Abstract: The paper describes the main aspects of the recently introduced 'federal' system in the Sudan and discusses some of its implications, particularly for development planning at the sub-national level. The scarcity of human and financial resources in the country, the maintenance of tight political control over the new state organs and the recent increase in the number of states do not augur well for the capacity of the new states to deal effectively with their own development problems. Recent trends in regional planning - towards identification of opportunities, mobilisation of resources and development promotion at the local and regional levels - add to the challenges that the newly created decentralised administration will face.
With its 2.5 million square km, the Sudan is not only vast in size but also extremely diverse, in terms of ethnic composition, population density, culture, climate, landscape and distribution of natural resources, to mention only a few main aspects. Both the scale and the diversity of the country constitute strong arguments in favour of some form of decentralized administration, capable of formulating and implementing adequate responses to widely different sets of problems, needs and constraints in different parts of the country. In addition to this, a number of basic ethnic, cultural, religious and political divisions in the country, most notably - but not only - between the South and the North, have played an important role as the source not only of tensions and conflicts but also of requirements and constraints that no decentralization scheme could afford to ignore.
In the past, various governments have responded to the country's diversity - and to the various political circumstances confronting them - by implementing structures of regional and local administration and government. Particularly useful references in this respect are Rondinelli (1981), Alassam (1983), Norris (1983), Moharir and Kagwe (1987) and Al-Teraifi (1987, 1994). Very little has, however, been written so far, especially in English, about the objectives, structure and workings of the so-called federal system, recently introduced in the Sudan.
This paper describes some main aspects of the new system, and discusses some of its administrative implications, particularly from the point of view of development planning at the sub-national level. Planning, particularly regional and local development planning, is in this context seen as raising questions and problems which are typical of other professionalized sectors of the administration. In order to assess the implications of the new system a brief review of recent trends in local and regional development and planning is sketched and some of their implications briefly discussed.
The description and analysis in the present paper are not facilitated by the facts that (i) the federal system has only recently been introduced; and (ii) certain of its aspects are still in the process of being implemented. These facts imply that the system is still in a process of flux, which in turn means that knowledge about it is incomplete and uncertain - since more changes may be just around the corner - and that it is especially difficult to make a full assessment of its ultimate impact and significance.
A detailed examination of past administrative structures and of the conditions and motivations that led to their creation is beyond the scope of this paper. It seems, however, useful to indicate at least the broad outlines of the system that preceded, and formed the context for, the recent federal reforms.
The administrative system that the current 'federal' structure replaced was set up during the last few years of the Nimeiri regime and survived the overthrow of that regime, albeit in a modified form. The late seventies saw a significant decentralization of powers to the then existing provincial councils, which included even the abolition of a number of central government ministries and the transfer of their functions to the provincial councils.
The Regional Government Act 1980 further reinforced the decentralization process by introducing decentralized regional government, which had existed in the South since 19732, also in the northern part of the country. Six regions were created in the north. This was followed by the Local Government Act 1981, which abolished the Provincial Councils and significantly reduced the role of Provincial Commissioners. Local government was entrusted to local area councils with a predominance of elected members3, supported by civil servants who were not council members. Subsequently, in 1983 the Southern Region was subdivided into three by President Nimeiri4.
Regional governments were given wide-ranging powers over regional affairs5. Regional assemblies included both elected and appointed members, the number of the latter not exceeding 10 per cent of the total6. The regional executive consisted of a governor, a deputy and a number of regional ministers. The governor was appointed by the president from a list of three candidates selected by a joint meeting of the regional assembly and the Regional Conference of the Sudanese Socialist Union; in turn, the governor appointed the deputy and the regional ministers (Alassam, 1983: 115 -116).
The record of the Nimeiri government from the point of view of decentralization is rather mixed. On the one hand, under Nimeiri the Sudan progressed significantly towards administrative decentralization, particularly from the points of view of institutional reform and of decentralization of responsibilities, from the central to the regional level and from the Regions to the Areas. On the other hand, however, the regime kept very tight political control over the decentralized regional and local governments. It also failed to allocate them human and financial resources commensurate with their new responsibilities, thus weakening them significantly.
After the fall of Nimeiri in 1985, regional assemblies and local councils were dissolved and replaced by management committees largely composed bureaucrats and chaired by appointed Governors (in the case of regions) or civil servants (in the case of the local committees). The existing structure of regions and local area authorities was, however, maintained, and was eventually inherited by the military regime that overthrew the al-Mahdi government in 1989. It therefore forms an important part of the administrative context in which the federal system was adopted by the current government.
In February 1991 the Command Council of the National Salvation Revolution issued the Fourth Constitutional Decree which introduced a new administrative structure for the country, designated by the decree itself as 'federal'. The territory of the Republic of the Sudan was divided into nine states and these were in turn sub-divided into provinces and local government areas. According to the Government, the new structure would lead to greater regional autonomy, a key issue in the civil war. Each State was to have its Governor, Deputy Governor and Council of Ministers, and to take responsibility for regional administration, supervision of local administration and the collection of a number of taxes. The Federal Government retained control over foreign policy, military affairs, security, the national economy and other main areas of administration.
There is a striking similarity between the Regional Government Act 1980 and the Fourth Constitutional Decree 1991 in relation both to the distribution of powers between central and regional or state governments, and to the way in which this distribution is formulated. Like the 1980 Act, the Constitutional Decree also contains two main lists, one of federal competencies upon which the State governments "shall not encroach" and the other specifying the State governments' powers and functions. The corresponding lists in the two pieces of legislation are very similar, the main difference being that, unlike the regions of 1980, the states do not count among their functions the supervision and control of the police, prison and fire brigade forces.
The Fourth Constitutional Decree was followed, in the same year, by an Act dealing with the division of the country into provinces, by the Local Government Act 1991 and, in 1994, by the Tenth and Eleventh Constitutional Decrees.
The Tenth Constitutional Decree increased the number of states from nine to the present 26, and the Eleventh defined in some detail the composition of legislative and executive bodies of the States, namely the State Government and the State Council or Assembly. State governments are composed of the Governor or Wali, the State Ministers and all the State's Provincial Commissioners - plus, in the South, "any person appointed by the President of the Republic as Advisor" (Section 3). All the members of the State Government are appointed - and can be dismissed - by the President, who also regulates and defines the functions of the Governor and the State Ministers (Section 3). The President thus firmly retains political control of the State executives. On the other hand, the State Council is given, at least on paper, a supervisory role over the executive, since it may recommend to the President that the Wali or any other member of the state government be released if the Council loses confidence in him or considers the co-operation with him less than satisfactory, or that he is failing to exercise the leadership necessary to realize the State's public interest. The Governor may also recommend the release of any member of the State Government for similar reasons.
All the members of the State government with the exception of the Governor are also, by virtue of their offices, members of the State Council7. In addition to them, each State Council has between forty and sixty members, selected in three different ways: 45 per cent of members are directly elected, another 45 per cent are promoted from the State Congress and the remaining 10 per cent are appointed 'for completion'. The mechanism of 'promotion' from the State Congress and the meaning of 'completion' are clarified below. State Councils elect from among their members a Speaker, a Deputy Speaker and a number of Committee Chairmen. The Secretary to the State Council is appointed by the President of the Republic.
The State Congress is part of a political structure which parallels the administrative structure and also includes Village Committees and Local and Provincial Congresses. There are four separate electoral colleges, whose members deal respectively with economic, social, youth and women's affairs. Village committees, whose members are elected by the villagers in one of these four categories, elect their representatives to the Local Congress (at the level of the District Council). The Local Congress has two main functions: setting development strategies and main policies at the local level, and electing the members of the Local Council. Formally, the Local Council is responsible before the Congress for the adoption and implementation of policy. The Local Congress also elects its representatives to the Provincial Congress. Still on the basis of the four electoral colleges mentioned above, each Provincial Congress elects representatives to the State Congress. In turn, the State Congress elects from among its members 45 per cent of the members of the State Council. At all levels except that of the village, Congresses normally hold only annual meetings, which in practice means that their main function is as a set of electoral colleges.
The appointment of 10 per cent of members of the State Council 'for completion' is justified on the basis that it provides a mechanism for ensuring the inclusion in the Council of representatives of minority interests, or of individuals who, because of experience or talent, may make a particularly useful contribution to the work of the Council.
The rationale of the adoption of the systems of electoral colleges and 'completion' is that they facilitate the direct or indirect participation and representation of a maximum number of citizens, regardless of age, gender and social class, in the political process. In practice, however, both mechanisms also effectively reinforce the political control exercised by the government and its supporters over the decentralized administrative structures, and particularly the Local and State Councils.
The most recent steps in the construction of the federal system followed the adoption, in 1995, of the Twelfth Constitutional Decree and the Local Government Act 1995. The Twelfth Constitutional Decree replaces the Fourth and Tenth Constitutional Decrees. It maintains the division of the country into 26 states, amends the distribution of powers between the federal and the state levels and apportions sources of revenue among the three main levels of administration, namely federal, state and local.
The distribution of powers between federal and state organs is specified by means of three lists, respectively of federal, state and concurrent powers, which are presented in Annex 1 below. It is clear from these lists that the States are given wide powers of social and economic planning and administration, but control over police and 'disciplinary forces' remains in federal hands. The text forbidding the States from 'encroaching' upon federal powers has been dropped; instead, Section 11 of the Decree makes the President of the Republic, through the Chambers of Federal Government, responsible for regulating the federal-state relations '... so as to avoid confusion of their relations and fields of activity'. This places the President in a position of arbiter of conflicts between the States and the Federal Government, and further reinforces the considerable degree of political control he exercises over the States.
An important, perhaps indeed the most crucial, aspect of any decentralization concerns the revenues of the decentralized organs of government or administration, which determine their degree of financial - and, by implication, administrative - autonomy. The Twelfth Constitutional Decree consolidates and systematizes previous legislation by apportioning revenue sources among the federal, state and local levels. The relevant sections are transcribed in Annex 2. The Decree also provides for the establishment of a national fund for the support of states with smaller revenues. The main sources of revenue for this fund are contributions of the Federal Government and of the richer states.
Although it has not been possible to obtain quantitative data on the relative importance of the various sources of revenue, and therefore of the degree of fiscal autonomy of the States and Local Councils, there is among experts in the Sudan a general conviction that a significant proportion of States - estimates range from six to sixteen , the latter a Government estimate - are already, or will become in the very short term, financially self-sufficient in the sense that they will be able to cover all their expenditure from their own revenue sources. Equally important, the system of revenue distribution is seen as creating both conditions and incentives for the poorer states to develop their own sources of revenue so as to increase their degree of financial autonomy. In the medium term, depending on each individual state administration's capacity to generate and collect revenue, several more states are expected to become financially self-sufficient, leaving only a relatively small number of poorer states which will continue to require significant transfers from the federal budget and from the State 'solidarity' fund.
An indication of the degree of financial decentralization could be obtained from the ratio between the state and federal budgets. Although it has been impossible to obtain reliable figures for the current or recent budgets, rough estimates set the aggregate state budgets at approximately 15 per cent of the federal budget, with a higher proportion for the recurrent expenditure budget and a correspondingly lower one for the development budget. These values are roughly in line with those of other federal systems, although they may create difficulties for some of the new state governments, given that state administrations are being set up from scratch and are likely to have, for that reason, pressing needs for once-off investment in facilities and equipment.
The combination of administrative and financial decentralization considerably simplifies the relations between richer states and central government in relation to the preparation of the budget. Financially self-sufficient states will henceforth basically draw up their own budget with little or no interference from the federal Ministry of Finance - although of course state budgets are supposed to be guided by the national development strategy, approved at the federal level. These states will simply forward their budgets to the federal Ministry of Finance for inclusion in the national budget. Things are somewhat more complicated in the case of states which are not financially self-sufficient, since their budget includes an element of contribution from the federal level, which must be negotiated between the state and federal Ministries of Finance.
Finally, it must be pointed out that an important characteristic of the new federal system is that the powers of the States are transferred down from the central government, not up from the Local Councils. The considerable administrative autonomy of the Local Councils is complemented with a significant degree of financial autonomy by the Twelfth Constitutional Decree and the Local Government Act 1995. These laws give local government the full authority to collect revenue and to spend it according to its competencies. Local Councils also identify local level development projects, which they may implement with their own resources or propose to the State government for co-financing. This led to the recent creation of a special chapter in the State budgets, entitled 'Community Participation', which includes development projects proposed by the Local Councils to which the State provides matching funds.
The main organs of the local administration are the Local Councils, with both appointed and elected members, and the local executive. Council members elect among themselves a Chairman and Deputy Chairman. The local executive or administration, formed by civil servants who are formally Council employees, is headed by an administrative officer who is the local financial secretary and also Secretary General of the Council, with the right to participate in Council discussions but not to vote. The Council approves the budget submitted to it by the local executive and supervises the work of the executive.
The recent reforms aim at combining a substantial degree of administrative decentralization - to both the State and local levels - with the maintenance of tight political control over the State and local organs. This control is exercised by the President of the Republic and by the Government, either directly or indirectly through the hierarchy of village committees and local, provincial and State congresses.
Administratively, there is significant continuity with previous systems of regional administration. The most important differences seem to be the greatly increased number of states and the much greater potential for financial self-sufficiency of the states under the new system. Also significant, both as an indication of the commitment of the Government to decentralization and for its potential consequences, is the virtual dismantling of a number of departments and agencies at the central level and the attempt to transfer the majority of their cadres to the newly created state governments.
Certain people interpret the increase in the number of states from 9 to 26 as a measure motivated by the desire to achieve greater ethnic homogeneity, particularly in the 10 southern states. From an administrative point of view this increase, and the corresponding decrease in state size, has a number of potential advantages but may also have some disadvantages. On the positive side, the decrease in the size of states makes it easier for state governments to stay in touch with the problems and needs of the state population. Greater closeness of the administration to the local populations may also play a useful role in facilitating mobilization of the population and participation in decision making and development project implementation. It may be useful to observe, in this respect, that the total areas of the (old) states of Darfur and Kordofan were approximately 509 and 380 thousand sq km. The magnitude of these figures may be more easily perceived in comparison with the areas of, say, France (552 thousand sq Km) or Spain (505 thousand sq Km). Combined with the difficult communications resulting from underdeveloped infrastructure, these sizes effectively ruled out any possibility of close and frequent contact between the regional or state administrations and large parts of the territory for which they were responsible. This frequently forced the state executives to rely on the Provincial Commissioners for some functions which lay clearly outside their competence, which in turn led to a politically undesirable blurring of functions and competencies.
On the negative side, and in addition to the obvious consequences of increased cost of the federal administration, the sudden increase in the number of states from 9 to 26 has brought about a significant weakening of the technical capacity of state institutions, both because some new states have had to start more or less from scratch in forming their professional cadres, and because at least some of the old states have been forced to share their professional staff - and frequently also other resources - with the newly created states. The attempts by the central government to transfer professional staff from the national ministries to the state administrations, which could help compensate for this weakening, have reportedly not been entirely successful, with many professionals - particularly senior ones - resisting transfer to the periphery, even to the point of taking early retirement or leaving the public service. The problems of scarcity of personnel are compounded by the severe lack of infrastructure in several of the newly created states, which has a negative impact in terms both of their residential attractiveness and of difficulties of work and communications.
A potentially serious consequence of the technical weakness of the new states is that they are very likely, at least in the initial stages of their establishment, to be in considerable need of normative guidance and technical support from the centre. However, because of the downsizing or even dismantling of certain of its departments, the Federal Government may find itself unable to provide this guidance and support.
The other major novelty of the new administrative system is the increased potential for financial self-reliance of the state administrations, already discussed under section 3.2 above, and a consequent decentralization of the budget. A possible disadvantage of this decentralization, especially as more states reach financial autonomy, is that it may entail a loss of control by macro-economic planners over a significant part of the national budget. Currently, this problem is manageable, since state budgets form a relatively small percentage of the national budget. If that percentage increases, however, it may be necessary to set up a multi-level planning process which will include some form of guidance from the federal to the state level.
Since 1975 the economy of the Sudan has been in a state of persistent decline. Per capita income is estimated to have fallen by 18 per cent between 1975/76 and 1988/89 and, despite a spurt of growth during 1991-92, the economy does not seem to have freed itself of the stagnation experienced in preceding years. Other indicators, including for example the widespread poverty and shortage of basic consumer goods, the very high rate of inflation or the deteriorating productive capital stock and basic infrastructure confirm this impression. Particularly important from the point of view of this evaluation is the fact that an estimated 10 per cent of the population in Northern Sudan (mainly in North Kordofan and North Darfur) suffers from chronic food insecurity, and on any one year close to another 38 per cent suffers from either transitory food insecurity or the threat of falling into that situation.
Faced with this situation, successive governments have tried to adopt suitable policy responses. The Programmes for Salvation, Reform and Development of both the previous and the present governments give priority to rural and regional development and to the rehabilitation of basic social and economic infrastructure, with special encouragement for food-security-oriented activities.
The current system of federal decentralization thus places considerable demands on the state planning units. They are expected to produce a general strategy for the development of the respective state, based on the national strategy produced, at the federal level, by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, and incorporating proposals of the Local Councils and by the line ministries of the state. The strategy must then be approved by the State Council. On the basis of the approved strategy, the state planning unit produces an annual investment plan, by identifying, formulating and appraising projects in line with the strategy. The annual investment plan is then incorporated in the budget of state, and submitted by the state Ministry of Finance to the Federal Ministry.
The considerable demands currently placed on state planning units do not, however, by themselves mean that regional (or state) planning will necessarily have a strong impact on development. That will largely depend on the allocation of resources to the development budget - and on the actual availability of such resources when needed, which is, in the Sudan, not quite the same. On the other hand, it may be said with reasonable certainty that, even if regional planning cannot by itself bring about the accelerated development of a state, the lack of such planning will almost certainly be associated with slow or inexistent development, by leading to faulty identification of priorities, mediocre strategies and irrelevant or wasteful projects.
Realizing that lack of planning skills and shortage of technical manpower for planning tasks constitute serious bottlenecks for the work of planning and organizing rehabilitation and development efforts, the Government has given high priority to the strengthening and expansion of the capabilities of the State Planning Units, which are central to any attempt to reverse the trend of past years and initiate a process of sustained development in the regions.
However, ongoing changes in the perspectives and orientation of regional planning mean that the goal-posts are themselves now being moved. To understand the long-term implications of the new federal system for regional planning, reference must be made to existing trends in the approach and practice of regional planning over recent years, since these trends have important implications for what is likely to be asked of the regional - in this case state - planning agencies.
Some deep and potentially very important changes have taken place in planning practice at the subnational level in recent years. Gone, to a very large extent, is the old emphasis on the allocation of - largely national - resources to various territorial units (regions, municipalities), in order to redress economic and social imbalances. In its place can be found today a much greater stress than hitherto on identification of opportunities, mobilization of resources, active participation of the local population and of the private sector in development efforts and the active enablement and promotion of economic and social development. Decentralization plays a key role in providing the administrative environment under which the new functions - which require proximity to the needs, problems and potentials of the region or local area - can be adequately carried out.
The new regional planning may, like the old, descend from a variety of different professional backgrounds; the tool kit that it comprises and requires has, however, changed significantly, in line with the much more open-ended nature of the work involved. This is the case, for instance, with the analysis of and interaction with the private and non-governmental sectors, identification of opportunities and of projects, strategic planning, negotiation skills and techniques, analysis of poverty situations and processes, etc. If anything, the degree of multi-disciplinarity required by the new approach and perspective is even greater than before. The planner's new role calls for skills of strategic planning, negotiation and resource mobilization which were, until recently, assigned very low priority - if any at all - in the training of planners.
Thus the tasks or the training needs of regional planners are very unlikely to become easier or simpler in the near future. Together with the increased demand for suitably trained staff in the state agencies (both in regional planning units and in the line ministries) resulting from the increased number of states and from the functions - particularly the planning and development promotion functions - devolved to state administrations in the framework of the federal system, this in turn implies that the country's need for training of staff and for institutional support to and development of state planning agencies has never been stronger.
The problems and challenges that the new federal system poses to regional planning may be representative of the situation of other sectors of state administration as well, particularly those which require well-trained professionals active in the preparation of policies and plans with significant potential impact on the long-term state development. From the point of view of such sectors, the chances of success of the federal reform would have been enhanced if they had been preceded by a sustained effort of preparation, including significant investments in training staff, creating and improving facilities in the proposed new state capitals, strengthening the normative, supervisory and backstopping functions of central ministries, creating incentives for staff to move from the capital to peripheral areas of the country, etc.
Given, however, the present situation, and knowing that few if any of these preparatory measures were taken, perhaps the most that can be said is that the success or failure of the federal reforms in improving planning and administration now hinge, among other factors, on the degree of success of the government in forming and making available to State governments planners and administrators in the necessary quantities, and with the necessary types and levels of training.
The recent federal reforms have created a legal and financial framework for decentralized administration in the Sudan, both at the local and at the state level. Whether these changes will be translated into greater effectiveness of the state administrations and greater participation will, ultimately, depend on how successful the country is in responding to the challenge posed by the increased need for human and material resources entailed by the new system.
1. The term 'federal' is used by the government of the Sudan to describe the political and administrative structure which it has been putting into place since 1991. As will become clear in the course of this paper, that structure lacks some important characteristics of federalism as it is usually defined - indeed most people would probably question whether federalism is at all compatible with a one-party system. Since the present paper is primarily focused on administrative matters, such a discussion would be out of place here. The terms 'federal' and 'federalism' are used in this paper purely as a convenient shorthand designation, which does not imply any judgement as to their adequacy.
2. The Addis Abbaba agreement, signed in March 1972 between the Government and the Southern Anya Nya rebels, gave the three southern provinces a considerable measure of autonomy. The Southern Region was responsible for its own internal security and the regional executive controlled the Police, Fire Brigade, Prisons and Wildlife Protection. A regional assembly was established in Juba, and the Southern Region's chief executive was directly elected by the Assembly. The success of the experience with decentralization to the south was one of the main arguments adduced in favour of extending the regionalization to the northern part of the country.
3. In addition to directly elected members, local councils included representatives of functional organizations of the Sudan Socialist Union and a 'reasonable' representation of women. Provision was also made for 10 per cent of the council to be appointed on the basis of 'talent' (Norris, 1983: 217).
4. This measure had the opposition of many Southerners, afraid that this would weaken their collective position in relation to the north. The fact that it is widely considered to have played an important role in re-igniting the civil war in the South illustrates well the political pressures and constraints under which successive Sudanese governments have been forced to consider matters of decentralization and administrative reform.
5. The Act contains a list of activities prohibited to the regions, another of matters in respect of which regional bodies should not exercise any power except with the permission of the national government, and a third one enumerating the region's functions and competencies. It is interesting to transcribe the first and last of those lists here in order to facilitate their comparison with the equivalent lists in the latest Constitutional Decree setting up the federal system.
The following matters were indicated as being the exclusive preserve of the national government, upon which the regional governments "shall not encroach":
National defence and security.
Foreign affairs and international diplomatic representation.
Nationality, immigration, passport and alien affairs.
Public audit.
Judiciary, public prosecution and advocacy.
Transit, means of communication and transport.
Inter-regional water supply resources and the national electricity network.
Currency and coinage.
Export and import trade. Weights and measures.
Natural resources and mining.
National and regional elections.
Educational planning.
Any other matters regulated by national legislation.
Regional governments were made responsible for the following functions:
The good administration of the region and maintenance of law and order.
The development and utilization of regional financial resources.
The promotion, development and supervision of local government councils.
Supervision and control of police, prison and fire brigade forces.
Fostering of social, religious and charitable institutions.
Regulation of trade, co-operation and industries in the region.
Utilization of water resources in the region.
Promotion of agriculture, pastures and animal resources in the region.
Provision and organization of regional communications and transport.
Supervision of public service personnel in the region.
Development and control of land use and town planning.
(Government of Sudan, 1980, quoted in Alassam, 1983: 114)
6. Of the elected members of the regional assemblies, over sixty per cent were directly elected in single member electoral constituencies (geographical constituencies). Other members were elected by "... special constituencies reserved to members of workers' trade unions, farmers, the women's association, the army etc. which are Sudan Socialist Union functional organizations. Voting in these special constituencies is reserved for their officially registered members." (Alassam, 1983: 116). It must also be pointed out that, as Al-Teraifi and Idris (1987: 61) say, "... the election process was completely under the direction and control of the Sudanese Socialist Union (the only legal party in the country). Under these circumstances we can hardly talk about free and democratic elections".
7. The Eleventh Constitutional Decree (Section 11 (1)) made all members of the State Government members of the State Council by inherence of functions; the Twelfth Constitutional Decree (Section 17) amended this rule to read 'the members of the State government, to the exclusion of the Governor (Wali), shall, by virtue of their offices, be members of the State Council'.
Al-Teraifi, A. A. (ed.) (1987). Decentralization in Sudan. Khartoum: Khartoum University Press.
Al-Teraifi, A. A. and M. S. Idris (1987). Decentralization: Origins and Development. In Al-Teraifi (1987).
Al-Teraifi, A. A. (1994). Decentralization in the Sudan: Characteristics, Challenges and Opportunities. Paper presented to the Conference on Major Federal Experiences with special reference to the Sudan. Khartoum: Friedrich Ebert Foundation (mimeo).
Alassam, M. (1983). Regional Government in the Sudan. Public Administration and Development, 3: 111-120.
Federal Government Bureau (1995). The Constitutional Decrees Covering the Federal System in The Sudan. Khartoum: Government of the Sudan (mimeo).
Government of the Sudan (1995). Provisional Order: Local Government Act 1995. Khartoum: Government of the Sudan.
Government of the Sudan (1995). The Twelfth Constitutional Decree (Re Federal Relations & Amendment of the States Systems) 1995. Khartoum: Government of the Sudan (mimeo).
Moharir, V. and S. Kagwe (1987). Administrative Reforms and Development Planning in the Sudan (1956-1975). Khartoum: Development Studies and Research Centre, University of Khartoum.
Norris, W. (1983). Local Government and Decentralization in the Sudan. Public Administration and Development 3: 209-222.
Rondinelli, D. A. (1981). Administrative Decentralization and Economic Development: The Sudan's Experiment with Devolution. Journal of Modern African Studies. 19(4): 595-624.
Division of Functions Between the Federal and State Governments
(Twelfth Constitutional Decree 1995, Sections 6 to 8)
Section 6:
The federal organs shall have power to legislate, execute or generally to plan in relation to the following affairs:
a) Defense, public security, the armed forces, police and disciplinary forces.
b) External relations.
c) The judiciary, federal public prosecution and advocacy.
d) International borders of the Sudan.
e) Nationality, immigration, passport and alien affairs.
f) Currency, coinage and fiscal, monetary and trust policies.
g) Planning in developmental, tourist, educational, public service and local government fields and the criteria for constructional planning.
h) Industrial planning and federal projects thereof.
i) External trade.
j) Federal taxation, excise and customs.
k) Federal natural resources, mineral and petroleum wealth and subterranean wealth.
l) Federal and air transportation, interstate roads and water courses and federal and interstate transportation and communication facilities.
m) Interstate waters.
n) Existing federal bodies, projects and public corporations until transferred by a federal Act.
o) Systems of public elections for the federal and states constitutional institutions, the general legal and popular institutions, local institutions and official national corporations working across the Sudan.
p) Public auditing and national census.
q) Archaeology.
r) General professions regulated by federal acts.
s) Emergency enforcement pursuant to the Constitutional Decrees.
Section 7:
The States organs shall have power subject to federal plans to legislate, execute or generally plan, within the limits of the State, in relation to the following affairs:
a) Government of the State, good administration, taking care of the interests and public order thereof, subject to the general policy.
b) Developmental and economic planning.
c) State taxation and excise.
d) Commerce, supplies, cooperatives and industry.
e) Agricultural lands, State forests, animal wealth, wildlife and the maintenance thereof.
f) Housing and construction.
g) Tourism and environment.
h) Exploiting waters and electrical energy within the State.
i) Health.
j) Education.
k) Public service and local government.
l) Roads and facilities for transportation and communication within the State.
m) Social welfare, women affairs, youth, sports, maternity, childhood and other affairs.
n) Cherishing of arts and culture.
Section 8:
(1) The Federal and State organs shall have the following powers subject to federal provisions:
a) Supervision of public service.
b) Regulation of information and culture by interstate media.
c) Statistics.
d) Regulation of border trade.
e) Survey.
(2) There shall be established by federal Acts, National Councils to undertake the reallocation to the federation and States of lands, forests, means of transportation and animal wealth. (Government of Sudan, 1995)
Federal, State and Local Revenues
(Twelfth Constitutional Decree, Sections 13 to 15)
Section 13:
The federal revenues shall consist of the following:
a) Revenues from customs and international harbors and ports.
b) Companies profit tax, personal income tax and stamp duty.
c) Profits of national projects.
d) Excise on federal industries.
e) Expatriates' tax, and taxation of foreign bodies and activities.
f) Any other tax or excise not interfering with the revenues of the states or local government.
Section 14:
The States revenues shall consist of the following:
a) Business profit tax, provided 40% thereof is allocated to Local Councils.
b) Excise on State industries.
c) Sales tax on purchase of state lands.
d) Returns of state services.
Section 15:
The revenues of local councils shall consist of the following:
a) Estates tax.
b) Sales tax.
c) Agricultural and animal production tax, provided that 40% thereof shall be allocated to the state.
d) Local roads and river transport tax.
e) Excise on local industries and handicrafts.