Sub-Saharan African populations are, perhaps, the fastest growing populations in the world. The region also enjoys the dubious distinction of being the most hard hit by severe economic, social and political problems. Even the Lagos Plan of Action(LPA), adopted as an agenda for action towards the reversal of the downward trends in development, did not produce the desired results mainly because of the inability of member states to formulate development policies based on a sound assessment of domestic realities as well as their inability to harmonize policies and development programs within the region in order to advance the goal of collective self-reliance. Collective self-reliance, incidentally, has been the corner stone of the Lagos Plan of Action and later the African Priority Program for Economic Recovery (APPER).
Economic and social problems assumed critical proportions in a number of countries in the nineteen eighties mainly due to unfavorable world commodity market situations, inappropriate systems of management of the economy, adverse climatic conditions, conflict within and between nations. Deteriorating political conditions resulting in economic and social instability set in motion a great African diaspora with significant proportions of African populations living in foreign countries either as refugees or as migrant workers. Africa is now second to none in the number of African refugees it harbors - the latest estimate being around 20 million. Many of the region's highly educated are working abroad in search of better conditions of life and freedom from fear. Africa is rich in natural resources. It is believed that it accounts for 97% of the world reserve of chrome, 85% of platinum, 64% of manganese, 25% of uranium, 13% of the world reserve of copper and other mineral resources.1 There are varied opinions as to why Africa remains so severely underdeveloped in spite of such natural resources endowment. Observers of the African scene, however, seem to agree about the following being at the root of the problem:2
a) the anti-agriculture and hence an anti-rural bias in development policy resulting in a widening developmental gap between the urban and rural sectors;
b) the increasing dependency of the region on imported food;
c) the inability and indeed the unwillingness of policy makers to create domestic capacity for generating needed factor inputs (i.e. the near total absence of research and development efforts designed to develop technologies appropriate in terms of the region's needs);
d) unabated population growth placing heavy demand on ill-developed resources and continuously threatening the delicate balance between population and the environment.
This paper does not presume to open a new line of debate on the determinants and consequences of African underdevelopment. Its purpose is to demonstrate how demographic factors affect the structure and level of employment and the level of employment affects the level of welfare of the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa. The dominance of the traditional sector in African economies has stifled economic and social dynamism and the emerging modern sector is too small to serve as a driving force in economic and social modernization. Since the dominant source of Gross Domestic Product(GDP) in the Africa Region is the traditional sector the majority of the economically active population lives and works in this sector. The capacity of this sector to sustain life has been deteriorating rapidly under the combined forces of stagnant technology, rapid population growth, increasing person/resource ratios and the attendant problems of environmental degradation.
Population is a critical variable in this nexus of factors affecting and being affected by them. Among the most visible effects of the size and distribution of population on the development process is its impact on productivity, other things being equal. This is particularly important in sub-Saharan Africa where there seems to be a mismatch between the increasing demand for goods and services and the capacity of the system to generate these goods and services.
The population of sub-Saharan Africa is among the fastest growing in the world. Among the consequences of the high rate of population growth for labor productivity and the level of welfare of the population and hence for socio-economic development are:
a) a young age structure of the population and the resultant high age dependency burden which negatively impacts on savings and investment;
b) the incongruence between the increase in the size of the labor force and the rate of economic growth resulting in high rates of unemployment and underemployment and hence in low productivity of labor;
c) increased poverty and general deprivation of large population groups in the region.
The gap between fertility and mortality in sub-Saharan Africa (Table 1) and the associated crude rate of natural increase (Table 2) is typical of societies that are in the early stages of the demographic transition.
Table 1: Changes in the Level of Fertility and Levels of Selected Mortality Indicators in Africa 1965-1988
Country |
Crude Birth Rate |
Crude Death Rate | ||
|
1965 |
1988 |
1965 |
1988 |
Ethiopia Burkina Faso Mali Mozambique Malawi Zaire Burundi Togo Madagascar Niger Benin CAR Rwanda Somalia Kenya Tanzania Sudan Guinea Sierra Leone Senegal Ghana Zambia Chad Mauritania Lesotho Liberia Morocco Egypt Cote d'Ivoire Zimbabwe Nigeria Cameroon Botswana Mauritius Congo Tunisia Algeria Libya Angola Mean |
43 48 50 49 56 47 47 50 47 48 49 34 52 50 52 49 47 46 48 47 49 49 45 44 42 46 49 43 44 55 51 40 53 36 42 44 50 49 49 47.2 |
51 47 50 45 54 45 47 49 43 51 47 42 53 49 47 48 44 48 48 45 46 49 44 45 41 49 36 36 45 47 50 47 46 20 45 32 41 45 48 45.6 |
20 26 27 27 26 21 24 22 22 29 24 24 17 26 20 22 24 29 31 23 20 20 28 25 18 22 18 19 22 17 23 20 19 8 18 16 18 17 29 22.1 |
20 18 19 17 20 14 16 14 16 20 15 15 18 19 11 13 16 22 23 16 14 15 21 19 14 16 11 10 14 12 16 14 12 7 12 9 10 10 22 16.1 |
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1991, Table 27.
Historically, the decline in mortality in the Western societies and later in Japan, for example, has been, by and large, a response to rapid economic development and a secular rise in the standard of living. While mortality declined moderately in sub-Saharan Africa on account of major improvements in public health, fertility continues to be very high with little sign that any significant change will take place in the foreseeable future. Efforts at bringing down the level of fertility have been and continue to be sporadic and have so far produced little result.
In the 23 years between 1965 and 1988, for example, the crude birth rate went down from 47.2 births per thousand population in 1965 to 45.6 in 1988. On the other hand the mean crude death rate (CDR) for the 39 countries for which data are reported in Table 1 went down from 22.1 deaths per thousand population in 1965 to 16.1 in 1988 indicating an average annual crude rate of natural increase of 2.9% a year. The rapid population growth observed in sub-Saharan Africa in recent decades has implications for the region's ability to feed itself, its ability to provide the population with basic social and economic services and, in general the attainment of the major developmental goals.
Data on the growth in population and the proportion of total population of working age are reported in Table 2 below. For the region as a whole population grew at the rate of 2.6% annually between 1970 and 1980 and at the rate of 2.9% between 1980 and 1991. It is projected that it will continue to grow at this rate during the rest of the century. The projection is based on the expectation that the present high level of fertility will continue unchanged.
In the period between 1970 and 1980, annual growth rates in population of between 2.5% and 3% were reported for 11 sub-Saharan countries or 32.4 % of the number of countries for which data were reported. About 35 % of the countries registered annual growth rates of 2.5% or less while 32.4% reported average annual growth rates of 3% or more.
In the period between 1980 and 1991 average annual population growth rates ranged between 2.5% and 3% for 32.4% of the countries for which data were reported. For 11.8% of the countries, growth rates lower than 2.5% were reported. Growth rates of 3% or more were reported for approximately 56% of the countries. The projections for the period between 1991 and the year 2000 indicate that only 9% of the countries are expected to grow at rates lower than 2.5% while 56% would grow at rates higher than 3%.
The conclusion to be drawn from these data is that the population of sub-Saharan Africa is growing rapidly now and is likely to continue to grow even more rapidly for the rest of this century. The implication of this for the growth rate in the size of the population of working age and hence for demand for employment is obvious.
Table 2: Population Growth and Distribution of the Labor Force by Major Sectors 1965 - 2000
Country |
Average Annual Growth of Pop. (%) |
Percentage Population of Working Age (15-64) |
Percentage of Labor Force in Agriculture Industry Services | ||||||||
|
1970-80 |
1980-91 |
1991-2000 |
1970 |
1991 |
1970 |
1991 |
1970 |
1991 |
1970 |
1991 |
Ethiopia Burkina Faso Mali Mozambique Malawi Zaire Burundi Togo Madagascar Niger Benin CAR Rwanda Somalia Kenya Tanzania Sudan Guinea Sierra Leone Senegal Ghana Zambia Chad Uganda Mauritania Lesotho Liberia Cote D'Ivoir Zimbabwe Nigeria Cameroon Botswana Mauritius Congo Mean |
2.6 2.1 2.1 2.6 3.1 2.3 1.6 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.7 2.2 3.4 2.6 3.8 3.0 3.0 1.4 2.1 2.9 2.2 3.0 2.1 3.4 2.4 2.3 2.9 4.1 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.8 1.5 3.0 2.6 |
2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 3.3 3.1 2.9 3.4 3.0 3.3 3.2 2.7 3.0 2.9 3.8 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.4 3.0 3.2 3.6 2.4 3.1 2.4 2.8 3.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.8 3.5 1.0 3.4 2.9 |
2.7 3.5 3.1 2.9 3.1 3.1 2.9 3.1 2.8 3.5 2.9 2.5 3.1 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 2.9 3.1 2.8 3.2 3.0 2.6 3.3 2.9 2.4 3.0 3.3 2.3 2.9 3.1 2.8 1.1 3.4 2.9 |
52 53 53 55 51 52 53 52 54 51 52 57 51 49 48 53 53 55 54 53 52 51 55 53 52 56 51 54 51 51 55 50 52 55 52.6 |
52.1 50.9 49.8 52.1 49.7 - 50.7 51.1 52.5 49.1 - 53.5 50.6 - 49.4 50.5 52.4 50.7 52.6 51.6 50.5 49.7 52.4 48.6 50.8 55.0 - 49.7 53.7 52.3 51.6 52.2 67.5 49.5 51.7 |
56 42 61 - 44 - 71 34 24 65 36 35 62 - 33 41 44 - 28 24 47 11 47 - 29 35 - 40 15 41 31 33 16 18 37.9 |
47 44 44 64 35 - 55 33 38 37 41 38 - - 27 61 - 29 43 20 53 16 43 51 22 14 - 38 20 37 27 5 11 12 34.6 |
14 21 11 - 17 - 10 21 16 7 2 26 9 - 20 17 14 - 30 20 18 55 18 - 38 9 - 23 36 14 19 28 22 24 20.0 |
13 20 12 15 20 - 16 23 14 19 14 16 22 - 22 5 - 35 14 19 17 47 18 12 31 38 - 22 32 38 22 54 33 37 23.3 |
30 37 28 - 39 - 19 45 59 28 52 38 30 - 47 42 42 - 42 56 35 35 35 - 32 56 - 36 49 45 50 39 62 58 41.6 |
40 37 43 21 45 - 29 44 53 42 49 42 40 - 51 34 - 36 43 62 29 37 39 37 47 48 - 40 49 26 51 41 56 50 42.0 |
Source: All data are from a combination of Tables 23 and 3 of World Bank, World Development Report 1993.
One of the likely consequences of continued rapid population growth is some decline in the proportion of the population of working age relative to other age segments. As childhood survivorship improves even with modest positive changes in health policy and programs, the proportion of total population under the age of fifteen is likely to increase if current fertility remains unaffected by efforts to increase the prevalence of contraceptive
use. If the rather modest gains in old age survivorship can be maintained, the proportion of total population of working age is likely to get squeezed between the increasing proportion of total population under the age of 15 and the increase in the number of survivors beyond the age of 65, thus perpetuating the current high age dependency burden. There is very little doubt that this will be the demographic scenario one can expect in the next century if fertility is allowed to continue at its present level.
In 1970 the population of working age represented 52.6% of the total population and it went down slightly to approximately 51.7% in 1991 (Table 2). This slight decline can only be attributed either to an improved reporting system or a slight increase in the proportion of total population aged 60 and older. Under such circumstances a high age dependency burden continues. In the context of severe underdevelopment a high age dependency burden implies decreasing capital-man ratio, lower labor productivity and declining human welfare.
The data in columns 6 through 11 in Table 2 show that the changes in the sectoral distribution of the labor force between 1970 and 1991 were insignificant. In 1970 the percentage of the population of working age in agriculture was approximately 38% and it went down to 35% in 1991. The proportion of the population of working age in industry went up from 20% in 1970 to 23% in 1991. In both 1970 and 1991 there has been high concentration of persons of working age in the services sector ( approximately 42% in both 1970 and 1991 ).
Knowledge of the relative contributions of the major sectors of the economy to GDP provides some clues as to how rapidly structural differentiation is taking place in the economy. In Table 3 data on the structure of GDP are summarized.
In 1965 the percentage of GDP originating in agriculture ranged between 14% for Zambia and 75% for Rwanda. In the same year the share of industry in GDP ranged between 3% for Niger and 54% for Zambia. In 1989 the share of agriculture in GDP ranged between 3% for Botswana and 67% for Uganda. The share of industry in GDP in 1989 ranged between 7% for Uganda and 57% for Botswana.
In both periods the services sector, on the whole stood second to agriculture in terms of its contribution to GDP. Thus in 1965 the contribution of the services sector to GDP ranged between 18% for Rwanda and 62% for the Congo. In 1989 it ranged between 26% for Uganda and 51% for the Congo.
It must be noted that the services sector in the Africa region should not be viewed as being in the same class as those in advanced industrialized economies. In Africa the service sector is likely to be dominated by supportive services to the burgeoning state bureaucracies and small-scale semi-traditional distribution systems which contribute only minimally to a dynamic and sustained structural differentiation.
Table 3: Structure of Gross Domestic Product - Sub-Saharan Africa (1965 & 1989)
Country |
Source of GDP | |||||||
|
Agriculture |
Industry |
Manufacturing |
Services | ||||
|
1965 |
1989 |
1965 |
1989 |
1965 |
1989 |
1965 |
1989 |
Ethiopia Burkina Faso Mali Malawi Zaire Togo Madagascar Niger Benin CAR Rwanda Somalia Kenya Tanzania Sierra Leone Senegal Ghana Zambia Chad Uganda Mauritania Lesotho Cote D'Ivoire Zimbabwe Nigeria Cameroon Botswana Mauritius Congo Mean |
58 37 65 50 22 45 25 68 59 46 75 71 35 46 34 25 44 14 42 52 32 65 47 18 54 33 34 16 19 42.4 |
42 35 50 35 30 33 31 36 46 42 37 65 31 66 46 22 49 13 36 67 37 24 46 11 31 27 3 13 14 35.1 |
14 24 9 13 32 21 14 3 8 16 7 6 18 14 28 18 19 54 15 13 36 5 19 35 13 20 19 23 19 18.4 |
16 26 12 19 32 23 14 13 12 15 23 10 20 7 11 31 17 47 20 7 24 30 24 43 44 27 57 32 35 23.8 |
7 11 5 - - 10 - 2 - 4 2 3 11 8 6 14 10 6 12 8 4 1 11 20 6 10 12 14 - 8.2 |
11 15 6 11 10 8 12 8 5 8 15 5 12 4 6 20 10 24 16 5 - 14 17 31 10 15 4 24 9 11.9 |
28 39 25 37 46 34 61 29 33 38 18 24 47 40 38 56 38 32 43 35 32 30 33 47 33 47 47 61 62 39.0 |
42 39 38 45 38 44 54 51 42 43 47 26 49 27 42 47 34 40 44 26 38 46 30 46 25 46 40 56 51 41.2 |
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1991, Table 3.
In sub-Saharan Africa growth in aggregate GDP (Table 4) declined from 4.0% a year in the period between 1970-80 to 2.7% in the period between 1980-91. With the exception of Guinea Bissau, Chad, Madagascar, Ghana, Benin, Zimbabwe and Senegal, most sub-Saharan African countries for which data were reported experienced from moderate to rapid declines in growth rates in aggregate GDP.
From an annual growth rate of 1.6% in 1970 agriculture-based GDP increased to 2.4% a year in 1991 (Table 4). Industry-based GDP declined from 5.8% in the period 1970-80 to 2.8% in the period 1980-91. Manufacturing declined from 5.5% for the period 1970-80 to 4.3% for the period 1980-91. The growth rate in the service sector also declined from 6.2% in the period 1970-80 to 3% in the period 1980-91.
All these show that sub-Saharan economic systems are rapidly reaching the limits of their population carrying capacity. They may have even reached that limit already as shown by the fact that since the 1970s many countries were finding it difficult to produce enough goods and services to satisfy the basic needs of their populations.
While political and environmental stability play important roles in perpetuating underdevelopment in the region there are other factors equally potent in terms of their impact on development processes. These include: rapid population growth, continued technological backwardness, adverse international commodity market situations and development policy that does not take into account the need for harmonizing development in the modern and non-modern sectors. This is not the place to discuss all these factors. The rest of this paper is devoted to a discussion of the effect of rapid population growth on the economy and the society. The effect of rapid population growth manifests itself, among other things, in increased person/resource ratios. Unless this trend is offset by either curtailing the rate of population growth or increasing the speed of technological change or both, life will be increasingly precarious for the peoples of Africa.
Excessive population pressure on land in the agricultural sector is, probably, one of the factors contributing to the decline in agricultural productivity and hence the problem of food observed in the Africa region in recent decades. Rapid growth in the size of the population of working age is one of the causes of the high rates of unemployment and underemployment in the region. The problems associated with health and related amenities such as housing in the region are also linked with rapid population growth. Hence the battle against poverty in Africa must be fought in several fronts, namely, tempering the growth of population, planning and implementing comprehensive technological and organizational development programs. Firm policies and realistic programs must be developed to expedite the rechanneling of excess agricultural labor into non-agricultural activities by, for example, linking agricultural development with industrial development.
But efforts at developing the urban economy via accelerated industrialization is frustrated by the combined forces of lack of capacity to generate domestic factor inputs and the rather low level of effective demand for manufactured goods. The decline in agricultural production that characterizes the current African economic scene undermines the material base for industrial development and these feeds the vicious circle of rural underdevelopment militating against the development of a viable industrial sector.
The degree of urbanization is, often, used as an indicator of the degree of structural differentiation of the economy and the society. But in the African situation, such an interpretation of urbanization must be made with caution. While it is true that the percentage of total population in Africa living in urban areas has been increasing over the last four decades (Table 6), it cannot be said that this growth has been matched by commensurate development in non-agricultural economic and social infrastructure.
In discussing the question of urbanization it is instructive to put sub-Saharan Africa in the larger regional context. The percentage of total population in urban areas in the North African Sub-Region almost doubled in 40 years ( from 24.4% in 1950 to 51.9% in 1990 ). Those of the Western, Central and Southern Sub-Regions nearly tripled. That of the Eastern Sub-Region nearly quadrupled while that of Southern Africa increased 28-fold. There seems to be no end to the speed of growth in the last 40 years. In sub-Saharan Africa, Central Africa is the most urbanized sub-region with 44% of its total population living in Urban areas in 1990, followed by Western Africa (29% ). Eastern Africa comes third with 23% and Southern Africa last with 22%.
Many African cities are, by and large, populated by recent migrants from their surrounding hinterlands. Most of them are not employable because they lack the required skills and attitude to enable them to function reasonably in the modern sector.
A few conclusions may be drawn from the preceding analysis of urbanization in the Africa region:
a) Since a significant proportion of urban population growth is accounted for by migration such growth is likely to be spontaneous rather than planned. It is more than likely that this spontaneous growth will put considerable strains on urban resources and amenities including employment;
b) Since migrants are generally without skills they are likely to be relegated to marginalized status often playing socially disruptive roles. This often manifests itself in the form of increased crime rates, prostitution and other forms of deviant behavior;
c) Even when employed, new entrants into the urban labor market tend to depress the level of productivity;
d) Urban housing is increasingly becoming a serious problem and the worsening problem is posing serious threats to the health of the population.
Table 4: Growth Rates of Aggregate and Sectoral GDP - Sub-Saharan Africa
Country |
GDP |
Agriculture |
Industry |
Manufacturing |
Services | |||||
|
1* |
2* |
1* |
2* |
1* |
2* |
1* |
2* |
1* |
2* |
Mozam. Tanzania Ethiopia G. Bissau Burundi Chad Madagascar S. Leone Malawi Rwanda Mali Burkina Niger Kenya Nigeria Benin CAR Ghana Togo Mauritania Lesotho Zimbabwe Zambia C.D'Ivoire Senegal Cameroon Congo Namibia Mauritius Botswana Mean |
- 3.0 1.9 2.4 4.2 0.1 0.5 1.6 5.8 4.7 4.9 4.4 1.7 6.4 4.6 2.2 2.4 -0.1 4.0 1.3 8.6 1.6 1.4 6.6 2.3 7.2 5.8 - 6.8 14.5 4.0 |
-0.1 2.9 1.6 3.7 4.0 5.5 1.1 1.1 3.1 0.6 2.5 4.0 -1.0 4.2 1.9 2.4 1.4 3.2 1.8 1.4 5.5 3.1 0.8 -0.5 3.1 1.4 3.3 1.0 6.7 9.8 2.7 |
- 0.7 0.7 -1.2 3.2 -0.4 0.4 6.0 4.4 7.1 4.2 1.0 -3.7 4.8 -0.1 1.8 1.9 -0.3 1.9 -1.0 0.2 0.6 2.1 2.7 1.3 4.0 2.5 - -3.3 8.3 1.6 |
1.6 4.4 0.3 5.0 3.1 3.4 2.4 2.7 2.4 -1.5 2.4 3.2 - 3.2 3.5 4.9 2.4 1.2 5.3 0.7 1.8 2.2 3.3 -1.2 2.7 1.1 3.3 0.3 3.2 3.0 2.4 |
- 2.6 1.6 2.1 11.6 -2.1 0.6 -3.2 6.3 - 2.0 2.5 11.3 8.6 7.3 1.4 4.1 -1.0 7.7 0.5 27.8 1.1 1.5 9.1 5.3 10.9 10.3 - 10.4 17.6 5.8 |
-3.6 -2.4 1.8 2.6 4.6 7.1 0.9 -0.8 3.3 0.5 4.0 3.8 - 4.0 -0.4 3.6 3.2 3.7 1.5 4.9 8.2 2.1 0.9 -1.6 3.8 2.2 4.7 -2.0 10.1 10.7 2.8 |
- 3.7 2.5 - 3.8 - - -2.1 - 4.9 - 4.1 - 9.9 5.2 - - -0.5 - - 18.0 2.8 2.4 - 2.4 7.0 - - 7.1 22.9 5.5 |
- -0.8 1.9 - 5.8 - - -1.4 3.9 0.5 - 2.6 - 4.9 - 4.8 - 4.1 2.5 - 12.8 3.1 3.7 - 5.1 - 6.3 1.7 11.2 7.5 4.3 |
- 8.4 3.9 11.0 3.5 2.2 0.6 2.3 7.0 - 6.9 19.9 2.9 6.8 9.6 2.7 2.3 1.1 3.6 3.7 13.6 2.4 1.2 10.9 2.0 7.8 4.5 - 10.9 14.5 6.2 |
-1.7 2.0 3.1 2.8 5.4 7.3 0.2 0.9 3.7 3.1 2.4 5.4 - 4.9 3.1 0.5 -0.2 6.6 -0.2 0.5 5.3 4.0 0.0 0.8 3.0 1.1 2.4 3.1 5.8 10.3 3.0 |
Source: World Development Report 1993, Table 2
* 1 = 1970-80 and 2 = 1980-91.
Table 5: Estimates and Projections of Urban Populations (%) in the Africa Region 1950 - 2000
Sub-Regions |
1950 |
1960 |
1970 |
1980 |
1990 |
2000 |
Northern Africa |
24.4 |
29.9 |
36.9 |
44.3 |
51.9 |
59.0 |
Western Africa |
10.1 |
13.5 |
17.4 |
22.5 |
29.0 |
36.3 |
Central Africa |
14.5 |
18.2 |
25.1 |
34.5 |
43.9 |
51.8 |
Eastern Africa |
5.6 |
7.6 |
10.7 |
16.4 |
23.0 |
29.6 |
Southern Africa |
0.8 |
2.0 |
5.3 |
12.9 |
22.3 |
29.1 |
Source: United Nations, Estimates and Projections of Urban, Rural and City Populations 1950-2025: The 1980 Assessment St/ESA/SER.R/45 (New York, 1982) as cited by V.P. Diejomaoh in his presentation at the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Employment in Africa, Dakar 21 - 25 October 1985.
Since independence the State, in Africa, has assumed the responsibility of spearheading rapid socio-economic development without necessarily being equipped with what it takes to play this role effectively. The common method adopted in the pursuit of this goal, in a number of countries, has been, during most of the post-independence period, central planning. Periodic planning (five-year plans, for example ) was the most common strategy believed to be instrumental in expediting economic development. Among the stated goals of such plans are increase in the general and sector-specific output of goods and services, raising the standard of living of the population and diversifying employment opportunities.
In Table 6 below data on trends in employment growth in Africa between 1975 and 1983 are reported.
Trends in employment growth did not show any consistent pattern. In 1975 the mean annual rate of growth was 3.9% and the decade ended with a growth rate of 6.4% per annum after three years of erratic up-and-down movement. The decade of the 1980s started with an average annual growth rate of 3.4%, went up to 6.5% in 1981 and then down to 3.9% in 1983. The employment situation in Africa was, at best, unpredictable during the period.
It was only a few countries that reported data on the trends of employment after 1983 as shown in Tables 7, 8 and 9 below. Six out of the eleven countries for which data are reported have data reported for three periods, namely 1981, 1985 and 1986. Five of them have data reported for them for 1981 and 1985 only. No claims are being made that these eleven countries represent sub-Saharan Africa.
Growth in the general level of employment ( Table 7 ), which is employment in the non-agricultural sector, ranged between -6.2% a year for Niger and a staggering 24.7% for Ghana. For five of these countries, namely, Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Malawi and Mauritius employment grew at faster rates than the population. Three of the countries, namely, Niger, Sierra Leone and Zambia experienced negative growth. The average rate of growth for the eleven countries was 4.3% signifying considerable variation among the eleven countries.
Table 6: Trends in Employment Growth in Africa 1975-1983 (%)
Country |
1975 |
1976 |
1977 |
1978 |
1979 |
1980 |
1981 |
1982 |
1983 |
Mean Annual |
Burundi Kenya Malawi Mauritius Seychelles Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe Cameroon Egypt Tunisia Botswana Swaziland Sierra Leone Libya Mean(Region) |
10.47 0.87 8.66 4.23 6.05 -2.74 2.23 0.98 1.94 1.84 -6.13 11.04 3.77 4.15 11.51 3.9 |
-4.36 4.68 8.17 7.11 8.44 2.10 -6.27 -1.60 6.43 - 5.38 3.66 2.81 0.96 8.21 3.0 |
25.43 5.29 15.66 7.61 7.33 0.61 0.45 -2.07 4.41 - 2.77 5.55 0.01 -0.90 4.40 5.1 |
11.5 0.96 9.87 1.23 -2.77 10.80 -0.94 -2.63 5.57 2.71 2.97 10.68 7.59 -2.08 1.07 3.8 |
5.2 6.65 5.45 1.30 8.09 11.92 1.88 -0.13 19.09 1.24 2.88 8.93 3.68 13.12 - 6.4 |
-4.88 3.44 3.52 -1.29 6.25 1.31 1.45 2.16 15.21 2.44 2.64 10.31 1.67 2.90 - 3.4 |
23.81 1.84 10.74 -1.04 -1.67 - 3.41 3.20 23.77 1.49 2.97 - 6.15 3.13 - 6.5 |
4.46 1.34 4.08 -0.43 5.07 - -6.30 0.42 - - 2.78 15.04 -2.98 - - 2.1 |
- 17.06 5.31 - -1.44 -5.16 - -1.01 - - - - - - - -3.9 |
6.01 3.18 8.25 1.92 3.51 4.0 0.50 0.04 10.91 1.94 2.03 9.31 2.83 1.85 6.29 4.37 |
Source: ILO, Year Book of Labor Statistics, 1984 as cited by V.P. Diejomaoh.
Table 7: General Level of Employment 1981 to 1989 ('000)
Country |
1981 |
1985 |
1989 |
Average Annual Rate of Growth |
Benin Botswana Burundi CAR Ghana Kenya Malawi Mauritius Niger Sierra Leone Zambia |
61.1 97.4 47.1 18.5 207.9 1024.3 330.6 194.9 74.3 72.1 374.8 |
80.8 116.8 44.7 19.8 464.3 1174.4 415.2 209.5 22.5 69.4 361.5 |
- 175.6 58.3 - - 1355.5 - 270.5 28.0 - 359.6 |
6.4 8.0 2.4 1.4 24.7 3.2 5.1 3.9 -6.2 -0.7 -0.4 |
Source: ILO, Year Book of Labor Statistics, 1991, Table 4.
Wage employment also generally increased in countries of the region for which data were reported. The mean growth rate for the 12 countries in the decade of the 80s was 2.7% a year. Four of these countries experienced growth rates in wage employment higher than those of their respective populations. However, since anything could have happened between 1985 and 1989, the growth rates for the countries with no 1989 data reported must be read with great caution. Again the same three countries that experienced negative growth in employment also experienced negative growth in wage employment.
Data for twelve countries cannot be used as the bases for generalization for the region. However, there is reason to suspect that the rate of growth in employment and indeed in wage employment could have been negatively affected by the considerable economic and social difficulties encountered by many sub-Saharan countries in the 1980s.
Table 8: Wage Employment in the Non-agricultural Sector - 1980s ('000)
Country |
1981 |
1985 |
1989 |
Mean Growth Rate |
Benin Botswana Burundi CAR Ghana Kenya Malawi Mauritius Niger Sierra Leone Zambia Zimbabwe |
64.6 92.6 38.7 13.8 176.1 788.8 170.4 139.7 31.8 66.1 343.0 743.5 |
74.7 112.8 38.2 15.4 407.9 933.5 220.0 159.0 21.5 63.5 327.0 780.0 |
- 168.9 50.1 - - 1098.4 - 224.0 26.3 - 322.0 - |
3.1 8.2 2.9 2.3 2.6 3.9 5.8 6.0 -1.7 -0.8 -0.6 1.0 |
Source: ILO, Year Book of Labor Statistics, 1991.
It appears that, on the whole, wage employment dominated the general non-agricultural employment. For the limited number of countries for which data are available, wage employment represented approximately 76% of the total non-agricultural employment in 1981 and this went up to nearly 83% in 1985. In 1989 wage employment represented approximately 88% of total non-agricultural employment. As is usually the case, non-agricultural economic activities are of the small family business variety where, by and large, unpaid family workers are the major actors. It is one of the characteristics of family-owned businesses to be operated in a fashion that does not make any significant distinction between the business and the family coffers. This arises from the general lack of regard for cost accounting. As a rule labor does not feature prominently in determining cost of production. Data on the magnitude of unemployment are not available for any of the countries. The only way to determine the gravity of the problem is to compare unemployment data with those of general non-agricultural employment. The column marked with an asterisk in Table 10 is the ratio of unemployed persons to those employed. The use of such an unusual indicator, though, by no means perfect, provides a general sense of some order of magnitude. The data summarized in Table 10 indicate that the ratio of the unemployed to the employed ranged between 10% and 50% in 1981, between 4% and 44% in 1985. The data for 1985 are not meaningful because the ratio can be calculated for only three countries.
Table 9: Wage Employment as Percent of General Non-agricultural Employment
Country |
1981 |
1985 |
1989 |
Botswana Burundi CAR Ghana Kenya Malawi Mauritius Niger Sierra Leone Zambia Mean |
95.1 82.2 74.6 84.7 77.0 51.5 71.7 42.8 91.7 91.5 76.3 |
96.6 85.5 72.8 87.9 79.5 53.0 75.9 95.6 91.5 90.5 82.9 |
92.6 85.9 - - 81.0 - 82.8 93.9 - 89.5 87.6 |
Source: Percentages are computed on the bases of the data in Tables 7 and 8 above.
Table 10: Unemployment Ratio of the Unemployed to the Employed
Country |
1981 |
Ratio* |
1985 |
Ratio* |
1989 |
Ratio* |
Angola Burundi Cameroon CAR Ethiopia Ghana Mauritius Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Mean |
- - 45.1 9.2 61.6 32.4 56.5 22.7 15.7 11.9 8.4 |
- - - 0.50 - 0.20 0.30 0.30 - - 0.10 0.28 |
56.1 1.9 14.3 8.2 56.4 24.2 64.8 29.0 28.3 10.8 0.3 0.26 |
- 0.04 - 0.44 - 0.12 0.33 0.39 - - - |
- 11.1 - - 52.3 27.4 18.1 24.6 - - - 0.45 |
- 0.20 - - - - 0.07 1.09 - - - |
* Ratio of unemployed to employed.
Source: Unemployment data are from ILO, Year Book of Labor Statistics 1991, Table 9.
The data reported (Table 11) below compare sub-Saharan Africa with the other developing regions in respect to population, GDP and the rates of change thereof. This comparison is useful in two ways. First, it places sub-Saharan Africa in a global context. Secondly, it permits a determination of how certain relationships hold across regions.
Table 11: The Association Between Rates of Growth in GDP and the Rates of Population Growth
|
GDP Growth (%) |
Population Growth (%) | ||||
|
1965-73 |
73-80 |
80-87 |
1965-73 |
73-80 |
80-87 |
Sub-Saharan Africa Oil Exporters All Low-income Countries South Asia Mean |
5.9 7.5 6.0 3.7 5.8 |
2.5 2.8 4.6 4.3 3.6 |
0.5 -0.5 6.1 4.8 2.7 |
2.6 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.5 |
2.8 2.6 2.1 2.4 2.5 |
3.1 3.3 2.0 2.1 2.6 |
Source: World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa - From Crisis to Sustainable Growth- A Long Term Perspective Study, 1989, Tables 2 and 28.
The pattern one observes in respect to sub-Saharan Africa is one that points to a negative association between the rate of change in GDP and the rate of population growth. As the rate of population growth increased the rate of growth in GDP decreased during the period for which data were reported. The same pattern seems to obtain for South Asia and the oil exporting countries. In South Asia GDP increased during the period while the crude rate of natural increase remained constant during most of the period and declined moderately towards the end of the decade of the 80s. For the low-income countries the pattern seems to break down.
The level of welfare of a population may be measured in a number of ways. For the purpose of the present study we use the pattern of income distribution, accessibility and adequacy of health services and nutritional status as proxy measures of the level of welfare. The accessibility and adequacy of such resources as health services and nutrition are associated with the capacity of society to generate