMC and the African NGO as required by the PCRD Policy is best articulated from the viewpoint of the African CSOs by ECOSOCC. In this way, the number of actors with whom to collaborate will become larger in that NGOs are only one category amongst several others such as social groups, professional groupings and cultural organisations, as reflected in the ECOSOCC statute.

It is envisaged that collaboration between the AUSMC and the African civil society would be in two ways. One of these ways would be with the Interim Standing Committee of ECOSOCC once established. The other way is one is that which is directly with the various types of CSOs. During the development of the PCRD policy some relationships between the AU and some NGOs were established. Also arising from these contacts, an AU – Post Conflict Group has since been formed. In time this e-mail-based group is expected to grow and contribute to the overall collaboration effort. It is from such contacts that the database of African experts on PCRD will be created. This is a database that should not only identify the capacity within the continent but also that in the Diaspora. Related to this is that the capacity of the CSOs in the area of PCRD which of necessity should be enhanced by providing them with preferential access to the tools of implementation, be them financial and interrogation of issue areas. In the likely event that the African CSOs do not have adequate capacity, strategic alliances ought to be encouraged.

African Union Volunteers

Probably one of the key issues in the PCRD policy is the creation of the AU Volunteers (AUVs). The need to create the AUVs was evidently taken from the backdrop of the existence of several volunteer groups such as US Peace Corp and UK Peace Army; regional ones like the European Union Peace Corp; and international ones like Volunteer Service Overseas, International Volunteers Program; and the United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) and the need for the Continent to take responsibility. The major focus of all these services is people and development.

The focus of the AUVs would in a number ways be similar to that of UNVs with the latter’s distinct contributions towards access to services and service delivery; inclusion and participation as well as activities which include peace operations, human rights, election assistance and urban development. Given that the AU’s central theme is on human security, it follows that its focus will too be on people and development. The PCRD Policy focus entails that the AUVs will be primed towards such activities as peace operations, humanitarian relief, refugees and IDPs, election assistance, social work, provision of medical services, water and sanitation works and urban as well as rural development. The past and current situations in countries emerging from conflicts on the continent suggest the following prioritisation of activities of AUVs:

• Peace operations;

• Humanitarian relief, refugees and IDPs;

• Election assistance;

• Health;

• Urban and rural development;

• Gender and the girl child;

• Youths and children; and

• HIV AIDS

The expected massive response to the development of the AUVs will require that a unit within the CMD be established and that it also be charged with the responsibility of handling the rationalisation of all foreign volunteer services and coordinate with the appropriate UN offices over the deployment of UNVs. Although the AU through the CMD are recommended as the employment agency of AUVs, this should be done in coordination with RECs and member states.

Although by definition AUVs are not salaried, they should nonetheless be given a monthly stipend of at least one thousand US Dollars ($1, 000.00) per month regardless of the nature of activity being done by the AUV. Although not particularly a competitive figure, the amount should be sufficient for AUVs who would normally be deployed in rural areas where the cost of living is expected to be relatively low. It is also recommended that the period of service for AUVs be a minimum of one year and a maximum of two years and that as an incentive, member states be requested to prioritise returned AUVs (RAUVs) to the entry into colleges/universities and the job market.

Mobilisation of Resources

The mobilisation of resources for the implementation of the PCRD policy has been extensively covered in the policy. Nonetheless a robust thrust on the private sector operating on the continent and the Diaspora would compliment the efforts already identified in the PCRD policy. The CSOs are especially well placed to undertake extensive mobilisation of resources through their relationships with donor countries, international NGOs and the private sector with business dealings on the continent.

It is evident that the African continent is confronted with immense challenges. It is also clear that however elaborate policies may be churned out by governments and the African Union, African CSOs need to be a part of the equation. For instance, Larry Diamond presents a rather robust argument about the role of democracy in ensuring a coup-free environment today and in the future. He postulates that “where civil society is weak and the politics are corrupt and divided, the military will prevail in that moment of opportunity”²⁵ regardless of whether it is distrusted or despised. The converse belief is that with good democratic governance, characterised by an active civil society and corrupt-free politics, military coups will no longer occur, as would the multiplicity of other challenges, which are responsible for cyclical violence on the continent. Ending on a positive note, it is necessary to realise the following:

While the circumstances in Africa today are dire, they are not hopeless. In fact, they offer more grounds for hope than at any time in the past three decades.²⁶

The paper has shown that the African continent is still confronted with enormous challenges despite the many improvements that have been noted in the security situation on the continent. What is also clear is that CSOs have been playing some very important roles in mitigating security problems, which have led French et al. to conclude that success in creating a more secure and more peaceful world is likelier if civil society is involved in the effort. Even more important to note are two issues. The first is that Africa has the responsibility for a peaceful, secure, stable and politically as well as economically well-governed continent. The second is that the civil society organizations and the African Union are intrinsically tied to the onerous task presented by the post-conflict environment and that they will therefore need to be fully resourced so that they may accomplish this mission together.

Notes

1 Hilary French, Gary Gardner, and Erik Assadourian. 2005. Laying the Foundations for Peace. In Erik Assadourian et. al., State of the 2005 World: Redefining Global Security, Worldwatch Institute, Washington, P. 172

2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Synopsis of Preliminary Assessment Reports on Selected African Countries Emerging from Conflict and in Post-Conflict Situations, Addis Ababa, May 2006.

3 Ibid, p. 1,

3 John Paul Lederach, 2001. Civil Society and Reconciliation. In Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.), Turbulent Peace: The Challenge of Managing International Conflict, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C. p. 842.

5 African Union, “Statutes of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African union” as read from Arty 1(2) and Arty 3

6 For a more recent critical perspective of this debate see Ngoma. 2006. “Civil Society and Human Security Challenges in Africa”…

7 Judy El-Bushra and Kumar et al. provide a fairly comprehensive critique of CSOs with the latter arguing that some of the CSOs “owe their emergence to the existence of donor support funds”. See Judy El-Bushra, “Transforming power relations: peace building and institutions”, Civil War, Civil Peace, Helen Yanacopulos and Joseph Hanlon, Ohio University Press (USA), The Open University (UK), 2006; Kumar, K., Baldwin, K. and Benjamin, J. 2000. Aftermath: Women and Women’s organisations in Post-conflict Cambodia, Working Paper No. 307, Washington, Centre for Development Information and Evaluation, USAID.

8 United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA), “Assessing the role of Civil Society in the Prevention of Armed Conflict in Africa”, November 2004, p. vii

9 Lederach, 2001, Ibid, 842.

10 Michael Renner. 2005. Security Redefined. In Michael Renner, Hilary French, and Erik Assadourian, State of the World 2005, Worldwatch Institute, Washington, p. 5.

11 See African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.

12 Ibid, P. 10

13 Ibid, P. 23

14 Ibid, P. 26

15 The 4th Brainstorming Retreat of the PSC and other PRCs to the AU on PCRD in Africa, 4-5 September 2005, P. 12.

16 Ibid,

17 See the Report Of Proceedings Experts Meeting On Post-Conflict Reconstruction And Development (PCRD) In Africa 6-7 February 2006, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p. 6&7)

18 Ibid, p.6

19 Report On the Elaboration of a Framework Document on Post Conflict Reconstruction EX. CL/274 (IX), 25-29 June 2006, Banjul, The Gambia, p. 2.

20 Ibid, p. 4.

21 Commission of the African Union, “Africa, Our Common Destiny: Guideline Document, May 2004, p. 16

22 Commission of the African union, Draft Framework for a Common African Defence and Security Policy; First Meeting of the African Standby Force and the Common African Defence and Security Policy, 20-21 January 2004, Addis Ababa, P. 6.

23 See Decision On The Au Policy Framework On Post-Conflict Reconstruction And Development DOC. ex.cl/274 (IX

24 For a lengthier discussion of the character of the African state see L Diamond, ‘Developing democracy in Africa: African and international imperatives’,http://democracy.stanford.edu/seminar/diamondafrica.htm.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid

* PhD, Lt. Col. Rtd, Expert, Post-Conflict Reconstruction & Peace Building, Peace and Security Department, Conflict Management Division, African Union, P.O. Box 3243, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

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