The formal colonial occupation of Botswana by Britain took place between 1885 and 1966. Liberal Africanist historiography has described the colonial epoch in Africa as merely an episode in African history, whose impact on the continent's development should not be exaggerated.1 In this paper, we proceed from the premise that the significance of colonial change should be measured in terms of its impact rather than in its duration. In Botswana colonial rule may have lasted less than a century, but its interaction with the pre-colonial Tswana socio-economic formations certainly left far reaching distortions in the colonial and post-colonial economies. The impact of this interaction, that is, between pre-colonial socio-economic formations and colonialism, especially vis-a-vis cattle production, is examined in this paper in the context of underdevelopment.
The writing of history, as is the case with the production in general of all social knowledge, takes place within a particular theoretical framework or problematic within which the researcher poses specific questions, gathers the necessary data and conducts the investigation.2 In this paper we have adopted a materialist problematic, embracing both the underdevelopment theory and historical materialism; this position is easy to rationalize. To begin with, historical materialism allows us to examine the pre-existing socio-economic formations, in particular the mode of production and the relations of production it gave rise to. This allows us to examine the problems which the entry of colonialism into Tswana societies entailed and, among such problems, is that of the alteration and undermining of the pre-existing mode of production. This approach extends our analysis further: we can now explain how the changes, due to colonial intrusion, conditioned the modus operandi of the cattle economy throughout the colonial period. In short, historical materialism allows us to explain how African cattle production was underdeveloped at the level of production.
The underdevelopment theory allows us to explain the same process of underdevelopment at the level of exchange as Africans struggled to penetrate the regional cattle market dominated by settler cattle producers. The failure by African cattle producers to profit from the regional cattle trade is hereby explained as a dialectical process or extension of the process which began at the level of production. The use of a materialist methodology is not accidental; it provides us with the right tools of analysis and enhances our ability to decode the contradictions of the colonial political economy. Maurice Conforth provides a better rationale for this approach: If historical materialism makes history into a science, this is because it is not only a theory about how to interpret history, but also a theory about how to make history, and therefore, the basis for the practical policy.3
At this point, we should say a word or two, about the validity of the underdevelopment theory which since the 1980s has been a target of scathing criticism from both the left and the right. It has at various times, been described as sterile, too pessimistic, static, inadequate, etc.4 We do not hesitate to point out that such criticism has been largely ideological than arising from the methodological weakness of the theory. Much of this criticism has either been misplaced or exaggerated. Also, the theory as applied here has nothing to do with the simplistic form which often accompanied its application during the 1970s.5 For example, by using this theory, it is not in anyway implied that colonial rule in Botswana came to disrupt a pre-colonial golden age, characterized by equality and economic prosperity for all. Exploitation of the weak members prevailed in pre-colonial society though this was exacerbated by colonial violence and arbitrariness. Applying Samir Amin's topology, we have categorized Botswana (Bechuanaland) as a colony falling between two modes of the colonial political economy, namely, the Africa of settler production such as Kenya and South Africa, and the Africa of peasant production such as Uganda and West Africa.6 At the level of official rhetoric, Botswana was supposed to be a colony in which both indigenous and settler cattle production were supported and co-existed. However, this in practice, was never to be and this reality has prompted us to reach the following conclusions in this paper.
Firstly, we argue that the pre-colonial Tswana economy of cattle rearing and arable farming depended on the maintenance of discipline in man's relation with his environment. This discipline largely manifested itself in the manner in which land was distributed for settlement, agriculture and pastures. Secondly, it is argued that African cattle production during colonial rule was largely undermined by colonial land re-allocation, a system which altered the pre-existing forms of land management and thus deprived Africans of sufficient land for arable and pastoral farming. As Kowet rightly observes, the control over land resources in the BP was a major basis for the exercise of economic power.7 Thirdly, it is argued that land alteration disturbed the ecological balance between man and animal, leading to increased land pressures and congestion in the African Reserves, factors which led to further ecological deterioration. The effect of all this was to affect animal husbandry negatively through, for example, the reduction of the carrying capacity of the pastures in the now crowded African Reserves. Lastly, it is argued that the division of the land into two, African and European, also meant the division of Botswana's cattle economy into two sections: a settler sector and an African one. This progressively led the colonial state to pursue discriminatory policies against the Africans, culminating in settler monopoly of state assistance in the form of capital projects, loans, transportation and access to the markets.
We thus see a dialectical relationship between on one hand, the settlers, capability in land and pasture management, better breeding methods of animals and on another, the Africans' inability to manage land and cattle properly. The viability of the settler sector and the impoverishment and undercapitalization of the cattle economy are explained here as parts of an inextricable whole and also as a cause of migrant labour which, plagued the territory throughout the colonial era.
Botswana as it now stands is largely a product of two major historical events which occurred in the region in the nineteenth century. These were the cataclysmic wars of the Mfecane and the northward expansion of white settlement from South Africa. Both events pushed the weaker groups northward and eventually resulted in the settlement of the Tswana in their present locations. Most of the territory was and is still semi-desert, characterized by scanty rainfall, few perennial rivers, vast expanses of waterless surfaces, scrub land, low humidity, a high incidence of solar radiation and high diurnal temperatures.8 This state of affairs to a large extent affected the manner in which both settlement and economic activity evolved in the territory.
For both ecological and economic reasons, the human population came to concentrate on the narrow eastern strip of the territory, which relatively had fertile soils and better rainfall patterns. As we will later observe, it was the same strip which the forces of colonialism came to see fit for building the railway line, the main road running north and south and above all, for the development of white settlement.
Owing to inhospitable climate, the Tswana developed a tri-local settlement pattern by the middle of the nineteenth century. They lived in large and centralized villages of permanent dwellings. The largest village was usually that of the chief, the Serowe, and this was also his capital village and centre of community life. According to Gunderson, the nineteenth century Tswana village could be thought of as the inner circle of three concentric circles making up the general settlement pattern of the tribe. The circle surrounding the residential area, represented "lands" for agricultural purposes.... The area in which livestock grazed formed the third circle which surrounded the agricultural area'9 Such community organization was an insurance against both ecological and human enemies. Settlement always evolved with the aim of defence against the failures of water supplies, pastures and fear of attack by enemy tribes. Failure to conquer these obstacles often constituted a raison d'etre for movement to other places.10 This settlement pattern was also an effective ecological adaptation because there was specific land for a specific activity and the disruption of this pattern by colonial land alienation, adversely altered the existing equilibrium. This set into motion a chain of negative events. For example, the change in pasture lands altered the quality of African animal husbandry, leading to the production of light-weight and sickly cattle which became a burden on the market. In pre-colonial Botswana, settlement and economic activity were part of a deliberately arranged ecosystem.
The Tswana practised a mixed economy. They were agriculturalists as well as pastoralists, growing maize and sorghum and rearing large herds of cattle, goats, sheep and other animals. The ecology of the territory rendered animal husbandry the most suitable undertaking, while agriculture was generally a painful activity. From the very beginning, therefore, agriculture was a poor cousin of livestock keeping, always playing second fiddle. Cattle keeping thus became the hub of Tswana economy on which the political, socio-economic and cultural institutions were centered. Missionary observations in this period authenticate the centrality of cattle among the Tswana.11 The transfer, distribution of, and rights in, cattle consequently came to condition Tswana perceptions of what constituted wealth. In short, the pre-colonial Tswana political economy revolved around cattle and land. Cattle ownership became the most important determinant of socio-economic and political status. Cattle became instrumental in understanding power relations and social differentiation among the Tswana.
In this context, it becomes easier to see the direct relationship between wealth in cattle and political power, and poverty in cattle ownership and lack of political power. Although nineteenth century European missionaries and travellers talked about the abundancy of cattle among the Tswana, ownership was characterized by great disparities, with royal households and their allies forming a hereditary caste of cattle owners. `Apart from inheritance, chiefs were able to accumulate cattle through [kgotla] court fines and tribute.12 Cattle owners often had a variety of ways in which they utilized the labour of commoners to look after their animals.13 The cattle economy largely thrived in relation to the distribution of land for pastures and water resources. Land in turn grew in importance mainly in its relation to the maintenance of livestock. Those who had enough cattle also had enough land. Control and distribution of land were the prerogative of the chief who acted as trustee of the land for his community. He allocated all the land for building huts, cultivation and grazing. He also determined different uses of land, and he controlled both the agricultural and herding cycles. For instance, the chief issued orders on when to plough, harvest or graze. In certain circumstances this function was delegated to subordinate authorities who included headmen and his close relatives.
In traditional Tswana land-use, the concept of freehold tenure or private ownership of land was something unknown. Land was always the property of the community. Therefore, a member of the community was only allowed its use for the benefit of his or her household and the community at large. A holding of land reverted to the chief when it was abandoned by the family using it or was required for some communal purposes. In the latter event, a family was entitled to another holding. Tswana custom limited the amount of land that anyone might utilize to the which constituted effective domestic utilization. Thus pre-colonial custom precluded land accumulation, rental or sale. Apart from the distribution of land and livestock, there was little opportunity for any group to acquire any means through which a situation of great economic differentiation among the Tswana might arise. It will be very difficult therefore, to understand colonial underdevelopment of the cattle industry without first relating it to the disruption of the pre-colonial system of land use by land re-allocation.
Looking at the traditions governing the utilization of natural resources such as arable land, pastures and water, one notices first of all, that their use was geared towards bringing discipline into man's relationship with nature. There were specific rules or actions followed which allowed the Tswana to counter their hostile physical environment characterized by poor soils, droughts and scarce pastures. For instance, pastoral lands and water for cattle were never individually owned, as this would have deprived some people of their use. Thence, pastoral lands were always common lands or matswetla, and these were divided into administrative zones under the appointed overseer or modisa whose duty was to supervise the use of grazing lands and whose permission was sought to keep one's cattle there. The overseer was sometimes a ward head or a descendant of some other prominent man. If the grazing land was too extensive for one overseer, it was often sub-divided, each division being under a local overseer appointed by the overseer of the whole district.
Secondly, the mafisa system by which cattle owners shared their cattle with, or hired them to, the poor was one way of redressing the disequilibrium between man and the environment through the rational use of land. As a way of distributing cattle to different localities, the mafisa indirectly helped to contain overcrowding of cattle and hence, avoiding overgrazing. The carrying capacity of the pastures was in this way regulated for the better. Thirdly, pre-colonial animal husbandry was very often characterized by the tradition of `frontier mentality': the idea that when one area no longer provided an adequate living, there was always somewhere new where the individual or group could move and start afresh. As far as the cattle economy was concerned, this pursuit of greener pastures helped the Tswana to discover areas of undisturbed ecology. The `frontier mentality' depended on unrestricted movement of the people. Similarly, the increase in human population was countered by a system of distributing villages, opening up and developing new centres large enough to provide the required social services and, at the same time, small enough to enable the cultivator to remain within reasonable reach of his land and stock.14
The tradition of group rights over grazing lands and the necessary officials to enforce control was one of the highest virtues characterizing pre-colonial animal husbandry and was a clear expression of grazing discipline. Its disruption during the colonial political economy came to breed anarchy in grazing and contributed to the deterioration in African animal husbandry. We have already argued that the availability of land in reasonable quantity and quality was cardinal to the pre-colonial economy. Land alienation came to reverse this by reducing the available land and by restricting people's movement. These factors in turn impinged on the quality of African animal husbandry.
Botswana came under the orbit of British colonialism in 1885 but until 1891 the declaration of a Protectorate was not followed up by any action. Together with Swaziland and Lesotho, Botswana became a responsibility of the British High Commissioner to South Africa, residing in Cape Town, hence the term High Commission Territory. The High Commissioner whose primary function was to represent British interests in South Africa became the `man on the scene', and was authorized to appoint such officers as might appear to him necessary to maintain a colonial presence in the territory.15 This arrangement continued until independence in 1966 and it subjected Botswana to second class status in colonialist circles. In making choices between Botswana and South Africa, the High Commissioner almost always sided with the latter because his job was to represent British interests in South Africa. South Africa was also perceived as economically crucial to Britain, and the task of governing Botswana, a territory assumed to be poor in resources, was usually perceived as a secondary and burdensome undertaking.
Botswana's marginality as a colony was compounded by its so-called uncertain political future; throughout its colonial history Botswana was faced by South Africa's persistent demands to incorporate it into greater South Africa. These demands, receiving covert British support, became a pretext for British lack of commitment to the economic development of the territory. This does not in any way imply that colonial rule stood for development, it was in fact an antithesis of development. Argument is made in relative terms. Throughout the colonial period, Botswana remained an embarrassment to Britain. Its rule was mainly negative, confused and contradictory. To camouflage this situation of neglect, Britain secretly permitted South Africa to increase its presence in the territory. For instance, Mafikeng, the Protectorate's capital city was situated in South Africa, an arrangement which imposed severe restrictions on the physical administration of, and contact with, the territory. Also, the bulk of essential services such as health and administration were performed by South African white civil servants who had no commitment whatsoever to the welfare of the territory.
The undermining of African cattle production and the pursuance of the policy of neglect and non-development by Britain were therefore no isolated incidents. These should be viewed in the context and status of Botswana as a colony. This context was spelt out as early as 1885 by Sir Hercules Robinson, then British High Commissioner to South Africa, in his famous statement: `We have no interest in the country north of the Molopo [river] except as a road into the interior; we might therefore confine ourselves... to preventing ... the protectorate [from] being occupied by either filibusters or foreign powers, doing as little in the way of administration as possible.16 This attitude largely explains why Britain maintained an extremely low profile in the matters concerning Botswana. For most of the period, except in 1912 and 1932, the colony depended on hut tax, the negligible colonial grants and earnings from migrant labour for its budgets. Despite endemic deficits, expenditure on the police and maintenance of the administration accounted for 80 per cent of the annual budget.17 In a territory whose economy depended on cattle production, expenditure on horse rations and police eclipsed expenditure on education, pasture improvement and veterinary services in every year prior to 1930.18
Having provided the context in which to understand the underdevelopment of the territory, we now proceed to examine the politics of land alienation and the ensuing impoverishment of African cattle production.
Colonialism in Southern Africa succeeded in creating African wage labour forces by deliberately destroying long established peasant economics through the separation of the peasants from their means of production such as land. In Botswana this was done through three mechanisms: land alienation, coercive legislation and the pursuance of the policy of neglect. Land alienation which accompanied white settlement, combined with other adverse ecological problems existing in the African Reserves, such as insufficient water supplies and pastures to over-power African animal husbandry. These factors together facilitated the creation of the culture of poverty in the territory. Between 1899 and 1933 Europeans had alienated more than 10,00 square miles of land for settlement and farming. The European Farming Blocks, as they came to be known, comprised Tuli, Gaborone, Lobatse, Ghanzi and later the Tati concession.19 Settlers, however, continued to increase their acreage by adding pieces of land from the 165,000 square miles which were officially designated as Crown Land, while Africans found it very difficult to do so.
By `land shortage' here we do not mean land per se, or land as it related to the total area of Botswana's land surface, but land as a proportion of the total fertile and usable land. In Botswana, land shortage was largely determined by the manner of fertility, distribution, and consequently by the control over the remaining land by the chiefs. Statistically, colonial legislation was, according to Worthington, responsible for alienating only six per cent of the total land surface of Botswana.20 At face value, this was a small and insignificant proportion of land, that is, in relation to Botswana's total geographical area of 570,000 square kilometres (220,000 square miles).21 But the significance of this land should be seen in terms of the use-value of the land that was alienated. As already pointed out, the alienated land was in the eastern fringe of the country which had comparatively fertile soils, substantial rainfall and a large population concentration. When one considers the fact that less than twenty per cent of the territory was suitable either for cultivation or grazing, the significance of the coercive transfer of the six per cent of the cultivable land is not far to perceive.
The nature of the pre-colonial ecological control which we earlier examined was broken down by land alienation. Apart from dividing the country into two economic sectors - African Reserves and European Blocks - land alienation brought anarchy and individualism in African animal husbandry. Ward segregation of land and communal grazing areas gradually disappeared due to land pressures, leading to increased individualism and landlessness. Many of the landless people began to move to the northern and western parts of the crown lands either as squatters or on permission. In the European settlement areas, Africans lived as tenants for most of their lives. Apart from the Ghanzi Block, the rest of the European Blocks were situated in the south-eastern part of the country. The result of land alienation was the creation of a situation in which tribal areas later came to function as labour reserves for the European areas within and outside Botswana, while congestion for both man and beast, reduced productivity and environmental deterioration became increasingly prevalent in the Reserves.
Settlers on the other hand, paralleled land occupation with cattle accumulation, using their own `initiative' and also relying on the role of the state. As many of these settlers were undercapitalized, they took to an illicit barter trade in European goods in exchange with African cattle, starting with the early 1890s. According to Alan Best, settler pioneers in Botswana, `were ranchers first and traders second, but they realized the close relationship between the two pursuits. They built up the herds with African livestock exchanged for clothing, hardware and other general merchandise from their stores'.22 Initially, settlers had only partial success, owing to the Africans' reluctance to dispose of their cattle. Africans preferred to exchange hides, skins and grain for the new merchandise. Sensing this, settlers decided to change their strategy, resorting to building `bush' stores all over the Reserves. `By the turn of the century, Europeans were operating numerous `bush' stores solely as a means of acquiring additional cattle'.23 Some whites exchanged their merchandise for grain such as maize and sorghum and stored it in way similar to hoarding. They later exchanged with cattle during times of drought and food scarcity in the Reserves. Faced with the threat of starvation, Africans had no better choice than to dispose of their cattle. In this way many settlers managed to build their cattle herds, especially in the period between 1889 and 1914. Those European traders living in Lobatse, Tuli and Gaborone Blocks, had a distinct advantage over their counterparts operating in the Reserves in that they could purchase large numbers of cattle from the Africans and readily graze and breed them on their ranches.
Settlers supplemented cattle accumulation by monopolizing government loans. The fund set up by the government in 1925 to provide loans to all categories of farmers turned into a tool of the settlers. The Financial Secretary projected that in 1921-22 roughly £53 per adult male head would be expended for the benefit of whites as opposed to £1.8s per adult male head for the Africans.24 Indeed, from 1925 when it was established up to 1933, the Fund did not give even a single loan to any African cattle producer, while at the same time 34 loans were granted to European farmers. Alan Pim criticized this monopoly of loan facilities by Europeans. He particularly criticized the arbitrary methods used in granting loans. The state used lack of security as a pretext for denying Africans access to such resources.25 This tactic has been widely employed by lending institutions in many independent African states to deny peasants credit facilities.
Veterinary services were both negligible and inequitably provided in favour of the settlers. There was no veterinary department in the territory until 1905, and this was established with great assistance from South Africa. Its financial problems prevented the veterinary department from expanding its activities. Between 1905 and 1933, during which time the cattle industry had established itself as the cornerstone of the country's economy, the veterinary staff consisted of thirty members. In the same period the cattle population has swollen to 777,000.26 We are told by Hermans that expenditure on services designed to improve livestock productivity was not only a minor part of the total recurrent outlays, but was also of a protective nature rather than developmental character. Disease control, rather than animal husbandry extension consumed most of the veterinary department's budgets.27 Broadly speaking, the veterinary department perceived its role as that of supervising the export of cattle. Their basic aim was to comply with the requirements laid down by the buyer countries, especially South Africa. The Pim Commission perceived this problem clearly: `maintenance of the veterinary staff is, in fact, practically a condition for being permitted to maintain an export trade, which is vital to the economic life of the territory'.28
With regard to actual expenditures on veterinary services, the colonial state spent a total of £21,115 in the period between 1899 and 1933, and part of this was substantially supported by money provided from the territory's Native Fund.29 For instance, the Native Fund's contribution to veterinary services between 1920 and 1932 amounted to £6,795. In the period between 1899 and 1954, the total expenditure of the state on veterinary and agricultural services, amounted to less than two million pounds. In the same period, more than £5 million (five million pounds) were spent on policing the country.30 The Pim Commission had earlier criticized this `police philosophy' of the colonial state. The Commission saw no need for the colonial administration to spend so much money on policing Native Reserves which in actual fact policed themselves as the incidence of crime there was very low. The limited veterinary services existing were also a monopoly of the settlers. This is why only settlers managed to meet the weight limit of cattle imposed by the South African Government for Botswana's cattle exports.31
The transport network which was necessary for the cattle export industry was also very undeveloped. The country was remarkably poorly equipped with public transport. Throughout the colonial period, there was no standard of adequacy in road communications. By 1954, the road system remained basically the same as it had been since the country was colonized. The whole road network consisted of a main all-weather road, successor to the old `Missionaries road' into Central Africa, and this ran up the eastern side of the country parallel to the railway. From it, branches went east and west of the railway into areas officially designated as `important'. These areas, as we earlier noted, were the ones largely occupied by European farmers along the railway and within the vicinity of thirty miles. According to the `Bechunaland Fact Sheet' released in 1965, the colonial administration left a total of `five miles of tarred roads and 4,900 miles of gravel or earth roads, out of which 4,500 miles were merely tracks. The whole country had only nine service stations'.32 Of this road network, the labour recruiting company, the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA), owned and maintained 940 miles to which the government granted £760 annual subsidy.33
Apart from the road, the railway was another form of transport. In fact, the railway system was the most important element in the country's communications. Built by Cecil Rhodes in the 1890s, the railway never belonged to Botswana. It was owned by the Rhodesian Railways and operated by South African Railways and, although it was the spine on which all forms of transport in Botswana hinged, the government had no control over it. The government could only obtain certain freight concessions on behalf of settler exporters while Africans, who had no access to it, became cattle exporters through the exploitative white middleman. Botswana was thus faced with isolation at many levels; there was internal, external and economic isolation. It was in part this situation which encouraged South Africa to extend its influence into the territory, consequently turning it into a quasi-Bantustan.
The African cattle economy was first undermined at the level of production and the role of the state was instrumental in this process. The ensuing deterioration in African livestock keeping was effectively reinforced by ecological degradation through such factors as overgrazing, soil erosion, drought and increased epizootics. These factors did not operate in isolation; they were a dialectical part of the articulation of the colonial political economy and they usually reinforced each other. It is in this context that Africans became predominant producers of what became known as compound cattle, the last of the four categories of cattle grading, while settler ranchers became producers of prime cattle, the first category. Although often having other reasons, South African rulers often capitalized on the defects of the African-bred cattle to impose sanctions on Botswana's cattle exports. When such cattle were allowed on the South African market, their quality was usually cited as a reason for offering lower prices. We have shown elsewhere how this mechanism of unequal exchange functioned to the perpetual detriment of African cattle producers in Botswana.34 It is also in this context that we should understand why Botswana emerged as a major exporter of labour to South Africa instead of a cattle exporter.
1. See Anthony Sillery, The Bechuanaland Protectorate (London: Oxford University Press, 1952).
2. See J.F.A. Ajayi, "Colonialism: An Episode in African History", in L.H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds.), Colonialism in Africa, Vol. 1: The History and Politics of Colonialism, 1870-1914 (London, 1969), pp.497-509.
3. See Henry Bernstein and Jacques Depelchin, "The Object of African History: A Materialist Perspective", mimeo (University of Dar-es-Salaam, 1977). The article has since been published in History in Africa, but the published version was not accessible to the writer.
4. Maurice Conforth, Historical Materialism, Vol. 2 (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1976), pp.14-15.
5. See for instance, John G. Taylor, From Modernization to Modes of Production: A Critique of Sociologies of Development and Underdevelopment (London: Macmillan Press, 1983); John Illiffe, The Development of African Capitalism (London: Macmillan, 1984), and the publication of the Joint Committee on African Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council (New York, July 1986).
6. Implicit in these studies was the alleged classlessness of pre-colonial African societies. Many articles in Neil Parsons and Robin Palmer (eds.), The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa (London: Heinemann, 1977), are written from this perspective.
7. Samir Amin, "Development and Structural Change: The African Experience", journal of International Affairs, 24, 2 (1970), pp.203-25.
8. Donald Kalinde Kowet, Land, Labour Migration and Politics in Southern Africa: Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978), p.10.
9. Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swazilan Report on Economic Survey Mission (London: H.M.S.O., 1960), p.92.
10. G. Gunderson, "Nation Building and the Administrative State: The Case of Botswana", Ph.D Thesis (Michigan University, 1970), p.45.
11. See H.A. Fosbrooke, "Land and Population", Botswana Notes and Records, 3(1971), p.178. For a detailed treatment of this issue, consult R.M.K. Silitshena, "Changing Settlement Patterns in Botswana: The Case of the Eastern Kweneng", Ph.D. Thesis (Sussex University, 1979).
12. See Una Long (ed.), The Journals of Elizabeth Lees Price Written in Bechuanaland, Southern Africa (London, 1956).
13. Kowet, Land, Labour Migration and Politics, p.68.
14. Apart from the Mafisa labour was also obtained through the regiment system and use of forced labour on the serfs, and underclass.
15. See Silitshena, "Changing Settlement Patterns in Botswana".
16. Among the officials appointed by the High Commissioner was the Resident Commissioner, who became the chief colonial official in the territory.
17. Public Records Office (PRO), Further Correspondence Regarding the Affairs of the Transvaal and Adjacent Territories, Blue Book C4588,49.
18. Quill Hermans, "Towards Budgetary Independence: A Review of Botswana's Financial History, 1900-1973", Botswana Notes and Records, 6(1974), p.114.
19. Hermans, "Towards Budgetary Independence", p.114.
20. See Financial and Economic Position of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1933 (London: H.M.S.O., 1934), p.7. (Hereafter cited as The Pim Report).
21. E.B. Worthington, Science in the Development of Africa (London, 1958), p. facing p.261.
22. Bechuanaland Protectorate: Report on the 1964 Census (Bulawayo: Rhodesia Printers, 1964), p.2.
23. Alan G. Best, "General Trading in Botswana, 1900-1968", Economic Geography, 46 (October, 1970), p.600.
24. Best, "General Trading", p.600.
25. David R. Massey, "Labour Migration and Rural Development in Botswana", 1900-54", M.A. Dissertation (University of Zambia, 1981), Chapters 1 to 3.
26. See A.C.S.Mushingeh, "Colonialism and Cattle Marketing in Botswana, 1900-54", M.A. Dissertation (University of Zambia, 1981), Chapters 1 to 3.
27. The Pim Report, p.25.
28. Hermans, "Towards Budgetary Independence", p.114.
29. The Pim Report, p.88.
30. The Pim Report, p.181.
31. Hermans, "Towards Budgetary Independence", p.114.
32. See Mushinge, "Colonialism and Cattle Marketing", Chapters 2 and 3.
33. "Bechauanaland Fact Seet" (Gaborone: Information Services, 1965), p.5.
34. The Pim Report, p.135.
35. See Mushinge, "Colonialism and Cattle Marketing", Chapters 2 and 3.