A central concern of this study is the supply of discretionary cooperation (Barnard, 1938; North, 1990; Organ, 1990), here understood as organisation citizenship behaviour (Organ, 1990), and that of commitment. Discretionary cooperation refers to an agent's behaviour that the principal is not in a position to demand or to enforce but which is essential for the success of an enterprise or organisation (Organ, 1990; North, 1990). Commitment is the relative strength of an individual's identification with and involvement in a particular employment relationship or organisation (Mowday, Porter and Dubin, 1979). Commitment is the attitudinal component of accountability (Munene, 1992). In examining these micro-level behaviours we will initially accept the fundamental neo-classical economic position of enthroning the market and leaving it to determine and control micro-level behaviour. The study will then seek to show that labour markets in SSA, Uganda in particulary, are not expected to behave according to prediction. That even when constraints and incentives are altered, the market will not, on its own, supply cooperation and commitment. This is because labour markets in SSA are not anything like markets in industrialised countries which act impersonally and rationally (Weeks, 1991). Instead,they are relational, differentiated and complex while simultaneously operating along various, often contradictory dimensions (Geller, 1991). To ensure the effectiveness of SAPs additional inputs will need to be introduced to work alongside the market.
The study proposes a model of understanding and ensuring commitment and discretionary cooperation by suggesting that on-going economic activities such as formal employment are essentially social exchange activities whose outcome are never completely rationally determined. There is for instance always an area of discretion that is not enforceable through legal or economic contracts because doing so would increase marginal costs beyond marginal utility (North, 1990). This is the area where an agent such as an employee acquires property rights over his/her labour (Jones, 1987) and which are then exchanged at her/his discretion. This is where behavioral considerations such as moods or temperament control the final outcome of an employment relationship.
As a social exchange, the employment relationship has the following characteristics:
1) unspecified obligations;
2) the return favour cannot be bargained about but must be equivalent and fair;
3) a need to prove trustiness by discharging obligations; and
4) generation of feelings of personal obligation, gratitude, and trust (Blau, 1964).
These characteristics imply that an employment relationship is also a relationship of reciprocity requiring no supervision while generating mutual commitment to the fulfilment of each other's needs (Gouldner, 1960).
In this study we propose the concept of the psychological or implicit contract to define and measure the social exchange aspect of an employment relationship. It is understood as a dynamic set of implicit obligations and expectations continuously negotiated between the organisation and an individual or between a principal and an agent. It is a network of expectations and mutual commitments that summarizes the complexity of real life as experienced within and without an employment relationship. It mirrors the situation of multiple contracts. People expect a number of rewards depending on the situation. Such rewards may include housing, educating of children at full or partial organisation expense, sick leave, sick leave pay, help with the kinship burden, and so on. Those, for instance, who feel let down will not experience a moral obligation to be accountable or committed. Instead, they may take the least cost action to themselves to restore the contract as they define it. In the health services nurses and doctors have been known to adopt a non-professional bedside manner. In education teachers have assisted their pupils to have access to national examinations for a fee. Everywhere else in the civil service most people have pursued all types of personal interests instead of organisational goals.
The psychological contract is multidimensional and is composed of at least three factors, namely trust, meeting one's expectations or needs, and perceived fairness. Trust means a willingness to ascribe good intentions and to attribute reliability to others. It is a general expectancy that develops out of favourable experience (Rotter, 1972) and is a means of identification with or belonging to a group of significant others (Ziller, 1973). The contract is also a network of needs and expectations which have always been considered as the most important motivators of behaviour including employment (McClelland, 1961; Maslow, 1970). Lastly fairness as the third component of the psychological contract, is evidenced by its open-ended and holistic nature which it shares with the contract. Fairness is also continuously renegotiated and is therefore dynamic. While variations are expected, the belief is that in the end everything will balance out (Organ, 1990). "Fair pay for a fair day's work" is a common example of this expectation.
The three components of the psychological contract indicate why the concept may be central to understanding organisational misbehaviour that is rampant in Africa. Organisations in Africa are characterised by untrustiness, need non-fulfilment, and unfairness (Onyemelukwe, 1973). Organisations in Africa cannot be relied upon to pay salaries or designated fringe benefits on time. They do not allow you to plan your career since any time they go down or you are fired. Many of us working in these organisations have formed our opinions that they are not reliable. That they are more likely to let us down than to meet obligations. Most of us know that we must follow up our due if we are to get it. Organisations are also unfair. There is for instance ample evidence of disproportionate remunerations perhaps dating back from the colonial days when salaries and privileges of expatriate management were far beyond those of any other member of the employment relationship. In addition, the organisations' failure to pay a living wage has increased perceived and experienced unfairness. The feeling is that you are paid for only thirty minutes of your working day but you are expected to put in eight to nine hours.
The psychological contract is broken or maintained depending on what happens to expectations. The assessment of what transpires is governed by principles of distributive justice such as equality, parity, and need. Which justice principle or principles are brought to bear depends on one's culture, and socialisation. For instance, societies that emphasize communal sharing as the basic mode of relating, are likely to invoke the principles of equality or parity. Those that depend mostly on ratio contracting (market relating) are likely to invoke the principle of equity (Fiske, 1991). When an individual feels that the basic principle of relating is violated then he/she will consider that the psychological contract has been broken. Take for instance equity which refers to a proportionate distribution of profits, where proportionate refers to the congruency between investments and profits, or between inputs and outputs. The psychological contract will be considered violated if what is taken as input by one of the party to the exchange is not so recognised by the other. It is also violated if one outcome is recognised as reciprocal by one party and not the other.
The social exchange view on which the psychological contract is premised,is explicit about the options open to members who are disatisfied with the exchange. They, for instance, may decrease their inputs, leave the relationship, or force the other party out of the field (Adams, 1965). In Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (EVL), Hirshman (1970) used a similar point of view to explain the responses open to individuals who are caught in unsatisfying productive and political relationships or, alternatively, in failing organisations. He showed that members of a disatisfying exchange relationship can exit the relationship and look for better alternatives, they can voice their disatisfaction in the hope of improving the relationship, and can remain loyal and not attempt to rock the boat either through the voice or exit options. Later applications of the EVL indicate several things: The first is that members do have a fourth option of neglecting the relationship without physically quitting or trying to improve it (Rusbult, Zembrodt and Gunn, 1982). The second is that exit and neglect are distructive processes that span indeterminate periods and lead to further deterioration of the exchange relationship. In romantic relationships the distruction may be exemplified by physical abuse or involvement with an outside party (Rusbult et al 1982). In productive relationships such as organisations on the African continent the process is characterised by the phenomenon of capture which is a tendency of members to engage in rent-seeking activities particularly by those who control the allocation of organisational resources (Paul, 1990). Those not in a position to `capture' the organisation practice shirking, malfeasance, tardiness, absenteeism and other indications of moral hazard or non-commitment which are in daily evidence.
In thise study two hypotheses were tested:
Hypothesis one: There is a positive correlation between the psychological contract and discretionary cooperation.
Hypotheses two: There is a positive relationship between commitment, intention to exit, and the psychological contract.
