Some slight alterations were made to the programme and the first presentation was subsequently given by Dr. G. Chikowore, research fellow, Institute of Development Studies (IDS), University of Zimbabwe. Dr. Chikowore's paper was on Development Perspectives in Zimbabwe: The Informal Sector as a Potential Reservoir in the National Transformation Process while Professor L. M. Sachikonye, also of the IDS, was discussant to Dr. Chikowore's presentation.
Chikowore compared the various contending paradigms surrounding the concept 'informal sector'. He presented the prevailing and persuasive arguments on the merits and demerits of the informal sector in relation to the formal sector.
Chikowore's general argument is that, globally, governments have resigned their duties to rejuvenate the formal sector because of moribund economic policies. Because governments lack the vision to economically transform the formal economy, they now view the informal sector as more promising. His argument, however, is that the informal sector is not conducive to national development and employment creation because of its historical character: highly unregulated, unremunerative, unrecognised and poorly managed.
Major problems identified for the formal sector, before the introduction and during the introduction of economic reforms pointed out by Chikowore were, rampant maladministration and inadequate managerial skills. The formal sector performance has been further weakened by high interest rates and a continuously devaluing Zimbabwe dollar. Barriers to entry to the formal sector are generally prohibitive.
The other problem identified by Chikowore is the high incidences of bankruptcy/insolvency by many formal sector firms during the negative economic climate. Economic policies were also prohibitive, especially to informal sector operatives, especially regarding holiday allowances that were very small. The Open General Import Licence (OGIL), the tariff policy guiding customs officers in terms of list of commodities that could be imported without excessive restrictions, was not granted to informal sector operatives and this was a major disincentive.
Chikowore criticises the government's policy shift to regulate this sector through research policies aimed at making the sector attractive for job creation and income. Chikowore's main argument is that the national economy must not be overly dependent on the informal sector its national development. The informal sector, however, should be promoted given its crucial role it has in the national economy. According to Chikowore, the informal sector cannot sustain the new economic demands created by globalization. The informal sector lacks the capacity to positively 'jettison' the nation towards sustained economic growth and development. Expanding the informal sector is thus not a very wise economic reform policy shift, especially given that the government has no effective structures in place to collect badly needed revenue unlike the situation with the formal sector where this is done with ease. Revenue is crucial to the government of Zimbabwe's transformation process. He does not see the sector as capable for both national development and national transformation.
Chikowore pointed out that the question of monopoly does not exist in the informal sector. Instead, this sector is characterised by barter/bargaining between buyer and seller. The formal sector, in contrast, traditionally operates under monopoly conditions. A stable market pricing system and a reliable money circulation framework are both crucial aspects for national development. The government, however, periodically steps in to stabilise potential destabilisations in prices and monetary flows.
In his presentation, Chikowore also critiques the theoretical underpinning of the informal sector, the 'basic's needs approach' which he finds problematic. According to Chikowore, the 'basic needs approach' does not meet the requirements of most operatives in this sector given the difficulties involved in operating within this sector. He further argues that the informal sector is a peripheral dependency relationship that promotes further underdevelopment. He does not see it contributing to the eradication of poverty but, only to poverty relief.
Dr. Chikowore highlighted the downside of the informal sector, a situation that he described as a 'bitter pill to swallow' given the government emphasis to expand this sector. Echoing the research done by an IDS researcher and discussant to the seminar, Dr Sachikonye, he described this sector as highly exploitative of child labour, denying children education, children periodically suffer from police harassment, industrial exploitation and hazards, under payment and sometimes non-payment.
The informal sector was also described as a poor creator of employment and thus not a reliable sector for job creation opportunities as well as the basis for a sound national economy. He pinpointed, however, that this sector has many female operatives, over 912 women actively involved in this sector using 1992 figures. Many women have been active in cross-border trade, an activity that Chikowore describes as negative in that these women need not cross borders to trade and shop if the formal economy was adequately meeting this demand. For him, the cross-border trade was suggesting to the government the areas that it needs to address within the context of formal sector operations.
Chikowore asserts that women have a better role to play in the informal sector but the question why this is so is inadequately addressed. The assumption given is that male operatives function better in the potentially lucrative formal sector. This however, creates a gender bias, the gender equity question is inadequately discussed.
His main recommendations were that the two sectors can coexist but that the government should create the enabling policy environment and infrastructure into transform the informal sector to the formal sector. Chikowore, however, does not address why it is desirable to transform the informal sector to the formal sector. The other recommendations were that the informal and small scale sectors were custodians of society's culture and tradition and that they also build a stabilising and a potential source for entrepreneurship. This sector was also a strong material base for building a thriving market for urban and rural tourism. This sector was also important in that it provided a stabilising role for citizens of Zimbabwe to earn a decent livelihood.
Criticising the romanticisation of the informal sector by philanthropic policy makers and government. Chikowore, however, does not view the informal sector as the panacea to poverty eradication. From a technical point, the presenter sees the informal sector as a replica of the formal sector in that most of the activities carried out in the informal sector are similar to those carried out in the formal sector. The only discernible difference is that informal sector activities are more subsistence oriented. For Chikowore, the new challenge is the need to create an enabling environment that fosters the complimentarity of the two sectors in the national development process.
In her interjection, the chair pointed out that we should not simply dismiss the importance of the informal sector, especially given the growing size of the sector and its capacity to generate millions of capital. According to the chair, about Z$200 million dollars exchange hands daily and this means that it is a major key player in the national economy.
Professor Sachikonye, discussant to Dr. Chikowore's paper applauded the good and stimulating paper presented by Dr. Chikowore. He especially appreciated the extensive literature survey in the paper highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of both the formal and informal sectors and the linkages between the two sectors to each other.
Professor Sachikonye, however, noted the literature gaps in the paper, especially recent contributions from Dr. Guy Mhone who draws a balance sheet on how ESAP negatively affected informal sector operations. The collapse of incomes under ESAP, for example, exerted immeasurable pressures on both the formal and informal sectors, especially given the forward and backward linkages between the two sectors.
The discussant pointed out that we cannot just dismiss the informal sector because it has the capacity to employ more people, double size, compared to the formal sector. There are also more people depending on the informal sector compared to the formal sector. The discussant further argued that the growth taking place in the informal sector is indicative of the stagnation taking place in the formal sector.
The discussant also pointed out that the issue of whether the informal sector was viable or not compared to the formal sector is academic especially given the volume of people who are dependent on this sector. The other factor lies on the fact that in principle, the formal sector salaries and wages have been declining and the informal sector is therefore emerging as the new and key source for raising supplementary income for many Zimbabweans. The ZIMPREST document has also picked up this emerging crucial development hence the policy shift towards provision of micro-credit to informal sector operatives.
The discussant further pointed out that the existing government-sponsored credit schemes such as the Small Enterprise Development Corporation (SEDCO) are no longer adequately catering to the growing needs of the expanding constituency of informal sector operatives. Alternative financing schemes are thus mushrooming all over the country. One fast growing scheme is run under the Zambuko Trust. There are many women-targeted alternative and successful finance schemes emerging as well.
Dr. Sachikonye pointed out that rural areas have also begun to experience an increase in village banks, for example, in the Hurungwe, Chipinge and Seke districts, these schemes are increasing at a modest scale. These rural schemes have made a great impact on rural livelihoods. Many rural folks are now able to purchase crop inputs and subsequently boosting their agricultural production. The schemes are also increasing opportunities for rural employment.
The expansion of the informal sector has also had a negative impact on the formal sector. According to Sachikonye, the textile and clothing sectors of Zimbabwe have been severely affected by the growth of parallel informal sector markets. The sectors have shrunk by 60% as to sales of new clothes and company foreclosures, a result of the mushrooming of the second hand clothing market. The growth of the second hand clothing market has resulted in the de-industrialisation of the formal sector textile and clothing sectors. For example, 45% employees have been retrenched in the textile sector to date while 35% have been retrenched in the clothing sector.
The discussant also highlighted the existing linkages between the formal and informal sectors.
According to Sachikonye, the linkages are very real. The formal sector is subcontracting various informal sector operatives to produce goods for its market at cheaper production costs to itself. This is true especially in the furniture and jersey production. The element of informal sector exploitation by formal sector operatives was also highlighted. His recommendation was that perhaps the government could intervene to regulate the marketing and production exchange relationships that are now characteristic of informal sector operations.
The other development around informal sector operations is that they are fast emerging as a new conduit for local government revenue extraction. In the Karoi district, for example, each trader pays Z$10.00 a day. If there are 400 such traders and we multiply this by 6 days per week, the local authorities make Z$24,000 per month. This practice has increased all over Zimbabwe. The problem identified by Sachikonye is that the local authorities are not reciprocating by providing better working conditions and infrastructure for the entrepreneurs.
The question posed by the discussant was what sort of economic policies do we want to put in place vis a vis the formal and informal sectors: what type of growth then do we want? Is it overall growth or increase in volume as to operatives in the sector or just mere expansion of the informal sector?
Following presentations from Dr. Chikowore and Dr. Sachikonye, many interesting observations were made in floor discussions on the subject. The basic's needs approach, for example, was not viewed as negative but an empowering strategy, especially for rural people as it allows them to participate in improving their livelihoods.
A major observation made during floor discussions was that the informal sector's major contribution to the national economy and development process was that it was creating a new entrepreneurial culture in Zimbabwe that was until now absent. Comparing Zimbabwe with Asia, the suggestion made was that this newly emerging culture can be the basis of creating a similar culture in the formal sector and therefore the importance of the linkage between the informal and formal sector.
An observation made on the growth of the second hand clothing market and the de-industrialisation of the textile and clothing sectors was that could the reason behind the growth perhaps lay with the fact that the increasing poverty in the country, it is unable to consume the expensive domestic market and is therefore forced to consume cheaper imported goods. Another observation was whether poverty, a result of reduced incomes and purchasing power in the domestic market, is resulting in the de-industrialisation of the sectors or, is because the second-hand market has better quality clothes compared to the domestic market that had a previous monopoly but could now no longer sustain the monopoly conditions due to outside competition.
Another contribution on the garments sector crisis in Zimbabwe was that the textile and clothing sector used the domestic market to subsidise itself. For example, prices in this market are generally higher when exported below cost prices. The collapse of the trade agreement with South Africa also contributed to the crisis in the textile and clothing sectors.
The thriving second-hands market is also thriving due to illegal activities of smugglers who are diverting clothes intended to help poor people: the clothes do not reach the intended target groups. The second-hand clothes are not necessarily durable but only cheaper.
Another equally important contribution was that we must not always make the assumption that informal sector operatives are poor. It may be because this unregulated and generally hard to tax sector provides ideal conditions for capital accumulation. Another observation made during discussions was that, despite the illegal activities going on in the informal sector, the government still views the sector as its salvation, given that it has failed to adequately address the crisis in the formal sector. The government is also unable to put control mechanisms in place to extract badly needed revenue from this sector. This is the problematic link between the formal and informal sectors resulting in the dwindling formal sector activities subsidising the informal sector operations.
Another observation made was that the informal sector is a variegated market. We must, therefore, not always assume that it has easy entry requirements. The sector activities are very different and this also affects barriers to entry into the various informal sub-sectors. Techno-economic benefits were identified as a possible barrier to entry. For example, some activities require many technological inputs in order to operate and they are capital intensive. The capital intensity may be a major limiting factor. There are also non-techno economic barriers, for example, market discrimination. Gender discrimination is a major barrier in some informal sector activities. Another equally important barrier is the creation of 'cartels' against new entrants/operatives into a sub-sector viewed as already over-saturated.
The absence of business ethics in this sector was also pointed out as a major flaw of the sector. At the moment, there is a 'free for all' attitude existing vis a vis the informal sector. The creation of an association that regulates informal sector operations would go a long way to curtail illegal operations. Business ethics need to be introduced in this sector to govern the operations, especially given the exploitative capacity of the sector on women, children and other vulnerable poor men.
There are many anomalies and inefficiencies in the economy, all reflecting the need to fundamentally transform the existing system. It was pointed out that the government, trying to redress the situation, is now beginning to create an enabling environment for revamping the national economy and the development map.
There is no plan of action yet in place on the indigenisation question, only a programme of action. The indigenisation programme of action stands alone and the ZIMPREST document also stands alone though they are both intended to complement each other. The creation of a National Investment Trust, part of the government black empowerment and indigenisation strategy, for example, is a new strategy/programme of action being put in place. The objective of this programme of action is not merely to assist small enterprises but the whole economy, through skills provision, land redistribution and equitable redistribution of productive assets. The privatisation mandate, for example is to sell shares to indigenous people and indigenously-owned companies. The government policies on privatisation and indigenisation are both aimed at building national capacity, hopefully, eventually, the base will have been laid to empower Zimbabweans to be self-sufficient and thus contribute to the national poverty eradication objective.
The government is, however, not the only player in the sector working at creating an enabling environment. The activities of the indigenous business lobby groups, especially the activities of the Indigenous Business Development Corporation (IBDC) and the Indigenous Business Women's Organisation (IBWO) was highlighted as significantly contributing to the new policy shift by government.
After the tea break, the second presentation was given by Mr. Arnold Sibanda on ZIMPREST: Some Unanswered Questions on Popular Participation and Development. Sibanda's presentation was heavily theoretical with a few empirical examples to highlight the role/absence of popular participation in the national development process.
According to Sibanda, ZIMPREST (1996-2000) was launched by the Zimbabwe government, two years behind schedule. For the first time in Zimbabwe, the ZIMPREST document tries to address the importance of popular participation in the formulation of national economic reforms. ZIMPREST is a significant departure from the first economic reform programme, ESAP One (1991-1995). EASP One did not extensively consult with the Zimbabwean population and was generally viewed as an imported policy.
Sibanda's paper focuses on three aspects of the ZIMPREST programme to highlight whether supporting documentation exists of addressing the question of popular participation. For Sibanda, indigenisation, decentralisation and privatisation are key elements to address to see if the state is withdrawing from its 'pervasive interventionist' tendencies. ZIMPREST is a test to measure whether government is genuinely committed to the promotion of 'citizens' intervention' in the new economic reform programme, a programme being carried out under a market force-propelled agenda.
In Sibanda's paper, the concept 'indigenisation' and its raison d'être is problematised. The concept is also addressed within the context of globalization and economic reforms taking place in the country. Similar questions are posed in relation to 'decentralisation', specifically in relation to issues of decision-making and implementation. Privatisation, a key element in the new economic reform programme is also addressed, especially highlighting the problems associated with the concept within the Zimbabwe context.
The issues of social inequity and poverty are also addressed as they are central to whether popular participation has a primary role to play in decisions made around the new economic reform programme.
The major point Sibanda is addressing is whether the state is adequately able to distinguish its facilitative or interventionist role in relation to the issue of popular participation. These are the unanswered question in the ZIMPREST document. Sibanda's thesis in his presentation is that if the ZIMPREST document inadequately addresses these critical questions (it apparently has inadequately addressed them according to Sibanda), then no popular participation is going to take place in the national economic development agenda.
In his presentation, Sibanda argues that the neo-liberal paradigm that pushes for the primacy of market forces in the national economic reform process is still the ideology guiding many state actors and actions in many industrialising economies. Zimbabwe is no exception to this global economic regimentation. The neo-liberal argument has denigrated the socialist ideology inherited at independence as a major failure therefore its push for neo-liberal market force ideology as the economic panacea. Sibanda argues that the existing redistributive reform strategies, largely guided by a pro-market force-based ideology have been reformist and have failed to address the existing crisis in the country.
Using the Gramscian model of the 'politics of position' and 'politics of manoeuvre', Sibanda convincingly argues that neo-liberals in Zimbabwe have colluded with external neo-liberal forces entrenched in international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, to pull the strings ('puppeteers') that direct the trajectory of national/domestic economic reform programmes. A major requirement of this neo-liberal agenda is the 'rolling back' of the state so that apparently more efficient 'market-driven' forces can have a free hand '/laissez faire' role in the national economic development process in many industrialising economies. If need be, the necessary political assistance can also be given so long it assists to push forward the neo-liberal agenda.
Sibanda notes that the major mistake made by the radical dependencia school of thought was to make the assumption that the Asian tigers were a showpiece of the positive effects of 'rolling back' the state. The Institute of Development - Sussex (Brighton, United Kingdom) school of thought has made a significant contribution to the neo-liberal discourse. According to this school, neo-liberals have demonstrated no theoretical and empirical validity to their approaches. Neo-liberals have also not provided any evidence supporting their conclusion that 'rolling back' the state opens up the door to greater popular participation in the national economic reform process. One has only to look at the evidence from South East Asia for concrete examples. The Sussex school main argument is that imperfect states do not necessarily operate better than imperfect markets. For them, the solution does not lie with 'rolling back' the state but in the intensification of the state's role in the national economic reform programme.
Sibanda argues that the Zimbabwe scenario is highly inequitable and new redistributive policies, based on popular participation, are imperative. The current national policy map in Zimbabwe is not sustainable and the crisis exacerbated during the first phase of ESAP worsened the existing economic stagnation taking place. ZIMPREST is the new government-driven initiative to redress the anomalies created by failed sequencing of ESAP and inadequate broad-based consultations.
In his presentation, Sibanda argues that privatisation does not necessarily provide the answer. Borrowing extensively from other case studies done in the Sudan, Ghana and Nigeria, Sibanda demonstrates that privatisation does not equate with improved economic situation, especially on the social question where it has dismally failed to address this question. The equity question, for example, is inadequately addressed under privatisation. Questions such as who readily accesses capital, especially not the poor workers, is not even problematised. The Economic Commission on Africa (ECA) has warned that privatisation is none other than a new strategy to recolonise Africa because only those with capital will be in a better position to take advantage of the privatisation spaces opening.
Sibanda also highlights that the popular participation idea is absent in the government's decentralisation programme. An important observation made in Sibanda's presentation is the fact that the Zimbabwe Constitution is also silent on the question of decentralisation.
Sibanda pointed out that in 1984, a Presidential Directive created Village Development Structures (VIDCOs) and Ward Development Structures (WADCOs) with a mandate to act as channels for popular participation in the national development/reconstruction process. These development structures were also similar to the ruling party, ZANU (PF) political structures. Because of the tendency to conflate the two structures, the decentralisation programme failed to become a strategy of harnessing popular participation.
Sibanda also spelt out that the decentralisation programme did not succeed given the conflicts generated by the character of the structures put in place under state tutelage. Sibanda argues that state corporatism became the major structural impediment of the decentralisation policy. The decentralisation programme became state corporatist and centre-driven. The structures only succeeded in curbing peoples initiatives. Eventually, the people turned to traditional structures that they found more amenable to their varied interests.
Drawing from recent research by one of the presenters, Masuko, Sibanda gives the example of the Manyame district experience, the decentralisation of rural district councils (RDCs). Masuko's research demonstrates that people do not feel that they are encouraged to democratically participate in the decentralisation programme therefore turned to their own alternative structures that encourage popular participation and initiatives.
Sibanda argues further that the state sends contradictory messages. The state appears pro-unification (decentralisation programme) on one hand but is also equally manipulative at the other. For example the Private Voluntary Association (PVO) Act of 1995 that give sweeping powers to the Ministry of the Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, the Ministry in charge of registering new organisations. Under this Act, the state is given sweeping powers to ban autonomous associations/organisations that are championing popular initiatives, at both urban and rural levels, if they are viewed as an oppositional force by the state.
Sibanda highlighted that existing institutional frameworks such as the existing Urban Councils Act, which has not been changed, does not allow for popular participation. He again noted that this Act already contravenes other existing instruments that are still to be dismantled as well. He argues that the Act needs to be reconstituted so that it allows for greater broad based participation, especially in the running of urban councils.
Sibanda argues that the indigeniation question is one other area where the government has been slow to address the urgent economic concerns of the black population. Sibanda pointed out that ever since independence, no policy has been in place on indigenization. The indigenisation programme of action only came into existence early this year, in February 1998. In its document on indigenisation, the Department of State, the department charged with the programme only had a paragraph in its document on the subject. Sibanda argues that both the ESAP and ZIMPREST documents do not adequately address the indigenisation question. Given the absence of the question in the two important national economic reform programmes, Sibanda questions how people are going to participate in the indigenisation agenda, especially given the absence of a legal framework or structure to initiate or encourage the popular participation.
Sibanda concludes that, by their nature, generally corrupt or totalitarian states do not encourage popular participation. Instead, nepotism and cronyism are the basis of the state character hence their interventionist tendencies of curbing potential challenges, thwarting popular initiatives and participation. He recommends that the ideal state is a democratic state, open to popular initiatives. Sibanda argues that the state can no longer hide behind the Constitution or behind unmet demands of the civil service. He argues that the pushes from the Zimbabwe civil society and increasing mass protests, for example, the recent trade union protests/strikes, are all indicative of the new swing and new found strength and empowerment of the popular voice.
Dr. Kaliyati, discussant to Sibanda's presentation, pointed to the importance of defining concepts. He highlighted the fact that since the paper addressed issues of popular participation and development, thorough definition of the two concepts was essential to guide the paper's general thrust.
The other important observation made by the discussant was the need to explicitly show the main elements of the ZIMPREST policy. He pointed out that ZIMPREST was mostly addressing micro-economic imbalances but that there were other supplementary policy documents such as the Vision 20 - 20 that also address popular participation issues. The discussant argued that supplementary policies to ZIMPREST such as the 3 Year Medium Term document; Government Policy Framework for Indigenisation; Drought Management document; Population Policy document and finally, the Poverty Alleviation Plan would have further enriched the presentation as well as fulfil the paper topic, the 'unanswered questions' in the ZIMPREST document.
Kaliyati pointed out that some minor consultations took place between the government, the private sector and some few individuals around the ZIMPREST document but, the consultation was not thoroughly done as was the case with Vision 20 - 20. Kaliyati pointed out that Vision 20-20 was the document for the implementation of popular will in the ZIMPREST programme.
The discussant pointed to the need to further probe ZIMPREST's intentions, especially those concerning the growth assumptions and whether these assumptions are realistic given outdatedness of some data used in the document. Sibanda, in his rebuttal pointed to the need for further research as he was not the best candidate to address the pertinent question given the scope of his presentation.
The floor discussions also echoed the discussants observation that concepts such as popular participation need more clarification to guide the general thrust of the paper, especially to explain if the presenters' concerns also included other non macro-parameters that were influencing the absence of popular participation.
Another observation made was whether Zimbabwe, in relation to the ZIMPREST document, was in a position to avoid reliance on neo-liberal economic policies given the existing character of the Zimbabwe state. According to Sibanda, the state needs a new character. This new character can only arise when it is reconstituted and a more democratic and accountable state is put in place. During floor discussions, Sibanda highlighted the fact that a more democratic state may not necessarily push for reform as it may be unable to transform existing neo-liberal pressures, especially where social issues are concerned. Neo-liberals sometimes even prefer a more authoritarian state so long it pushes the neo-liberal reform agenda. Despite the state's intransigence, Sibanda pointed out that the civil society and the popular voice are, however, increasingly pushing the state to accountability and transparency, crucial ingredients for democracy and good governance.
In his rebuttal, Sibanda appreciated the points raised from the floor, especially those concerning definition of concepts. He pointed out that the problem with the ZIMPREST document was its tendency to dwarf other policy documents, especially the Vision 20 - 20 document that has a possibility of incorporating popular initiatives. Sibanda, noted that ZIMPREST is already suffering from the shortcomings of ESAP, and also lacks a broad consultative base. He argues that ZIMPREST has the tendency to marginalise popular participation. The only instances where the ZIMPREST document analyses issues of popular participation (on page 7) is when it addresses issues of indigenisation, decentralisation and privatisation. The absence of an extensive discussion around these key issues is problematic given that these three issues are central issues of popular participation and democratisation.
Sibanda pointed out that the micro-framework needs to be addressed so that the issue of inclusion of the three concepts is given primacy. He also pointed out that consultations do not necessarily mean that a participatory process has taken place. Sibanda's main argument was that people's initiatives are being deliberately curbed by the state as the prohibitive legislative frameworks have not been dismantled,, for example, the PVO Act and the Urban Councils Act.
The last morning session paper was presented by Mrs Madzingira of the Department of Population Studies, University of Zimbabwe. She gave the presentation on behalf of Dr. Nherera, Director, Human Resources Research Centre, University of Zimbabwe, who was unable to come.
Dr. Nherera's paper, in the form of a proposal, dealt with the issue of Vocationalisation of School Curricula and the World of Work: A Study of Zimbabwe and Selected sub-Sahara African Countries. Nherera's paper raised many critical issues concerning vocational training in the school curricula. Nherera's research is collaborative in nature. The pilot study will cover Zimbabwe and Uganda.
Nherera addresses the nature of the precolonial formal education whose main objective was to produce semiskilled African workers work in white owned institutions but strictly under white supervision. Nherera argues that the bottleneck system of the formal educational system developed for the African population during this colonial period was intended to create mental underachievers. Furthermore, the F1 and F2 schools were set up to create a pool of vocationally-trained but, semiskilled workforce, subservient to white industry. The question posed by Nherera in his paper is whether in independent Zimbabwe we need to revert to this type of vocational training system, as a strategy for unemployment.
Nherera noted that when Zimbabwe attained her independence in 1980, the government adopted a new educational programme, the education with production philosophy, demonstrating its commitment to technical and vocational training. The objective of this new policy thrust was to create a highly trained and skilled workforce. The technical and vocational training programmes were also viewed as possible solutions to the growing youth unemployment in the country. Youth unemployment was viewed as a situation that is increasing the school-leaver population. The demands of a globalising and dominating world market also created new economic imperatives requiring a more skilled-workforce.
Given the new and highly global world market, Nherera questions whether the existing formal sector can adequately meet the growing volume of vocationally and technically trained workforce in terms of employment potential. He poses the question whether the informal sector is emerging as the answer to this rising dilemma of unemployment, given the government's new interest in the sector.
The general argument presented in Nherera's proposal is that given the non-static nature of the labour market, what kind of school-leaver should the formal educational system produce to fit into the prevailing economic and labour environment. Nherera further poses the question whether the main question is school-leavers' need for economic survival or what the economic system needs them to do?
Nherera argues that vocational education should not be seen as a preparation for employment but for the empowerment of most of school-leavers who are not absorbed by the formal sectors of the economy. The informal sector, Nherera further argues, should actually be viewed as complementary to the formal sector, especially in expanding the industrial sector.
The proposal also raises the issue whether the content of subjects, of existing curricula, is adequate to prepare school-leavers for the hostile and highly competitive labour market. Nherera points out that the government efforts of trying to merge the purely academic with the vocational courses may actually be the source of problems plaguing the country's current educational system. His argument is that the system is overpowering and as such, may be the actual cause of the difficulties currently experienced by students. The ideal school curricular for all students, according to Nherera, is one that blends both academic and vocational subjects. But the question is again posed whether those who are academically-inclined should take vocational subjects so that they can easily accomplish their objectives.
The research proposal argues for a new philosophical outlook on vocational trades, such as weaving, pottery, sculpture, subjects that are generally rated very low in the existing formal education system. At the moment, there is limited vocational training being given around these potentially lucrative trades in Zimbabwe as they are generally viewed as non-academic subjects. A new orientation is essential to make these subjects more acceptable, within the existing school curricula. The proposal further argues for the creation of new opportunities and markets for those school-leavers who are taking up vocational training as an option.
Several issues were raised from floor discussions on the problems created by existing vocational training programmes. There are too many of one thing and it seems like the market is now over-saturated. No new creativity is being generated in these vocational training programmes. The shifts to more potentially employable fields such as computers and information are currently expensive. What then are the viable options open to most people in Zimbabwe. There is an absence of an 'entrepreneurial spirit' in Zimbabwe. The question posed was: vocational training for what. What are vocational students being currently taught in the existing curriculum? Are they able to go out and create their own employment or do they learn so that they can then only go out to look for employment in someone else's firm? The managerial backup for those taking on vocationally training was pointed out as highly absent in the vocational training programme.
It was generally agreed during discussion that the experiences of Zimbabwe Fund for Education with Productivity (ZIMFEP) was highlighted, especially since it was a fresh approach from the one generally pushed by the World Bank. ZIMFEP demonstrated that the academic and vocational training could be integrated and that if one were trained as such, chances for employment were also great. The World Bank's view only assesses the cost effectiveness but does not look at the long picture, of the future employment opportunities or benefit to be accrued later upon completion of vocational training, for example, to have a skill that enables one to cut costs by doing the task themselves.
Discussions also pointed out that vocational training provides life skills and basic skills and that both these two skills are useful for any human being to have. Vocational training in secondary schools, for example, should be viewed as a preliminary training ground to identify talent as well as provide provision of life skills or basic skills, useful skills later in life in daily subsistence. Life skills or basic skills are not necessary taken up for employment purposes but for skilling oneself.
The argument from the floor was that new innovative challenges to technical self-employment and were essential career opportunities that can result in such spin-off trades such as weaving, pottery and sculpture. The new challenges and innovations should be those that can put 'value-added' on the existing products being produced.
The first afternoon presentation was made by Masuko on: Rural District Council Capacity Revisited. Masuko's paper focuses on local level governing structures and assesses to what extent these are truly decentralised structures that encourage popular participation, especially at the decision making level.
Masuko's study is based on a case study of the social capacity or lack of social capacity in the Manyame Rural District Council. His study examines current capacity, through an examination of:
- council resources, such as human, equipment and financial;
- organisational and administrative structures;
- management systems and procedures, instruments for information gathering, processing, and storage and the type of information that Council has access to;
- role of councillors in relation to electoral conveyance belt for the constitutional needs and as a mechanism for accountability of services demanded and,
- methods of organising people for meaningful development.
Masuko asserts that the other problem in RDC institutions is that information is not readily available from local authorities vis a vis development issues taking place in the districts in question. His argument is that existing information does not 'empower' rural communities to participate in the development process of their communities.
In his presentation, Masuko pointed out that councillors have a generally good relationship with their constituencies but that this relationship is based on misinformation. He argues that when there are problems in the districts, councillors place the blame mostly on council officers and not themselves. Consultations take place but can we truly state that consultations by themselves are participatory. Masuko pointed out that there is no precise legal framework in place to facilitate popular participation in the districts. As presently constituted, the local authorities do not have the capacity for rural communities to play a central role in the development and decision making processes of their communities.
According to Masuko, Zimbabwe has a 'well established executive, political and development structure at the local level government, characteristic of a deconcentrated form of decentralisation'. The Zimbabwe government developed this system of devolving power as a strategy to involve the ordinary people in the development and decision making processes of the country. Despite all these efforts at greater popular participation, both policy makers and academicians agree that very little has been done to achieve this popular participation in local government affairs.
The failure of rural communities to effectively participate in the development and decision making processes is attributed to an absence of capacity at the Rural District Council (RDC) level. The government set up a Capacity Building Programme in 1997 as a strategy to address this RDC shortcoming.
New questions that are arising from this government empowerment initiative are how sustainable is the RDC capacity, in terms of social involvement given that the focus at the moment is more on the RDCs' physical, monetary and human capacities only. The other problem identified is the excessive dependency on external assistance for the five-year projected period of the capacity building programme. Masuko also questions whether the projected five-year period is adequate to create the required institutional capacity for rural development.
In his presentation, Masuko argues that the 'trickle down' theoretical approaches to capacity building to empower rural communities and create sustainable capacity have generally failed to live up to expectations. An important missing element to the capacity building agenda is the absence of a clear social capacity component. Masuko believes that the social capacity component is equally critical to the building up of more sustainable rural community development capacity.
Masuko defines social capacity as: the institutional knowledge of a particular community about how best to organise the members of the community in a productive manner. For him, social capacity provides the 'missing link' to empower rural communities to build sustainable rural development programmes, something lacking in the current set up.
Masuko advocates for a sound and democratic decentralisation policy that takes advantage of existing academic and research capacities that have already highlighted the areas requiring transformation in order to strengthen existing capacities. Unfortunately, local government in Zimbabwe is a creation of the centre and it is the centre that also determines the fiscus. The state engineered 'decentralisation' agenda has raised rural expectations but with no financial backing to facilitate the needed development agenda. Masuko argues that the state must encourage greater popular participation and must allow rural communities and RDC structures/institutions to break out from the 'control shell' of central government.
Masuko argues that, the existing decentralisation agenda does not clearly reveal the areas where the RDCs and central government have a convergence of interests. The only existing RDC development activity is through the income generating projects (IGPs) which only strengthen RDC structures and do little as to empowering rural communities. If a social capacity base was put in place, it could successfully trigger rural transformation and sustainable development of rural communities, through capital and technical skill's injection.
Because of his Manyame study, Masuko concludes that the issue of sustainability goes beyond decentralising the fiscus and physical and human capacity building. The conversions of such capacities and how they are invested to develop organisational skills of beneficiaries are equally important if they are to be transformed into guiding meaningful productive and social activities.
Strong, effective, representative and resourceful local government institutions with a potential for raising revenue and investment capital are viewed by Masuko as central to the capacity building and sustainability of local government structures. The capacity to raise revenue thus depends on the local government's own capacity to raise revenue. This in turn depends on the depth of the productive base in the district in question, in other words, the social capacity base and how it is best organised to meet these demands is a crucial aspect of rural development .
Masuko also argues that entrepreneurship within the various district councils should be an essential component of the local government philosophical outlook. Successful rural community projects, according to Masuko, are those projects that ' ... involve rural communities in the planning, programming, acquisition of material, organisation of labour, management of resources and networking capacities ... ', to ' ... raise revenue and sustainability'.
Dzenga pointed out that Masuko's presentation suffered from an 'isolationist' approach. Masuko needs to explain more fully what he means by capacity: capacity to do what. Dzenga argues that Masuko needs to elucidate some more his operational concepts. She also highlights the need for Masuko to explain if his study is more of a technical study or an action-oriented policy document. In Masuko's presentation, he only assesses capacity but not the purpose of the capacity. For example, is it just to deliver services or implement district objectives. Is the 'capacity' described by Masuko local government's capacity to eradicate poverty or what? She argues, for example, that the concept 'social capacity' needs to be explained in detail as it is not currently clear in his study. Is the notion of social capacity same as the notion of participation?
Dzenga poses the question whether the existing structures allow for the participation of people in the communities in question or the development initiatives of the RDCs. How do issues of accountability to the communities by the RDCs structures, for example, arise, are the RDCs accountable under existing structures? Dzenga argues that when rural communities pay development levies that is not participation. Similarly most participation takes the form of consultation and that is also equally unsustainable. A process of 'continuous consultations' with the RDCs is what is needed to create more sustainable institutions and structures. RDCs have to have capacity to implement both top down or bottom up development decisions.
Dzenga also raises the issue of how best to view the concept 'social capacity'. She argues that this exercise must be done in relation to the decentralisation and centralisation swings that have been going on in the government: in 1982, the mood was for centralisation; in 1984, it was for decentralisation; in 1988, it was again for centralisation and in 1992, the government again moved to implement its decentralisation programme. The government is already implementing its decentralisation programme in the health and education sectors. Dzenga argues that what we are now experiencing is state decentralisation.
Dzenga pointed out that the new and dangerous decentralisation being pushed by the state has tremendous effects on democracy, for example, the re-introduction of the traditional authority through the 'zunde ramambo'/'chiefs' granary' concept. The crucial question that was raised by the discussant was what will the impact of the granary project be to RDC capacity. The question of democratic governance is highly problematic under these circumstances where democracy has been compromised. There are 'ripple effects' of the granary concept on rural communities as the project presupposes that village women and young girls, the traditional agricultural producers, will play a central role in the provision of the required stocks. Dzenga pointed out that it was highly doubtful whether the women and young girls were consulted about the whole project.
Dzenga noted that Masuko's delivery should have also addressed the quality, networking capabilities and general ability of RDC leadership in RDC operations. The RDC are supposed to steer the rural development agenda therefore their leadership capabilities play an important role. The discussant raised the point that if the RDC leadership is inward looking as opposed to being outward looking, which is another major problem of the RDCs', they will not succeed nor positively redirect district councils to work towards rural transformation.
During discussions, it was generally agreed that Masuko's paper was quite informative but that the concept capacity, especially in relation to his concept 'social capacity' needed to be further explored.
The last afternoon presentation was given by Ms Rekopantswe Mathe, lecturer in the Sociology Department, University of Zimbabwe.
Mathe's main argument was that there is need to have a historical approach to analysing issues of development and popular participation in the Zimbabwe context. Her main argument was that the development discourse in Zimbabwe is characterised by an absence of the gender discourse. Mathe argues that the existing development paradigms have generally been exclusionary to the 'nonparticipating gender'. In the Zimbabwe context, this largely means the diempowered female community is marginalised in the development discourse.
Mathe argues that mass mobilisation is a crucial component of national development. She defines several concepts. For Mathe, mass mobilisation involves the mobilisation of people by people concerned who come together for problem solving a common problem. Mobilisation also takes the form of mobilisation of non-human resources for solving various national development problems.
Mathe points out that 'conscientisation' is key to the process of popular participation. The process of 'conscientisation', however, also involves gender sensitivity or a gender perspective as to who benefits and who does not and what role do the different genders play in the process of national development. Mathe argues that 'conscientisation' is lacking in Zimbabwe and therefore popular participation is a problem. Because of the absence 'conscientisation' in Zimbabwe, Mathe questions whether women, for example, can hold the state accountable. There is an international document supposed to safeguard women's interest, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), but because there are no enforcement and monitoring structures in place, the government does not have to comply. A weak female lobby that has no popular base makes it possible for the state not to conform to CEDAW requirements. One has only to analyse some Zimbabwe legislation that contradicts the CEDAW document.
Mathe defines gender as a 'socially constructed' relationship, based on socially defined gender roles and not a biological (sex-defined) or physiologically derived difference between men and women. A problem identified by Mathe is that women in Zimbabwe are still grappling with the notion of patriarchy at both conceptual and practical levels. The gender identities/scripting of women into 'good versus bad' women further polarises women and fragments their interests making it more difficult for them to speak in a unified voice. A clear example of this polarisation has to do with the women who work as maids and sex workers. The state and other women 'box' these women and it makes it difficult for women to have a common front against patriarchy. Their 'work' is made difficult by the state's 'labelling' process, in collusion with an equally misogynist attitude towards women that is common through the society.
National development policies also suffer from this marginalising tendency and the policies end up being filtered through a male-biased lens in the Elsonian sense. Several development policies developed in Zimbabwe post independence, for example, the Africanisation policies (where female professionals and business women had to seriously lobby and still do for inclusion) and Mass Education policies (where the girl-child has been unfairly disadvantaged, especially post primary level due to traditional practices and a gender insensitive educational system until lately, again due to female advocacy and lobbying efforts) were all characterised by an absence of gender sensitivity. The Affirmative Action Policy was set up in response to female pressures.
Another equally problematic area barring the creation of a conducive environment for popular participation has to do with the cultural; attitudes that make it hard for women to actively contribute in the national development process and on the participatory democracy platform.
Some empirical examples of male intransigence involve the land question. Many assumptions, for example, in the land resettlement exercise, were made about the types of families: that they are largely male-headed whereas there are many female-headed and female-managed households in many rural communities.
Mathe argues that the development paradigms developed immediately post-independence, the Women in Development (WID) and Women and Development (WAD), succeeded in marginalising women even further. Another empirical example was the creation of the poorly funded, poorly staffed and conceptually problematic 'Women's Affairs' Ministry, a Ministry that only managed to 'ghetto' women's issues by making them a welfarist and targeted vulnerable group in the national development process. Women were subsequently mobilised from the top and by men. Mathe argues that many women-related projects suffered from the 'small is beautiful' myth while the 'big is beautiful' was seen as a male enclave type of initiative.
In her presentation, Mathe argues that existing policies on poverty suffer from inadequate consultation with the 'poor' groups and as such, are not 'client-driven'. Mathe defines poverty as a form of deprivation. She defines it within the context of social meanings/social relations. Deprivation has a lot to do with the ability to access goods/'entitlement's' in the Amartya Sen sense. Mathe argues that, a concept, poverty has operational problems. She argues that poverty can be across households and intra-households and that there are also gender imbalances across and intra households. In terms of 'entitlement's' it becomes vital to make a poverty comparison of who owns what or who is 'entitled' to what in any community or society. In the Sen sense, 'entitlement's' refer to 'access to resources'. This process thus involves negotiation and bargaining relations.
Mathe further argues that resource austerity affects 'entitlement's' and deprivation ensures as a result. The disparities are at both urban and rural settings due to increasing differentiation taking place in terms of getting to and controlling resources.
In her presentation, Mathe identifies another potential source of women's poverty. The notion of virilocality, the movement of women from their own families to their spouses homestead within the patrilineal framework, is disempowering for many women. The land question is central to this disempowerment and manifests itself acutely in the intra gender conflicts. Mathe highlights the plight of many women living in the Gokwe district of Zimbabwe (Midlands Province), especially the phenomenon commonly called the 'cheque suicides' where women are being disempowered by their husbands from enjoying the fruits of their agricultural labour. The men use the hard earned money to secure another wife.
Because of the 'treachery' and a disintegrating social fabric, women are committing suicide at an increasing rate. The suicides are intrinsically linked to culture, a culture that disempowers women as producers and as wives in the domestic sphere. The 'Master Farmer' concept introduced during colonialism, for example took quite along time to change and yet most rural agricultural producers are women.
Mathe argues that cultural barriers are being resurrected once more through the decentralisation agenda. This may raise future problems, especially the 'zunde ramambo' concept addressed earlier on by Masuko's discussant, Dzenga. The resurrection of traditional authority is being done with the collusion of an equally patriarchal state that is increasingly pushing the line that family values are falling and people are becoming immoral. The powers of the chiefs are being reawakened to presumably give the stamp of authority, as the guardians of national morality. This authority of the chiefs has immediate gender implications: women are the ones who are viewed as the conveyancers of social immorality and as such, heavy social sanction, through the chiefs, will be meted out to them if they violate the 'social morality'.
Mathe raises a new social problem being created by the state in terms of its perceived notion of popular participation and community empowerment strategies. She criticises the gender-biased orphans' programme and the home-based health care programmes under the ESAP regime. According to Mathe, these programmes are forcing women and children, especially the girl-child to put up with social reproduction with no support service or structures put in place by the state to alleviate the financial pressures these programmes will create on women and young girls.
Mrs. Chiroro praised Mathe's presentation, despite its late delivery in the afternoon. Mathe's paper was the only paper that tried to give the gender perspective on development and popular participation issues. The discussant pointed out that in future OSSREA seminars, gender oriented papers should be presented early to set the gender tone of seminars.
The discussant, highlighting the points raised in Mathe's presentation, pointed to the importance of incorporating gender issues, especially around issues of poverty, deprivation, disempowerment, powerlessness, gender insensitivity, intra- and inter-household poverty, work choices and risks involved, for example, in the case of the vulnerable female sex workers.
The discussant also blames the state for not setting up financial resources for communities and not just women and the girl-child to work with in the orphans and home-based health care programmes. The issue of state patriarchy is addressed by the discussant as one of the major hurdles in the gender debate in Zimbabwe. The state also assumes that women have heterogeneous interests and the notion of 'sisterhood in oppression' highlighted in Mathe's presentation becomes problematic to assess, especially within the context of political partisanship. The fragmentation of women, for example, is one reason the formation of a woman's federation, representing women's non partisan concerns, has not succeeded.
During general discussions, it was pointed out that clash existed between what the CEDAW document advocates states to do vis a vis women in national development and what the Zimbabwe Constitution actually does. The result of the gender clash is the general effectiveness of the state to deliver where gender issues are concerned. There is a tendency to 'feminise poverty' in Zimbabwe. There was agreement that the key to poverty alleviation was the transformation of the household in terms of gender roles and responsibilities and resource redistribution. Another equally pertinent questions posed was whether the mobilisation of women is desirable or possible eventually in terms of 'conscientising' them to unify and challenge the state on gender-related issues that are continuously merging in the Zimbabwe context.
