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NEWS

Executive Director Addresses the 2009 Annual Research Conference of NUR

OSSREA Executive Director, Professor Paschal B. Mihyo, was invited by the National University of Rwanda (NUR) to deliver a keynote address at its Annual Research Conference for 2009. On 19 October 2009, Professor Mihyo delivered the keynote address on the role of social sciences in the development of African countries. The keynote spanned on the themes:

- The quest for social development and how social sciences affect social development;
- Separation of disciplines and development, which calls for:
  - the branches of social sciences to work together to effect development in Africa,
  - the need for an autochthonous African development paradigm and African development agenda,
  - realizing and effectively exploiting the inseparable inter-dependency of the social sciences, and
  - managing the interdependence of public administration, politics, over economics and social policy, to ensure sustainable development.
- New challenges—environmental insecurity, food insecurity, diseases of poverty—and the role of social sciences in confronting them.

Accompanied by Prof. Herman Musahara the Liaison Officer for Rwanda Chapter of OSSREA, Prof. Paschal also met Prof. Silas Lwakabamba the Rector of the NUR, discussed various issues with him, and agreed the following:

- NUR would continue hosting and supporting the OSSREA Chapter and involve it in consultancy services under the University Consultancy Bureau.
- NUR would participate in the development of a database of dissertations in social sciences under the OADDIS programme being developed by the secretariat.
- OSSREA would develop a proposal on the development of a research school for Rwanda universities. The proposal will be sent by NUR to donors including Sida.

Following is the full text of the substantive Keynote address delivered at the NUR 2009 Annual Research Conference by Prof. Paschal Mihyo, OSSREA Executive Director on the Role of Social Sciences in the Development of African Countries.

Excellencies,
Esteemed Host, The Rector of National University of Rwanda,
Distinguished Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Quest for Social Development

The history of our continent for the last five centuries can be summed up as a struggle for social development. A struggle to control and if possible tame the environment in which we live. A concerted effort to overcome the forces of nature and utilize natural resources for our benefit and development. Where we have succeeded it is because we managed to amass enough resources to support our cause,
the necessary skills to chart out our course and the necessary vision to guide our destiny. Where we have failed it is not because we never tried but we did not have the necessary resources, skills or vision. The difference between our failure and our success has been very much determined by the tools we have had which could guide us as we wrestled with our destiny in search of better control of our existence, our means of livelihood and our environment.

The necessary tools for this masterly can be developed through social sciences. These sciences stand on a tripod of three branches of disciplines: (1) economics, (2) governance (combining politics, public administration, management and law) and, (3) social policy. It is when each of these disciplines combines with others to prop up the pot of development that the process of bringing about that development can move faster. Neither of these disciplines standing on its own can bring about full development. In actual fact, it is the failure of these branches of social sciences to operate in tandem with each other that explains most of our past development problems.

**Separation of Disciplines and Development**

The failure of the branches of social sciences to work together has characterized our development profiles for decades. It has to do with Africa’s excessive dependence on foreign aid and its attendant models of development as well as the total absence of an autochthonous African development paradigm. Since the early days of independence, the development agenda has been dominated and driven by former colonial powers and development partners. Their agendas were allowed to dominate because of the vacuum created by a total absence of an African development agenda.

The first signs of this came before independence. The African nationalist struggles were waged in the backdrop of peasant worker alliances that brought to power the Bolsheviks, communists in China and Cuba and radical movements in Indo-China and Latin America. These peasant revolts, backed by workers’ movements were mainly struggles for land. In Africa they were emulated by the NFL in Algeria, the Mau Mau Movement in Kenya and the ANC in South Africa and Zimbabwe, then Rhodesia.

To pre-empt land issues becoming the rallying point for peasant worker alliances in Africa, the early sixties were dominated by agrarian reform policies predicated upon the policies of ‘land to the tiller’. Radical governments in Congo Brazzaville, Mali, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia wrapped themselves into the land reform policies by promulgating ideologies, such as Bantu Socialism (Congo), Humanism (Zambia) and African Socialism (Tanzania and Uganda). Noble as they were, these policies did not achieve their goals because they were focused only on social policy. The two other legs of the tripod were undermined. The driving force was politics. Economics was not given a chance prop up and propel production and productivity. Governance was sacrificed at the alter of one party system and monocratic political regimes. This was an agenda that failed because it ignored the inseparable inter-dependency of the social sciences and any regime that has since undertaken land reforms dominated by one discipline, has never succeed and as the case of Zimbabwe recently proved such policies will continue to fail if they are not propped by a three legged tripod of social sciences.

The second wave of policies that influenced Af-
rica’s development agenda in the seventies were dedicated to state formation. Civil service reform was one of the components of the development therapy. Although based on the development agenda of state formation, civil service reforms combined with decentralization, blended well with the local agenda of one party state. The global decentralization agenda found appeal in the possibility of decentralizing the development budget to the local level where control was weak. On the other hand the local excitement about decentralization was that it transferred responsibilities without transferring power or the necessary resources to form basis of empowerment at the local level. The congruence of interests in civil service reforms was that for development agencies this created opportunity for strengthening competence in public administration; but for the local forces this gave opportunity to strengthen control over the economy and social forces and legitimizing the existing regimes.

The combined difficulties of securing development through decentralization and civil service reforms were compounded by the monistic approach in development theory. These two programmes elevated politics and the public administration above other disciplines. Central planning became the norm and this diluted the role of economics while submerging social policy which, with the failure of economics, could not be easily upheld.

The elevation of public administration and politics over economics and social policy caused stagnation in development. It put bureaucracy at the centre of the development agenda, pushing underground the private sector, the farmers and peasants who were the backbone of growth. The failure to involve these actors entrenched pillars of poverty undermining the capacity of government to support health, education, housing, sanitation and transport infrastructure.

As if we had not learnt our lesson, we embarked on Structural Adjustment beginning the early eighties. This programme, essentially driven by international financial institutions, was aimed at attacking the roots of and problems caused by statism. The heroes of the seventies were blamed for the development failure. State formation having driven the agenda since the 1960s was put into the dock. The same experts and advisors that had come in the seventies to develop the structures of state-owned enterprise, came back; this time to bury them and not to praise them. The bureaucrats that had been trained in big numbers were blamed for stagnation, axed and given a golden handshake. The development wheel turned full circle. The same experts who had come as midwives when the African economies were being born, came back as nurses when the economies were sick. They still came as undertakers when these economies were dying.

The only difference is that this time it was not the public administration experts or political scientists that performed the post-mortem or led the requiem. It was the economists. Sideline during the era of state planning and one party democracy, the economists were called in to perform the autopsy. The political scientists were rallied to grease the machinery by organizing campaigns for multi-partysm and civil and political rights, which were essential to justify the paradigm shift from non-market to market-driven development.

The positive aspects of these changes cannot be undervalued. Market reforms were fundamental in unlocking the potential of the hitherto restricted capabilities of the commercial and small holder farmers, small and medium enterprises, technology developers and numerous service providers. The outcomes of the whole process, however, would have been maximized if structural imbalances in African
economies had not been treated primarily as an economic issue or if the therapy had not been left to economists alone. Once more we failed to adopt a multi-pronged, multi-disciplinary approach to development.

The futility of mono-disciplinary approaches to economic and social problems was quickly proved by the failure of structural adjustment programmes to stimulate rapid growth. As the process of adjustment continued mowing down tax payers (in some countries the main tax payer) based in the public sector, diminishing tax returns put the state on diet in many countries unable to meet the demands of a functional modern state. As enterprise closed one after another and many countries became nations of importers, the balance of payments tipped against our favour, increasing debt and suffocating the growth of local industry. At the end of it all, with the exception of the lucky and happy few, the majority became more equal, overstretched in their capacity to meet their survival and reproductive needs. Thanks to structural adjustment, we nearly achieved the main objective of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But that is not the equality we need. We need equality in prosperity rather than in squalor and poverty.

The discussion on the futility of the hierarchy of disciplines in resolving social and economic development problems will not be complete without reference to the contemporary period. While political science, public administration and economics have been competing for ascendency to the helm of development disciplines, social-policy-oriented disciplines have suffered severe haemorrhage in this monistic approach to development. The first of these was anthropology. Abused by colonial institutions as it was used to understand the natives in order to control them, when it fell into the hands of nigger lovers, it was turned into an object of exotic studies. It strengthened the divide between them and us. It became the study of ‘we the other people’.

This led to a backlash as radicals began classifying it as a racial discipline or a class discipline used by academics to understand the poor—how they live and how they reproduce. When it rapped itself into nutrition and population studies, it was seen as a discipline that probes how the poor survive without the intention of changing their lives. It was seen as more concerned with the plight of the poor but it did not try to explain the delight that the rich and powerful derive from this plight. In short, by its misuse, anthropology was a victim of mistaken identity. It was shelved in many radical universities and was retained by a few.

As a result of its demise, most African development specialists no longer understand their own culture. We can explain with difficulty why HIV prevalence is on the rise. We cannot adequately explain why population pressures and ecological stress are leading to violent conflicts. We have lost indigenous knowledge on almost all factors that affect our livelihoods.

As if that is not bad enough, we have lost the discipline of history. Some of the universities that hosted and boasted of strong historians have lost their best historians. Makerere is one of them and Dar es Salaam is fast approaching Makerere where now history is history in itself. Some of our best historians have retired but the new crop of historians is very
small. As history began retreating to the back burner of academia, our current students have forgotten even the immediate histories of colonial pillage, violent structural adjustment and very soon they will forget about genocide and the carnage of the nineties. The effort to ditch history is not accidental. The more people forget the less bitter they become about the past and the happier they become about the present—which is the only reality they know. But as the saying goes, it is those that forget history that are bound to repeat it. If destiny will allow us to repeat the good things that happened in our history, that will be by divine intervention. But having forgotten our history, the biggest chance is that we shall repeat the ugly parts of it.

Another casualty of competition among disciplines has been rural studies. This is where we started with land reforms and land to the tiller. When the threat of peasant revolts became less imminent, the project and idea was shelved. Only the socialist regimes retained it on their agenda. But for them also the agenda was not rural transformation but the control of the peasantry and the prevention of capitalist agricultural development. Two months ago, I was looking for experts in rural development at the University of Dar es Salaam, once a stronghold of rural development studies. To my surprise, the Director of the Institute of Development Studies could point to only two professors in the whole university. This confirmed my fear that since the liberalization of food markets under the WTO, rural development and the agrarian revolution are a specialization of other continents and no longer a priority for Africa.

In this new division of labour, Africa’s specialization has become to open up markets, remove price controls and tariffs to prepare communities to import food crops and other grains. These are the dividends our disinvestments in core disciplines that could together with economics, public administration and politics, push our economies further forward. In order to recapture our destiny, we have to harness social sciences to work together in order to move our content forward. The new challenges to development require a holistic, integrated and concerted approach under which all social sciences will combine efforts to combat fear, superstition, ignorance, need, greed and disease. These lie at the core of our development problems. They cannot be overcome by engineering, medicine or architecture alone. They need social sciences disciplines to overcome them.

New Challenges and the Role of Social Sciences in Confronting them

There are three core areas which will require disciplines to combine efforts. The first is environmental insecurity which started with resource scarcity and has been aggravated by atmospheric instability, otherwise known as climate change. Climate change has shrunk ecospace for most communities—thereby restructuring human space from politics to culture; habitats to markets; and services to infrastructure. It has changed resources and environmental insecurity into climate and atmospheric insecurity. It has created climate refugees from environmental refugees. It has turned water from a necessary amenity into a security concern threatening to push communities and states against each other.
Climate change is reshaping food and other markets—causing social changes in the age and gender composition of actors on these markets. To address the insecurity generated by such changes, political scientists, public administration specialists, anthropologists and sociologists will play a big role. Economists will be expected to help design programmes that will keep these markets clean and transparent. Lawyers and management experts will help to design frameworks for regulating these markets. Political scientists and public administration specialists will watch and restructure them and geographers, demographers, sociologist and anthropologists will keep everybody informed about them.

The second major challenge is food insecurity. Aggravated by bad governance and climate change, it has recently been exacerbated by monopolistic tendencies among grain companies, nine of which control over 80 per cent of the global grain market and intellectual property rights in plants and grains. While engineers and geologists will continue searching for better ways of preserving water resources, it is the agricultural specialists who will lead the way towards producing more yields with less water—repeating the Egyptian miracle. To socialize children to water and energy saving techniques is the work of the education systems and community-based organizations. Diversification of food production and breaking away from monoculture will be achieved faster if educationists, politicians and political scientists play a big role in socializing children and communities towards varieties of food stuffs. To reverse the process of extinction of traditional food security crops, the agricultural specialists will need the support of anthropologists and historians, without whom they may never know about these crops. It is the combination of efforts by these disciplines that will liberate our people from hunger.

The third major challenge is that of diseases of poverty. These diseases are intensified by poor nutrition, inadequate sanitation and dilapidated habitants. They range from hypertension, diabetes and obesity more often higher in women than men and spread across the various social milieus of rich and poor. They include specific diseases prevalent among the poor caused by poor ventilation, sub-standard housing, nutrition-related deficiencies and diseases of neglect. Absence of sewerage systems in shanty towns is the main cause of recurrent bouts of cholera. Chagas’ disease caused by flees and spread through migration is common in overcrowded habitats especially in rural areas.

These diseases and others, such as lasa fever, Rift Valley fever, leishmauasis, and ebola are diseases aggravated by poverty and environmental degradation. While medical research is beginning to respond to the diseases of the poor, less than one per cent of global investment is going into research on tropical diseases. Only poor countries can invest more in this kind of research either on their own or in partnership with others. To increase investment in R&D for this, planners and economists have to prioritize R&D in this area. Education has to gravitate away from knowledge for knowledge’s sake and create technical and technological capabili-
ties to solve and not only manage problems. Public administration specialists have to elevate R&D, science and technology and the creation of local technological capabilities in capacity development policies, poverty reduction strategies, and public sector reforms.

The struggle against fear, poverty, ignorance, illiteracy and disease cannot be won on a single front or using a single strategy. It is a multi-sectoral, multi-faceted and multi-dimensional struggle. It requires convergences across and of all disciplines. The failures of the past have partly resulted from isolated incursions of single disciplines into this multi-pronged problem. To ensure we succeed this time, we need to pull our efforts together through to form a multidisciplinary, inter-disciplinary, and trans-disciplinary front against forces that challenge our individual and collective existence, perpetuate fear and superstition among us, clog and disable our creative and productive capabilities, and make us irrelevant on international and regional issues. Social sciences can help take our region a step further. We can achieve this goal if we all play our part.

Rwanda Chapter of OSSREA Celebrates Its 10th Anniversary

Rwanda Chapter of OSSREA celebrated its tenth year Anniversary on the 20th October 2009, in Kigali.

The marking of the anniversary was an amalgamation of several activities. Firstly the event was marked as part of the International Annual Research Conference of the National University of Rwanda, which is the host of Rwanda Chapter. The Chapter took part in an exhibition which included display of books by OSSREA and Chapter publications. The Chapter stand was graced by a banner on the anniversary and brochures on the event were distributed to visitors from National University, Rwanda at large and from abroad. A more notable event was delivering of a Key Note speech on Social Sciences and development to the Research conference by the Executive Director of OSSREA Prof Paschal Mihyo.

Secondly, on the same day in the afternoon an Extra Ordinary General Assembly of the Chapter was convened exclusively for members with one overarching theme: “10 years of OSSREA in Rwanda”. Short speeches were delivered as part of the opening ceremony of the Assembly. The Speeches were by the Liaison Officer Prof. Herman Musahara, The Executive Director of OSSREA Prof. Paschal Mihyo and The Rector of the National University Prof. Silas Lwakabamba represented by Prof. Verdiana Grace Masanja Director of Research of National University of Rwanda in that order. Subsequently two presentations were made. One was on the background of OSSREA Rwanda Chapter and another was on lessons to be drawn from the 10 year experience.

A decade of OSSREA in Rwanda is a
remarkable experience for a number of reasons. Firstly formed in the aftermath of the genocide and in a francophone setting, the Chapter progressed positively against expectations as Rwanda was emerging from emergency to reconstruction.

Lessons learnt included: the importance of capitalizing on the positives while giving attention also to the negatives, overriding wars of the sciences, exploring economies of multi-disciplinarity, working with the host-NUR, learning to be competitive, opening up to new HEIs, including emerging stakeholders, and mentoring the young. Achievements were that research findings are influencing policy, members gaining knowledge/skills through research activities, production of reading materials, and imparting knowledge/skills through training.

The Chapter also conducted a SWOT which revealed that support from secretariat, strong leadership, commitment to OSSREA mission, teamwork, research output, competence, multi-disciplinarity, partnerships, visibility, international collaboration, and capacity building as strengths. Weaknesses included weak networking with other chapters, financial dependency, and failure to “grab” opportunities availed by OSSREA Secretariat was recognised as another weakness of the Chapter.

Identified opportunities to exploit were: enhanced culture of research, increasing contribution to increase knowledge, demand for research from government, organising national seminars to policy makers, collaboration with the private sector, brand name, and integration with NUR. On the threats side were mentioned mushrooming of social research organisations, brain drain, drying up of financial grants, language and donor dependency.

The colourful celebration took place in the evening, graced by the presence of the Executive Director of OSSREA Prof Paschal Mihyo, Chapter members at the National University, a few students and a few members of families of some chapter members.
As parts of the celebration, dinner was served, certificates were awarded to 32 dedicated members of OSSREA as a token for their contribution to the existence and development of the Chapter, awarding of presents to the National University of Rwanda for hosting the Chapter for 10 years, and cutting of a large OSSREA cake punctuated with a happy birth day to OSSREA.

EC Discusses Revitalizing the Kenya National Chapter

Members of the Executive Committee (EC) of OSSREA, Ex-Official Member of the Executive Committee, the Kenya Chapter Caretaker Liaison Officer, representatives of Egerton, Kenyatta, Maseno, and Masinde Muliro universities and Chuka Campus discussed on how to revitalize the Kenya National Chapter of OSSREA.

According to Dr. Gerphas Opata OSSREA Vice President, the meeting held from 11th to 12th September 2009 aimed at restoring the lost vibrancy of the Kenya chapter, restatement of the legitimate institutions that had been set up under its constitution and at electing an Acting Liaison Officer who would steer it through the transition to normalcy until the election of a substantive Liaison Officer at a future stage.

Chaired by Prof. John Shiundu, DVC Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, founder member of OSSREA and the Chapter, former Vice President of OSSREA and Ex-Officio Member of the Executive Committee of the National Chapter, the meeting reviewed handover report by the former Liaison Officer was in her absence. It covered major activities accomplished in 2008, activities not accomplished, challenges encountered, lessons learnt, an action plan, funds spent and a membership list. The meeting noted discrepancies between what had been reported and the realities regarding accomplishment of activities, managing and accounting of finance, commitment and involvement of the EC of the Chapter and the Editorial Board in the chapter’s activities. The meeting decided that:

- Acting Liaison Officer to be appointed should contact all legitimate representatives for a correct record on membership.
- Prof. Monndoh should be asked to provide bank statements and the missing receipts and she should give full account of the income from membership fees and how such income was spent.

The meeting unanimously elected Dr. Fred Ogola, former Campus Representative for Egerton University to be the Acting Liaison in capacity building and
if the commission can give the Namibian Chapter some consultancies and contract research projects.

Officer of the Chapter until the next annual conference in 2010.

The OSSREA ED briefed the meeting on the improving financial situation at OSSREA, the process of developing a new strategic plan and the staffing situation.

The meeting also discussed extensively issues of how to move forward and decided that the constitution of OSSREA and that of the chapter should be followed without deviation, membership lists should be constantly reviewed and upgraded, the chapter should be pro-active in developing research proposals and working with the Secretariat to mobilize funds, LOs should be involved in the grant system of OSSREA so that they can monitor progress and answer questions by members about grants, members should be given preferential treatment in the grant system. The meeting recommended that the Acting LO should inform all members about this meeting and follow up on all its decisions.

OSSREA Attends Regional Workshop on Editorial and Online Peer Review

OSSREA Publications and Dissemination Director Dr Abiye Daniel took part in a regional training workshop on editorial and online peer review that was conducted November 4–6, 2009 in Nairobi, Kenya, after which certificates were awarded to trainees. Contents of the training included:

- free or controlled access of online publications;
- use and usage concerns;
- archiving and preservation;
- alternative publishing modes;
- interoperability, use and discovery; and
- alternative online initiatives.

The aim of the training was to help African institutions that have been involved in publishing to avail their manuscripts as open access on the AJOL (African Journals Online) website. He noted the targeted year is 2010 whereupon institutions shall make all journals downloadable free of charge with a software that manages the on-line publishing process.

Dr. Abiye indicated that OSSREA had a lot to benefit from such an initiative to make its publications more visible as well as avail all the publications that are now out of print and kept in the library.

Also a network has been established, whereby all participants can keep in touch and share their experiences as well as find directions on the way forward. Free space will also be made available for editors to interact on the AJOL website.

The way forward, no doubt, is the open access approach. However, each institution has to make its own decision based on its experience and advantages and disadvantages from the approach.

The participants constituted 30 people from Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Africa (AJOL), and INASP (Britain).

OSSREA Participates in the 12th Nairobi Book Fair

OSSREA took part in the 12th Nairobi International Book Fair (NBF), which was held from 21st to 27th September 2009 at the SARIT Centre in Nairobi, Kenya.

The main objective of the Fair is “to focus on books and all issues related to it”; to provide the venue and
opportunity to showcase new publications and also to meet and interact with new authors, publishers, and agents. Activities often include workshops and seminars on topical issues; book launches; children activities; and presentation of the Jomo Kenyatta Prize for literature Award.

This round’s Fair, which was held under the theme of “Read for Change”, was attended by considerable number of participants drawn from various sectors, including publishers, regional and international organizations, research institutions, professional associations, and universities. Both the opening and the closing ceremonies were by high-ranking government officials. The Venue has provided OSSREA delegates with an opportunity to conveniently promote OSSREA and to sell its publications. The OSSRERA stand was visited by numerous visitors from various sectors, but most of all by individuals who were either already familiar with OSSREA or first-time visitors from academic and research institutions, and publishers as well as dealers.

The Nairobi International Book Fair (NIBF) is an annual event organized by the Kenya Publishers Association and several sponsor bodies.

**OSSREA Takes part in COMESA Workshop**

OSSREA Programme Specialist in Migration and Employment Dr. Paulos Chanie attended ‘Experts workshop to improve understanding on existing legal framework on war economies’ that was hosted by Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 31st August to 2nd September 2009 in Livingstone-Protea Hotel, Zambia.

Three study reports were presented by three groups of researchers subcontracted by COMESA, these were:

- Report on understanding legal and policy frameworks to address war economies in the COMESA region – cluster on Horn of Africa Countries (Ethiopia, Djibouti and Sudan)

- Legal and policy framework relating to the exploitation of natural resources in the COMESA regions: the case of Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo

- Exploitation of Natural resources and Conflict, legal and policy frameworks: the case of Botswana, Kenya, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe

Mr. Mesfin Adnew (right) and Mrs. Alemtsehay Zewde (left) exhibiting OSSREA books
In all the studies war economy is conceptualized as a system of producing, mobilizing, and allocating resources to sustain violence and sometimes to promote public and private wealth. Such economies are characterized by criminal activities that propagate conflicts. These activities include competition over control, exploitation and marketing of natural resources, the proceeds from which are then used to fund and hence propagate the conflict. Some of these activities thrive on weak or non-existence of state institutions such as ineffective judiciary system, high level of corruption, weak human rights protection, etc.

Participants also identified the gap in legal framework, policy and institutions and discuss the roles COMESA should play in addressing war economies in the region.

Paulos noted having contacted key individuals from COMESA Secretariat (Ms Elizabeth Mutunga and Mrs. Odetta Mukazi Mutanguha), EAC and IGAD (Mr. Yufnalis Okoubo), who promised to work with OSSREA in the future. I have met also scholars from the region who volunteered to be active members of OSSREA.

According to him, the workshop was attended by 39 participants from COMESA member countries. Also in attendance were representatives from the East African Community (EAC); Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); UNECA; UNDP, IDRC.

**Executive Director Participates in Namibia Chapter Affairs**

OSSREA Executive Director Prof. Paschal B. Mihyo participated in some affairs of OSSREA Namibia Chapter during the period 10th to 15th December 2009.

He met the Chapter officials, visited Parliament and met official of the National Planning Commission and the National Youth Council. He said he also communicated with the Namibian Parliament about the possibility of cooperation through research training methodology courses and policy briefs for MPs. During the visit, he met the Director of Policy and his staff and discussed possibilities of cooperating in research methodology courses.

Paschal also met the Director General of the National Planning Commission Prof. Peter Katjavivi and discussed ways of cooperating.

**OSSREA Employs Research Programme Assistant**

OSSREA has employed Mr. Abraraw Tesfaye in the capacity of Research Programme Assistant. Abraraw had earned an MA degree in Social Anthropology in 1998 and a BA in Sociology and Social Administration in 1990 from the Addis Ababa University.

He has also attended short-term training courses focusing on Child Rights, Health Communications and Advocacy.

Abraraw has worked for about 19 years for governmental institutions, including Jimma University and Gondar University where he taught different courses, an International NGO Italian Cooperazione Internazionale
(COOPI) where he worked as a Research Consultant, Project Expert, and Assistant Project Manager. He was also actively involved in community-based fieldwork and research, development of curricula, project proposals, and worked as Secretary for Academic Commission at Jimma University. Abraraw has also served in several temporary Advisory Missions for WHO in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Liberia and Uganda, and participated in the evaluation and monitoring of Community-Directed Treatment with Ivermectin (CDTI) Projects since 2003.

The OSSREA staff extends him a warm welcome.

Zimbabwe Chapter Liaison Officer earns a PhD

OSSREA Zimbabwe Chapter Liaison Officer Sunungurai Dominica Chingarande earned a PhD in Development Studies from the University of Zimbabwe where she is a Senior Lecturer and Head of the Sociology Department. Sunungurai defended in August 2009 her dissertation *Livelihood Strategies: Contemporary Urban and Peri-Urban Agriculture in Harare, Zimbabwe*. Abstract of her dissertation is presented here.

Abstract

Changing economic conditions and rising poverty levels in post-1990s period in Zimbabwe have resulted in the increase in the urban and peri-urban agricultural phenomenon in terms of practitioners, their diversity, space used, contributions to household welfare and to the urban economy in general. The aim of this research was to establish the contributions of urban and peri-urban agriculture to the livelihood strategies of the people in Harare. This was necessitated by a lament by Tevera (1996, 182) over the lack of research on the potential contribution of urban agriculture to poverty alleviation. Qualitative research methodology which is anchored on interpretivism was used for this study because the research was concerned with people in a social setting attaching meanings to what they do. In-depth interviews, key informant interviews, observation, transect walks, visual methods (taking photographs) and focus group discussions were the major tools for gathering data. The data was analysed using the common themes approach. The research established that contrary to earlier findings that urban and peri-urban agriculture does not contribute much to urban livelihoods and food security, recent years have seen such contributions being significant, not just for the farming households alone, but for the non-farming ones, too. These benefits have extended to school children through urban farmers supplying food for supplementary feeding schemes in schools, helping to mitigate the vulnerability of orphans in child headed households and to some extent empowering the youth by providing income in the face of high employment levels. Urban people no longer have to rely on rural people for food supplies due to restrictions on the movement of grain by the government. The realization of the role played by urban and peri-urban to ur-
ban livelihoods has resulted in competition for scarce urban resources, such as water and land which has resulted in poor environmental practices, such as stream bank cultivation in a bid to get easy access to water and all year round farming. The argument throughout the thesis is that urban farmers are not passive victims of economic policies that have impacted negatively on their livelihoods. They have resorted to urban and peri-urban agriculture among other coping strategies. In this they face a number of constraints and express their agency in dealing with the constraints. However, this should not distract the government from finding solutions to poverty and hunger characterizing urban areas.

**NEW PUBLICATIONS**

During September–December 2009, OSSREA published and availed six invaluable books on different issues in social sciences the previous issue of the bulletin. Titles and summaries of the publications are presented as follows with display of the cover pages.

**Analysis of Rural Women’s Reproductive Behaviour Patterns in South Africa**

*Zn Mfono*

This report presents a description of the patterns of change in rural women’s reproductive behaviour in South Africa over a period of 17 years extending from 1987–9 to 2004. The analyses were informed by the Programme of Action that was set out at the 1994 International Cairo Conference on Population and Development. The Programme of Action has a 20-year implementation time period, and the year 2004 was halfway through the 20 years. The year 2004 is also 30 years since the introduction of South Africa’s National Family Planning Programme in 1975, which advanced the health rationale for fertility regulation. It is also twenty years after the introduction of the Population Development Programme in 1985, which emphasized the demographic rationale for fertility regulation. It is the seventh year after the introduction of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act in 1997, which legalized pregnancy terminations under prescribed conditions, with emphasis on women’s rights to choice.

Guidelines and strategic approaches on provision of reproductive health services that balance women’s
rights and health considerations with demographic, developmental and poverty alleviation considerations are provided in the Programme of Action. The ultimate aim is bringing about changes in all societies that contribute to the Millennium Development Goals of poverty alleviation and development.

Secondary data from the 1987–89 and 1998 South African Demographic and Health Surveys was analysed, along with reproductive health service records data for 2004, collected from two rural hospitals in each of the three provinces included in the study.

The focus of this research on black rural women emanates from the fact that they constitute a large proportion of reproductive age women, who, for various reasons, are at the rearguard of the reproductive changes that are afoot nationally.

Five of South Africa’s nine provinces, which have more than 50 per cent of their populations living in tribal areas, were included in the analyses. The focus of the analyses was on the patterns of childbirth, contraception, voluntary surgical sterilizations and pregnancy terminations. The age and marital patterns of childbearing onset and progression, contraception, voluntary surgical sterilizations, pregnancy terminations, as well as changes in number of children born were analysed across the selected provinces. Comparisons with the national trends and between provinces are made. The observed dynamics were also compared with findings of similar analyses done in other African and Caribbean societies, and finally with those observed in Asian and European societies. Qualitative findings derived from a 2002 study that employed focus group discussions with rural women were used to determine the significance of the changes from the perspective of rural women, as well as the motivations for women’s selective compliance with the various aspects of change.

The findings indicated an upward shift in childbearing ages and a progressive fall in the mean number of births per woman, but both aspects varied according to women’s reported marital status. The median age at onset of childbearing shifted modestly from 19 years in 1987–89 and 1998 to 20 years, with considerable delays in the timing of subsequent childbirths, especially the second childbirth, which had a mean spacing reaching a maximum of seven years in 2004. Child spacing was, however, uneven with the mean years between higher order childbirths progressively narrowing. Provincial variations in ages at childbearing onset were modest.

Lower order births had predominance across the periods considered, and growing proportions of childbearing-age rural women had zero childbirth. The proportions of higher order births reflected a progressive decline during the periods compared. These trends accounted for the decline in the mean number of childbirths per woman during the three time periods compared.

Both contraception and pregnancy terminations during the periods considered had predominant use amongst women in the 20–24 years age cohort. Within their brief history, pregnancy terminations shifted from reflecting neither age nor parity patterns in 1998, to a predominant use by younger age cohorts in 2004. Surgical sterilizations, which appealed to women in their 40s in 1987–89, also changed to a predominance of younger age cohorts during the re-
cent time periods, but the modal parity at which rural women request sterilizations has increased in recent years.

Both contraception and pregnancy terminations appeared to play a significant role in child-spacing than in the postponement of childbearing onset. Surgical sterilizations played a much significant role in limiting the number of childbirths amongst married than amongst single women. Accessibility and use of reproductive health services amongst South African rural women appeared to be good, but sub-provincial variations that require attention appeared to be a problem. The demand for pregnancy terminations was apparently high, and rural women relied heavily on referrals to the health centres that provide this service.

Although the distinction between single and married women is difficult to make because marriage tends to be a long drawn process in the African cultural context, women who identified themselves as currently single reflected an earlier onset of childbirths but a lower number of children ever born than currently married women. Due to their larger representation in the 1998 and 2004 samples, single women had a stronger pull on the overall directional trends on childbearing. Their large representation in childbearing reflects the high incidence of non-marital childbearing in the subject population, which arises from the high mean marital age, which is estimated at 29–30 years. This high marital age appears to have limited bearing on childbearing onset for many women, but might be the reason behind the narrower spacing of higher order childbirths.

Despite wide criticism of governmental health service provision to rural populations in South Africa in recent years, the findings of this research gave the impression that women’s reproductive health services are accessible enough to provide a variety of choices to rural women of reproductive age. The marginal change in age at onset of childbearing and the apparent decline in contraceptive use between 1998 and 2004 might be indicative of a pervasive normative age of onset of childbearing. The question of the impact of children’s grants on childbearing onset within the rural poverty context is debatable. If the grants provide an incentive to childbearing onset, one has to contend with the fact that they appear to lose their incentive edge after the first birth. Both child spacing and termination of childbearing, when considered appropriate, appear to be within reach for rural women. The downward shift in the normative age for voluntary sterilizations might be indicative of a growing acceptance of sterilization amongst rural women that increasingly frees them from childbearing obligations to meaningful participation in various personal and community developmental initiatives. However, the normative parity for requesting sterilization appears to be rising.

Overall, the reproductive behavioural patterns of rural black women are largely set on the same course as those for their urban counterparts. There are, however, some regional lags, particularly in the former rural Transkei districts of the Eastern Cape Province that have to be addressed. Another challenge is the demand for pregnancy terminations, which presently depends heavily on referrals to a few hospitals that provide the service. This causes delays which in turn result in women requesting the service exceeding the legally prescribed durations for pregnancy terminations.

The fertility transition that is taking place in rural
South Africa, while similar to the postulated African transition in some respects, differs from the latter largely in that the high incidence of non-marital childbearing introduces an accelerative momentum to the transition phenomenon. Both the marital ages and ages at onset of childbearing are also much lower in the societies that were used in the analysis that generated the postulated African transition thesis. Marital prevalence is also high in the polygamous contexts that were considered as basis for the thesis. The South African rural fertility transition context is, however, characterized by considerable postponement of childbearing onset, even more pervasive child spacing and a growing limiting of use of childbearing through surgical sterilization. There is substantial and apparently conscious regulation of childbearing.

The high incidence of non-marital childbearing amongst South African black women has its parallel in both Botswana and Latin American and Caribbean societies, where its dynamics were subjected to more intensive analyses. The backgrounds of the Asian and European women’s reproductive change patterns provide tenuous comparative scenarios because of the cultural distance of childbearing norms.

Focus group discussions conducted with women of different age cohorts indicated that normative patterns of reproductive behaviour have developed, which integrate reproductive health technology into the reproductive traditions. The emerging reproductive patterns are distinctive, and reflect women’s optimal choices, taking into account their perceived economic, health, beauty, social and other realities.

From a policy perspective, the role of men as reproductive partners—an issue that came up strongly in the 1994 Programme of Action—still warrants strategic interventions to place men and women on an equal footing on this important aspect of change in their societies. Adolescent disruption of schooling because of pregnancies, despite accessible family planning services, remains a problem. The decline in childbearing amongst South African rural women requires alternative life options for women, whose time only a few years ago was absorbed by producing and nurturing children. Rural women need alternative developmental challenges that can provide new meaning to their lives and benefit their societies.

Cultural Determinants of Adoption of HIV/AIDS Prevention Measures and Strategies among Girls and Women in Western Kenya

Constance Rose Ambasa-Shisanya

This study examines the role of culture in the adoption of measures and strategies for the prevention of HIV/AIDS among girls and women in Western Kenya. It focuses on levels of awareness of HIV/AIDS prevention measures and pattern of adoption of five the measures that are currently being promoted in Kenya, i.e.:

1. the use of condoms;
2. screening for HIV at Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) Centres;
3. prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT);
4. the use of post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP); and
(5) the prompt treatment of sexually transmitted infections (STIs).

This research is focused on examining the cultural context of HIV/AIDS research and programmes in Western Kenya and aims to reveal how limited has been the critical analysis of culture as a determinant of adoption of these measures despite the stated prioritization of culture as a key factor to consider. An extensive review of literature conducted by this researcher has revealed that there is very little empirical evidence to show the extent to which cultural analysis informs ongoing efforts at promoting HIV/AIDS prevention measures in Kenya and other African countries. The influence of culture is mentioned in a number of documents, and even in some speeches launching campaigns against HIV/AIDS, but its influence has never been given an in-depth critical analysis.

Data used in this report were derived from primary sources and from a review of empirical studies. The field study was conducted in Busia and Siaya districts of Western Kenya. Both quantitative and qualitative data were generated using focus group discussions (FGDs), a survey, in-depth interviews (IDIs) with key respondents and participant observation methods. Thus, this study has made an effort to bridge the perennial divide which unnecessarily polarizes quantitative and qualitative research methods. Nine focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted to gather information for designing a questionnaire. A total of ninety respondents participated in the FGDs. Each FGD comprised ten respondents drawn from the following groups: employed women, non-employed women, girls in primary school, girls in boarding school, out of school girls, women who live with HIV/AIDS, male youth, married men and men who live with HIV/AIDS. The FGD data were analyzed using the Nudist 6 computer package. A survey questionnaire was then administered to 402 respondents in rural and urban settings in the Busia and Siaya districts. The two settings were targeted with a view to examining whether a variation exists in the adoption of HIV/AIDS prevention measures and strategies. The quantitative data were analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The third phase of data collection comprised eighteen IDIs with key respondents to gain greater insight into issues that had not been clarified during the initial two phases of data collection. Content analysis was used to classify the data based on convergence and divergence of ideas on various aspects, followed by an examination of the relationships between these ideas. IDIs were used to clarify issues and assess the validity of the collected data; these formed the basis for case studies that illustrate this report.

The findings show that, in spite of a high level of knowledge concerning the modes of transmission of HIV, the majority of respondents were only familiar with: abstinence, being faithful to one sexual partner, and the consistent and correct use of condoms (ABC) approach to preventing transmission of the epidemic. This scenario could lead to HIV infection, due to ignorance, for example, from mother to child, despite the availability of appropriate interventions to avert such vertical transmissions. Again, the study revealed that knowledge about HIV prevention measures is higher among girls and women than boys and men due to the greater degree of interaction of the former with health-care providers. Fur-
Thermore, respondents with a primary-school and above level of education, as well as those below 30 years of age, were more knowledgeable about HIV prevention measures when compared with those with no formal schooling and/or those who were above 30 years of age. However, many respondents did not perceive faithfulness to one sexual partner as being an efficient method for preventing HIV infection because of cultural practices which allow boys and men to have multiple sex partners, thereby rendering girls and women susceptible to infection.

This study has established that more people, especially those below 30 years, have adopted the use of male condoms for vaginal sex and visiting VCT centres before marriage. However, fewer people than expected had adopted other HIV/AIDS prevention measures. Furthermore, the findings reveal that while it is easier for girls to adopt HIV prevention measures when still single, the situation alters upon marriage. This is because, according to cultural tradition in the Abaluhya and Dholuo communities, married women are expected to procreate to perpetuate the lineages of their spouses. Therefore, many married women become susceptible to HIV infections through unprotected sex for the sake of procreation. Other cultural practices rendering girls and women especially vulnerable to HIV infection include: the practice of polygamy, male preference for multiple sexual partners and preference for dry sex that causes abrasions and increases chances for HIV infection.

This study concludes that culture plays a pivotal role with regard to the adoption of HIV prevention measures and strategies. To this end, the worldview of a community needs to be understood by those planning HIV/AIDS interventions and traditions of culture must be integrated with the HIV/AIDS prevention measures and strategy, and related advocacy campaigns, so that these become more efficient and have a greater impact. For example, local terms and, when possible, the vernacular language should be used when referring to HIV and AIDS and when advocating to prevent its transmission. Existing community structures, such as the village councils of elders, should be recognized and made integral parts of campaigns to prevent HIV infection and transmission. The elderly, the traditional custodians of culture, ought to be targeted and enlisted as key spokespersons who have finally understood the dangers in some of their cultural practices which may predispose people to HIV infection. By so doing, it would be possible to change deeply rooted beliefs and practices of Abaluhya and Dholuo communities, to lessen the risks of HIV infection and transmission. If the elders can learn to clearly comprehend HIV/AIDS messages, they would strive to protect the lives of people because life is perceived as sacred in the Abaluhya and Dholuo culture.

In a culturally sensitive HIV prevention campaign, the communal elders could be persuaded to promote cultural practices which prevent HIV infection and reduce transmission, rather than the current practice of fostering it, and to play a leadership role in breaking the silence on traditionally taboo subjects, such as sexuality and illness, again with a view to averting HIV-related deaths. This study, therefore, recognizes a great need to target the elderly in HIV/AIDS advocacy campaigns, in addition to young people, who are already quite knowledgeable about modes of HIV transmission and the corresponding preven-
tion measures and strategies, in comparison with their relatively ignorant elderly counterparts. Redirecting HIV/AIDS campaigns to focus on prevention measures and strategies which target the married and elderly men will enable them protect their spouses and allow a possible reversal of the current tragic trend where marriage is actually heightening the risk of HIV infection among girls and women in the Busia and Siaya districts.

Informal Sector and Poverty: The Case of Street Vendors in Lesotho

Pius T. Tanga

This study investigates the survival activities of street vendors as a way of fighting poverty within households in the face of the current economic crisis that has dampened the survival spirits of many poor households in Lesotho. It also examines government intervention in street vending activities. The contributing factors to the present poverty include, among others, the harsh weather that is unfavourable to agricultural production; retrenchments in cloth and textile factories, as well as in the South African mines; absence of a vibrant private sector; and the inability of the government to create much needed jobs. Therefore, these factors have pushed many poor individuals into street businesses to fend for their households as a strategy to fighting poverty. The study is guided by a principal hypothesis that states that there is no significant number of street vendors climbing out of poverty. The three districts selected for the study are Maseru, Berea and Leribe. The specific study sites within these districts are Maseru, Hlotse, Maputose and Tetateyaneng. Primary data has been collected from 556 respondents through questionnaires, focus group discussions and interviews with officials of municipal councils.

The major findings include the following: Firstly, the primary reason for engaging in street vending for the overwhelming majority is to have a source of livelihood and stop the dependency syndrome. Although many street vendors had begun their businesses using personal savings and buying smaller stock on a daily or weekly basis, a few are able to acquire formal capital to buy large stock from South African cities. Most women deal in perishable goods, while more men than women deal in non-perishables. This pattern affects the gains or profits they are able to make. Furthermore, despite the fact that only a few street vendors’ associations exist, the bulk of the vendors do not belong to any of them for various reasons, and this is rendering them ineffective and inefficient. Also, a few street vendors had undergone training prior to engaging in street activities, this had a positive effect on the profitability of some of them. The government had also failed in its attempts to regulate street vending through the construction of markets and stalls, even though many belong to different political parties. A good number of vendors are able to show that they had acquired assets and other household equipment, as well as effected some improvements to the overall outlook of their homes and general sanitation in them, despite the meagre income they earn from their trade. Others express the satisfaction of household needs, among other benefits, which they derive as a result of their involvement in street vending. With regard to poverty alleviation, some
vendors are escaping from poverty, while some are trapped in poverty and others are struggling but their households are still surviving. Overall, the number of street vendors climbing out of poverty is not significant.

Some conclusions drawn from the findings of this study include the fact that street vending is a viable option for many poor households in which the government is unable to properly intervene given its old and outdated framework. Secondly, the inability to acquire a trading license is an obstacle to vendors, as well as to government and councils, raising the much needed income from street vending. Finally, street vendors face enormous problems, risks and costs. One of the recommendations of the study is the urgent need for market reforms and other specific framework for street vending in the cities and towns of the country. Other recommendations include access to formal capital, better organisation and linkage to other international street vending associations and organisations, as well as formal training of street vendors by stakeholders.

Inter-Group Conflict, the Role of Pastoral Youths and Small Arms Proliferation in Nomadic Areas of Ethiopia: The Case of the Karrayu and Their Neighbours in the Upper Awash Valley Region

Ayalew Gebre

This book is the result of a Senior Research grant. The book presents review of literature and results of the study that help to increase the understanding of inter-group conflict, the role of pastoral youths, and small arms proliferation in the pastoralist areas of Ethiopia taking the case of the Karrayu and their neighbours in the Upper Awash Valley areas. More specifically, the research:

1) Maps out the various inter-group conflicts that have taken place between the Karrayu and the neighboring pastoral and agropastoral groups in the Upper Awash Valley region;

2) Explores the life patterns, self-perceptions, and the role of youths in the community, and thereby portray the interface between their goals in life and possession of small arms;

3) Identifies the routes through which small arms are circulated and determines the socio-economic conditions that govern their demand and supply; and

4) Finds out mechanisms and institutional arrangements to mobilize young men for effective control of the proliferation of small arms and the promotion of peace and security in the area.
Living With Divorce: Expectations and Contradictions within the Lesotho Socio-cultural Context

'Matora T. Ntimo-Makara

In this book, which is the result of the OSSREA Sabbatical Research Grant, Dr 'Matora T. Ntimo-Makara presents the down to earth challenges of living with divorce in an African country like Lesotho that operates a plural legal system. The book explores the complexities and conflicting expectations of married life in plural legal systems where indigenous customary marriage laws coexist alongside those of foreign origin brought into force by colonial regimes of governance. Substantiating her arguments with stories, her own lived experience as a divorcee together with those told by different subjects of her research, males and females from different walks of life as well as across the educational spectrum, the author of the book presents the realities of what it actually means to be a divorcee in the face of the expectations and contradictions prescribed by the diversity of Lesotho socio-cultural contexts and the legal systems.

The book is a rare piece of evidence-based scholarly research which exposes contradictions and ironies of marriage and divorce for many African husbands and wives governed under multiple and fused legal systems which are underpinned by principles and dictates emanating from different social and cultural contexts. The customary law indigenous to the Basotho people and the legal system brought in by the British colonialists who ruled Lesotho until it gained independence in 1966 take different positions on marriage itself as well as on issues such as marital power, property and other rights, belongingness of spouses to each other’s families, responsibility over children born out of the marriage relationship, etc. The author contends that mixing the two systems of law when marrying causes utter confusion in one’s life to an extent that even when circumstances force one to quit the marriage relationship, it becomes difficult to know what system of law would offer real and meaningful relief to her or his predicament. She therefore advises people to remain with one type of marriage and recommends that the Lesotho law of marriage, divorce and rights of the divorcees (particularly women) be amended as soon as possible, but without encroaching important socio-cultural values that form part of Basotho people’s identity.

Gender Issues Research Report Series No. 24

This book has three chapters by three young researchers in gender issues. In the first chapter, Aurelia N. Kamuzora presents the results of her study of “Sustainability of Women’s Businesses: The Case of Kagera Region in Tanzania”. Aurelia explores the factors affecting the sustainability of women’s businesses in two of six districts (Bukoba Urban and Bukoba Rural districts) in Kagera Region, which is located in northwestern Tanzania. It focused on variables thought to affect women’s businesses, namely: education,
sources and availability of capital, gender issues, location of the businesses, and enabling environment. She indicated that women’s businesses were mainly related to female roles and about 38 per cent of such businesses were food-oriented. Women who had started businesses with their own capital, and who therefore had decision-making power over such businesses, had sustained businesses. In contrast, women’s businesses in which the women themselves had no decision-making power were less sustainable compared to those started and run independently by women.

In the second chapter, Befekadu Zeleke looks into major determinants of Gumuz girls’ primary school participation in Mandura district and indicates areas of intervention to policymakers and planners. He conducted a descriptive survey that involved analyzing both qualitative information and quantitative data from the different sources. This study indicated that four of the 13 institutional factors: distance from home to school, lack of secondary schools, the school's schedule and weak school-community relationships were the major barriers for the low primary school participation of Gumuz girls’ in the district. Out of the four socio-economic factors, poor family background to pay for school expenses and the demand for girls' labour for household chores and farm activities were considered as major hindrances. Seven of the eight socio-cultural factors: early marriage, early pregnancy, fear of sexual harassment and rape, parents’ preference for educating boys to educating girls, low perception of the community towards girls’ education, girls' low self esteem, and low decision-making power of Gumuz women in development activities were found to be among the major barriers for Gumuz girls' primary school participation. Participation of Gumuz girls in primary schools in the district, in most cases, was found to be more a function of the out-of-school socio-economic and socio-cultural factors than of institutional factors. The study recommended the importance of giving attention to the demand side of policy intervention to address the problem of Gumuz girls' primary school participation.

In the third chapter of this book, Demewoz Admasu shares his study of Rape Awareness, Prevalence, Preventive Strategies and Future Directions in Institutions of Higher Learning in Ethiopia: taking the cases of the then Debub and Alemaya Universities in 2000/2001 academic year. Rape has a long and disturbing history in many societies of the world but is perceived as less a problem of women, especially in traditional societies, such as Ethiopia. Empirically speaking, though most females are either actual or potential victims of rape and suffer from its immediate and long-lasting impacts, to date no research has been attempted to study the problem in institutions of higher learning in Ethiopia. This work is an attempt to study whether rape is a problem encountered by female students in institutions of higher learning and, if so, to what extent it is a problem, what is done at present and what should be done in future. Demewoz indicates that the result showed a significant proportion of female students were either potential or actual victims of rape, i.e. about 95 per cent of them fear rape, about 26 per cent reported its occurrence in the colleges/universities, and about five per cent experienced rape. Female students in the selected institutions of higher learning are affected academically, socially, emotionally, and so forth. Demewoz calls for different measures to redress the problem.
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This October 2009 Issue is the 3rd series of Volume VI of the Bulletin. This issue contains different news articles about OSSREA and new staffs, policy brief and feature articles, as well as list of recent publications of OSSREA.

Migai Akech shares a policy brief article titled “Democracy, Law and Privatization in sub-Saharan Africa”. Ethical Considerations in Research: Challenges and Dilemmas for Researchers has been presented by Emaculate Ingwani. In this issue, Tefera Darge shares his investigation of Gender-Power Relations in Contraceptive Use Decision-Making: The Case of Migrant Weavers of Addis Ababa. Impact of Electricity Crisis on Winter Wheat Production for Resettled Farmers in Zimbabwe has been explored by Nyasha Kaseke. Steven Jerie presents Delimiting Spheres of Influence of Gweru and Their Role in the Development Planning of the Midlands Province of Zimbabwe.
FEATURE ARTICLES

A Glimpse at Preparations for Copenhagen and Its Accord

Wondwossen Worku Mebrat*

Once an environmental issue, then an energy problem, climate change is now being recast as a security threat. Africa is particularly vulnerable—with its history of resource, ethnic and interstate conflict. According to Claudia Ringler, Senior Research Fellow and Project Leader at International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), "In the coming decades, climate change will have a major impact on the availability of water and food, particularly in rural areas of developing countries, such as Ethiopia, where agricultural production is the major source of income and employment."

According to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, "The injustice of the whole issue of global warming and climate change lies in the fact that those who have contributed nothing to its genesis will suffer the most from its consequences because they have the least capacity to adapt to these changes."

Accordingly, climate change issues were discussed at the 8th Africa Partnership Forum (APF) in Berlin (May 2007). Issue of access to carbon markets and new innovative financing for climate adaptation was discussed at the 10th (APF) in Tokyo (April 2008), at the 11th APF in Addis Ababa (November 2008), and more recently at the 13th African Union (AU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Sirte, Libya (July 2009). The APF has also reviewed papers on the impact of climate change and commissioned further work on promoting greater access to the world carbon finance and on an effective post-2012 climate framework.

For the first time in its history, Africa was represented by a solo conferring squad empowered to negotiate on climate change issues at The COP15 United Nations Climate Change Conference in behalf of all the member states of the African Union. To that effect, the Summit in Sirte had established a high level committee to steer the process in behalf of Africa.

Determined not to get a “raw deal”, Africa was represented with “the most unified voice” compared with other negotiating blocs at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Barcelona negotiations.

In a keynote addressed to the special session of the APF, hosted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said, “While African negotiators would reason with everyone to achieve the continent’s objective, they would not rubberstamp any agreement by the powers that be as the best Africa could get for the moment.”

Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said, “Africa will not be there to express its participation by merely warming the chairs or to make perfunctory speeches and statements. We want to be and deserve to be in the thick of it all. We will not participate to merely adorn the positions of this or that party but to protect our common interest and within that common interest that of the specific interest of Africa. While we will reason with everyone to achieve our objective, we are not prepared to rubberstamp any agreement by the powers that be as the best we could get for the moment. We will use our numbers to delegitimize

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any agreement that is not consistent with our minimal position. If needs be, we are prepared to walk out of any negotiations that threatens to be another rape of our continent.’’

Like the single voiced Africa, also India’s Minister for Environment and Forests, Jairam Ramesh, had threatened that his country “will walk out” of the United Nations Climate Conference (COP15) in Copenhagen if industrialized nations push for legally binding greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions.

These threats of both the AU and India were reflective of the deep issues of inequality that sometimes hinder international negotiations. Historically, climate change has been caused mostly by industrialized countries, but the world’s poorest countries will be among the worst affected.

However, some like Rev. Gabriel Odima, President of the U.S.-based Africa Center for Peace & Democracy, said that threatening to walk away from the negotiations is not a wise idea. He added, “African leaders should check their own closets first before rushing to blame the West.”

Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in a key note address on 03 September 2009 stated, “we as the prime victims of climate change and among the primary beneficiaries of a meaningful agreement on the matter cannot but be responsible actors and negotiators. Even as we defend our corner we cannot but highlight our common humanity and destiny. We cannot but reach out to everyone to curb the insanity—that is global warming. Africa's effective participation in the upcoming negotiations is thus bound to contribute to a more progressive and environmentally friendly outcome than would otherwise have been the case.’’

On the contrary, Mike Hulme, the author of ‘Why We Disagree About Climate Change”, Professor of climate change in the School of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia, stated that the Copenhagen Climate Summit is seeking something that has never before been achieved. Gathering together representatives from all the world’s sovereign nations, it will thrash out the outline of a new global agreement on climate change, an agreement with one central goal: to shape the direction of future world energy and social development in such a way as to prevent the world warming by a further 1.2C.

“This sounds a daunting task. And it is.” He added, “I can’t think of any previous exercise in international diplomacy that has come close to seeking such an ambitious goal”.

It is audacious in its scope (all nations included), in its time-scale (extending decades into the future) and in its reach (from energy, to development, to forests, to intellectual property and so on).

Negotiations for a successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol were moving at a slower pace than many had hoped. As tensions between rich and poor countries increased during the countdown to Copenhagen, so too was the pressure on policymakers to come up with a viable agreement at the summit in Denmark.

Africa, in the context of environmental justice, sought to be equitably compensated for environmental, social and economic losses. African nations felt that the Kyoto Protocol, which is a legally binding document until 2012, should not be scrapped, as was suggested by some countries, but should rather be amended. Establishing an entirely new protocol to be ratified by numerous parliaments around the
world could take a very long time, and Africa, which is already feeling the effects of climate change, could not waste time in adapting for a changing climate.

Mattias Soderberg, representative for nongovernmental organisation DanChurchAid, said, “It doesn’t look like we will have an ambitious binding agreement at Copenhagen. We already have one legally binding agreement which is the Kyoto Protocol and there is no need to create a new agreement. In DanChurchAid we are worried that a political agreement will lack an ambitious content, and that public pressure and momentum may be lost on the road towards a new legally binding agreement in 2010.”

Raila Odinga shared this idea. He has a dismal view of the future and the African demands. He said, "I am very pessimistic about the outcome of Copenhagen. … No firm commitment has been made by developed countries to support developing countries to adapt to the effects of climate change.” He even called COP15, "very worrying and disappointing".

After all, Africa required three critical outcomes from an equitable climate deal. These are: a commitment to provide funding for climate change adaptation in developing countries; an agreement on technology transfer from developed to developing countries; and capacity building to enable Africa adapt to climate change.

As far as the funding for climate change adaptation is raised, African experts on climate change and high-level representatives of AU member states have recommended Africa demand between 67 billion and 200 billion U.S. dollars annually in compensation.

Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga stated that African countries strive for an international fund of 200 billion dollars a year to help poor countries deal with the consequences of climate change. He said that he hoped "common sense is going to prevail" and that a compromise will be struck.

But what did the participants agree to? Was it substantial enough to make a difference? Did they silence the sceptics? Will Sarah Palin finally believe Alaska is melting into the North Pacific?

German Chancellor Angela Merkel defends the Copenhagen Climate Summit. In an interview with the German news source Bild am Sonntag, Merkel stated "Copenhagen is a first step toward a new world climate order—no more, but also no less. Anyone who just badmouths Copenhagen now is engaging in the business of those who are applying the brakes rather than moving forward."

Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi of China said he believes the Copenhagen Summit produced "significant and positive" results. "Developing and developed countries are very different in their historical emissions responsibilities and current emissions levels, and in their basic national characteristics and development stages," Yang said. "Therefore, they should shoulder different responsibilities and obligations in fighting climate change" (Xinhua).

On a Press Conference in Copenhagen, President Barack Obama stated, "a meaningful and unprecedented breakthrough" was made in Copenhagen. "All major economies have come together to accept their responsibility to take action to confront the threat of climate change." But there are sceptics.

No event is perfect. When you get representatives from 192 nations in a room, teamwork is probably a fantasy none of us should harbour. A small island
nation may wish to defend their island from rising oceans, where an oil-producing country may want to defend their industry. Communist and socialist countries may have an agenda, religious leaders an agenda, democracies an agenda, and superpowers an agenda. So as expected, not everybody walked away from the conference with warm words for the "Accord."

- Venezuela international thought leader Hugo Chavez stated, "If it's to go and waste time, it's better I don't go." "If everything is already cooked up by the big [nations], then forget it."

- Bolivia Bolivian President Evo Morales called for the creation of an actual climate justice tribunal. “The Global North”, Morales said, “should indemnify poor nations for the ravages of climate change”.

- Ethiopia Director General of the Ethiopian Environment Protection Agency, Dr Tewoldebirhan Gebre-Egziabher said he believes Africa is already suffering, and likely to suffer more from climate change, but contributes very little to climate change.

- Nepal Prime Minister Madhav Kumar highlighted his concern of the "seriousness of the problem of climate change" particularly for the least developed and vulnerable countries. He added that Nepal urges for special focus on the impact of global warming on the Himalayas, in Nepal and elsewhere.

- UK Ed Miliband, the Climate Change Secretary, said, "If leading countries hold out against something like 'legally binding' or against the 2050 target of 50 per cent reductions in carbon emissions —which was held out against by countries like China—you are not going to get the agreement you want." (COPS15).

The BBC’s environment correspondent Richard Black puts it, as the EU is not able to maintain its pledge of lowering its emissions 20 per cent below the 1990 levels by 2020, rather than going to its alternative higher of 30 per cent for an acceptable package that several European countries had put forward, EU had a politically defensible reason for hunting it down. If they had, many if not all developing countries would probably have followed suit. But it is still a mystery for us why EU decided not to stand up against the US and China.

In light of this, the dramatic change in position by the head of the African delegation, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is not an extraordinary.

Of course, there was a clear change of position before and after Copenhagen. Before travelling to Copenhagen, the African delegation called for 400 billion dollars a year, for Africa to cope with climatic disaster and readjust. The minimum requested ranged 18–23 billion dollars. The delegation agreed to an abysmal 10 billion dollars. When this is seen as is, it sounds perfect U turn. Looking at it, however, is comparison to the giant EU position, Africa accepting what was offered is not that disappointing. (Capital, Sunday December 27, 2009).

The climate conference ended with 192 participating nations walking away with the "Copenhagen Accord," a deal brokered between China, South Africa, India, Brazil and the US.

The "Accord" can really be brought into one statement:
“To achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, we shall, recognizing the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius, on the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable development, enhance our long-term cooperative action to combat climate change.’’ (http:// unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/107.pdf).

How the global community gets to that objective resulted in a non-binding acknowledgement that doesn't set hard numbers on reducing carbon emissions, specific timelines, or penalties on violators.

It does agree to provide $30bn in funding for poor countries to the "adverse effects of climate change and the potential impacts of response measures" from 2010 to 2012, and $100bn a year after 2020.

The "Accord" cites as issue not only carbon emissions, but also deforestation. Oddly, or maybe not, China, the world's largest source of carbon emissions and greenhouse gas, applauded the "Accord." Maybe the "non-binding" nature of the "Accord" gave China some relief, or maybe China has simply accepted their role and responsibility in providing global leadership in reducing harmful toxins into our environment. (http:// unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/107.pdf)

Regardless of which side of the debate you fall, the result is your position will now need defense. Defense to integrate climate change adaptation measures into national and regional development plans, policies and strategies. Africa’s priorities are to implement climate change programmes with a focus on adaptation in such a way as to achieve sustainable development, alleviate poverty and attain the Millennium Development Goals, with emphasis on the most vulnerable groups. (Capital, Sunday December 27, 2009).

"However unjust it might be we have to adapt or die. We can only succeed to adapt to climate change if we fight poverty effectively and generate the resources needed for the purpose. Climate change is thus an additional reason why sustained and fast economic growth is a matter of life and death for our country." said Prime Minster Meles Zenawi.

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South-South Co-operation or Sub-Imperialism? South African “Quiet Diplomacy”, SADC¹ Docility, and the Underdevelopment of Zimbabwe

Feddious Mutenheri *

Abstract
The (mis)management of the decade-long cataclysm in Zimbabwe by South Africa and SADC has hoisted a perpetual debate on the nature and character of regional socio-economic and political relationships in general and the temperament of south-south relations in particular. The protraction of the conflict resolution process and the often disappointing tacit support (the so called ‘quiet diplomacy’) of the impunity of the Mugabe regime by both South Africa and SADC jerk three crucial questions on their culpability in the process of the underdevelopment of post-colonial Zimbabwe. This paper grapples with the ensuing crucial questions: What are the underlying principles of the so called South African “quite diplomacy”? Who controls SADC principally as it regards the (none) resolution of the Zimbabwe question? And lastly, what importance and opportunity did the crisis in Zimbabwe provide to South Africa and other SADC regional countries in the context of the World Economic Recession? As the researcher responds to these crucial questions, the convoluted external processes that have led to the underdevelopment of Zimbabwe, hardly a decade into the 21st Century, are unknotted.

Introduction
In the aftermath of the 2002 controversial presidential elections in Zimbabwe, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) instituted a crises resolution mechanism and Thabo Mbeki (then South African President) became the chief negotiator be-

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Historical Background to South Africa-SADC-Zimbabwe Relations

The relationship between post-colonial Zimbabwe and Apartheid South Africa can be located in the prevailing relations between Apartheid South Africa and SADC (then the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)) as a whole. Apartheid South Africa, by all means and intents, treated SADCC countries in contempt. Successive Apartheid South African governments were known for their destabilization efforts in the region. It is this particular behaviour which post-apartheid South Africa seeks to shed. The Solidarity Peace Trust (2007) report argues that South African Policy of Diplomacy is rooted in the desire to shed the ‘Big Brother’ image of the Apartheid era.

Since Mbeki assumed the presidency he has been at great pains to assure fellow Africans that South Africa will not adopt a ‘big brother’ attitude on the continent. He has often declared that South Africa claims no right to impose its will on any country and will act only “within the context of its international agreements.” Given the history of regional destabilization by successive apartheid governments, democratic South Africa has rightly refrained from projecting its political power; though memories of a regional bully are still fresh.

Given these fears, it is also valid to argue that whereas democratic South Africa gained political independence, the capital and imperial structures of South Africa were not decisively dismantled. I emphasize here that foreign policies of countries are decided not only upon political decisions per se but also in the context of national interest, which obviously encompasses economic interests.

Trade and business ties between South Africa and Zimbabwe have existed for many decades and pre-date independent Zimbabwe. The importance of these linkages to both countries is underlined by the fact that bilateral trade remained robust despite political hostility at the height of the apartheid system in South Africa (Games 2006). South Africa’s powerful position in the region enabled her to ensure that Zimbabwe remained reliant on its trade corridors to the sea-ports by destabilizing the alternative routes through Mozambique and Botswana. As such, when Zimbabwe became independent, South Africa was its largest trade partner, though this declined in the 1980’s.

It should be noted that the special relationship was based on features which are not difficult to identify in their current relationship. What is more clear now is that just as during the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) era, the unequal economic relations between Zimbabwe and its much larger neighbour have become singularly asymmetric under “sanctions”.

On the political side, the rivalry for control of Southern Africa between Zimbabwe and Apartheid South Africa can be located in the pre- and post-independence epochs of Zimbabwe. In the aftermath of the struggle for independence, Zimbabwe then had the leverage to assist other non-independent countries in the region. Zimbabwe’s economic and political prowess and leverage in the region then saw her being instrumental in the formation of the SADCC. Apartheid South Africa’s ire was jolted by Zimbabwe’s efforts to assist other Southern African countries gaining independence. She then constantly destabilized her northern neighbour frequently.

This rivalry also protruded into the post-apartheid
era during Mandela’s tenure. The relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe degenerated into a political wrestling for control of the region. In 1997, Mandela and Mugabe had a highly publicized showdown over the status and functions of a regional security organization, the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security within SADC. Mugabe wanted the Organ to operate as an autonomous body under his control, something vehemently opposed by Mandela.

This competition and battle for supremacy climaxed when Zimbabwe militarily intervened in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1998. For South Africa this move by the Zimbabwe government, undertaken in the name of SADC, was viewed as placing the organization in risk and challenged South Africa's leadership aspirations in the region. The two countries were also at odds over the participation of Congolese rebels in national peace talks, with Mandela favouring their inclusion but Mugabe dead set against it.

Under the stewardship of Thabo Mbeki (whose ascension to the office of the president in 1999 was paralleled by intensifying political and economic problems in Zimbabwe) South Africa has been subject of a great deal of both positive and negative attention (McKinley 2003).

**Conceptual Framework**

It is important to highlight from the onset that foreign policies are designed to help protect a country’s national interest, national security, ideological goals and economic property and this can take place through peaceful co-operation with other nations through aggression, war and exploitation (www.encyclopedia.laborlatalk.com). According to Evans and Newnham (1990 100), foreign policy is “the activity whereby state actors act, react and interact”. In other words, it is a set of political goals to outline how a particular country relates with another country. To some, foreign policy is the “set of decisions made by national leaders which are intended to serve as a broad guideline for choosing among various courses of actions in specific situations in international affairs” (Pearson and Rochester 1988 103). According to Chigora (2007), ‘Thus, when one talks of foreign policy it means both goals that national government pursues in relation to other international actors’.

South African policy towards Zimbabwe has been appropriately characterized as that of a regional economic powerhouse versus a satellite. However, the vague reasoning here has been that, South Africa had (and still has) the stamina to tell Mugabe off and therefore overnight transform the political, humanitarian and economic catastrophe clutching the country. This is obviously impossible. As Alden and Soko (2005) point out, “The limitation of South Africa’s policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ in Zimbabwe bears eloquent testimony to the limits of Pretoria’s regional power.”

In response, the South African government took a very subtle standpoint of condoning the situation in Zimbabwe. Alden and Soko’s thoughts consciously or discourteously paid no attention to fundamental reasons why South Africa treated Zimbabwe “softly”. Many reasons have been merchandise in support for South African policy.

According to McKinley (2003), Mbeki’s continued adherence to Pan-Africanism would not allow him to condemn an African neighbour. This argument only serves to lift Mbeki to lofty heights of a conscious
policy of African servantship ignoring South African government and business’ selfish ends of courting Zimbabwe in order to benefit their country while Mbeki consolidate his power base locally and internationally.

Also Buthelezi, Erstwhile Minister of Home Affairs (1994–2004) and Chairman of Traditional Leaders in the KwaZulu Natal Legislature, offers what essentially is a timorous argument that because of the sorry state of land reform in South Africa, it made no sagacity for her to rule Zimbabwe out of order. This argument is embedded in a very misleading assumption that South Africa is so paralyzed as to be unable to deal with its land issue in a manner different from the fast track and controversial Zimbabwean land reforms. This stands to be challenged.

The other reasoning provided by McKinley is that South African policy towards Zimbabwe is class-based. He argues that South African financial assistance to Zimbabwe prior to 2000 elections was meant “To secure economic (read: class) interests of an emergent black South African bourgeoisie, in both the state and private sectors through the auspices of a foreign policy smokescreen”(McKinley 2003). While this can be credible to a certain extent, it does not fully explain the fundamentals of South African Policy towards Zimbabwe.

To the contrary, this paper, in explaining South African Diplomacy and SADC collaboration, advances the triplet arguments that (i) The South African behaviour towards Zimbabwe, at least as manifested in the contact of its head of state and rubber stamped by the African National Congress and conducted through the SADC is an evident and premeditated policy of economic and political subjugation of the second largest economy in the region; (ii) SADC, especially at the Head of States level, far from being an independent organ and pursuing an African Agenda, was at least in the Zimbabwean case, a conduit of South African Conquest Diplomacy; (iii) faced by the World Recession, South Africa and SADC, which apparently were beneficiaries of the Zimbabwe economic crises, deliberately guided and protracted the process of restoration for their own economic advantages.

**The Imperial Basis of South African Policy**

The argument in this section is based on the veracity of South Africa’s policy of “quiet diplomacy” being driven by the economic interests of the South African state and its corporate sector. According to a preliminary report by the Solidarity Peace Trust (October 2007), South Africa’s policy has been guided by the broader political concerns of the South African state on the continent but also further argues that there is growing evidence of South African business concerns exploiting the conditions of the Zimbabwean crisis which has to be looked at more carefully in terms of its on-going effects on South Africa’s strategy on Zimbabwe. (http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/reports/difficult_dialogue.pdf)

It is clear that due to the geo-economic circumstances between the two countries, the Zimbabwean crises provide easy business opportunities for South Africa. This is corroborated by the Solidarity Trust Report which notes,

> Perhaps because of its troubles, Zimbabwe remains South Africa's most important trading partner in Africa. And the strong economic ties between the two countries are poised to con-
continue into the future; South African companies are unlikely to pull out of Zimbabwe because of that country’s internal crisis. Many South African firms believe Zimbabwe is still a better and easier place in which to do business than many other African countries, and they have found ways to negotiate Zimbabwe’s largely dysfunctional economy in order to maintain a presence there in expectation of eventual political change and economic recovery.

(http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/reports/difficult_dialogue.pdf)

It is a paradox that while Mbeki acknowledged the failure of his ‘quite diplomacy’, the ANC government continued to implement it. Barrow (2001) notes that Mbeki even acknowledged in a BBC television interview that his Zimbabwe policy had not worked—pointing out that he was at that stage pinning his hopes on a new Commonwealth initiative to help the country. Furthermore, the African National Congress (ANC) flatly refused any alternative policy. From such a standpoint then where an institution admits policy failure but continues to implement the same, it is safe to argue that such a policy advertently serves other ‘useful’ purposes and in this case, furthering the economic interests of South Africa.

Both formal and informal trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa has increased during the Zimbabwean crisis. This fact could not be ignored in the political decisions of the Mbeki regime. Zimbabwe remains South Africa’s most important trading partner in Africa, and one of the 15 countries globally with which South Africa exchanges the highest volume of trade (Chibamba 2007). Official trade figures, however, mask the growing informal trade that has been taking place across South Africa's borders with Zimbabwe since the beginning of the economic and political crisis. A significant proportion of trade between South Africa and Zimbabwe takes place through informal means.

Trade figures between Zimbabwe and South Africa are only a tip of the iceberg in showing where South Africa’s economic interests in the region are located. It goes without saying ‘you put your heart where your wealth is’. Several of South Africa’s biggest firms have investments, subsidiaries and interests in Zimbabwe. And the business linkages are extensive at every level. Twenty seven of South Africa's biggest listed companies have operations in Zimbabwe, and some of them are also listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE). Of all the companies listed on the ZSE, 60 per cent are South African. Old Mutual is the biggest company on the exchange with about 18 per cent of the ZSE market capitalization index as at mid-May 2006. (http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/reports/difficult_dialogue.pdf). The highest proportion of Zimbabwe’s exports in 2005 was to South Africa, for example (see Table 1).

Table 1. Zimbabwe’s top ten export destinations in 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Country of export destination</th>
<th>Zimbabwe's export earnings (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>145,556,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>53,991,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>33,572,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>26,504,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>21,635,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>16,198,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>15,567,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>13,034,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>12,312,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>12,136,685</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Zim Trade (2006))
The ownership trends of some major businesses in Zimbabwe are useful in understanding the reasons for Mbeki’s guidance of the dialogue process to a damp end. Metallon Gold owns 60 per cent of the formal sector gold mines, while South African-owned or part-owned mines, own over 90 per cent of the platinum mines. Stanbic and the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ) are significant actors in the banking sector, while there are some sizeable stakeholders in the clothing retail, sugar, brewing, and pulp and paper sectors. For example, Cafca is 76 per cent owned by South Africa’s African Cables; CBZ is 26 per cent owned by ABSA Bank; Delta is 34 per cent owned by SABMiller; Edgars is 43 per cent owned by South Africa’s Edcon; Hippo Valley Sugar is 80 per cent owned by Anglo American; Hunyani is 40 per cent owned by Nampak; Truworths is 33 per cent owned by South Africans; and Murray & Roberts is 48 per cent owned by South African shareholders.

(http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/reports/difficult_dialogue.pdf)

Quiet diplomacy masks huge South African economic interests in Zimbabwe. The trade partnership between Zimbabwe and South Africa has ranged within the top 20 of each of the two countries’ trade partnerships. In fact, Zimbabwe ranks as position 16 of South Africa’s world top import partners, and position 2 of South Africa’s African top import partners; Zimbabwe also ranks as position 8 of South Africa’s world top export partners, and as position 2 of South Africa’s African top export partners. Generally, Zimbabwe ranks position 16 of South Africa’s world top trade partners, and as position 2 of South Africa’s African top trade partners (Table 2a-c).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Euro</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>63.238</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 EU</td>
<td>22.620</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 China</td>
<td>6.081</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 USA</td>
<td>4.458</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Japan</td>
<td>3.718</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3.486</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Iran</td>
<td>2.625</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Oman</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Korea</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Australia</td>
<td>1.588</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 India</td>
<td>1.583</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Brazil</td>
<td>1.374</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Nigeria</td>
<td>1.281</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Thailand</td>
<td>1.064</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Argentina</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Malaysia</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Zimbabwe</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Hong Kong</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Singapore</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Canada</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Switzerland</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
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</table>
The World Economic Crisis, as in any other region or country presented a dreary future to the South African economy. Job losses, financial crisis, dimin-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major export partners</th>
<th>Euro</th>
<th>%</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>51.164</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 E U</td>
<td>17.667</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 USA</td>
<td>6.295</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Japan</td>
<td>5.148</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 China</td>
<td>4.418</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Turkey</td>
<td>1.441</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Switzerland</td>
<td>1.438</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Zambia</td>
<td>1.054</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Zimbabwe</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Australia</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Mozambique</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Korea</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Canada</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 India</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Angola</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Nigeria</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 UAE</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Kenya</td>
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<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Tanzania</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Thailand</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Brazil</td>
<td>366</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SA’s Major Trade Partners</th>
<th>Euro</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>114.403</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 E U</td>
<td>40.286</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 USA</td>
<td>10.753</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 China</td>
<td>10.499</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Japan</td>
<td>8.867</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3.766</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Iran</td>
<td>2.826</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Korea</td>
<td>2.553</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Australia</td>
<td>2.457</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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ished buying power of consumers, credit crunch were some of the effects of this crisis. South Africa sought to deal with these problems. The Zimbabwean crisis provided an easy opportunity to the SA as a market of South African goods, provision of very skilled but cheap labour, a source of raw materials in minerals and others.

Finally, South Africa under Mbeki in trying to ward off competition for regional leadership had to make her economic power felt. This imperialism has been covered under a façade and rhetoric of African Renaissance. According to the Economist (2007), “Under the leadership of Mbeki, South Africa has assiduously sought to cultivate a position as a ‘natural’ leader of the SADC region and, indeed, of the African continent. Invoking the rhetoric of ‘African renaissance,’ Mbeki has set out to reaffirm South Africa’s African identity and legitimize its leadership ambitions”.

SADC Passivity

In this section, I question the behaviour of SADC which was in practice divergent from its principles. Firstly, SADC has a clearly defined code of conduct for installing and removing leaders. The SADC electoral Guidelines and Principles, though not legal and binding, are meant to guide its decisions and behaviour towards member states violating the democratic principles. Following is an outline of how SADC went out of its way to violate both the letter and the spirit of those guidelines which Zimbabwe too ratified.

In March 2008, Zimbabwe held a four-tier election which was widely pronounced as free and fair by SADC, African Union (AU), The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and other local observers. Opposition led by Morgan Tsvangirai won all the four (Local, Parliamentary, Senate, and Presidential) elections. While it did not take much time to announce the first three elections, the Mugabe regime withheld for more than a month the results of the real election at stake—the presidential results. During the same period, President Mbeki, the SADC negotiator, visited Zimbabwe and to the astonishment of the whole world commented, ‘there was no crisis in Zimbabwe’. It was surprising that SADC was whipped into the same line and chorus as Mbeki.

The run-off election of June 27, 2008 was worse and the SADC’s incompetence reached its nadir. Characterized by unmitigated violence, abductions, police brutality, and all sorts of political harassment, the “one men” election was declared by all and sundry observers as a sham.

This raises the second question why SADC failed to suspend Zimbabwe from its grouping. This question has been made brazen with SADC’s double standard when they hastily suspended Madagascar after the handing over of power by Ravalomanana to Rajoelina via the army. From such a standpoint, it is with merit to argue that SADC, far from aiming to solve the Zimbabwe crisis, was driven by economic interests of South Africa and its member states.

Thirdly, much of Zimbabwean human resources (general, semi-skilled, skilled and majority of professionals) flooded the Southern African market at the height of the crises. What is outstanding about the Zimbabwean human power is its agility, professionalism and hard work which has proved irresistible across the world. From such a submission, it is
arguable that SADC member states found the protraction of the Zimbabwean crisis not only an opportunistic benefit but also a necessity that should be perpetuated at all costs for the benefit of their own economies. The South African Home Affairs’ scrapping of the visa constraint on Zimbabweans entering their soil on the 1st of May 2009 with a stipend to find work without a permit, barely three months into the Zimbabwe Inclusive government, attest to the afore-stated assertion that SADC countries benefited from the elongation of the crises there.

The state of underdevelopment in Zimbabwe cannot be overemphasized. It can be summarized as the reversal of all its gains at independence as a result of ZANU (PF) expediency and the culpability of South Africa and SADC and is highlighted by the disintegration of such sectors as the health, education and industry; dire food situation; high unemployment; and the general impoverishment of the people.

Conclusion

The long and short of it is that countries act as directed by their own national concerns, such as economic, political, social, and environmental. The moral compulsions of countries are always superseded by their pragmatic and pressing needs at a given eon. The moral duty thrust upon South Africa by SADC was meant for her to use leverage to restrain a dictator (Mugabe) from ravaging a once “jewel of Africa”. With the challenges posed by the World Economic Recession becoming more realistic, the need for regional dominance, and general economic interests of South African capital made it convenient for the South African Facilitation to guide the crises resolution process and allow South African business to derive benefits before finality could be brought to the crisis. The sloganeering of ‘African solutions to African problems’, and ‘south-south cooperation’, while plausible, has in this case proved to be a visor of obvious imperial tendencies of regional powerhouses against any competition. Just like multilateral institutions as the United Nations, European Union, African Union, the Arab League and others have been used by the powerful countries, regional blocs and particularly SADC have been used by the mighty to advance their interests.

References


http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/reports/difficult_dialogue.pdf


End note

1 SADC is the Acronym for Southern African Development Community, a regional grouping of 13 Southern African countries. These countries are: South Africa; Mozambique; Tanzania, DRC; Botswana; Swaziland; Lesotho; Angola; Madagascar (currently suspended); Namibia; Malawi; Zambia; and Zimbabwe.
Armed Conflict and Its Impact on Environment in Central and Southern Africa

Steven Jerie *

Abstract
This paper is a highlight on the environmental impacts of wars that have been waged or are still raging on in central and southern Africa. Land and its distribution has been a major cause of conflict in southern Africa. After the independence of countries in central and southern Africa, civil wars have raged on due to ethnic, regional and ideological differences. The major victim of these wars have been the environments which have been affected either directly or indirectly as both sides to the conflict contribute to the degradation. The direct impacts include loss of human and animal life, chemical pollution, landmines, fires, trenches, and deforestation. The indirect impacts include displacement of people resulting in refugees leading to increased poaching of wildlife and deforestation. The results of interference with the environment include localised climate change as evidenced by reduced precipitation, soil erosion due to increased surface runoff as well as air and water pollution. It is recommended that there is need to promote peace in central and southern Africa through regional blocks and mutual understanding for the sake of protecting the environment from the harmful effects of armed conflict. Countries also need to abide by the international environmental policies that safeguard the environment chief among which are the Biological Diversity Convention and the Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Introduction
Conflict over resources, such as minerals, fish, water, and especially territory is seen as a traditional source of armed struggle world-over (Martin 2005; Nils 1998; Reichberg and Syse 2000; Salehyan 2008; Urdal 2008). All sides to a conflict contribute toward environmental damage and use environmental damage as a propaganda tool to discredit each other (Booth et al 1994). Today, claims have been made to the effect that environmental degradation will increase resource scarcity and thereby contribute to an increase in conflict. The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development acknowledges the destructive impact of war on the environment by observing that warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. The declaration therefore encourages states to respect international law that provides protection of the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary.

The so-called 'war on terrorism', the United States has been waging in Asia, started with the shocking event that we recall well from news bulletins world-over. On September 11, 2001 'terrorists' flew airplanes into the buildings of the World Trade Centre and the attack and simultaneous collapse of the Twin Towers caused a serious and acute environmental disaster (Enzler 2006; Pearce 2004; Salehyan 2008; Urdal 2008). Countries in Southern Africa, especially Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, have engaged in armed conflict for a variety of reasons—chief among which has been liberation from colonial rule. At the heart of the liberation wars has been the land question, which up to now remains the most bitterly contested reform area in countries, such as Zimbabwe and South Africa (Anstery 1993; Moyo 1993). Despite independence from colonial rule, civil wars have ensured in some independent states in southern Africa, notably Angola and Mozambique. Before South Africa attained self rule in 1994, it engaged in aggression and destabilisation against independent states in the
region that were sympathetic to the liberation movements. The aggression was thus directed at Angola, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania, Namibia and Zimbabwe (Booth et al 1994; Hauge and Ellingsen 1998; Urdal 2008; Salehyan 2008). In some countries, there has been internal dissent over policy areas, such as those to promote market economics, multi-party politics or protest against economic structural adjustment. In other cases, political instability due to economic and social tensions resulted in the states using armed force to control dissent in a limited manner as was the case in Zambia in 1991 and Malawi in 1992–1993 and widespread military response in South Africa between 1976 and 1994.

Land and its distribution was thus a major cause of the liberation wars in southern Africa. The apartheid policies in South Africa tended to marginalise the black majority to unproductive areas and these tended to trigger liberation wars. The distribution of land in South Africa and Zimbabwe tended to favour the white minority (Moyo 1993). In South Africa, the Blacks, who comprised 87 per cent of the population, were confined to 13 per cent of the land in the notorious homelands. Overpopulation became a glaring feature of these homelands as there was limited access to resources, such as land, water, fisheries and wildlife. According to the SARDC (1989), the consequent resource degradation, deforestation and soil erosion remain the worst environmental monuments of apartheid.

After independence in countries, such as Angola and Mozambique, wars continued to rage on as a result of ethnic, regional and ideological differences. Armed conflict escalated in Mozambique and Angola and this resulted in full-blown civil wars.

**Environmental Impacts of War**

The application of weapons, the destruction of structures and oilfields, fires, military transportation movements, and chemical spraying are all examples of the damaging impact war may have on the environment (Enzler 2006). Air, water, and soil are polluted; people and animals are killed; and numerous health effects occur among those still living. War destroys the environment directly and indirectly. The direct impacts include fires, bombings, pollution from war chemicals, trenches, anti-personnel traps, and cutting down of trees to remove cover (Booth et al 1994). Military training can go wrong and result in environmental damage affecting wetlands, plants and animals as was the case in Angola's Birkuar National Park and in the De Hop Nature Reserve of the Western Cape in South Africa. Angola has the largest number of amputees in the world estimated at 70 000 in 1990 and over 20 million landmines are scattered over a third of the country (Anstery 1993; Booth et al 1994). In Namibia, the South African Defence forces planted landmines in the combat areas and these are still affecting people, goats, cattle, donkeys, and sheep despite the war of liberation having ended in 1989. Indirect impacts include over-exploitation of wildlife for food or cash, localised environmental problems that may be caused by refugees and other displaced people who (Martin and Johnson 1981; Koch 1992).

**Deforestation**

Deforestation is by far the greatest threat posed by armed struggle on the environment. The deforestation is associated with the armed forces themselves,
refugees, and even the local population itself. The fighters themselves have undertaken deforestation for many reasons. Usually they need the wood for fuel and as lumber (Westing 1992). However, there may be conscious deforestation because the foliage is an important camouflage that may keep the fighters as inconspicuous as possible. Deforestation may also be undertaken for strategic reasons to enable access to remote areas of the forests and thus avoid unnecessary ambushes. According to Kalpers (2001), in 1991, the Rwandese army cut a swath that was between 50 metres and 100 metres wide through the bamboo forest connecting the Virunga volcanoes. This was also the case in the DRC whereby, in 1999, themselves army had to clear-cut themselves area around the road that crosses the Virunga National Park and links themselves city of Goma to the north.

Deforestation is probably the greatest threat refugees pose to the environment (Biswas and Tortajada-Quiroz 1996; Black 1993). The refugees engage in deforestation to meet their own survival needs such as farming, collection of fuelwood and building material and for selling to earn money. The refugees also introduce plants and animals that are exotic to the areas they invade. In Malawi, there were over one million refugees due to the Mozambican wars and these initiated extensive deforestation in areas, such as Dedza, Ntcheu, Mlanje, and Nsanje districts in Southern Malawi. Due to subsistence agriculture and fuelwood collection over 2,500 hectares of forest were cleared yearly in the 1980s (SARDC 2000). A major casualty of the Rwandese conflict was one of Africa's first national parks, the Virungu National Park on the border between the DRC and Rwanda. In their search for food and wood, the Hutu soldiers from Goma and Rwandese refugees had deforested some 300 square kilometres of Virungu National Park and between 410 and 770 tonnes of forest products were taken out of the park daily by the 850,000 refugees who lived close to the park at the height of the conflict (Enzler 2006; Pearce 2004; Percival-Homer Dixon 1995; PICG-Rwanda 1998). The increase in refugees in these areas has had negative impacts on the environment and some of these impacts are summarised in Fig. 1.1.

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**Fig. 1.1.** Refugee population pressure and resultant environmental problems
Over the last ten years the area with undisturbed ecosystems has been reduced in size such that 204,000 hectares of forest are lost each year through deforestation by way of agriculture, logging, mining and armed conflict (SARDC 2000).

Forests are a valuable environmental and economic resource for supporting natural ecosystems and for also supporting human welfare. The forests account for almost 30 per cent of the earth's total area and are an integral component of the biosphere as they help to stabilise natural ecosystems. They also contribute to biological diversity and help to maintain air, water, and soil quality. Forests regulate biochemical processes, runoff, groundwater, local climate; control soil erosion; and reduce downstream sedimentation and flooding. Forests are also carbon sinks, reducing the greenhouse effect. They have an aesthetic value and offer recreational opportunities. Forests also represent capital when converted to desirable forms of shelter and infrastructure and provide land for food production.

Deforestation impacts upon biodiversity and the destruction of even a small area of forest can eliminate entire species, which have economic value as important sources of food, medicine, genetic material for crop hybridisation and other marketable products. In Rwanda, resettlement of former refugees in the Akagaraga National Park resulted in the loss of some species of ungulates including roan antelope and the eland (Williams and Ntayombya 1999). When natural forest is cleared the nutrient and water budgets of the soil are fundamentally altered. Evapotranspiration is reduced and hence water tables and water yields are reduced as well. The circulation of nutrients from the soil through trees and shrubs and back through plant litter is disrupted.

Poaching

Poaching is regarded as another major activity that has negative impacts on the environment. Rebels and some disorganised regular armies may engage in poaching to supplement their low wages (Westing 1992). The armed groups may also poach for commercial purposes as was the case in Angola and Mozambique where rebel groups exploited elephant populations for commercial purposes in the same way they have exploited natural resources, such as wood, gold and diamonds (Dutton 1992; Pearce 2004). War has thus contributed to biodiversity losses in southern Africa through poaching. Angola alone has lost as much as 90 per cent of its wildlife in protected areas since 1975. In Mozambique, there was over-hunting of wild animals in the Zinave National Park in northern Inhambane Province as to supply both urban areas and army centres with food and money to buy arms (SARDC 2000).

The wars in Angola affected over 21 species of mammals which occurred in large numbers over two decades ago—making them either endangered or extinct and these included the giraffe, hippo, rhino, lechwe, the black-faced impala, and the gorilla (Cooper and Cooper 1996). As a result, only three lechwe remain in the Luando National Park in post war Angola. Angola lost over 90 per cent of its wildlife in its protected areas in the 20 years of war it experienced and Mozambique also experienced a similar amount of loss in terms of wild animals in the Gorongoza National Park (Booth et al 1994). In the Marromen Delta at the mouth of the Zambezi, the number of buffalo went down to 4,000 from 55,000, water buck to 4,000 from 45,000, zebra to 1,000 from 2,700, and hippo to
260 from 1,700. In the Garamba National Park in North Eastern DRC, the white rhinoceros was endangered by armed conflict and the resulting refugees (Anstery 1993; Chilvers 1992; Smith 1997).

Pollution

Environmental pollution may result from some activities in war that include the storing and abandoning of ammunition in natural settings hence contaminating the waterways and groundwater with liquid and solid waste. Refugees and displaced persons also spread disease due to activities that include improper disposal of solid and liquid waste in rivers and on land. Landmines have been a big threat to humans as well as domestic and wild animals. There are over 100 million landmines that have been planted word-over and Angola and Mozambique are the worst affected (Peck 2000). The landmines are a big threat to wild animals; the most vulnerable being ungulates, elephants, and primates. According to Zimbabwe Wildlife (1987), the greatest difficulty with landmines lies in their durability such that it may be very difficult to remove them. However, the mines may be a blessing in disguise because the areas littered with the landmines may be inaccessible thus protecting the natural habitats and making poaching and deforestation difficult.

Way forward

The environment is vital for various life forms including the well-being of humankind. There is therefore need to promote peace in central and southern Africa for the sake of the environment by emphasising good regional relations in organisations, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Peace deals reduce pressure on natural resources although this may be a big setback on people who depended on poaching during times of war in countries, such as Angola, Mozambique, and the DRC. Wildlife management programmes similar to the Communal Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe need to be introduced to enable locals to manage their own resources and avoid overuse. Indigenous knowledge systems in the management of environmental resources also need to be encouraged as these have in some cases enhanced conservation. The guerrillas in Zimbabwe, for example, knew it was taboo to kill certain types of wild animals as these had spiritual connections with ancestors as the guardians of the land and its resources. It was also taboo for the fighters in Zimbabwe to kill animals related to their totems and these included the lion, elephant, zebra, monkey, and fish. In Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Angola, ex-fighters had been introduced into the national parks and, as noted by Sogge (1992), similar plans could be introduced in Namibia, DRC and Rwanda.

There is need to continue to re-emphasise the conservation of biological diversity following the resettlement of refugees in Mozambique, Angola, DRC, and Rwanda. It is thus important to comply to international and national environmental policies to minimise negative impacts of armed conflict on the environment. The Convention on Biological Diversity was adopted on African soil in Nairobi, Kenya in 1992 and its objective is to conserve biological diversity; promote the use of its components; and encourage equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources. Such programmes include CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe, The Wetlands Programme in Kafue and Bangweulu Flats in Zambia. The Framework Convention on Climate
Change of 1992 aims at averting the threat of global warming by achieving the stabilisation of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, nitrous oxides, methane, ozone concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climatic system. Forests need to be preserved as a vital carbon sink as one of the ways of sticking to the aims of the Climate Change Convention.

References


Revitalizing Growth in Africa in the Era of Global Crisis: Reforms vs Institutional Transformation

Emerta Asaminew*

Abstract

From 1990’s up to mid 2007, Africa has witnessed good economic performance—growing by over 6.5 per cent from 2004 to 2007. Favourable external conditions, macroeconomic stability and relative return of peace have been frequently cited as casual factors for its renewed growth performance over the past decade and half period. However, owing to the unfavourable external condition (world financial crisis and economic slowdown), this performance has contracted back to close to five per cent in 2008 and projected to level to one per cent in 2009—a more than decade low rate. The concern by African leaders and concerned organizations is how to regenerate growth in the continent in the era of financial and economic meltdown: what this article intends to scientifically answer based on the long-run statistical relationship between growth and relevant variables. To do so, a new approach in growth analysis—episodic growth analysis—was followed. Based on data spanning from 1950’s to 2008 on 48 African economies, institutional variables (democratization and regime change) were robust predictors of episodic growth. However, none of the reform variables explain years of growth accelerations significantly. Of the control variables, government expenditure and terms-of-trade shock significantly explain the probability of growth accelerations. Since re-igniting growth should be a priority in African states so as to achieve at least part of the MDG’s and drag some portion of the population out of poverty, policy makers should envisage in more institutional transformation. The cost of not doing so cannot easily be recovered.

Introduction

Majority of the world’s poor resides in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Africa hereinafter). Countries in this region have been experiencing poor and erratic eco-

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nomic growth for the last several decades. This trend combined with high population growth has led to very low per capita incomes and unacceptable standards of living for the large segments of the population. The economies are also often characterized by high income inequality. For a number of years, issues of growth, poverty, and inequality have, therefore, been key challenges facing policymakers in this region.

Since recent, Africa has witnessed good economic performance growing by over six per cent from 2004 to 2007. Favourable external conditions, macroeconomic stability and relative return of peace have been frequently cited as casual factors for its renewed growth performance over the past decade and half period. However, owing to the unfavourable external condition including world financial crisis and economic slowdown, a treat has emerged over this promising performance. As a result, the growth performance of these countries is assumed to shrink by one percentage points in 2008 and by five percentage points in 2009. Now, the concern has become on how to regenerate growth in the continent in the era of financial and economic meltdown.

Growth has been the concern of world’s citizens long ago, and it has passed various thoughts in its evolution. However, the notion of long-term economic growth and the analysis of growth determinants has dated back from the classic contributions of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) as documented in different studies, such as Villa (2005) and Aghion and Howitt (1998). Since then, ample of neoclassical and endogenous growth models were run. However, none of these models were able to provide “much reliable and clear evidence that could be operationally useful (Rodrik 2005). In an effort to fix the problem of those growth models, Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2004) have introduced an alternative (two-pronged) approach. This approach involves a short-run strategy of igniting growth and a medium and long-run strategy of sustaining the growth achieved. In this analysis, some form of this approach was used in attempt to see the relative contribution of reform and institutional variables in re-stimulating growth in African economies.


Africa experienced a solid economic performance in the decade 1995–2008, with a hope for renewed growth in the economies. According to IMF (2009), between 2002 and 2007 sub-Saharan Africa’s output grew annually by some 6.5 per cent—the highest rate in more than 30 years. World Bank (2007) shows that as many as 28 countries recorded improvements in growth in 2006 relative to 2005 (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Per capita GDP growth

SOURCE: Own construction based on Penn World Tables and IMF (2007)

The region’s average growth rate began to approach that of other developing countries for the first time since the mid-1970s. This recent outcome is the result of both good policies and good luck.

A number of factors were cited as the causes of such renewed growth in Africa. Policies in many African
countries have become better. Inflation, budget deficits, exchange rates, and foreign debt payments were relatively manageable during the period. Moreover, Nudulu et al (2007) attributed the recently improving economic performance of African economies for institutional improvement, the return of peace and security in the region, increasing political participation and competition. Also African governments are increasingly taking control of their own economic destinies. The observed growth was also underpinned by good luck explained by strong global demand for key African export commodities, resulting in high export prices, especially for crude oil, metals, and minerals.

However, the financial and economic crisis witnessed since 2008 has manifested itself in the African economies by dragging back the promised growth. Accordingly, the growth performance of the continent flattered to about five per cent in 2008 and projected to as low as one per cent in 2009- the low growth in more than a decade time. This implies that the continent is hard hit by external shocks.

**Empirical Strategy**

**Identifying the Episodes in Growth**

1. This method was used to search for points of accelerations in the growth rate of GDP per capita of SSA countries. Following Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2004), the growth rate was defined at time $t$ over horizon $n$ to be the least squares growth rate of GDP per capita ($y$) from $t$ to $t + n(g_{t, t+n})$ defined implicitly by the following:

$$\ln(y_{t+i}) = a + g_{t, t+n} \cdot t_i, \quad i = 0, \ldots, n,$$

$a$ is the intercept

$$\text{[1]}$$

The change in the growth rate at time $t$ is simply the change in the growth over horizon $n$ across that period:

$$\Delta g_t = g_{t+n} - g_{t-n, t} \quad \text{[2]}$$

Growth accelerations were identified by looking for rapid growth episodes that satisfy the following conditions. The cut-offs are from Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2004).

1. $g_{t, t+n} \geq 3.5$, that growth is rapid
2. $\Delta g_t \geq 2.0$, that growth accelerates
3. $y_{t+n} \geq \max\{y_i\} \quad i \leq t$, that post growth output exceeds pre-episode output

This method was applied to the GDP per capita data for all SSA countries for which the researcher had adequate data points. Unlike Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2004), the relevant time horizon was taken to be six years (i.e., $n = 5$). This is to address the plainly high volatility of overall rate of African growth. Based on studies by Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2004) and Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2006) among others, it was assumed that countries can have more than one instance of growth accelerations as long as the dates are more than $h=5$ years apart.

This filter was strictly followed and consistent to previous works; it provided large number of growth accelerations equal to 58 episodes in 37 of the 48
countries for the years between 1955 and 2003. This gave us unconditional probability of 2.46 per cent for growth accelerations.

**Empirical Model**

The series “episodes” (the 3-year window) were used around the point of growth acceleration generated through the process explained in section 3.1 as dependant variable for limited dependant panel data probit regression. This variable was regressed on a number of covariates to examine what correlates with these growth episodes. To check the robustness of the regression, also alternative estimation techniques were undertaken. Note that our models contain country effects (country dummies) to control countries’ unobserved heterogeneities.

The baseline specification used for analyzing the binary outcome variable in the panel data probit regression was

$$\text{episodes}_{it} = \gamma + \sum_k \beta_k X_{kit} + V_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad t = 1, \ldots, T$$

where $X_{kit}$ are the right hand side variables (covariates) used in the model, $V_{it}$ is the country effect, $\beta_k$ are coefficients, and $\varepsilon_{it}$ is the error term.

In analyzing the relative significance of economic reforms and institutional variables in accelerating growth in Africa, three groups of variables were used: (i) economic reform variables, including financial liberalization ($\text{Finan\_Lib}$) and economic reform ($\text{Econ\_lib}$); (ii) institutional variables, including democratization ($\text{Democ}$), regime change ($\text{Reg\_Change}$), conflict end ($\text{Conflict\_end}$) and ethnolinguistic factorization ($\text{Ethnoling}$); and (iii) other control variables including terms-of-trade shock ($\text{ToT\_Thresh90}$), petroleum price shocks ($\text{PoP\_Thresh90}$), inflation ($\text{Infla}$), government expenditure ($\text{Gov\_Exp}$), and resource richness ($\text{Resou\_Rich}$).

**Discussion of Estimation Results**

Analysis of the correlates of growth episodes on SSA countries revealed surprising results. None of the reform (economic and financial) variables explained the timings of growth episodes in the group of countries analyzed. Big reforms are not necessarily prerequisites for accelerating growth in Africa. On the other hand, some of the institutional variables considered were found to be statistically significant predictors of the probability of growth accelerations (Table 1). Democratization and regime change were found to be relevant variables in stimulating episodic growth, implying just institutional change is enough for stimulating frequent growth episodes in the set of countries considered. Of the controlled variables included in the models, government expenditure and external terms of trade shock are significant in explaining growth in African economies. This was evidenced in the slowed down growth of most of African economies associated with the recent global financial crisis and economic downturn.
Table 1. Predicting growth episodes in Africa

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<td></td>
<td>0.2600</td>
<td>0.3600</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict_end</strong></td>
<td>-0.0889</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.5200</td>
<td>-0.7100</td>
<td>-0.7000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Democ</strong></td>
<td>-1.0140***</td>
<td>-1.9205***</td>
<td>-1.8720***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-2.7000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Reg_Change</strong></td>
<td>0.2589***</td>
<td>0.5195***</td>
<td>0.5028***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.1300</td>
<td>2.3100</td>
<td>2.2700</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnoling</strong></td>
<td>0.6974</td>
<td>1.2968</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3100</td>
<td>1.4100</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Resou_Rich</strong></td>
<td>-0.0461</td>
<td>-0.0643</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.1200</td>
<td>-0.1000</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gov_Exp</strong></td>
<td>0.5010***</td>
<td>0.9336***</td>
<td>0.9022***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>4.0900</td>
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<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
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<td>1372.0000</td>
<td>1092.0000</td>
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<td><strong>Wald chi2(43)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>LR chi2(9)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Prob &gt; chi2</strong></td>
<td>0.0130</td>
<td>0.0066</td>
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Note: C1 means Column 1 estimated by random effect probit regression. Coefficients shown are marginal probabilities evaluated at the sample means. Values in parenthesis are t-statistics.

C2 means Column 2 Random effect logistic regression

C3 means Column 3 Conditional fixed effect logistic regression

(***)) indicates significance at the 1% level. Estimations include country effects (dummies).

If African countries are to re-stimulate growth and achieve most of the MDGs, they need to improve their institutional landscape and work to save from the unfavourable external environment currently prevailing. The results are robust across estimated models.

**Conclusion**

For the last couple of decades, what determines growth continued to be the concern of policy makers and various models have been run. However, the recent growth literature has come with the realization of economic growth as a sequence of different growth regimes (Jerzmanowski 2006; Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik 2004; Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer 2006; Dovern and Nunnenkamp 2006; Arbache and Page 2007) rather than a smooth process well described by the long-run average. The approach followed in the current analysis builds on this complexity of the growth process and analyzes the impact of reform and institutional variables on the likelihood of quick growth.

Given the methodology used in this analysis, it was found that growth accelerations are explained by institutional factors, such as democratization and regime change. Nonetheless, none of the reform variables are statistically relevant in explaining years of growth accelerations in African economies. On the other hand, government expenditure and positive terms-of-trade are important variables in accelerating growth in SSA.

**References**


Dovern, J. and P. Nunnenkamp, 2006. Aid and growth


End notes

1. Citing WDI, Africa has been growing on average by – 0.7%, -0.6% and 0.7% over the 1980’s, 1990’s and between 2000 and 2002 (McKay, 2004).


3. Excluding 2001 for which Africa recorded a -4% per capita income growth rate(an outlier).

4. IMF(2009)

5. Where ToT_Thresh90 takes the value 1 whenever the year-on-year change in the terms-of-trade is in the upper 90% of the entire sample; PoP_Thresh90 takes 1 whenever the change in the petroleum price is in the upper 90%, Infla is a dummy variable taking 1 for five years following the year in which inflation is in the lower 20% of the entire sample, Econ_lib takes the value of 1 during the first five years of a transition towards trade openness, Finan_lib is dummy for the first five years of a financial liberalization episode, Conflict_end is another dummy for the five-year period starting with a cessation of all sorts of armed conflicts, Ethnoling shows ethnic heterogeneity, Reg_Change takes a value of 1 in the five-year period beginning with a regime change as recorded in the Polity IV dataset, Democ is 1 during the first five-year period if the Polity2 score changes from negative to positive denoting a movement from autocracy to democracy, Resou_Rich is a dummy taking 1 if a country is rich in resources and Gov_Exp is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for five-years period if change in government expenditure as share of GDP is in the upper 90% of the entire sample.

6. However, democratization turns out to be with unexpected sign. This was nevertheless consistent with Hausmann et al (2004).

Forthcoming Publications

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