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Plenary Speeches
Plenary Speech of His Excellency, Mr. Libère Bararunyeretse, President of the Senate of Burundi
Dear Chairman,
Mister OSSREA Secretary Executive,
Distinguished participants,
Ladies and gentlemen,
It is a great honor and pleasure for me to speak to this majestic audience gathered for the International Conference on the issue of conflicts in Africa.
I would also like, first and for most, to express my deepest and sincere gratitude to the Secretary Executive of the Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa, for having associated us to this conference.
I am so grateful since my country Burundi is not included in the scope of activities of this association. But I now and henceforth think that this won’t probably be for a long time again since my country has demanded to adhere to the East African Community and impatiently awaits for its admission to this sub-regional whole, today composed of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.
Here, I would like to note that as soon as this step is achieved, I will do all my best to impulse the influence of this association in Burundi and to promote an active participation of our professors and researchers in its activities.
Dear Chairman,
Mister OSSREA Secretary Executive,
Distinguished participants,
Ladies and gentlemen,
For any Burundian political person responsible, and mostly a member of parliament, the theme of the present conference bears a paramount importance. It gives us an excellent opportunity to confront our experience in resolving the crisis which has threatened our country for more than ten years, as are other countries also unfortunately torn by wars like ours.
As a contribution to the fertile debate that we begun yesterday, I would like to give some information on the peace process on hand in Burundi.
In this regard, it is worth recalling that the present-day crisis begun after the assassination of President Melchior NDADAYE, on 21 October 1993, some months after his enthroning. President NDADAYE, being descendent of the Hutu majority ethnic group, his death was followed by blind massacres, resembling a genocide in all aspects, perpetrated throughout the whole country against children, women and old people by the Tutsi minority ethnic group to which the killers of NDADAYE were supposed to belong. The war worsened the situation by adding deaths after deaths, thus putting the country into a spiral of violence and unprecedented destruction.
We have to note, however, that, while more destructive, that crisis came in addition to others which had cyclically plunged Burundi into mourning, especially in 1965, 1972 and 1988, accumulating a heavy blood continuously between the Hutu and Tutsi communities.
After the crisis started, politicians tried to find solutions to the conflict internally. It was especially urgent to start negotiations so that, if impossible to organize other elections, the institutions decapitated by the crisis could be restored.
The negotiations led to the signature, in October 1994, of a government agreement which established the power distribution guidelines between the Hutu majority political parties labeled as pro-goverment and the Tutsi majority political parties labeled as the opposition.
This agreement did not live longer. Reluctant to share power with the opposition, some Hutu political leaders finally took weapons in order to defend democracy, they said. Coming in addition to other ancient small armed movements known as Palipehutu (Hutu People Liberation Party) and Frolina (National Liberation Front), the birth of that rebellion put the country in a situation of civil war which caused wounds that are still difficult to heal.
It was in 1998 that negotiations resumed after a tumultuous evolvement, details of which are unnecessary and time-consuming to be mentioned here. The negotiations were supervised by an international mediation led by the President of the Republic of Tanzania, the late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere first, and then President Nelson Mandela afterwards. Both were supported by the Burundi Initiative for peace composed of the sub-region heads of states and led by President Yoweli Museveni of Uganda.
The negotiations were centered around four major issues, namely: genocide and exclusion; democracy and good governance; peace and security for all, and, finally, reconstruction and development. At the end of the work, a final protocol on guarantees of the implementation of the peace Process in embryo was equally established. The recommendations from the negotiations made up the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi, signed on 28 August 2000.
After this agreement, a transition period was established essentially aimed at leading the country to the adoption of a new constitution, the national reconciliation, the repatriation of refugees as well as the rehabilitation of displaced people, the organization of general elections, and so on.
At which stage are we now? Presently, Burundi is in a vast electoral program which will lead to presidential elections in April 2005, preceded by a national referendum scheduled for 22 December 2004 for elections at the level of communities, and parliamentary elections.
According to a number of outside observers, Burundi’s peace process has been delayed, and this is undeniable.
That delay can be easily explained by the turn which the conducting of the process has taken since its beginning. As a matter of fact, whereas negotiations elsewhere are preceded by determining conditions of a ceasefire, the Arusha Agreement was concluded without the participation of the chief armed movement. This agreement would not, therefore, bring peace. We had to wait until 16 November 2003 for the transition government to sign a global ceasefire agreement with the CNDD-FDD of Mr. Pierre Nkurunziza, now Minister of state in charge of good governance and state inspectorship.
In spite of the delay, the same observers acknowledge that the peace process in Burundi is predictive of the end of the tunnel. Nevertheless, still important issues remain. I shall mention at least four.
Firstly, the post-transition constitution design still remains at the center of serious controversies due to the fact that it advocates a power-sharing between ethnic groups without taking into account the political membership of each other. This leads to the establishment of a mono-ethnic power from the Hutu majority parties owing to their demographic supremacy (85%); this excludes other powers.
We are still persuaded that in a society that is as divided as Burundi, where citizens still live with the haunting memory and fear of catastrophic events which remain recent in their reminiscence, the best democratic approach lies in an institutional approach which reassures everybody and progressively brings peace, and grants confidence, national reconciliation and stability. It is what we call ‘participative democracy’ or ‘consensus democracy’.
Secondly, the impunity of the crime of genocide remains a reality. In order to handle the issue of genocide, which has been attested as a reality in Burundi and in the Great Lakes Region, the Arusha Agreement has advocated that the United Nations Security Council set up an international judicial inquiry commission on crimes of genocide, war crimes and other crimes against mankind.
The Commission has to, as its mission, inquire, establish and qualify facts and identify culprits.
This work would allow the creation of an international penal court which would be in charge of judging and punishing the culprits; if the inquiry commission establishes the existence of acts of genocide, of war crimes and other crimes against mankind.
The reality is that this commission has not been set up until now. This shows that the peace process will soon reach its end without anything undertaken to solve durably the ticklish problem of genocide. Burundi will have ended the peace process in impunity of the more odious crime, and this is not likely to enhance peace and reconciliation.
Thirdly, in the field of security, there always exist serious challenges to the electoral process.
Although the peace process progresses normally, the FNL-Palipehutu of Agathon RWASA still slaughters innocent people, rapes women and young girls, pillages and commits all sorts of violence.
The electoral process runs the risk of being held when an important quantity of arms continues to move throughout the country. In this context, citizens risk to vote under the threat of arms; this will only be a democratic rhetoric.
Fourthly and last, the present economy context is characterized by extreme poverty. Burundi’s economy has been largely destroyed by: the embargo which was imposed on us for nearly three years; the war which has destroyed everything; and, the suspension of international cooperation.
This situation forces the great majority of the population to live below the poverty line. Apart from the vital need for reconciliation and development, there lacks a minimum material basis which is absolutely necessary for social peace and development.
Therefore, it is worth noting that the issue of reconstruction for countries heading for post-conflict period always encounters almost insurmountable difficulties. Generally, financial backers from whom we expect to have means put conditions on the release of aid with the setting up of a perfect security climate; whereas this requires, for its establishment and reinforcement, a minimum development.
Dear Chairman,
Distinguished participants,
Ladies and gentlemen,
This is, in substance, the contribution that I would like to make to this conference by providing some analysis of the process of resolving the crisis which has ruined my country for ten years.
Finally, in response to the proposal forwarded by Professor Ali Mazrui to solve ethnic problems in Burundi, I would like to end my speech by the following remark: Burundi is an old nation built along centuries of integration of all its ethnic components.
The great indicators of this integration are that, whatever their ethnic origins, Burundians share the same language, the same culture and, in former times, the same religion and live together throughout the whole territory and this is rather scarce elsewhere in Africa.
Whatever their ethnic origins, Burundians feel that they are Burundians, as Tanzanians feel they are Tanzanians. Consequently, we are not allowed to solve Burundian crisis by the dissolution of Burundi people’s identity into other people’s national sovereignty. This would, undoubtedly, raise problems of another kind that would need to be studied deeply; taking examples from the colonial experience which has led to the creation of artificial wholes that we watch weathering, causing inexpressible sufferings on people.
The peace and stability in Burundi will be enhanced by the national reconciliation and reconstruction of the Burundian nation; otherwise it will not be. The other point is, of course, the present evolvement that is observed throughout the world which is in favor of creating regional wholes, which we sincerely believe in. But, in order that this be achieved successfully, it will have to rely on people’s deliberate commitment, but not in the loss of our identity.
Thank you.
Professor Ibrahim Ghandour, MP. Sudan National Assembly, MP. Pan-African Parliament
Honourable guests,
Distinguished participants,
Ladies and gentlemen,
Since the Second World War, the number of wars and conflicts has increased enormously in different parts of the world. As many as 150 have occurred during the past fifty years. The last ten years alone have seen over forty, and more are foreseen in the immediate future. Most have been civil wars and hardly any region has been spared. Many have also been of long duration, spanning twenty to fifty years.
While our African continent is considered the home of many crises, including poverty, unemployment, huge debts, HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, low levels of education and illiteracy, lack of clean water and sanitation, natural disasters, and disadvantages in economic and trade relations with developed countries, armed conflicts have, however, remained the worst. A quick count indicates that almost 50% of African countries are either in one kind of armed conflict or another or have emerged from one recently. Millions of people are affected either by displacement, loss of property or loss of lives. In addition, conflict-exhibiting countries are the bigger losers, and so is, of course, our continent.
Conflicts in Sudan
Sudan is the largest African country with a surface area of one million square miles, and having a boarder with nine countries. Sudan is rich in natural resources (oil, gold, copper, iron, etc.), with 130 million heads of livestock, and huge amounts of surface, underground and rain water. With all these resources and others It is considered a country with huge economic potential for both the Sudanese as well as Africans. However, with a civil war that started in 1955 (before independence) many of those resources either remained untapped, underutilized or badly utilized.
The Conflict in Southern Sudan
The conflict in southern Sudan began in 1955 when a Sudanese military batch declared mutiny in Trit town, at the then Equatorial region in the south. The main demand then was for a federal governing system, and fair share of power. However, following the independence on the first of January 1956 and departure of the British army and civil servants, all jobs were Sudanized. Out of these jobs, only two posts were occupied by southern Sudanese because of lack of appropriately trained Sudanese from the south. The main reason for that lack of training was the policy of the closed areas declared by the colonizing authorities. According to the 1926 ordinance, those traveling from the north to south must have a travel permit. While northern Sudanese gained access to higher education in Egypt and in Khartoum (Khartoum University College was established in 1902), southern Sudanese remained without any appropriate graduate training. The gap between north and south was large enough to create a feeling of injustice. However, while the first reason was created by the colonial policy of divide and rule, the second was self-inflicted by Sudanese politicians. Before independence, southern Sudanese leaders were invited by the British authorities to decide between three options:
1. To be part of a united Sudan;
2. To join a neighboring country;
3. To have a sovereign state;
This was in 1948, and the southern Sudanese leaders, motivated by the leaders from the north, decided to be part of a united Sudan but demanded a federal system of government. This promise was not fulfilled following independence; however the story is too long to be told in a short time. The war that broke through hearsay before independence continued up to 1972. In 1972, the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed between the government of Sudan (General Nimeiri) and the Anania Forces headed by General Joseph Lago. The agreement granted southern Sudan regional self-governing rights; this was included in the 1973 constitution.
The Addis Ababa Agreement was considered a turning point in the history of the conflict. However, in that agreement the situation of Anania Soldiers was not well defined; moreover, it did not indicate clearly the power and wealth distribution issue. However, peace was enjoyed for ten years. But in 1982, the late Chief Karbino Quanine, head to the forest with the Military Batch (105) Bur declared a new rebel movement known now as SPLA/SPLM. One of the main reasons behind the failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement was the decision of Nimeri’s, the Sudanese ex-president, decision to divide the southern region into three regions, a demand said to be supported by many tribes to escape the domination of the Dinka tribe that is the largest tribe in southern Sudan. Since the 1982 restart of the civil war in southern Sudan, the war continued up to the signing of a cease-fire agreement. It was intended to ensure a positive environment for the IGAD talks in Kenya. However, while the civil war before 1982 was only in the southern Sudanese territories, the latter conflict included new areas, namely: the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile areas. However, while those areas were considered historically part of the northern Sudan (according the boundaries of the regions in 1956), the rebel movements in those two areas joined the SPLA/SPLM headed by Dr. John Garang, under the slogan of marginalized areas. Later in January 2003, the Darfur conflict started and new rebel movements called the SPLM and JEM (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, and Justice and Equality Movement) declared themselves.
The Darfur Conflict
Darfur is the region that lies in western Sudan and is composed of three states: the north, south and west Darfur states. The total surface area of Darfur is nearly 200,000 square miles (one fifth of Sudan). This surface area is equal to the surface area of countries like France. The population in Darfur is nearly six million, and the people are all Muslims. The weather in Darfur ranges from desert to semi-desert and in some areas to Savanna or even a Mediterranean climate. Inter-tribal conflicts in Darfur are as old as the history of Darfur itself. The many tribes that live in Darfur are either subsistent farmers or nomads (camels, cattle, and sheep herders). Fight over graze, land and water used to break out every now and then. With the increase in population and livestock, the need for more resources lead to fiercer competition for the already draught affected land and water resources. Fights between different tribes used to take place, followed by a reconciliation process with appropriate compensations for lost lives and wealth. This reconciliation process is usually supported by the efforts of local, state and federal authorities. However, following the severe draught in the regions during 1983-1984, the competition became more vigorous. Political motives and interventions added more fuel to the fire. At one time in 1986, each party was accused of supporting and arming a particular tribal militia.
When the present government came into power in June 1989, heavy fighting was going on in Darfur. An agreement to stop hostilities between the Fur Rizaigat and Misseria tribes was reached on the 8 July 1989. However, while the intertribal fighting used to break out almost on regular basis, the causalities and lost lives were usually limited because only light and traditional arms were used. From the early 1980, because of the armed conflict in the south and some neighboring countries, heavy arms became available and some tribes were armed to teeth. With heavy arms available, heavier losses were inflicted. In fact, while all conflicts in Darfur used to be over natural resources, mainly land and water, a political element complicated the conflicts
The history of politics in Darfur goes back to the days of the emergence of the political parties in Sudan. Each of the Sudanese national parties tried to enjoy the support of the large tribes in Darfur. However, later at the beginning of the 1960, Darfur Development Front was formed by a young politician, who later joined the Umma Party. In 1968, an underground semi-military movement under the name SONI was formed. In May 1969, a military coup took place and the Nimeri government came into existence. The armed opposition against Nimeri’s government started. Many of those who participated in the main trials to overthrow the regime in 1973, and 1976 were from Darfur. The fighting in Darfur continued and became widespread with an increase in armed raids and armed robberies. In 1987 alone, 1400 such events were reported, 960 of which were in north Darfur alone.
In an effort to spread the conflict into other areas outside southern Sudan, the SPLA/SPLM, led by Dr. John Garang, tried to bring the conflict into Darfur. The attempt, spearheaded by Dawood Bolad, however, failed. It was defeated by the government and the leader was executed. In 2002, the Darfur Liberation Movement started in Karnoy and Umbaru areas in north Darfur. The government started negotiations with the movement to reach an agreement, but all efforts failed and new members joined the new movement. Following the division of the Sudanese ruling party, some of its members formed the justice and equality movement. The fighting between Darfur Liberation Movement and JEM on one side, and the government of Sudan on the other side continued. The raid of the rebels on Elfashir airport (Capital of north Darfur) on the 25 April 2003 became a turning point; and, as the central government in Khartoum felt the real danger of the movements, it decided to reinstate law and order in the region.
Reasons for the Conflict
1. Lack of development and limitation of resources;
2. Lack of promoting the culture of mutual coexistence among different tribes;
3. Domination of larger tribes over smaller ones.
4. Absence of dialogue, justice and democracy, and violation of human rights;
5. Luck of recognition, spread of corruption, favoritism, nepotism, and greed;
6. Economic injustice
If all shares are yours..
If all my shares are yours..
If your shares are yours..
Then where is my share?
(Music Goes To War) From Woza Africa
7. Foreign intervention
In a country with strategic geographic location and huge natural resources, foreign intervention by external powers and multinationals is expected.
Civil War Impacts
1. Death and displacement of people;
2. Lack or delay of development;
3. Spread of diseases such as HIV/ AIDS, malnutrition, etc.
4. A negative impact on the environment represented in the misuse and abuse of trees and removal of the vegetation cover leading to desertification;
5. Loss of national coherence and the spread of hatred, and the culture of killing in the society;
6. Two million people dead and wounded, three million displaced, and a cost of 150 billion USD spent during fifty years of war.
Peace Efforts
The efforts continued in order to find a solution to the conflict in southern Sudan. Before the present government’s coming into power in 1989, the previous government, lead by H.E Elsadig Elmahadi (then prime minister), made some efforts but the SPLA/SPLM leader refused even to negotiate with the government. The SPLA/SPLM only accepted to discuss the matter with the prime minister only in his capacity as a chairman of the Umma political Party. A one-day nine-hour meeting ended up with no agreement. In November 1988, Garang agreed to negotiate with Sayed Mohamad Osman Elmirghani, leader of the National Unionist Democratic Party, and an agreement was signed between the two parties. But it was not accepted by some of the major political powers because it denied the rule of Sharia Laws even in the majority Muslim north.
The present National Salvation government organized a national conference on peace in October 1989. Following the congress, the government declared a cease-fire, which was violated by the SPLA by attacking Elkurmuk on the Ethiopian boarders. The government also declared general amnesty and started humanitarian relief in the famous operation Life Line supported and executed by the UN. The government later on started what is known as peace from within. The following agreements were signed with small fighting groups in the south:
1. The Abu-Shoak agreement in 1992
2. The Mazloum factions and the Upper Nile government in 19923
3. The United Faction Agreement in 1992
4. Agreement with SPLA group in Benteu in 1993
5. The Peace Forces Agreement (Gubrial Tank 1993)
6. Agreement with Bour Association in 1994
7. The Fariang meeting with Garang forces in 1995
8. The signing of Elnasir political charter (Nuair tribe) in1996
9. The political charter in Khartoum and the Fashouda Peace Agreement
(Shoulok tribe)10. The Nuba Mountains Agreement SPLA/ Nuba Mountains sector in January 2003 (Geneva)
However, in all these efforts, with the exception of the Nuba Mountain Agreement, the SPLA/SPLM, led by Dr. John Garang, was not directly involved.
External efforts to achieve peace in Sudan are many. These include:
1. The American Efforts: 1989-2004:
The USA initiative started by the Kohian envoy in 1983, continued through GLOBAL 2000 (President Jimmy Carter), to Senator Rev. John Danforth in 2002 up to involvement through IGAD friends (Later IGAD partners and of course through the USA influence on the UN and the Security Council).
2. The Nigerian Efforts 1992 (Abuja 1 & 2)
Nigeria, as a leading African country, showed special concerns to peace issues in Sudan and an initiative was declared on 24 August 1992.
3. The IGAD Peace Initiative 1994-2004
Since 1989 many rounds of talks between the SPLA/SPLM and the Sudanese government have taken place. However, the most serious talks were mediated by IGAD. The efforts of the Kenyan government in supporting the talks cannot be overlooked. The talks have continued from 1994 up to the now. However, the direct involvement of the UN and USA is about to end the civil war in southern Sudan.
4. The Libyan-Egyptian Initiative 2001
This initiative called for a preparatory conference for the Sudanese political parties. The best outcome of this initiative was the sensitization of IGAD and IGAD partners (USA, Norway, UK, and Italy) to reactivate their initiative which culminated in the signing of the Machakos Protocol in July 2002 that further led to the signing of the Niva1`sha Protocols on security arrangements as well as power and wealth sharing.
Key Elements of the Machakos Protocol
The government of Sudan and the SPLA/SPLM agreed, inter alia, on the following:
· Peace implementation will be conducted in ways that make the unity of Sudan attractive;
· The southern Sudanese have the right to govern affairs in the south and to participate equitably in the national government;
· The southern Sudanese have the right to self-determination, including a referendum to determine their future status;
· A democratic system of government will be established;
· There will be a national constitution that guarantees freedom of religion and an inclusive constitutional review process during the interim period;
· The sources of law for national legislation in states outside southern Sudan will be Sharia and the consensus of the people.
According to the Machakos Protocol, peace implementation will include the following elements:
· A six-month pre-interim period;
· A six-year interim period during which mechanisms and institutions would be provided for.
Thank you.
Plenary Speech of Colonel Zephania Urio, Defence Liaison Officer, East African Community
Honourable Chairperson
On behalf of the East African Community (EAC), I am very pleased to be associated with this important Conference, which has been organized by the Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA).
I would like to begin by expressing my appreciation to OSSREA for dedicating itself to the worthy cause of peace and security in our region and continent. I am sure the Organization is making a significant impact with its contribution to the peace efforts in Africa.
Honourable Chairperson
The cause for peace and security is a cause that must be joined by all. It is a cause that must succeed through the collaborative and systematic efforts of all the sections of society and all the nations of the world.
There is need to identify clearly the sources and causes of conflicts and to design effective approaches and interventions for lasting solutions.
Indeed, over the years, many approaches have been tried and tested to establish the conditions of peace and security within and among nations in Africa and the world at large. Yet, these interventions and approaches have not yielded the ideal situations; and these call for increased efforts to find solutions and sustain peace and tranquility in our societies. The challenge is to constantly develop new ways, more effective ways, of dealing with the situations of conflict and insecurity.
It is in this context that one appreciates the appropriateness of this conference, focused, as it is, on the theme of African conflict management.
By bringing together the representatives of a wide range of sectors, the conference is likely to generate good ideas and effective strategies for the management of African conflicts.
Honourable Chairperson
Since its inception, the East African Community has placed emphasis and priority on the establishment of regional peace and security as a pre-requisite for regional integration and development. It is recognized that any development efforts and any development achievements would be invalidated by the emergence or prevalence of conflicts and insecurity.
The pursuit of the consolidation of east Africa as a large and viable investment destination and market area imposes on the EAC Partner States the need to pursue and maintain peace in each of the Partner States and the region at large (including the Great Lakes Region).
On account of this, both the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC and the Second EAC Development Strategy (2001- 2005) emphasise peace and security among the agreed areas of regional integration and development.
Moreover, as in the words of the 1991 Kampala Document on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, “the Security, Stability and Development of every African country is inseparably linked with those of other countries. Consequently, instability in one African country reduces the stability of all other African countries.”
The EAC Partner States have, therefore, made concerted efforts involving mainly diplomatic interventions to solve the conflicts in the countries surrounding the region, e.g. the Burundi peace process.
Another factor in the maintenance of regional security involves the political and economic liberalization measures which the EAC Partner States have pursued since the 1980s.
These trends have created room for the active role of civil society and private sector organizations, but also the emergence of strong central governments, which can be relied on to ensure peace and stability.
The quest for regional peace and security in East Africa is safeguarded under Article 5 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC (1999), which provides that peace and security and good neighborliness in the region shall be among the fundamental objectives of the Community.
Article 124 of the Treat elaborates on the Cooperation in Regional Peace and Security; and the Partner States have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for Co-operation in Defence matters (signed in 1998 and revised in 2001).
Under this MOU, an EAC Defence Liaison Unit was established at the EAC Headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania in 1998, manned by senior military officers, one each from the three Partner States.
On the whole, the EAC Partner States are taking measures to address the issues of peace and security through, among other:
· Ensuring the maintenance of peace and stability in the region; and in the countries surrounding the region;
· Avoidance and prevention of conflict within the region; observance of the principles of good neighborliness and peaceful resolution of conflicts;
· Addressing the root causes of conflict through observance of good governance, respect for human rights, including issues of good security and poverty eradication;
· Co-operation in defence matters as well as capacity-building and preparedness for peace-keeping, conflict resolution and disaster management.
Indeed, in its broader vision, whereby it embraces the eventual establishment of a Political Federation of East African States (Article 123), the EAC Treaty looks at the eventual establishment of a common defence pact (Article 125). Thus, a formula has been found and the prospects of any of the Partner States going to war against another eliminated.
Whereas the EAC region has enjoyed relative peace and stability compared to other parts or region of Africa, the region is, nevertheless, affected by the conflicts which have occurred or prevailed in the countries surrounding it.
Thank you.
Plenary Speech of Mr. Ilunga Ngandu, Regional Liaison Representative, AU, ECA, IGAD, UNHCR
Professor Eshete
Excellencies
My fellow panelists
Ladies and Gentlemen
I would like to express my deep appreciation to the Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) for organizing this International Conference on African Conflicts: Management: Resolution, Post-conflict Recovery and Development.
The subject of my presentation will be centered on UNHCR’s experience in addressing the repatriation, reintegration of refugees IDPs in a post-conflict situation.
Voluntary repatriation and reintegration of refugees, when a conflict ends, take place in a particularly challenging environment:
the security situation is far from being totally restored;
the basic socio-economic coping mechanisms have been weakened and disrupted;
infrastructures have been destroyed and dilapidated: schools, health, sanitation, roads;
the political governance are to be restored, elections held and democratic institutions established;
the normal income generation systems have been disrupted – activities, such as farming are made difficult due to landmines, and lack of adequate support programmes.
The affected populations and the challenges of post-conflict situations in Africa
After the initial assistance provided by humanitarian actors, which is of an emergency nature, the subsequent process of reintegration and longer-term reconstruction does not occur in a seamless fashion. The communities requiring assistance for reintegration are returnees from exile, internally displaced, who by far outnumber returnees, the demobilised soldiers, ex-rebels or combatants who return to the communities and the resilient population who never left the war zones.
Major Challenges
One of the major challenges that arise in a post-conflict situation is the reestablishment of the security situation. Rebuilding law enforcement institutions (Police, Judiciary, Civil Territorial Administration) is an urgent need. Without these institutions, it would be impossible to ensure the protection of the civilian population, good administration of justice and restoration of enjoyment of the full spectrum of human rights, including freedom of movement and return and reintegration of internally displaced and refugees in safety and dignity.
The issue of reconciliation is a fundamental element in the process of peace building and reintegration of the displaced persons, returnees, ex-combatants and war affected populations.
The repatriation, reintegration and rehabilitation of such large population require investments that should deal with the most immediate access to vital social services, such as shelter, water, sanitation, health, basic education, but also income generation activities in order to transition from being dependent on humanitarian assistance to rebuilding their lives.
Most evaluations undertaken so far in Africa point to serious weaknesses in DDRR programme implemented in transition situations. In the words of Liberian Authorities, ONLY the first DD are implemented while the double Rs are not. The challenge lays with the fact that based on well conducted assessments of past or on-going DDRR. There is a need to devise new strategies in order to:
To re-engineer DDRR programmes of demobilizing, decommissioning and disarming combat troops;
Support systems need to be refined to register, monitor and control decommissioned weapons;
To disarm soldiers and train them either to join state army or to prepare for an alternative career.
Such programmes credibility will be found in their ability to get former combatants into the work force, through reconstruction projects of high intensity of man-power and requiring semi-skilled labourers.
Another area which will require investment will be the rehabilitation of destroyed or dilapidated basic infrastructures indispensable for civilian populations affected by war to resume normal, productive lives, such as feeder roads, schools, hospitals, shelters and sanitations facilities. Such programmes can create jobs and revive socio-economic activities much needed in a transition situation.
In post-conflict, the civil administration system should be rebuilt and provided with resources, equipment and capacity to assume the much needed responsibilities to the communities. With capacity are needed new ethics in order to ensure delivery of services, settlement of disputes, conduct reconciliation processes and ensure that the rule of law replaces the law of the jungle.
Gender based violence has characterised most conflict situations and post-conflict situations. The special needs of women and girls should receive particular attention.
One very significant challenge is the need to devise appropriate credible funding arrangements that can assure timely and adequate resources that cover holistically the core components of an integrated post-conflict programme.
The paramount challenges of post-conflict reconstruction have been identified by a recent report of the UNDG Working Group on transition as being mainly the difficulty to bring together all agencies, entities with different sectoral mandate into integrated and coordinated programmes from needs assessment, programme formulations, and joint coordinated implementation.
The absorption capacity of transitional governments in Africa or elsewhere is relatively weak – analysis should focus on what measures should be built into the post-conflict programmes to ensure adequate absorption capacity of the considerable resources needed within the five transition years to consolidate recovery and avoid relapse into war.
The involvement of the local governments is paramount. Host governments should establish an inter-ministerial system which would ensure national ownership and higher chances of a successful post- conflict process. The only long-term way of preventing countries from relapsing into conflict is for governments to address the legitimate grievances of their populations. Many of these grievances are tied to socio-economic developments outcomes, but addressing them requires creating political structures that engage with different groups and allow them to voice freely their concerns and to meet their needs. A decentralised, effective, participatory and INCLUSIVE government structure is typically the surest long-term way of re-building broken societies.
Finally, post conflict programmes of recovery cannot be quick fix programmes – the countries in transition, destroyed by long conflicts are extremely poor and usually highly in debts. There are lessons to be learnt from the Balkans where a holistically integrated and well-funded programme covered most areas of post- conflict recovery from humanitarian, to governance and development over a medium to long term period. This has, unfortunately, not always been the case in Africa.
The 4Rs framework
For millions of refugees and IDPs voluntary repatriation and reintegration remain the most preferred durable solution to their plight.
The realization of this solution, however, involves complex and challenging processes requiring integrated and sustained actions by the international community. One such challenge is presented in the effort to bridge the gap between relief and development. The smooth transition from emergency relief to longer-term development remains a key priority for the international community, particularly in post-conflict situations.
The High Commissioner proposed an approach known as the “4Rs” (Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction), which is a programme concept referring to the related repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction processes. The “4Rs” aims to ensure linkages between all four processes so as to promote durable solutions for refugees, ensure poverty reduction and help create good local governance.
The guiding principles and critical success factors for this integrated approach are:
Ownership by host governments of the processes which the 4Rs concept embodies;
Integrated planning process at the country level by the UN Country Team;
Strong institutional cooperation and commitment to support, punctually and at decisive moments, the needs and efforts of country teams to bridge essential gaps in transition strategies; and,
Participation of the plethora of actors who form part of the development community – UN agencies, bilateral and multilateral institutions.
The 4Rs is intended to serve as an overarching framework for institutional collaboration in the implementation of reintegration operations in post- conflict situations at global level. It is designed to allow a maximum flexibility for field operations to pursue country specific approaches with support from heir respective Headquarters.
This is a comprehensive and institutionalized approach to reintegration which would help produce a number of desired outcomes in an integrated manner. These include: good local governance; protection of the rights of communities inclusive of returnees; improved social services including infrastructure; co-existence and confidence building; economic revival; and, livelihood creating and improved access to services.
UNHCR experience of Repatriation and Reintegration Programmes in Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone
Burundi In Burundi, the signing of understandings between the Government and the rebellion as well as progress in the recent peace talks have already enabled UNHCR to facilitate the repatriation of 35,000 refugees since the beginning of this year. Up to 800,000 refugees could eventually return over the next few years. UNHCR is cautious with promoting a large-scale repatriation at this stage, as there are still enormous challenges to be met.
The Operation Review Board launched the supplementary programme for the return and reintegration of Burundian refugees from the neighboring countries. To facilitate this process the Cellule Inter-Agencies de Reinsertion (CIR) has been established. This mechanism will allow UNHCR to tap into funds and benefit from the other agencies strength. In this context, UNDP has hired staff and posted them to Makamba and Ruyigi provinces where they will work alongside UNHCR’s personnel. This relationship serves as the focal point in the engagement of the Minister of Return, Reinsertion and reintegration (M3R).
Other attempts to strengthening the cooperation and work towards durable solutions are initiatives emphasized in the different sectors established within the UNCT:
Within the Food Sector an MOU between WFP/FAO and UNHCR has been signed. The memorandum recognizes the central role that FAO and WFP will play in reviving food production and food security. This memorandum will include returnees in the distribution of seeds and basic tools in the areas of return.
In the Health Sector, a joint memorandum has been signed between WHO/UNICEF and UNHCR. This memorandum has been further strengthened by the decision of DFID to support its implementation. All the health technical aspects, as they relate to return and reintegration, will be addressed by the memorandum and DFID will provide all the necessarily funding.
The education sector will be led by UNICEF who expect to keep a longer commitment, and who have already taken on responsibility for 75% of the education needs countrywide. In this respect, UNICEF/UNHCR and the Belgian Cooperation have established a close relationship resulting in UNICEF and UNHCR signing a bilateral agreement.
Develop a joint Mine Awareness and De-mining campaign under the leadership of UNMAS and involving UNICEF, UNHCR, Handicap International and Danish Church Aid.
Liberia. The facilitated voluntary repatriation of Liberian refugees from neighboring countries commenced beginning of October, as part of the 2004-2007 multi-year plan to properly manage the return of Liberian refugees. It is furthermore planned that some 100,000 IDPs be assisted to return back to their counties of origin.
The re-integration programme has factored the host communities who never left. UNHCR and UNDP have developed a joint programme aimed at Community Based Recovery. The programme includes Community Empowerment Projects (CEPs) which target rural communities without categorizing Returnee, IDPs or host communities. The community will be expected to prioritize their needs and participate in the implementation of the programmes which will enable them to gain control of resources. At the basis of the CEP concept lies the idea of establishing transparent, inclusive and participatory procedures for communities in managing resources.
The coverage of CEPs has now spread to the major counties of return. Currently, more than 200 CEPs are at different stages of implementation, including several targeting youth and women.
UNHCR community reintegration programmes also benefit the ex-combatants and their families. Linkages are being developed with UNDP, EU, DIR and other partners on ways to integrated programmes which benefit the community at large. Specific programmes targeted, include: skills training centers, maintenance of feeder roads, shelter construction, peace-building and human rights activities.
To strengthen the sustainability of some of the above mentioned activities, ILO and UNHCR intend to work together within the 4Rs framework and the framework of the UNHCR operational plan for the reintegration of Liberian refugees and IDPs. A community-based approach will be followed for sustainable integration initiatives, with UNHCR identifying target communities in areas of return and working in partnership with ILO for the implementation of medium and long-term initiatives.
Sierra Leone since 2003. Two major achievements in the 4Rs process were accomplished in Sierra Leone. The first achievement was the arrangement of a Transitional Support Team (TST) that UNCT set up in order to support the transition from recovery to poverty reduction in the country. In close cooperation with the Government and its partners, local authorities and communities, the TST is identifying needs for capacity-building and community empowerment, which can ensure that reintegration of returning populations, is durable.
A second achievement transpired in the handing over of some revolving funds for micro-projects to UNDP, aimed for sustainable development and ensuring successful exit of UNHCR from Kambia District by the end of 2004.
As part of UNHCR's drive in 2003 and 2004, both to decentralise programming to field office level and to bolster community self-reliance, more than 250 Community Empowerment Projects (CEP) in main areas of return have been approved and funds provided via Implementing Partners (IPs). These projects are based on a facilitated inclusive community decision-making and planning process, with communities deciding to allocate external funds and their own resources to small-scale projects, such as agriculture, community schools, water and sanitation, village infrastructure, local commerce support, skills training and women's capacity building.
In coordination with other agencies, the promotion of capacity building of IPs and line ministries expected to participate in developmental activities, with information sharing, logistical support and office equipment is also part of UNHCR’s phase out strategy (e.g., CEP provides one year rent of office space for Ministry of Social Gender and Social Welfare and stipend for health workers in clinics – Kambia district, while awaiting the line ministries HQ to take over).
AU/NEPAD
In conclusion I would like to briefly mention UNHCR’s involvement in the AU/NEPAD programme. The United Nations General Assembly had decided and instructed the Secretary General to see to it that the NEPAD programme adopted by African Heads of States and the African Union should become the overall guiding framework for all the programmes and activities of the United Nations in Africa.
The UN system support for NEPAD has been organized around seven thematic clusters that broadly correspond to the priorities of the Partnership. UNHCR has been designated the lead agency for the sub-Cluster on “Humanitarian Response and Post-Conflict Recovery” under the auspices of the Cluster on “Governance, Peace and Security”.
The objective of the sub-Cluster is to develop a consolidated UN inter-agency post-conflict recovery programme for the target countries in line with NEPAD’s post-conflict framework with special attention to refugees, returnees, IDPs, ex-combatants. To this end, UNHCR and its sub-Cluster partners are in the process of establishing criteria for selecting countries in post-conflict transition and develop a framework for a standard humanitarian response. The strategic framework aims to establishing integrated approaches to respond to the challenges highlighted above. Taking into account that there are currently post-conflict programmes being implemented, or just adopted for a number of African countries, it was felt by the UN sub-Cluster on post-conflict that what was needed as an added value by NEPAD was to identify the glaring gaps that might exist in the on-going post-conflict programmes, either in term of missing core component, lack of resources, disconnect or lack of coordination.
Therefore, once the strategic framework for post-conflict situations in Africa is adopted, it will serve as a yardstick for a NEPAD post-conflict task team in consultation with the UNCT and each country in transition, to be used for reviewing the current state of affairs, identifying gaps in core areas, and formulating additional complementary programmes to consolidate the post-conflict reconstruction.
Thank you.