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State, Civil Society and the Democratization Process in Zimbabwe,1995-2005
Constantine Munhande*
Abstract
The late 20th Century witnessed the emergence of a plethora of civil society groups particularly in the so-called developing nations of the South. The major impetus for this phenomenon has been the end of the Cold War characterised by the unpopularity of the one-party state system and the hegemonic ascendancy of neo-liberalism as the ideology of governance. This accommodative environment enabled the development of a vocal and vibrant civil society movement. The movement has been concerned with the violation of human rights and lack of democracy in these countries and the belief that a strong civil society can be a counterweight to unbridled state power. Citizen participation, initiative and discussion are the hub of a vibrant democracy. Recent developments in Southern Africa have demonstrated this positive effect. This paper attempts to analyse state-civil society relations in Zimbabwe’s democratization process and development. The Zimbabwean scenario has proven that a vibrant civil society in a state dominated by an inflexible and power hungry leadership is an antidote for gross human rights violations and limited citizen participation necessary for attaining sustainable development.
Introduction
The struggle for human rights and democracy in Zimbabwe reached new heights in the post Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) era. The period from 1995 to 2005 has witnessed an increase in the number of civil society organisations operating in the country. This increase in civil society participation has largely been on the back of an upsurge in cases of human rights violations, repression, oppression, corruption, endemic political violence and lack of accountability. Such a scenario saw the deterioration in the Human Development indicators for the country. Instead of emerging as a panacea for the unbridled state power, the emergence of the civil society in Zimbabwe has actually led to increased abuse and violations of human rights. In the wake of increased civil society participation on the political front, the government has upped the tempo through arbitrary arrests of opposition politicians, selective application of the law, intimidation of opposition supporters, the closure of political space, introduction of oppressive legislation and the use of para state arms of terror to further ruling party agenda. This paper therefore, seeks to show that the Zimbabwe case is a paradox as civil society has emerged as an antidote for human rights violations, limited political participation and ruling party hegemony which are all antithetical to the realization of development and sustainable development in any nation. It has been observed that political freedom is one of the key indicators of development. Rodney (1973) noted that development in human society “is a many sided process which at level of the individual implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and well being”.
Conceptualizing Civil Society
In its simplest sense, civil society, according to ACDP cited by UNDP (2000), refers to the organisations through which citizens participate and exert influence over public life. In other words, one could say that civil society is that conglomeration where citizens who do not control the levers of political and economic power have access to locally constituted voluntary associations that have the capacity to influence and even determine structure of power and allocation of material resources. Put simply, at any one time from the definition above, civil society is engaged in activities outside the realm of mainstream state activities with the sole purpose of influencing decision making to the populace’s advantage. In support of such an argument, Marx and Engels assert that civil society refers to a concept of society minus the state and that it is a result of man’s desire to free himself from injustice, (Marx and Engels 1970). Thus, from Marx and Engels’ perception civil society is concerned with the eradication of all forms of injustice through active engagement with the state. The ultimate goal of civil society participation in any state, therefore, is to help its citizens to develop in all spheres.
Politics of Inclusion: State-civil Society Relations, 1980-1992
In the immediate post-independence period, the state-civil society relations were cordial. The political discourse of the 1980s emphasized reconciliation and unity, development and nationalism. To achieve this all groups had to work together in “unity” under the umbrella of ZANU. Churches, Unions, and other groups were reminded in official speeches about the importance of unity (The Herald Jan 27, 1982). Those who did not acknowledge ZANU`s leadership were accused of destabilising the state in collaboration with South Africa or other enemies.
Against this background, the state sought to widen its support base through control over civil society organisations, such as the fledgling labour, women and students’ movements. In this regard, the state actually initiated moves towards the formation of an umbrella organization for workers in 1980. Subsequently, the inaugural congress of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was held in February 1981 and the first leaders elected were ZANU (PF) in orientation (Sachikonye 1997). For example, the first Secretary-General, Albert Mugabe, was the then Prime Minister’s relative, with Alfred Makwarimba - a well-known party member - as the President. In these early days, civil society organisations sought an approach complimentary to government efforts and their activities were largely in the areas of rehabilitation, relief and social services, (UNDP 2000). When legislation was promulgated to govern NGOs in 1995, most organizations were actually unwilling to criticize it. Murombedzi Kuchena, Secretary General of the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, told Sarah Rich, "I am not really very worried about it…the basic welfare operations will remain the same…so I am not going to spend my time and my energy trying to look at the dots and the full stops…which difference does it make" (Dorman 2001).
Thus the prevailing atmosphere was one in which NGOs were reluctant to challenge the state. This relationship was to change with the advent of new avenues of operation opening up for civil society organisations. These included the human rights, democracy, corruption, governance and human security areas especially after the fall of Communism and the subsequent fall in one party autocracy on the African continent.
In a proper functional democratic situation, civil society should be of such influence that it allows citizens to have a say in governance issues that ultimately determine their destiny. In other words, a strong civil society is an important insurance or bulwark for democracy. Thus, it gives citizens access to those locally constituted voluntary associations that have the capacity to influence and even determine the structure of power and the allocation of resources. However, a close look at the Zimbabwean situation reveals a clear paradox. Despite the presence of a plethora of civil society organisations in the country, the situation vis-à-vis governance, democracy and human rights has not shown any improvement, but been worsening with each day.
The state-civil society animosity and deterioration in the violation of human rights dates back to the late 1980s with the end of the Cold War. In the Cold War era, Zimbabweans anxiously watched as the ruling elite tried to privatise politics as a preserve of the petit-bourgeois nationalists that had led the liberation struggle. The people also watched, as the ruling elite became increasingly corrupt and accumulated wealth at the expense of the peasants, workers, students, youth and women. The fall of the Soviet Union, the crumbling of Communism in Eastern Europe, the retreat of apartheid South Africa and the collapse of dictatorship in Zambia and Malawi exposed the one party system, clamoured for by the ruling ZANU (PF), as being prone to corruption, dictatorship and unworkable (Ndlovu 2002). Such a realisation by the populace inspired a renewed debate and activism on the part of Zimbabwean civil society, formed around the issues of good governance, democracy, human rights and human security.
In the early days of this resurgence, Zimbabwean civil society scored some remarkable victories. For example, the movement managed to convince the ruling ZANU (PF) to abandon the selfish idea of establishing a one party state. Under pressure from civil society, particularly students, workers and intellectuals, the ZANU (PF) government was also forced to repeal the colonially conceived and constructed State of Emergency (Ncube 2001). However, the honeymoon was soon over as the government adopted the neo-liberal Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) without consulting the people. This arbitrary decision, reminiscent of the authoritarianism of the 1980s provoked widespread criticism, mainly by the workers and students (Mlambo 1997). In all this criticism, one organization that began to adopt a militant attitude was the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) which, in alliance with the student movement, began to clamour for the observation and respect of human rights and good governance.
Politics of Repression: 1992-2005
Since from 1992, when it became apparent that the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, fostered upon the people under the false claim that it was a home-grown solution to the country’s economic woes would not deliver the promised positive, voices of discontent began to be raised within the working class, student movement and civil society in general. The working class represented by the ZCTU organized anti-ESAP demonstrations, strikes and stay aways that set the union on a collision course with the ruling ZANU (PF) and were met with violence. The state-controlled main daily newspaper, The Herald, in an editorial warned that the labour movement was setting its interests in conflict with those of government and the ruling party (The Herald 23 June1992). The state President Robert Mugabe also added his voice to the anti-ZCTU stance. When refusing to attend the ZCTU -organized May Day celebrations for the second year running he stated: "The moment you turn yourself into a political party, I will tell you I am ZANU (PF). I cannot go to May Day celebrations to be a subject of ridicule by school children like students at the University of Zimbabwe" (Raftopoulos 2001).
Such statements from the head of state did not augur well for a cordial co-existence between the labour movement and the state; and not surprisingly, the movement began to seriously consider the feasibility of forming a political party to challenge the ruling party hegemony.
The above events all marked the emergence of an active civil society as the ZCTU soon gained the backing of both local and international organisations in its quest to get the workers to be listened to. However, this did not bring about the desired results as, instead of leading to improved conditions, the confrontation between government and labour soon led to the arrest and arraignment of labour leaders in the courts of law on trumped up charges. For example, the then ZCTU General-Secretary Morgan Tsvangirai was first arrested for supporting University of Zimbabwe students demonstrating against the University of Zimbabwe Amendment Act in 1992. Upon his acquittal by the High Court he was rearrested on allegations that he was working for the then apartheid South Africa’s National Intelligence Services, a charge that was again dismissed by the courts. This was a sign of what was to come as trumped up charges have since become the order of the day with opposition party and civil society leaders being arraigned in the courts on a regular basis. The use of trumped up charges has actually become a ZANU (PF) specialty as in the 1980s Dumiso Dabengwa, the PF-ZAPU intelligence supreme, and the late Lookout Masuku, the ZIPRA Commander, were detained on unproven charges of wanting to dethrone the ZANU (PF) government. In 1995 the late ZANU (Ndonga) leader, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, was also arrested on allegations that he had plotted the President’s assassination and formed a rebel movement called Chimwenje.
In 1997, disillusioned with the continued use of the independence Lancaster House Constitution, civil society organisations grouped to form the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) to advocate for the introduction of a new, home-grown constitution. This was with the hope of pressurizing government to accept a consultative process through which a new constitution could be introduced. However, instead of joining forces with civil society, the government reacted by forming its own Constitutional Commission tasked with the duty of drafting a new constitution. This was largely because there were major differences in approaches with the National Constitutional Assembly favouring a stakeholders’ conference to first agree on the process while the ruling party’s position favoured a central role for the President in selecting a Commission after “consultations” with stakeholders (UNDP 2000). The Commission did carry out a nation-wide consultation process and came up with a draft constitution that was put to a referendum in February 2000. The referendum results served as a wake up call to the ruling party, leading to parliamentary polls scheduled for March 2000 being inexplicably delayed till June 2000. This was intended to give the party time to campaign, intimidate and woo voters through a vindictive land reform process aimed at winning the rural vote.
Against this backdrop of changing state-civil society relations, unbridled animosity has characterised these relations since 1995. The state has always-and still does-claimed that civil society has one aim; that of regime change in collusion with the opposition MDC claimed to be a stooge of the West. In support of such allegations and to prevent the “…reversal of the gains of the liberation war” (The Herald 24 August 2004), the government in 2004 repealed the Private and Voluntary Organisations Act through the introduction of the Non Governmental Organisations Bill. The bill ostensibly sought to regulate the operations of NGOs but appeared in fact to want to pulverize them in the same manner the government did with the media, courtesy of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) (The Standard 24 Dec 2004). This was largely because the NGOs were perceived to be providing funding to the MDC in addition to campaigning for the party through their activities in the rural areas since most rural areas are inaccessible to the MDC. The government actually claimed that NGOs were using drought relief aid as a campaign gimmick for the opposition. The Bill, among other things, criminalized any foreign funding for NGOs involved in the governance sector, which includes all NGOs involved in issues of human rights, democracy, peace, security and political governance in general. This bill was in addition to the already existing and repressive Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). These were introduced in the run up to the 2002 Presidential Elections as a way of castrating the opposition MDC and the independent press respectively. Thus, with the introduction of the NGO bill, the ruling party sought to effectively close all the avenues to political expression by the opposition, media and civil society. Fortunately or unfortunately, the president declined to put his signature to the bill following its strong condemnation locally and internationally.
In an effort to further curtail civil society and the opposition, the ruling ZANU (PF) tightened its grip on power through the carrot and stick approach. In this regard, in 1997, after open attacks on the government from the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association demanding compensation for its members for participating in the liberation war, the government capitulated and awarded each war veteran a lump sum of Z$50 000, a Z$2 000 monthly pension and various other social benefits (Ndlovu 2003). This preferential treatment extended to the war veterans bought them to ZANU (PF)’s side, and since then, they have been and still are being used by the party to torture, intimidate, threaten and harass civilians on the party’s behalf. This, coupled with the militarisation of the country, has made life difficult for the opposition, civil society members, civilians and the independent press. In addition to the use of the war veterans as the party’s paramilitary wing, the ruling ZANU (PF) has since 2000 also made use of graduates from the National Youth Service (NYS) to violate human rights wily nilly. The NYS, instead of producing a progressive, patriotic youth like its vision proclaims, has churned out a bunch of brainwashed ZANU (PF) apologists. These graduates have been unleashed on the populace and have even gone to the extent of declaring rural areas a no-go areas for the opposition. These youths, popularly referred to as 'Green Bombers' after the colour of their uniforms, have in collusion with war veterans received overt support from the police and the military. As such, they are never arrested and actually get transport from the security forces to perpetrate their orgies of violence on the defenseless populace. At times both opposition politicians and civil society organisations’ leaders have categorically stated that the police watched with acquiescence as these para state organs of coercion assaulted them (The Standard 22 August 2004).
The formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in September 1999 worsened civil society-state relations as the state began to look at all civil society organisations as agents of neo-imperialism. Even organisations involved in relief work that had hitherto been spared the state’s wrath were also subjected to state sponsored violence. A case in point is that of the internationally acclaimed CARE International that unwittingly distributed a slow maturing variety of sorghum to resettled farmers in the arid Masvingo Province. When the matter came to light, the organisation was accused of working in collusion with economic saboteurs in the country to derail the land reform process as a way of ensuring an opposition victory in the 2005 Parliamentary elections, (UNDP 2000). Furthermore, a number of organisations in the governance and human rights arena have either been forced to close or have scaled down operations. Examples of these include Amani Trust, which since 2000 has been forced to adopt a low profile, and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) which has been forced to close most of its offices throughout the country and was only allowed to continue operating with a skeletal staff largely due to the influence of the Roman catholic Church in the country (Interview with JB Nkathazo 2002).
In the aftermath of the heavily contested 2000 Parliamentary elections and the 2002 Presidential elections, war veterans through their Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) have carried out witch-hunts on perceived opposition supporters (ZIMRIGHTS Oct Report 2003). This was accompanied by the frequent arrest of the National Constitutional Assembly Chairperson, other NCA members, the ZCTU Secretary-General, the Secretary-General of Progressive Teachers’ Union of Zimbabwe, and a variety of opposition supporters. Such a stance from government has definitely not facilitated for good civil society-state relations.
Conclusion
Civil Society is seen as an important agent of development the world over. The state, especially in developing nations, does not have enormous resources and capacity to tackle the development agenda alone. In this vein, civil society can play a crucial role in complementing government efforts. However, the states in developing nations, especially those that perceive themselves to be under “siege from the international community”, have put so many hurdles in the operations of civil society as they are perceived to be part and parcel of the monster. Events in Zimbabwe have demonstrated that there is strong relationship in the way the state and civil society interact and development. Because the Zimbabwean state did not trust any civil society that tried to operate in the areas of human rights, the relationship between the two has been characterized by suspicion, which in many instances ended up with certain civil society groups being proscribed from operation. The hate by the state of civil society that operated in the areas of human rights created an environment that was antithetical to the development of the country. Instead of channelling its limited resources towards the lifting up of the poor majority, the state used the resources to beef up its propaganda machinery to fight its “enemies operating under the guise of civil society”. On the other hand, civil society has also limited or withdrown its resources from the potential beneficiaries, as the environment has been “militarised”. Thus civil society can only advance their interests and those of the communities in which they operate if the state is democratic. Short of this development, their objectives will remain a mirage.
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* Lecturer, in History and Development Studies, Midlands State University, Zimbabwe. E-mail: munhandec@yahoo.com