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Selected Plenary Presentations from the African Conflicts Conference
Honorable guests,
Dr. Alfred G. Nhema, Executive Secretary of the Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA),
Distinguished Participants,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It gives me great pleasure to open this conference that is convened to address conflict, which is one of Africa's persistent challenges. I would, therefore, like to express my appreciation to the Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) for organizing this important and timely conference.
This is probably one of those periods when Africa should take stock of the situation in the continent with respect to conflicts, so that it would be in a position to work effectively to ensure peace and stability in the region. The records of the past few years have been rather mixed in our continent.
That Africa has for long been associated with conflicts is something we have been used to. Africa has suffered both from inter and intra-state conflicts. The crises that have afflicted the continent have been one of the reasons why it has been possible for Africa to lag behind in economic development. No doubt the lack of economic and social development and the hopelessness that has been engendered by that reality has also contributed to fueling conflicts in the continent and to making Africa almost synonymous with instability.
Academicians might attribute the crises in Africa to many causes, including extra-African factors both historical and current. But one thing is absolutely incontrovertible – the reality and image of Africa as a region of conflict can effectively be addressed only when Africans manage to put their houses in order and when they take the lead in ensuring peace and stability in the continent.
Excellencies,
Distinguished Participant,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is not all doom and gloom in our continent. Indeed, there have been real improvements in Africa in addressing the challenges of conflicts. Since 1993, first the former OAU and now the AU have made real contributions to strengthen Africa’s role in resolving and managing conflicts in the continent. The AU has, in particular, taken a major historic step towards creating African capacity for peaceful resolution of conflicts in the continent including peace-keeping and peace-making. The establishment by the AU of the Peace and Security Council is, in particular, a major effort by Africa in terms of laying the basis for enabling the continent to address the challenges in this area.
It must also be mentioned that African sub-regional organizations have been contributing, in quite a notable manner, to the alleviation of the problem in specific regions of the continent. The role of IGAD has been no doubt commendable with respect to the progress that has been made for peace in Somalia and in connection with the conflict that has affected relations between the north and the south of Sudan for too long. The ECOWAS has also been effective in helping the West African region mange the conflicts, particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
Excellencies,
Distinguished Participant,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
But Africa is not yet out of the woods as far as conflicts are concerned. There is no better reminder of this than the current situation in Cote d' lvoire. We all know how that country had been perceived as a beacon of economic development as recently as a few years ago. The tragedy of that country is Africa's tragedy and the fact that Africa is yet unable to stop the slide of that, country into greater conflict is indeed a sad commentary on the condition that still prevails in our continent. The situation in Darfur is yet another episode that shows how the situation in Africa is so brittle and so precarious.
In this regard, it is obvious that while in the final analysis it is through greater effort by Africa that the conflict situations in the continent can be mitigated and eventually resolved, it would be unrealistic to believe that Africa can handle the problem alone; international solidarity and co-operation is absolutely critical for the continent to make headway in this respect.
International co-operation is required on two areas. First, economic co-operation is fundamental since conflicts are more often than not rooted in economic difficulties and the hopelessness that results form this reality. Secondly, co-operation in enhancing Africa's capacity for managing conflicts is also critical. In today's globa1ized world instability in Africa certainly has implications for the security of the rest of the world. Therefore, international partnership in addressing the root causes as well as management of conflicts in Africa need to be further strengthened with the requisite determination and seriousness of purpose.
Finally, I would like once again to express my gratitude to OSSREA for taking this initiative which undoubtedly would help shade light on the salient issues involved in understanding as well as responding to conflicts in Africa.
While wishing you successful deliberations, I now declare this conference officially open.
I thank you.
Keynote Speech of Professor Ali A. Mazrui : Conflict in Africa: An Overview
Dear Chairman,
Distinguished participants,
Ladies and gentlemen,
As the twentieth-first century begins, Africa consists of some fifty-four countries, depending upon how you count some islands. Since independence, about one third of those countries have experienced large-scale political violence or war.1 This does not include those countries that have had relatively bloodless military coups or occasional assassinations (After all, even the United States has had presidential assassinations). It is true that not all of Africa is afflicted to the same degree. Africa is an immense continent, richly varied in its cultures and peoples. The levels of violence differ greatly. Nor can one easily predict where violence will occur. Kenya, for example, shares borders with five other countries, four of which have experienced civil wars: Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda. The fifth country on its borders is Tanzania, a country that was partly born out a revolution (the Zanzibar Revolution of 1964). In comparison with its neighbors, Kenya has so far been spared large-scale civil conflict. Yet the overall pattern of violence on the African continent is disturbing and deserves analysis.
There are no simple and easy explanations for conflicts in Africa and the theories that have been advanced are both numerous and contradictory. Rather than attempt to catalogue these many theories, I shall look at some of the rather haunting paradoxes that seem to mark conflict in Africa. Then, I shall suggest some possible solutions and consider how much progress has, in fact, been made in recent decades.
The Roots of Conflict
Black Violence, White Roots
While the most lethal of all wars in Africa have been those fought between blacks, the roots of these wars lie in the white legacy. On the one hand, bloody as they were, the anti-colonial wars were less bloody than post-colonial wars. It is true that the anti-colonial wars (primarily fought between black's and whites) did cost a lot of lives. A case in point is Algeria, where more than a million people perished at the hands of the French.
However, post-colonial wars have been fought mainly between blacks, and they have been even more ruthless.2
On the other hand, it must be recognized that the seeds of the post-colonial wars themselves lie in the sociological and political mess which "white" colonialism created in Africa. Colonial powers destroyed old methods of conflict resolution and traditional African political institutions. They failed to create effective substitute ones in their place. In the West, effective states are widely perceived to be one of the major tools societies have invented for the preservation of internal stability and order. In Africa the states founded by Europeans were not effective. They were developed in newly fashioned countries and built on fragile bases. The Africans who inherited these states from the Europeans had, moreover, little experience in governing themselves. Self-government is not something easily taught. Failing states have been one of the major sources of conflict in post-colonial Africa.
Are Borders to Blame?
While most African conflicts are partly caused by borders, those conflicts are not themselves about borders. Before the western colonial powers arrived there were virtually no boundaries in Africa. Most people lived in loose groupings. Their territories were unmarked. Empires came and went, absorbing new groups and being assimilated themselves, but possessing few, if any, rigid frontiers. But at the end of the last century the colonial west arrived. The Berlin Conference in 1888 imposed the iron grid of division upon the continent.
The political boundaries created by colonial powers in Africa enclosed groups with no traditions of shared authority or shared systems of settling disputes. These groups did not necessarily have the time to learn to become congenial.3 In West Africa, for example, the large territory which the British carved out and called Nigeria enclosed three major nations and several smaller ones. Among the larger groups, the Yoruba in the west were very different from the Muslim Hausia in the north, who in turn were quite distinct from the Ibo in the east. This artificial mixture was to lead to one of Africa’s great human tragedies, the Nigerian Civil war of 1967-70. Until pictures of starving Ethiopian children shocked the world in 1980’s, the most haunting images from post-colonial Africa were those of starving Biafran children, the victims of this war.
If colonialism forced into the same political entity people who would otherwise have lived apart, it also separated people who would otherwise have lived together. A country like Somalia is in effect a nation trying to become an all-inclusive state. The Somali have scattered in four different countries, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. Their desire for reunification has resulted in deadly conflict.
On the other hand, paradoxical as this seems, one cannot say that African conflicts are about boundaries. African governments, ironically, have tended to be possessive about these artificially created colonial borders. They have generally resisted any challenge to them. They have been relatively few disputes about borders. The borders generate conflicts within them but have not been encouraged to generate conflict across them. The dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea is in this regard an exception rather than rule4.
Religion or Ethnicity?
While the worst conflicts in Arab Africa are religious, the worst conflicts in Black Africa are ethnic. The word ethnic in this case is used in the sense of the older word, tribal. By Arab Africa, we largely mean North Africa (Algeria, Libya and Egypt, for example, are Arab). For example, Algeria is afflicted by arguably the worst conflict in Arab Africa. The conflict is between Islamicists and the military secularists, and religion, however politicized, is at its root. It is among the uglier and most intractable armed conflicts in the world.6 Religion is also at the root of the conflict in Egypt.7
By contrast, the worst outbreaks of violence in Black Africa in the 1990's occurred as a result of the conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi. The genocides in Rwanda and Burundi in the 1990s were ethnic.8 The conflict in Somalia was likewise ethnic, or at any rate, sub-ethnic (between clans rather than between tribes). The civil war between northern and southern Sudan further illustrates my point. Sudan straddles the Arab and the African worlds. Is its civil war primarily ethnic or primarily religious?9 You may take your pick. Either interpretation is totally defensible.
Resources or Identity?
While blacks clash with whites in Africa over resources, blacks clash with blacks over their identities. White and black people, in other words, fight each other about who owns what but blacks fight blacks about who is who. Racial conflicts between blacks and whites in Africa are ultimately economic. Apartheid in South Africa, for example, was ultimately an economic war. By contrast, when you look at configurations of violence in those parts of Africa, where blacks are fighting blacks, it is difficult to show that the struggles are over resources. Often there are no resources of any significance over which to fight. Sometimes it is possible see the struggle in terms of an effort to get a share of power. But for the most part, major clashes appear to be related to cultural demarcations. The struggle between the Hutu and Tutsi is one such example.
That it is culture rather than economics that matters in the politics of Black Africa can best be illustrated by looking at what happens when Africans who are left of center attempt to invoke class solidarity. When they fight somebody who invokes ethnic solidarity the cards are stacked against them. Class symbols time and again prove inadequate in the face of ethnic sentiment. In Kenya, for example, the Luo politician Oginga Odinga used left of center rhetoric and appealed to all Kenyans to follow him. Despite the fact that his message ought to have appealed to the exploited, those who rallied to his cause were not the disadvantaged members of all Kenyan ethnic groups. Instead, Odinga found himself followed by Luo of all social classes. Obafemi Awolowo of Nigeria had a similar experience. He moved just a little to the left of the normal orientation of major Nigerian politicians. He warned Nigerians that they were being cheated. He too drew support, not from disadvantaged Nigerians of all ethnic groups, but from all the Yoruba. The Yoruba, moreover, came from all social classes, the rich and the poor. In other words, the ethnic messenger rather than the economic message has proved to be what counts in the conflicts among blacks.
Modern Weapons and Pre-Modern Armies
At independence, weapons in Africa were in general not very advanced but the armies were relatively disciplined and professional, in short, modern. Now, the weapons have become more advanced, but the armies have become less disciplined and less professional. The standing army and western weapons both, it may be added, were yet another legacy of colonialism. One of the few African countries to consider, even briefly whether to do without a standing army was Tanzania. In 1964, Julius Nyerere had the opportunity to disband his entire army and not build an alternative one. He did disband the old one but he did not follow Costa Rica's example and do without an army. Instead, he reconstructed a national army. African countries, as a whole, entered independence with this dysfunctional twin inheritance.
This combination of modern weapons and less than modern armies has proved to be a menacing and destabilizing one. Africa's rather fragile government institutions are all too easily destroyed by the predominant power in the country, the gun. Soldiers have proved to be the most powerful force in African politics since independence. Africa has seen over seventy coups in a quarter of a century. The susceptibility of African states to military takeovers is all the more worrisome in that militaries have not proved capable of transforming African economies. Some soldiers, it is true, have made an effort to be constructive. Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, a military pilot who seized power in Accra in the summer of 1979, sought to put his power to good use. He attempted to mobilize his people for economic development and social transformation rather than for war, and Ghana received a relatively large amount of support from the World Bank. But Rawlings' success was limited, and Ghana to this day remains impoverished.
Dualism and Pluralism
Although plural societies cause us more alarm, dual societies may in fact be more dangerous. The dangers of plural societies have been much discussed. A plural society is one which has multiple groups defined ethnically, racially, religiously, culturally, or by other parameters. The United States is a plural society. Dual societies are less numerous and less discussed than plural societies in Africa.11 A dual society is one in which two groups (again defined ethnically, religiously, culturally, or by other parameters) account for over 80% of the population. Belgium, for example, is a dual society of Flemish and Francophone identity.12
Dual societies run a number of high risks. First, they run the risk of getting trapped in a prolonged stalemate. The standoff between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is a case in point.13 Second, a culture of polarized ethnic distrust may develop. The examples that come to mind here are outside Africa: Belgium, Guyana, and Trinidad. Third, dual societies may endure prolonged periods of tension and violence. Outside of Africa the struggle in Northern Ireland provides ample warning of this.
Within Africa, Berbers and Arabs in Algeria are on the verge of a similar struggle. Fourth, dual societies also run the risk of separatism and secessionism. Asian and European examples exist. Sri Lanka is still torn by the Tamil bid to secede from the Senegalese dominated polity.14 Bosnia and Herzegovina today is split between the Muslim-Croat Federation in the west and the Serbian Republic Sprska in the east.15
Lastly, dual societies run the risk of genocide and potential genocidal reprisal. The most telling example of this is to be found in Rwanda, where the Hutu and Tutsi engaged in bloody confrontation that destabilized the region and became a key cause of the international war that later unfolded in neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo. Meanwhile, Burundi faced acute danger of genocide until a delegation led by Nelson Mandela in 2001 helped ease ethnic tensions at least temporarily.16
"Ethnic" dual societies can be differentiated from "regional" dual societies, where the division is between two regions rather than between two ethnic groups. Within Africa we may point to Sudan17, Nigeria, and Uganda. Northern and southern Sudan experienced civil war between 1955 and 1972 and have been engaged in civil war again since 1983. Northern Nigeria fought southern Nigeria in a civil war (1967-1970)18. While this war was not totally about divisions between north versus south, it certainly included that dimension. In Uganda, there have been periodic eruptions of violence between the north and south, especially since 1980. Outside of Africa, we may point to the struggle between the northern and southern U.S. (The American Civil War) and, more recently, the tensions between North and South Korea. Since their unification both Vietnam and Germany have become regional dual societies and have had to deal with the attendant problems. The evidence to date suggests that dualism may be even more dangerous than pluralism.
War: Curse or Blessing?
Africa should indeed celebrate the relative rarity of interstate conflicts today. But should it also lament the relative rarity of interstate conflicts in the past? Has the balance between external and internal conflict tilted too far towards the internal?
Africa has, in fact, had more than its share of civil wars and, as human history has repeated time and again, civil wars leave deeper scars than most inter-state conflicts. They are more indiscriminate and ruthless than are most inter-state conflicts, with the obvious exception of world wars or nuclear wars. The U.S. lost more people in its civil war in the 1860's than in all its other wars combined.
That Africa has had so many civil wars is, perhaps, not unrelated to the fact that it has had relatively few inter-state conflicts. The history of nation-states in Europe reveals a persistent tendency on the part of the European states to externalize conflict and thus help promote greater unity at home. A sense of nationhood within each European country was partly fostered by a sense of rivalry and occasional conflict with its neighbors. Even the consolidation of the European state as a sovereign state was forged in the fire of inter-European conflicts. The Peace of Westphalia (1648), which launched the nation-state system, was signed at the end of the Thirty Years War19.
Africa's relative dearth of external conflicts in the past may thus partly account for the prevalence of internal conflict in the present. In the modern world, however, external aggression is no longer a viable means of forging unity and building states. International war has become too dangerous. Africa must look to other solutions to bring an end to divisiveness.
Conflict Resolution
What will the future hold for Africa? The presence of violence and conflict on the African continent is obvious, but all is not self-evidently gloomy. In the past few decades, there have been signs of the winds of change blowing through the continent. Africans can point to examples of successful conflict resolution and reduction. The late Julius Nyerere, for example, has bequeathed young Tanzanians a greater self-confidence and national pride. In November 1985, he voluntarily stepped down as president of Tanzania and Vice-President Au Hassan Mwinyi took over. Out of some 170 rulers Africa has had since independence, Nyerere was only the third to relinquish office of his own accord. By leaving the political scene Nyerere gave the lie to the famous dictum that all power corrupts. In Ghana, Jerry Rawlings sought to eradicate corruption, tackled the economic miseries of his people and cultivated their sense of independence and initiative. In Nigeria, the civil war (1967-70), ugly and tragic as it was, did not scar the nation as it might have done. Nigerians are not noted for their restraint and discipline. Yet, the victors of the Nigerian-Biafran war were magnanimous to their enemies. They did not gloat or focus on vengeance. Yakubu Gowon and his successor Murtala Muhammed both demonstrated a remarkable ability to bring about reconciliation and, in so doing, to help heal the wounds of war.
All these examples make it clear that Africans can bring their countries to a better future. What are some of the more concrete things that can be done to achieve this goal? By cultivating toleration, developing pluralism, improving civil-military relations, and fostering innovative Pan-African solutions, African nations can make positive and constructive moves to reduce and resolve conflicts.
Toleration
One important step towards creating greater stability on the African continent is to cultivate that very elusive trait, tolerance. Tolerance is the ability to accept difference20. We need to recognize that victims of intolerance do not necessarily become paragons of toleration. History has amply illustrated this fact. Christians, who suffered dreadful tortures at the hands of the Roman government, in turn inflicted the torments of the inquisition on their enemies in later centuries. The Jews, who suffered incalculable miseries under the Nazis, themselves became oppressors. As an occupying power in the Holy Land, they held thousands of Palestinians as political prisoners. The Muslims, whose entire calendar is a celebration of the Hegira as asylum, are today bombing each other's mosques across the sectarian divide. The Tutsi, as victims of yesterday, became the oppressors of today and the Hutu, as victims of today, seem destined to become the oppressors of tomorrow. Toleration can work. Kenya was at the time such a closed and intolerant society, that the notion that a Kenyan, in Kenya, had dared to call upon the Kenyan President to resign was seen as something remarkable. The BBC World Service reported this action. Today every second or third Kenyan calls upon President Daniel arap Moi to step down. It is no longer of any significance. There is obviously a new level of toleration of dissent, at least in that part of the continent only be attained by eternal vigilance. It must be actively cultivated and institutionally enforced.
How to bring about toleration is not clear, but it does seem as if some strides have been made in the right direction. In 1991 the author visited his native land, Kenya, and called on President Daniel arap Moi to step down. It took a while before the President agreed.
Constructive Pluralization
Another avenue that needs to be explored is what some call decentralization, and others, myself included, call the pluralization of power. Recently, power has tended to shift away from the center and become institutionalized in smaller groups. This trend is, in my view, a healthy one, and should be encouraged by promoting the development of multi-party systems, capitalism, federalism, and the political representation of women.
Multi-party Systems
One of the historic problems in Africa has been the existence of one-party states that have restricted the development of multiple political organizations. Multiple parties are useful to the extent that they expand choices. Fortunately, many African countries that have previously been one-party states have become multi-party states in more recent times21. They have been moving towards greater toleration of opposition parties and rival political organizations. Tanzania under Julius Nyerere and Kenya under Daniel arap Moi both illustrate this trend.
Capitalism
So long as power is concentrated in one place, constructive pluralism cannot flourish. Constructive pluralism must be nurtured. How can this be done? One answer is to develop at least minimal degrees of capitalism. This notion is, of course, abhorrent to many African socialists. However, capitalism is the necessary "manure" for liberal pluralistic democracy.22 Manure maybe dirty, but it does make things grow! Capitalism creates the kind of environment in which constructive pluralism can take root. It helps ensure that power is not concentrated in one particular place. A concrete example of the kind of thing capitalism can accomplish can been in the resignation of Richard Nixon from the American presidency in 1974. Without the newspapers, owned by private interest, he would surely not have been obliged to step down.
This does not mean that Africa should develop the same form of capitalism that exists in contemporary America. The American system demands far too little economic accountability from its citizens. Such a system would be quite destructive on this continent. What is needed is for us to develop a type of capitalism in Africa that permits us to pluralize power but which is also responsible and does not allow the desire for profit to run amok.
Federalism
The concept of federalism also deserves to be given more attention. Federalism refers to the division of power between a central authority and its constituent political units. For the last thirty-five years or so, only Nigeria has treated federalism as legitimate concept. The trouble is that Nigeria has been almost constantly governed by military rule and militarism does not go well with federalism. The rest of Africa has tended to regard the concepts as anathema. And yet it does hold out some real possibilities.
Representation of Women
Another important means of creating greater stability in Africa is to give a greater voice to African women. Women need to become major voices in decision not just about development - although that is very crucial – but on the other issues (including security issues). This means that women must be given power within the legislative process and in the executive branch of government, and they should be enlisted in the armed forces in increasing number.
African women today are, for the most part, sadly under-represented. To change the situation some kind of direct intervention is needed. Yet this is not easy. The problem is well illustrated in India. Indians are trying to deal with the lack of female representation in their government. There is a movement afoot to have one third of the legislative branch of government reserved for women. Despite the fact, however, that a variety of political powers claim to support such legislation, Parliament will not pass it. Opponents claim that the real intention of its proponents is to increase the representation of the higher caste. They point out that it would be women from the upper caste who would break into power. So, the argument goes, by increasing the representation of women you reduce the representation of the lower classes.
In Africa, too, the struggle for emancipation will doubtless encounter entrenched opposition. While there is a great deal of cultural variation in Africa, many African societies have traditionally assigned women a very subordinate place. At the same time, we need not despair. Culture is not always the insurmountable obstacle that we think it is. One of the last barriers to be broken between men and women is that of military culture. Even liberal societies have balked at the enlistment of women in the army. And yet in Somalia, women – and Muslim women at that – at times can be seen bearing arms. When the sense of urgency is great enough, traditional values are transcended.
It is clearly vital that, despite the difficulties, Africa begins to empower women. The author's recommendation is that this be accomplished gradually in a series of measured steps. In the first phase, women voters should be given the opportunity to elect women candidates. A certain percentage of seats (about 10%) should be reserved for these female candidates. In the second phase, a certain portion of seats should still be reserved for women. However, women should no longer seek votes from women alone. They should attempt to reach out to men as voters and address the concerns of males as well as females. This will help close the gender gap. In the third and final phase, when it no longer is necessary, seats should no longer be reserved for women. A parallel process in Zimbabwe suggests that this could happen. Here seats were reserved on a racial basis for a while. After a point, however, such quotas ceased to be necessary.
The greater politicization and empowerment of women has direct security consequences. If women are given a greater role to play, and as they become more influential in debating, they will surely have an effect on the choices that are made for war or peace. If feminist theories are correct, they may swing the balance in favor of peace. Once women have been empowered within their societies, then it may be possible to move one step further and tackle the task of empowering women ill security institutions.
How far from these goals are we? Africa has, in fact, been slowly responding to the idea that women should be allowed to played greater role in public life. There are some countries that have shown great reluctance. Nigeria, a nation in which democracy has not had much overall success, is a case in point. However, elsewhere the issue is at least being debated, as in South Africa. And some countries, Uganda, for example, have already taken steps to be more representative.
Civil-Military Relations
Clearly, something must be done to reduce the power of the gun in Africa. African leaders have tried a variety of measures to tackle the problem of predatory militaries. Jerry Rawlings, for example, armed the ordinary people of Ghana. He worked on the assumption that an armed people would be better able to protect itself from the depredations of the military. This is an idea with which, ironically, many Americans are quite sympathetic. Their own constitution gives them the "right to bear arms." Whether arming the people will lead to stability in Ghana or elsewhere is, however, very much of a debatable point.
There is, however, a more central concern, and that is, the power struggle between the military and civilians. A lot of African countries are "coup-prone." There are some things that could be done to help reduce this problem. Giving the military a share in power might, reduce the temptation of the military to intervene violently and ease the transition over to civilian government.
Nigeria might benefit from such an experiment. A system along the following lines might be adopted: For the next thirty or forty years (or for however long is thought necessary) civilians and soldiers could share power. A two-house system resembling that of the British Houses of Parliament could be set up. One house (the equivalent of the House of Lords) could be a "military" house, the other an elected house. Committees, composed of elements from both Houses, could be formed. Committee members would be entrusted with the task of examining issues that have serious implications for security. They would thrash out differences until they found out a solution. In addition, a civilian and a soldier might agree to run together in a presidential campaign, the civilian seeking election as president, the soldier seeking election as his vice-president. (Of course, the constitution would have to make it clear that the vice-president would not succeed the president in the event of his death. Otherwise, the temptation to assassinate the president would be too great!
Africa entered the twenty-first century restless for changes in continental arrangements. There was widespread disenchantment with the status quo. South Africa was promoting the concept of an African Renaissance. Nigeria had embarked on contradictory trends of renewed democratization at the national level and establishment of Islamic law at the level of some northern states. Senegal pushed for a new African agenda. East Africa was moving towards a new East African Community. And Libya took the initiative to host a special summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity to discuss a new agenda for Africa, and new continental institutions for such an agenda. The concept of the African Union (A.U.) was born.
The Union was finally consummated in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002. Its ambition was much greater than the original scope of the Organization of African Unity, which the A.U. replaced. The Union envisaged greater and greater economic integration, the creation of a continental banking system, the establishment of a Pan-African parliament, and eventually a monetary union with one continental currency23. The concept of an African Security Council gained greater support, but its membership was still a matter of contention. If the African Security Council is to have permanent members with the veto (in the style of the United Nations) the major powers of Africa world have to include South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt.
Would such major permanent members of the African Security Council provide troops for a Pan-African interventionist force to restore order in emergencies like those of Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia in the 19905? Such an active umbrella of Pax Africana may take time to win adequate consensus within the African Union.
The Union came into being simultaneously with the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). This is designed as a partnership between African countries and its major donors and trading partners to help Africa exploit its resources efficiently and realize its economic potential. One important innovation in NEPAD is peer-review. African states would review each other's performance both economically and in terms of good governance, and pass judgment on each other. The quest for higher standards of state-behaviour would include a greater effort to fight corruption and to punish its excesses. In due course the African Union would have to accept the need for collective sanctions against members who violate too many rules of good governance.
If this agenda of the African Union and NEPAD is realized, Africans would at last have become truly each other's keepers.
There are a variety of creative Pan-African solutions that need to be considered.
Intervention
First of all, Africans can intervene to try and minimize chaos when a neighboring state collapses. There are a variety of ways in which this can be done.
First, there is unilateral intervention by a single neighboring power. A famous example of unilateral intervention is the 1979 invasion of Uganda by Tanzania. On that occasion, Tanzanian troops marched all the way to Kampala and put Uganda virtually under military occupation for a couple of years.24 period of time. Tanzania's intervention was very similar to Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia to overthrow Pol Pot, except that the Vietnamese stayed on in Cambodia a lot longer than the Tanzanians stayed in Uganda.
Another, slightly different kind of intervention, was the 1994 invasion of Rwanda by Uganda. This type of single power intervention might perhaps be dubbed a "Bay of Pigs" style intervention. Just as Eisenhower and Kennedy trained Cubans to invade Cuba in the Bay of Pigs operation in 1961, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda trained exiled Rwandans to intervene in Rwanda in 1994. The Ugandan based Rwandese Patriotic Front invaded Rwanda and defeated the armies of the genocidal government, the Forces Armées Rwandaises. Unlike its American counterpart, the "Bay of Pigs" operation in Africa was spectacularly successful in achieving its objectives. It ended the genocide and permitted the return of Tutsi refugees to Rwanda. It did not, however, bring about democratization or long-term stability to the country.
The second type of intervention is regionally supported single power intervention. In this case, a single power intervenes with the blessing of a wider group of states. It acts under a kind of regional umbrella. Neither Tanzania nor Uganda had the backing of a regional organization when they intervened. But Nigeria's intervention in Sierra Leone and in Liberia arguably had the blessings of ECOMOG and ECOWAS. This type of intervention likewise has counterparts outside of Africa. Here one might point to Syria's intervention in the Lebanese Civil War. On this occasion, Syria had the support of League of Arab States.
A third type of intervention is what might be called "inter-African colonization and annexation". Africans have on occasion "colonized" other African countries in an effort to re-establish stability. As a solution to Africa's ills, this type of intervention is controversial, but has not been not entirely unsuccessful.
In 1964, for example, the Tanganyikan government annexed Zanzibar. It did so with the backing of western powers who were alarmed by the situation in Zanzibar. Lyndon Johnson, the President of the U.S., and Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, both encouraged the merger. They feared that Zanzibar, an island that lies off the East African coast, was subversive and unstable. They wanted to avert the danger that it would become a kind of Cuba, threatening the mainland.
The methods used by the Tanganyikans were very much like those used by the British in colonial days. Just as the British had "convinced" African chiefs to accept treaties by which they ceased to be sovereign, the Tanganyikan ruler got the dictator of Zanzibar to agree to a treaty of Union. Nobody held a referendum in Zanzibar to check if the people wanted to cease being an independent nation. So it is fair to see this as a colonization of sorts. But the annexation was fairly successful and did impose a kind of "Pax Tanganyika." Benevolent "colonization" by Africans, for all its negative connotations, is an option worth considering.
Regional Integration
Another solution to state collapse that holds some promise is regional integration. This takes place when the state as a political refugee is integrated with its host country, when, in other words, an unstable state is 'assimilated by a stable state. In my estimation the best chance of a peaceful solution of the conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi is to integrate them with such a stable society.
Rwanda and Burundi are dual societies and as a result they seem doomed to face an endless cycle of violence. A mere 'tinkering' with their internal constitutions will not solve their problems. There is every reason to fear that, while limited reforms may put a temporary halt to the violence, it will only be a matter of time before Rwanda and Burundi once again face state collapse and genocide. A more radical solution is needed. Federation could solve the problem. But federation with what state? Clearly one should not attempt to integrate Rwanda and Burundi with a “sick” with a conflict-ridden society, such as the Congo. This would merely add to the problems. One should also be careful not to integrate them with a relatively unstable state (like Uganda). This would run the risk of destabilizing the plural society rather than stabilizing the dual society. Federation with the Republic of Tanzania, in contrast, might work.
Interestingly, German colonial powers before World War I had leaned towards treating Tanganyika and Rwanda-Uganda as one single area of jurisdiction. Tanzania is a stable and a plural society. Once part of a wider system, Hutu and Tutsi would compete for resources with fellow Tanzanians. They would have other political rivals. In that context, their differences would be less apparent and they might behave far differently than they have done in past. Hutu and Tutsi soldiers would be retrained as part of the federal army of the United Republic of Tanzania and Hutus and Tutsis would stop having de facto ethnic armies of their own.
Union with Tanzania would be safer than union with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in spite of the shared Belgian connection and Frencn language. Tanzania is a less vulnerable society and a safer haven for Hutus and Tutis. It is indeed significant that Hutus and Tutsis on the run are more likely to flee to Tanzania than to DRC in spite of ethnic ties across the border with DRC. Moreover, Hutus and Tutsis are becoming partially Swahilized and should be able to get on well with "fellow" Tanzanian citizens. As citizens they would be assimilated in due course; what was a refugee state would become an integrated part of their new country.
What leads one to some optimism here is the precedent in Uganda. The Bahima, who are traditionally pastoralists, and Bairu, who are traditionally agriculturalists, are the Hutu and Tutsi by another name. They both belong to a Bantu group known as the Banyankore. The Bahima form a dominant caste, just as was traditionally true of the Tutsi. And though the Bahima and Bairu are mutually dependent on one another in many ways, their society reflects the traditional mistrust of pastoralists and agriculturalists. However, because they are part of Uganda, on most issues they operate as one. There are occasions, of course, when they are divided, but in the wider plural society they see themselves as Banyankore and distinct from the various other ethnic groups of Uganda. They recognize their shared interests and this is reflected in their political behavior.
Clearly there are some difficulties to be overcome before federation with Tanzania is possible. The chief obstacle is that the Rwandans and Burundis are very possessive about their independence and their separate identity. It will take some very compelling and well-reasoned arguments to persuade them of the need to renounce their sovereignty. Immense resources on the one hand will have to be made available to all three governments. They must be offered the means to build clinics, roads, schools, and other things of this sort to make palatable their sacrifices. At the same time they must be reminded of the unbearable alternative to loss of sovereignty. Do they want their children to live constantly under the cloud of imminent genocide? Though a difficult idea to sell, federation is not one that should be lightly abandoned.
African Security Council
This author has often dreamed of African Security Council composed of African military and civilian leaders who would focus on limiting, containing, and ending African conflict. The structure would resemble that of the United Nations. Some of the more influential countries would be given permanent representation on the Council. These influential countries would likely include Nigeria (from the West), Egypt (from the north) and South Africa (from the south). It is much less easy to point out the most influential country in the east. Ethiopia would, in some ways, be the logical choice as a permanent member, although this would anger the Eritreans, and quite likely the Kenyans who have become the most pan-Africanist and the most interventionist of the countries of eastern Africa. The Ugandans, too, long the favorite of western aid organizations, would no doubt vie for a permanent seat. There should be some non-permanent members, ranging from three to five. The principle of permanent members would be reviewed every thirty years. For example, it may be necessary to add the DRC as a permanent member to represent Central Africa.
A great deal of work would have to be done to settle the details, which are almost bound to create acrimony and rivalries. Many important issues would have to be addressed. For example, in times of crisis should the African Security Council meet at the level of African heads of state? Should each permanent member have a veto or not? But the idea is certainly worth exploring. This is one area, too, in which Western cooperation would prove useful.
The establishment of a Pan-African Emergency Force might prove useful in resolving conflict. This would act as metaphorical fire brigade, putting out fires from one collapsed war to another. It would serve to teach Africans the art of building a Pax Africana. Exactly what shape such a force should take is not clear. Should it be independently recruited? Should it be given specialized training? Should it be drawn from units of the armed forces of member states? How should the training, maintenance and deployment of the Emergency Force be paid for? How can Western friends of Africa like the US and the European Union help? Certainly the successes and failures of ECOMOG in Liberia should be studied carefully in preparation for this new venture.26 There are times when renegade states are basically refugee states. Brutal villains in power are also pathetic casualties of history. The emergency force should be trained to use minimum violence.
Self-Help
Another concrete proposal is a High Commissioner for Refugees and Displaced Africans under the Organization of African Unity. The fact is that, although we produce a disproportionate number of refugees and displaced people, Africans pay a disproportionately limited role in helping them. A continent of one tenth of the world's population is rapidly becoming a region of a third of the displaced people of the world. We really should organize ourselves better and tackle the refugee problem in a systematic and efficient fashion. We do not want to discourage others from helping us. But we do need to do more, and be seen to be doing more, for our own people. We need to lead.
Conclusion
As a final warning, let me stress the importance of moving with speed towards political reform in Africa. The English poet Andrew Marvell, once wrote to his mistress:
Had we but world enough, and time,
This coyness, lady, were no crime.
But at my back I always hear
Time's winged chariot hurrying near,
And yonder all before us lie
Deserts of vast eternity.
The Grave's a fine and private place,
But none, I think, do there embrace.27
Marvell's words have relevance to our own situation. Africa is a continent of immense potential. It is our obligation to move swiftly to resolve its problems and make sure that its people are given the chance to enjoy the blessings of peace and prosperity.28
End Notes
1. See the table in James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay, A Quick and Dirty Guide to War, Third Edition (New York: WIlliam Morrow and Company 1996), 651-653.
2. Recent figures include the hundreds of thousands in Rwanda and Burundi, and the tens of thousands in Algeria and the Congo: Dunnigan, 387.
Note surprisingly, an article in The Economist 352 (25 January 1997): 17, argues that borders have not been the primary cause of conflict.
For an interesting article on the conflict, see Kjetil Tronvoll, "Borders of Violence- Boundaries of Identity: Demarcating the Eritrean Nation-State," Ethnic and Racial Studies 22, 6 (November 1999): 1037-60.
5. The Broad of UNESCO outlawed the use of the word "tribe" seems to be Eurocentric. Those who do not like the word "tribe" largely are aping a European dislike of the term. But, to avoid giving offense, the author has used the word ethnic in this chapter instead.
6. An overview of this conflict may be found in Robert A. Mortimer, “Islamists, Soldiers and Democrats: The Second Algerian War," The Middle East Journal 50 (Winter 1996): 18-39.
7. The struggle between religious groups in Egypt is analyzed in Hamied A. Ansari, "Sectarian Conflict in Egypt and The Political Expediency of Religion," The Middle East Journal 38 (Summer 1984) 18-39, and for a recent article on the conflict, see The Economist 354 (January 8, 2000): 41.
8. Descriptions of the genocide may be found in Edward Nyakanvzi, Genocide: Rwanda and Burundi (Rochester, VT: Schenkman Books, 1998).
9. The Somalian descent is chronicled in Alice B. Hashim, The Fallen State: Dissonance, Dictatorship and Death in Somalia (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1997).
10. For one analysis of the identity conflicts that have bedeviled Sudan and brought war among the Sudanese, see Francis Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995).
11. These societies may also be termed "ethnically bipolar"; see R. S. Mime, Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States: Guyana, Malaysia and Fiji (Vancouver and London University of British Columbia Press, 1981).
12. For a positive assessment of the Belgian experience, see Michael O'Neill, "Re-imagining Belgium: New Federalsim and the Political Management of Cultural Diversity," Parliamentary Affairs 51, 2 (April 1998): 241-258.
13. An overview of the Cyprus situation may be found in Robert McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus (London: Brassey's, for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1989).
14. The various kinds of violence bedeviling Sri Lanka are detailed in Jagath P, Senaratne, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1977-1990: Riots, Insurrections, Counterinsurgencies, Foreign Intervention (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1997).
15. Richard Holbrooke, To End War (New York: Random House, 1998).
16. British Broadcasting Corporation, "Mandela: Burundi's Gloomy Politics," BBC News, October 12,2001; for an overview of the situation in the Great Lakes, consult the special issue of the African Studies Review 41, 1 (April 1999): 1-97.
17. See Ann M. Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities (Bloomington, IN and Oxford, UK: Indiana University Press and J. Currey, 1998) for an overview of the conflicts and peace efforts.
18. For a guide to the Biafra war, consult Zdenek Cervenka, The Nigerian War, 1967-70. History of11le War, Selected Bibliography and Documents (Frankfurt Am Main: Bernard & Graef, 1971).
19. The Westphalian compact established the principle that national sovereignty was inviolable. It became customary for the international community to avoid intervention if this meant infringing on state sovereignty; Internal excesses may, however, be testing this custom. On this issue see Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanutono, eds., Beyond, Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
20. For an overview of "tolerance," see Susan Mendus, ed., Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives (Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
21. Robert G. Moser provides an interesting comparative analysis of how different types of electoral systems affect the number of political parties in regions once governed by a single party system; see Robert G. Moser, "Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States," World Politics 51, 3 (April 1999): 359-84.
22. The debate on the linkages between economic freedom and political freedom is historic and relevant; for a recent example see Paul A. Cammack, Capitalism and Democracy in the Third World: A Doctrine for Political Development (London and Washington, DC: Leicester University Press, 1997).
23. Consult Paul Q. Hirst, From Statism to Pluralism Democracy, Civil Society and Global Politics (London and Bristol, P A: UCL Press, 1998).
24. A description of the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda may be found in Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, War, in Uganda. The Legacy of Id Amin (Westport, CT: L. Hill, 1982).
25. The conditions leading to the Syrian intervention in Lebanon are described in Karen Rasler, "Internationalizing Civil War: A Dynamic Analysis of the Syrian Intervention in Lebanon," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 (September 1983): 421-456.
26. See Kenneth L. Cain, "Meanwhile in Africa," SAIS Review 20, 1 (Winter/Spring 2000); 153-76.
27. These lines are taken from Andrew Marvell's "To A Coy Mistress," in H. M, Margollouth, The Poems and Letters of Andrew Marvell, Volume I, 3rd Edition (Oxford Clarendon University Press, 1971): 27-28.
28. The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of the following in revising this chapter: Albert Luthuli, Professor-at-Large, University of Jos, Jos, Nigeria; Ibn Khaldu, Professor-at-Large, School of Islamic and Social Sciences, Leesburg, Virginia, USA; Andrew D. White, Professor-at-Large Emeritus and Senior Scholar in Africana Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, USA.