1.For the recent social and economic performance see the World Bank World Development Report 1990 & 1991.
2. For example see Myers (1989 b: 25).
3. See Mohammed (1993 e).
4. World Bank World Development Report (1990; 7).
5. The World Commission on Environment and Development (1987: 101).
6. World Bank World Development Report (1990: 5).
7. USACDA World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1989.
8. See Deger (1991), pp. 115-35, for a recent survey on the trends of world military spending.
9. See Mohammed (1992 & 1993 c) for the frequency of military coups and the size of the armed forces in Africa.
10. Myers (1989 a: 73).
1. Lodgaard (1992; 117); and World Bank Technical Paper No. 139 (1991: 55).
2. See Myers (1989 b: 23).
3. Prins (1990: 727).
4. Wolpin (1986).
5. Brown (1981: 39).
6. Mohammed (1989: 3).
7. Hardoy & Satterthawite (1985: 171) point to the effect of this migration on the internal (home) environment, cities, and region's environments.
8. Runge (1986: 628).
9. An example of these studies, is Wade's (1987: 95) findings on Southern India.
20. For example, the UNEP postulated that "The only view rich and poor counties seemed to share was the conviction that environmental conservation and economic development are in conflict with each other" (UNEP, 1978).
2. The UNEP then introduce the concept of ecodevelopment defined as "development at regional and local levels... consistent with the potentials of the area involved, with attention given to the adequate and rational use of the natural resources, and to applications of technological styles ... and organizational forms that respect the natural ecosystem and local sociocultural patterns" (UNEP, 1975, para. 100).
22. The constraint of the above resources also manifest itself in the form of rising costs and diminishing returns, rather than in a sudden loss of a resource base. See, the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987: 45).
23. The South Centre, Geneva, (1991: 1).
24. With acidification, and with deforestation for fuelwood in many developing nations. This is also true for the absence of nucellar energy generation.
25. The effects of the political aspects of militarization (e.g., military intervention in politics) are not included in the analysis. The emphases here are on the direct effects of military establishments on the economy and the environment.
26. Mohammed (1992) provides an extended literature survey and evaluates the studies in each of the two categories.
27. An example of other studies on warfare-welfare trade-offs is Dixon and Moon's (1986) study on the military burden and the provision of basic human needs. The regression analysis corroborated that, when controlling for the size of the military establishment, military spending tends to inhibit welfare outcomes in LDCs.
28. Dunne (1990) reviews different approaches to the study of the economic impact of military expenditures: neo-classical, critical liberal and Marxist approaches. See also Deger & Smith (1985) for the classical and Keynesian approaches.
29. The skills range from driving and repairing vehicles, metal and woodworking, construction and improved agricultural techniques, to engineering and other sciences. Note also that most LDCs (and particularly African countries) have volunteer armies. [See Ball (1988: 308), Figure 8-1].
30. Harris et al. (1988). However, in a sample of 26 African countries for the period 1967-1976, Nabe (1983) concludes that military expenditure impeded social development efforts in education in these countries.
3. Mohammed (1992)
32. See Deger & Smith (1983: 388).
33. Hess (1989) found that arms imports had a significant positive impact on receipts of foreign aid in a sample of 76 LDCs for the period 1978-1984. However, he concluded that this is conditional on the composition of nations in the sample. Indeed, the significance of arms imports vanished when the Middle Eastern countries were omitted from the sample.
34. For example, the empirical evidence provided by the following studies confirm the negative impact of military spending on economic growth: Faini et al.(1984); Deger & Smith (1983); Deger & Sen (1983); Deger (1985); Deger (1986). Mohammed (1992) provides a detailed evaluation for these studies.
35. Mohammed (1993 a & b), however, revised his analysis and claimed that his reported results are weak and do not support his conclusions because the calculated multipliers were based on statistically insignificant coefficients.
36. An example of other studies on warfare-welfare trade-offs is Dixon and Moon's (1986) study on the military burden and the provision of basic human needs. The regression analysis corroborated that, when controlling for the size of the military establishment, military spending tends to inhibit welfare outcomes in LDCs.
37. See Atles (1992), Gamba-Stonehouse (1992), and Westing (1989).
38. Maizels & Nissanke (1986), and Ball (1988).
39. At least, this was the declared motive for three successful military interventions in the Sudan (1958, 1969, and 1989).
40. Atles (1992: 65).
41. See Brauer (1991) for the recent trend of arms production in the Third World.
42. Atles (1992: 71).
43. Chourci (1992: 70).
44. For example, Rocha (1990) reveals the intensions of the Brazilian army against preserving rainforest.
45. Of which 59% are in uniform. See Westing (1988: 257).
46. See for example Westing (1988).
47. Lewis (1990) shows the role of the Kenyan army (the anti-poaching squads) in protecting wildlife.
48. Wars usually take place as a result of higher militarization, or it can be both the cause and the manifestation of higher militarization.
49. Hassan (1992: 81) gives examples of conflict in South Asia which was caused by population displacement owing to environmental stress.
50. Deger & Sen (1992: 167). Moreover, this damage caused to the Gulf's environment in 1992 corroborates Atles's previous argument.
5. Similarly, Karliner (1989; 798-801) clarifies the environmental consequences of civil wars and US intervention in Central America (e.g., Nicaragua and El Salvador).
52. Westing (1989).
53. The World Commission on Environment and Development (1987: 290) concluded that "Environmental stress is both a cause and an effect of political tension and military conflict. Nations have often fought to assert or resist control over raw materials, energy supplies, land, river basins, sea passages, and other key environmental resources. Such conflicts are likely to increase as these resources become scarcer and competition over them increases".
54. Gamba-Stonehouse (1992; 102). Gleick (1990) provides many examples of how resources have been used as strategic goals, have been targets during conflict, and have been tools of war.
55. Atles (1992) has examined how environmental factors have contributed to belligerent political behaviour and the outset of war.
56. Deger & Sen (1992: 168). See also Westing (1989) for the regional threats of water pollution.
57. Starr (1991) reviews conflicts emanating from water competition, with especial emphasis on the Middle East. See also Lodgaard (1992: 116).
58. See Gamba-Stonehouse (1992: 109). Homer-Dixon (1990: 3) also shows the effect of environmental factors on the conflict over the Euphrates river and on the internal conflict in the Philippines.
59. Quoted from Myers (1989 b: 32).
60. Holst (1989: 126)
6. The 1985 Uprising in Sudan is an example of the effects of food shortages on the stability of African regimes.
62. Similar argument is given by Myers (1989 c: 138).
63. The World Commission on Environment and Development (1987: 7) emphasized that "Already in parts of Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, environmental decline is becoming a source of political unrest and international tension".
64. See Homer-Dixon (1990) for the excellent theoretical discussion of the causal links between environmental change and conflict.
65. Conversion-Opportunities for Development and Environment (1992: 8).
66. Of course the elimination of poverty is not an easy task. See the World Bank: World Development Report 1990, and Hassan (1992: 93) for some recommended measures to eliminate poverty.
67. Gleditsch and Mavaer (1992: 11).
68. Belousov et al. (1992: 82).
69. The approach was criticized mainly for its implicit assumptions (e.g., substitutability of labour between defence and non-defence sectors; and the ability of defence industries to adjust to structural changes without government aid). These assumptions ignore that conversion may lead to structural unemployment; and the obstacles which face adjustment from the specific industrial structure and culture of the defence sector. See Willett (1990:472) for an evaluation for this approach.
70. Kaldor (1991) argues microeconomic conversion, which promotes product rather than process innovation, tends to reinforce industrial and technological patterns of production rather than transforming them, and as such represents a missed opportunity in terms of the potential for more broad-based economic restructuring.
71. Dunne & Willett (1992).
72. Most LDCs do not have nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and do not have well-developed military industries. Therefore, the extreme cases and obstacles of conversion do not apply on most LDCs.
73. There are many ways in which the military pollutes the environment: through radiation, through disposal of waste, through testing of nuclear weapons; chemical leaks and fires; biological dangers from germs; electronic pollution; waste from bases; military exercises. See Deger & Sen (1992: 190) & Conversion-Opportunities for Development and Environment (1992: 11). Moreover, Kalashnykov et al.(1992: 269-277) describe a simple and inexpensive technique for the conversion of conventional ammunition (bombs), involving comparatively low environmental pollution.
74. Perelet (1992: 231-241) gives many examples of making effective use of military products,facilities and personnel. Examples could be the use of military satellites for environmental monitoring, or troops for eliminating negative consequences of technological accidents.
75. Gleditsch (1992: 23) throws more light on this issue.
76. See Batchelor & Mohammed (1992), and Kaldor (1991).
77. In Africa, this is relevant only for Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria, where the military industrial base is well-developed. See also Dunne & Willett (1992).
78. Conversion-Opportunities for Development and Environment (1992: 15). See also the recommendations of that report.
79. See Gleditsch [ed.] (1992); Dunne (1991); Dunne & Willett (1992), Paukert & Richards (1991), and Barker et al. (1991) for further discussion of the issues associated with conversion.
