THE IMPACT OF MACRO - ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES ON HOUSING INVESTMENT IN KAMPALA CITY - UGANDA: SHELTER IMPLICATIONS FOR THE URBAN POOR

Augustus Nuwagaba

Abstract: Shelter is indisputably one of the basic needs of mankind. The improvement and state of the housing sector is part and parcel of the development process, a fact which evidence especially from poor countries apparently contradicts. In the worst cases, the current poor shelter state, reinforced by growing homelessness, is a far cry from the pre-historic caves, for the poorest of the poor. Hitherto, the shelter problem has continued to be a global phenomenon varying in terms of magnitude rather than presence. In Uganda's case, the causes of the urban housing problem are rooted in the country's turbulent history, inhibitive land tenure system, haphazard urbanisation and phenomenal demographic dynamics. Since the early 1980s, efforts to bring the economy back on the development track through adjustment programmes have undermined the housing sector in general and urban shelter for the poor in particular. Indeed Macro-Adjustment Programmes (MAPS) in Uganda have among other effects fuelled rural-Urban migration, reduced income opportunities, swollen the ranks of the urban poor and devastated the people's living standards. The programmes in their orthodox framework have deterred investment, both private and public. The adjustment methodology has side-lined and gravely undermined the housing sector thereby aggravating the shelter problem. The paper is neither an indictment of adjustment per se nor does it seek to exonerate Uganda's recent turbulent history. The gist is that while the past upheavals, uncontrolled edaphic and explosive demographic dynamics sowed the seeds of the current shelter problem, the orthodox Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) methodology as currently employed in economic management has ably nurtured the seeds so as to create formidable problems. These already threaten the very survival of the urban poor and urgent intervention to defuse them is imperative. Such intervention should aim at revising the current SAP methodology beginning with serious initiatives to identify the urban vulnerable groups, especially the poor, and to design strategies directed at cushioning them from `shocks' as a result of adjustment programmes. There is a need to incorporate and emphasise the social-human dimension in the adjustment programmes without which they are doomed to failure.

1. INTRODUCTION

Shelter is one of the basic needs of mankind. The state of the housing sector in a country is an instructive pointer to the level of socio-economic development. Indeed, backwardness and inadequate shelter go in tandem. The housing problem manifests itself through inadequate quantities of shelter units as well as the poor quality of the existing structures. While the rural case hinges essentially on a quality deficiency, the urban phenomenon exhibits both quality and quantity elements.

The backwardness-shelter relationship notwithstanding, the housing problem is world-wide. The country disparity is only in regard to its magnitude, distribution and severity. It is not uncommon to encounter homeless people in the mega-cities of advanced countries. Nevertheless, the housing industry has lagged behind demographic dynamics and population needs, especially in the developing countries, culminating in a formidable shelter vacuum. The main factors responsible are incessant turbulence, institutional decay, and policy deficiencies. Uganda is a typical poor country which has, since the mid-1960's, experienced more than her fair share of the afore-mentioned retrogressive forces.

In this paper, we attempt to evaluate the urban shelter question, concentrating on conventional Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS) in the context of the above retrogressive factors.

1.1 The Context

The current sorry state of urban housing, and indeed the entire social sector in Uganda, can hardly be understood without recourse to the socio-economic and political events over the last three decades or so. Nor can the adjustment process since the early 80s be meaningfully evaluated without focusing on the above events as the point of reference. From independence (1962) to the early 1970s, Uganda had one of the fastest growing and most buoyant economies in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In its 1988 report on the Ugandan economy, the World Bank notes that Uganda's economic growth averaged 5.1 % per annum over the period and that the cost of living was fairly low and stable. Indeed in Winston Churchhill's own words, the country was the Pearl of Africa.

Unfortunately, the ascendance to power by General Idi Amin through the 1971 Military Coup ushered in an era of economic mismanagement and repression. Vali Jamal (1985?) relates how the General decimated rival tribes, terrorised the intellectuals and entrepreneurs and squandered Uganda's natural resources, reducing a once prosperous and promising nation to one of the poorest in the world. The "Liberation War" of 1979 to oust the military Junta inflicted further destruction on property, the infrastructure and human life.

The aftermath of the War was characterised by even more civil strife, political intrigue, social unrest and economic disequilibrium. The multi-dimensional chaos only entrenched the country further in socio-economic maladjustment.

Meanwhile, the demographic dynamics remained on course despite the wanton killings of the 1970s. By 1980, the population had increased to 13.6 million from the 10 million levels of 1970. This was out of proportion with the declining trend of health services, educational facilities, public utilities and shelter provision. Rural-urban migration intensified in the period, causing unprecedented pressure on urban facilities.

The external environment also-took on an increasingly hostile character over the 1971-80 decade. This was heralded by the 1973/74 oil price escalation unleashed by the OPEC cartel. Uganda suffered the full brunt of the "Oil Shocks", nurturing the seeds of socio-economic deterioration. With time, the terms of trade of primary products - Uganda's lifeline - plummeted severely. There was a high and volatile interest rate and also dwindling international finance. This was crowned by Uganda's growing international isolation in the late 1970s and a global recession at the beginning of the 1980s. It was against this background of socio-economic devastation, precipitated by turbulent internal factors and an adverse external environment, that Uganda embarked on the adjustment programmes under the auspices of the Bretton Woods twins - the IMF and the World Bank. While the foregoing events before the 1980s set the analytical context, adjustment measures since June 1981 constitute the prime focus of examination in this paper.

2. ADJUSTMENT POLICY

Adjustment refers to both stabilisation measures and structural adjustment initiatives which are usually applied together on the basis of their complementality. The former encompasses measures designed to improve the balance between demand and supply. Structural adjustment on the other hand refers to the sustained pursuit of a programme of policy reforms that is designed to reduce economic and financial imbalances arising from domestic or external shocks, and to address policy deficiencies that impede progress towards accelerated economic growth (Lateef 1991). It aims at improving the current account of the balance of payment and generate efficiency in resource allocation.

2.1 Particularisation of Uganda

The history of adjustment in Uganda can be divided into two phases namely 1981-1984 and 1987 to date. The first phase began in mid 1981 with exchange rate realignment, elimination of price controls, de-subsidisation, increase of interest rates and the institution of producer price incentives. With time, there was some commendable success in terms of G.D.P growth and B.O.P and reduced inflation and smuggling. The programme however could not be sustained through 1984 due to scarce financial inflows, intensifying civil war, partial implementation and over-reliance on the exchange rate (Ochieng 1992?). Uganda's initial attempt at adjustment therefore was tantamount to a false start.

The second phase of adjustment was initiated by the incumbent government under the May 1987 Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). This was supported by the IMF Structural, Adjustment Facility (SAF) approved in June 1987, an IDA Economic Recovery Credit and other foreign assistance. In 1989, the government decided to deepen and accelerate the on-going reforms. The IMF replaced the SAF with the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in April 1989 and the IDA also extended a second Economic Recovery Credit in January 1990. Since January 1988, Uganda has been eligible to draw resources from the World Bank-sponsored Special Programme of Assistance (SSA) involving enhanced concessional aid flows to debt distressed low-income, Sub-Saharan countries under adjustment.

Since 1987, the government has gone ahead with the liberalisation of the foreign exchange market and established forex bureaux. It has introduced cost-sharing user charges in public institutions and utilities; liberalised commodity trade; privatised some parastatals; "retrenched" some civil servants and "demobilised" some soldiers. It has periodically devalued the national currency and removed price controls. Reforms in revenue collection have been effected and tough monetary and fiscal measures instituted. Tight budgetary discipline is now the guiding principle. Disposable income has therefore become scarce and in the recent budget proposals (1998/99), the Minister of finance reported a 5% rate of inflation. Clearly, the adjustment policy in Uganda has had a tremendous impact on the social sector in general, though we shall focus mainly on urban housing. However, in order to facilitate our analysis, it is instructive to begin by placing it in its historical, political and economic framework.

3. THE INTERNAL FRAMEWORK AND ADJUSTMENT IMPACT

3.1 The Land Question

Land is a fundamental pre-requisite for shelter. With a land mass of 197,096 sq. km and a population of 19.8 million, Uganda would not have a land problem if the land were evenly distributed. Population statistics show a density ranging from 12 persons per sq. km in Moroto District North-Western Uganda to 4,112 persons per sq. km in Kampala District - Central Region (Ministry of Finance 1998). Further, individual land accessibility is determined by many other factors including the tenure system, the land marked and management regimes. In accordance with neoclassical economic theory, the price of urban land is determined mainly by its location from the centre.

In the pre-colonial era, the land tenure system in present day Uganda revolved around communal ownership. Under the protectorate philosophy, the colonial state sought to preserve this system alongside some form of freehold tenure created under the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1903. Under the Mailo1 System, holders obtained certificates of title. Between 1900 and 1974, there occurred much sub-division of the original Mailo holdings and in time, titles became quite easily transferable, negotiable and marketable among individuals and with credit institutions as collateral security. This was a direct result of the structural reorientation of Uganda"s economy from a subsistence one to a monetary one. Land effectively tuned into a "Commodity" with the titles certifying ownership.

The immediate implication of the "Commoditisation" of land is that there developed a landless class. This is put clearly into perspective in the urban case. Until 1995, there was public land and private property tenure under the Mailo system. The former was managed by the Urban Authority which issued to a prospective developer a lease on which a premium and ground rent were payable. The latter was owned by private entities, and individuals could sell it when need arose.

Clearly therefore, the poor have no accessibility to land, especially in the urban areas, whether public or private. A lucky few enjoy squatter rights in the urban fringes but lack security of tenure and poverty hinders them from putting up decent shelters. We shall explore the full implications of land management regimes in detail later.

3.2 Population and Urbanisation

Uganda's population has grown tremendously over the past three decades. The table below portrays the trend with high rates of growth in the inter-censal periods 1969-1997.

The total figures, however, obscure the population redistribution in the period due to migrations both rural-rural and rural-urban. The former involves people moving from high density areas like Kabale District in South-Western Uganda to resettle in lower density ones like Kabarole and Hoima Districts in Western Uganda, which has been happening since the 1950s. The latter refers to massive movements of people from the countryside to the urban centres, a phenomenon which has stimulated haphazard urbanisation.

Urbanisation in Uganda started in the colonial period in the first half of the present century with the establishment of economic and administrative centres all over the country. This triggered the influx of people. to the urban nuclei for commerce, employment and education. With time, the nuclei developed into fully grown district urban centres. The influx however later over-ran the urban facilities due to increased rural poverty and deprivation, and neglect of urban public facilities. This bred pressure on housing, utilities, land and other infrastructure, a phenomenon which still obtains. The table below depicts the magnitude of urbanisation since 1969.

Urban Centre

1969

1980

1991

1997

Kampala

330,700

458,503

773,463

894,123

Jinja

47,872

45,060

60,979

70,491

Mable

23,544

28,039

53,634

62,000

Masaka

12,987

29,123

49,070

56,724

Gulu

19,170

14,958

42,841

49,524

Entebbe

21,096

21,289

41,638

48,133

Soroti

12,398

15,048

40,602

46,935

Mbarara

16,078

23,255

40,383

46,682

Total

482,845

609,075

1,062,008

1,274,612

The eight urban centres comprise 9.5% of the total urban population in Uganda. The table shows that the urban population has doubled over the past two decades, with most of the growth in the decade of adjustment (1980s). However, it is also evident from the table that the level of urbanisation in Uganda is comparatively low. The total urban population constitutes only 13.4% of the total population (Ministry of Finance 1998). Nevertheless, the point is that there has been a high rate of haphazard urban growth, which has put tremendous pressure on urban facilities.

3.3 The Shelter Situation

The housing stock in Uganda stands at 2,690,900 units while the household distribution of people averages 5.7 persons. The occupancy density is estimated at 1.05, giving a backlog of 235,904 units. Kampala has a housing stock of about 138,068 units with a backlog of 44,228 units. All the other urban areas have approximately 176,310 housing units and a backlog of 63,473 units (Dept. of Housing, MLH & UD 1992).

The background to budgets 1998 estimated total urban housing stock of 203,814 housing units and a backlog 73,374 (MFEP 1998).

Settlement patterns in Uganda can be considered under three broad categories. The first is the dispersed rural homestead which is in the majority. The second category constitutes constellations of local administration centres, intermediate towns and centres of socio-economic establishments or nucleated urban centres. Finally, there exists a linear corridor of fast urbanising settlements along roads and at junctions of major highways. The latter two overlap and it is upon these that we shall focus, taking an urban centre to mean any town with over 2,000 persons. There are 113 urban centres in Uganda, using this yardstick (MLH & UD 1992, Ministry of Finance 1998). Table 3 shows the nature of housing in Kampala City.

Table 3. Percentage Distribution of the Population by Quantity of Housing in

Kampala City (1997)

Type of Dwelling Unit Total HH (%)

Wall Material: Pole and Mud

39.8

Floor Material: Rammed Earth

34.6

Type of Dwelling Unit: Tenement

42.8

No. of People Sharing a Room: 4-6

82.5

Place for Cooking: Veranda

60.0

Energy for Cooking: Charcoal

87.5

The figures from the table above indicate the magnitude of the housing problem, as already alluded to in our previous analysis. The majority of the population live in temporary dwelling units and up to six persons share one room. What the table does not indicate is that even the middle income working population occupy dwellings that are devoid of facilities necessary for adequate living. The major issue of concern here is that housing investment has become an unattainable activity for the majority of the population.

3.4 Housing Under Adjustment

Perhaps nowhere has the cost of adjustment been more evident than in the housing sub-sector, especially in urban Uganda. There has been a steady increase both in homeless people sleeping on verandas and in abandoned structures and parks, and in displaced people and those living in sub-standard, unplanned and unserviced settlements.

The bottom line of worsening shelter provision since the introduction of the adjustment are contractionary monetary and fiscal policies which tend to reallocate resources from the disadvantaged to the well to do. According to the UN (1992), the burden of adjustment inevitably tends to fall disproportionately on the politically weak and poor.

The problem of urban shelter is, however, linked to the rural areas through macro dynamics. Adjustment as heralded by periodic devaluation, trade liberalisation, de-subsidisation and massive cuts in government social service expenditure, etc. has served to lay bare the tremendous urban bias in the country's socio-economic configuration. With no more extension services, subsidised agricultural inputs, education and health coupled with less and less disposable income, many people have flocked to towns in search of better opportunities. This has compounded the urban problem, already exemplified by galloping unemployment and underemployment, steady erosion of real wages and a constraining tax regime. Shelter has virtually become a luxury. In urban Uganda today, it is not uncommon to find a middle ranking civil servant occupying a two-roomed "house" with a family of eight persons. The "lucky" amongst the poor put up in improvised shelters.

The infamous "retrenchment" of civil servants and the demobilisation of soldiers in the name of institutional streamlining have unleashed a phenomenal wave of unemployment, poverty and homelessness. Formally occupying public housing, some of these have had to find their new level in the urban slums. While these policies may have been well intentioned, the methodology which provides no viable alternative means of livelihood to the victims needs, without doubt, new thinking. Meantime, both conditionalities continue on a phase basis.

The SAP conditionalities of divestiture, privatisation and trade liberalisation have also caused much harm in shelter terms. These involve the selling of parastatals considered as non-performing. Trade liberalisation has also meant the dismantling of some of the giant marketing boards like the Coffee Marketing Board. Such parastatals were big employers and many people have lost jobs in the process, some joining the ranks of the urban destitute. Indeed, the policies have caused so much public uproar that the National Legislature recently suspended the sale of public enterprises till the process is streamlined.

Another main impact of MAPS on housing investment has been through the policy of positive interest rates. This means that the interest rate must be higher than the inflation rate despite the fact that the latter has been very high, thus pushing the former prohibitively higher. This has made loanable funds inaccessible, thereby stifling investment.

The devaluation of the currency and inflation have constantly pushed up the cost of building materials. This is the more so as most of them are imported, including foundries, cement, glass, locks and hinges, tiles, nuts and bolts, screws, electrical items and sanitary ware. Even some of the locally produced materials such as cement have exhibited volatile prices under adjustment, as shown in the table below.

According to the Ministry of Housing (1993), such increases can be attributed to currency devaluation and inflation, increase in costs of labour, equipment, machinery, transport, and shortage of locally available materials. The Ministry of Finance has attributed the astronomical increase in prices to the fact that the local currency in Uganda is pegged to the dollar and the currency has depreciated due to lack of a strong export base. The gradual erosion of the power of the shilling, prohibitive interest rates and the contraction of incomes has severely deterred otherwise enterprising investors in housing. This requires tremendous sums of money and the process of putting up a structure is normally lengthy, necessitating stable monetary value, accessibility to affordable credit and stable, affordable prices. Indeed, stalled housing projects are a common feature in urban Uganda.

Since the early 1980s, housing investment has become more and more out of reach of the average Ugandan in urban areas. Even most of the otherwise "well-to-do" find house construction elusive. Indeed this class of people has resorted to occupying rented private houses. Only a few affluent households can be found occupying houses they own. Decent housing construction has become so dear that even most of the individuals who invest in construction opt to rent them out, while they themselves occupy more modest accommodation which is also rented. The bottom line is that building costs have become so high that urban housing investors have sustained the industry in the knowledge that good returns will come by way of rent. It is mainly this assurance that has sustained some form of growth in housing construction.

One of the major bottlenecks in housing investment is the volatile and high prices of land. These have sky-rocketed mainly resulting from the constrained land market due to individual ownership. As already alluded to in section 4.1, land in Uganda belongs to private citizens and the holder and user rights are vested in them according to the prevailing land tenure system (Republic of Uganda 1995). The implication from the prevailing land tenure system is the issue of individual land ownership where approximately 70% of the land in Kampala city is privately owned (Nuwagaba and Kisamba-Mugerwa 1993?). The major issue here is that individual land owners may not be in a position to develop their land and yet, they do not wish to dispose of their land parcels to potential developers. This has led to the rising prices of plots, given that the land supply side is heavily constrained. It is mainly this factor that has led to slum formation and a significant level of irregularities in Kampala City. The table below shows the prices of plots in selected areas of Kampala City.

Table 5. Land Value for Selected Areas of Kampala, 1989-1997 (US $ / 0.25 acres)

year

Muyenga

Makerere

Rubaga

Bunga

Busega

1989

8,000

5,000

4,000

2,000

2,000

1990

12,000

6,000

6,000

3,500

3,200

1991

16,000

8,000

8,000

5,000

4,000

1993

18,000

9,000

8,500

6,000

4,000

1995

22,000

10,000

10,000

7,000

5,000

1997

25,000

12,000

12,000

10,000

6,000

Sources: a) Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Kampala, 1993.

Clearly, the cost of an urban plot of land is well out of reach of the overwhelming majority. It is a factor which has undermined housing investment. Considering that the medium income of a worker is approximately US $ 200 per month. It is clear from the table that acquisition of a housing plot is out of reach of the great majority of population.

3.5 Access to Public Land

The question of access to expensive land parcels on the open market could have been solved by making public land accessible on a lease basis. This system of public leasehold operated in Uganda up to 1995 when all the public leasehold properties formerly under the control of municipal authorities were converted to freehold. The municipal authorities have lost jurisdiction over land they previously controlled, a condition that has further worsened the problem of land accessibility. A venturesome critic may, however, hazard a question as to how accessible public leasehold were to the ordinary urban residents. The major issue has been corruption and bureaucratic hurdles involved in securing public leasehold land. The public leasehold land was mainly dominated by highly placed individuals in government, to the detriment of the poor who could not deal with the bureaucracy and the high level corruption in the management of leasehold land.

Clearly therefore, the adjustment process in Uganda in its orthodox format has not facilitated investment in urban housing, nor, indeed, in the social sector as a whole. It has come to be `almost synonymous with homeless, poverty and lack of opportunity. Its micro and macro instruments have impoverished the people and stifled shelter investment both private and public. Its short-term cost have proved to be almost unbearable, moreover without evident trends of possible longer term gains.

It is in this vein that adjustment has met with bitter criticism. The bone of contention is indeed not whether adjustment is necessary, but rather on the methodology of adjustment. Critics dissent from the orthodox IMF/World Bank methodology which invariably ignores the local conditions and the aspirations of the local people. The worsening urban shelter problem authenticates the case of the critics.

3.6 MAPs and Income Distribution

The preceding analysis has indicated the negative impact of SAPS on housing investment in urban areas especially Kampala. It should, however, be reiterated that not all has been lost. There is a significant proportion of the urban population that has made tremendous gains from SAPs. Due to liberalisation of export trade, individuals have taken opportunities in foreign export markets with a concomitant increase in their incomes. This sector of the population has benefited from tremendous windfalls from their export business. There is growing construction of ostentatious houses which are mainly rented to foreign missions. However, most of these homes are inaccessible to the average urban inhabitants due to their rental prices. It is therefore, ironical that houses are available but the population is still unaccommodated due to the mismatch between income levels and housing structures available. This is the highest level of social exclusion.

4. STATE CAPACITY

Historically, the state has played a major role in urban shelter provision including allocation of public leasehold land to individual developers, construction of houses, renting for public officials and the provision of infrastructure and utilities (roads, water, electricity, etc.) to housing areas. This was as long as the economy was buoyant and government institutions such as the Uganda Electricity Board, Land Commission, Urban Councils and National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NW&SC) were functioning properly.

The 1970s saw the breakdown of government institutions, increased corruption, impoverishment and economic deterioration. The net impact was the deterioration in government's capacity to provide decent housing and to promote private housing investment. Since the early 1980's, adjustment programmes have further incapacitated government in shelter provision. SAPS emphasise the need to let market forces take their course through the elimination of price distortions.

The government's subsidisation of domestic utilities and services such as water, electricity and sewerage disposal at the expense of the profitable performance of such parastatals as Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) and National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC) is unacceptable to orthodox adjustment principles. As such, the cost of these services is gradually being transferred to the end users. The urban poor cannot afford the full costs of these services yet, they are part and parcel of decent urban housing. The Bretton Woods twins are reportedly pushing for the complete privatisation of these service parastatals, a move which does not augur well for the housing sector. While it is often argued that the privatisation of these service corporations will increase efficiency, it ought to be reiterated that the windfalls may benefit only the urban well to do, to the detriment of the poor.

The Government intended to spearhead the crusade for urban shelter provision through the National Housing and Construction Corporation (NH&CC). Indeed, NH&CC put up most of the residential flats in Kampala City. However, its capacity has been reduced by the adjustment principles, which discourage government "pump priming" of parastatals. Since 1980, it has only managed to erect a few maisonettes which are available for sale to the affluent.

A more recent and ominous challenge to state capability of housing provision is the case of the formerly nationalised (disguised as "abandoned") Asian properties. Their management had been vested in the Departed Asians Properties Custodian Board (DAPCB) on behalf of Government. Since the Asian exodus in 1972, these properties had given a false impression of enhanced state capability to provide housing. The on-going return of the properties has exposed this falsehood and actually shows that the capacity has declined. While previously Government could virtually house all the public officials entitled to an official house, now it is up to government officials themselves to look for their own accommodation. Government is reportedly selling off all pool houses to the private sector, divesting itself of the responsibility of housing civil servants. It is not uncommon to find a medical officer putting up in a shanty settlement in Ugandan urban areas while pool government houses have been privatised and sold to those who can afford to pay for them.

5. POLICY OVERVIEW, CHALLENGES AND THE NEW THINKING

The main challenge is thus to achieve adjustment with credible transformation and without undue pressure on the fundamentals of peoples' welfare, such as shelter. We have endeavoured to examine the impact of adjustment on urban housing. Its negative influence on other aspects of socio-economic welfare has been well documented elsewhere. There is broad consensus that the above challenges can be ably addressed along the lines of positive adjustment. These have been well articulated in the African Alternative Framework to SAPS (AAF-SAPs), developed under the Economic Commission for Africa in response to the devastating conventional SAPS. The main thrust of AAF -SAP is its holistic nature in which the macro-economic framework, the policy directions and measures, and the implementation strategies take into account the dynamic relationship among all major elements related to adjustment with transformation. Thus, the dichotomy between adjustment and long-term development is eliminated and the human element as an integral part of the process is emphasised.

According to an Oxfam Report (1992), even the World Bank, in its review of SAPS in Sub-Saharan Africa, concedes that adjustment has left much to be desired in terms of restoring growth and social welfare. It admits that investment levels have dropped significantly in countries implementing its programmes, and that even where SAPs have been associated with higher levels of economic growth as in Ghana and Uganda, there is no evidence that they reduced poverty levels. This lack of consonance between economic growth per se and human welfare is mainly due to neglect of the peculiar characteristics in the social, economic and political set up in individual countries.

Uganda is a largely traditional society where patrilineal tendencies are strong and the extended family concept is still very much alive. These affect production and consumption relations. The economy is predominantly agrarian and agricultural production takes place on smallholdings. The informal sector accounts for approximately two-thirds of economic activity. The land tenure system is lopsided, as already discussed, and poverty is a widespread phenomenon. Incomes are low and the distribution tremendously skewed. Rural-urban differentials in terms of social service accessibility and opportunity are pronounced, yet 90% of the population are rural dwellers. Political instability and policy experiments are the norm. The country's recent political-economic history, as characterised by upheavals, has already been examined.

These, among others are the issues that must be addressed by any meaningful development programme. Failure to recognise such peculiarities undermines any initiatives and renders them unsustainable in the long-term. One point that policy makers must appreciate is that in a situation of widespread abject deprivation, short-term costs can prove to be fatal, thereby nullifying any long-term windfalls. The essence should therefore be to incorporate strategies that focus on short-term costs amongst the vulnerable groups and thus enable them to survive to witness the long-term gains. Otherwise the writing on the wall is quite vivid. In Robert McNamara's (1975) words, "If cities [and towns] do not begin to deal more constructively with poverty, poverty may well begin to deal more destructively with cities."

5.1 Prospects

While the foregoing does not augur well for the forces of progress, there is nonetheless cause for optimism. The Western donors, notably the World Bank, are also aware of the shelter problem of the urban poor under the adjustment process. They have intervened to help up-grade their housing conditions. The Namuwongo slum upgrading pilot project in Kampala city is a heartening pointer. It emphasised the provision of infrastructural utilities and decent low-cost structures. While such projects elsewhere have sometimes met with some hitches such as the Tondo Offshore Project in Manilla, Philipines (Payer 1982) and the sites and services project in Dar-er-salaam, Tanzania (Stren 1989), the Namuwongo pilot project is nevertheless a major step in the right direction.

The donor community has come out strongly in favor of financing urban projects in Uganda, which is still ongoing. Infrastructure and shelter are prominent items on the project agenda. Donor agencies such as UNICEF, HABITAT have been instrumental in the provision of eroded services in the social sector such as sanitation, health and water in both rural and urban areas. Though rather belatedly, the government, with donor financial assistance, has embarked on a programme for the alleviation of poverty and the social costs of adjustment (PAPSCA). This is essentially meant to cushion vulnerable groups from devastating adjustment costs. While its practical benefits are yet to be seen, on paper the initiative is novel and if well implemented, should go a long way in solving, some of the more contentions issues inherent in orthodox SAPS.

But perhaps most important is the evolution of an alternative ideology of adjustment methodology as championed by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). This is summarised under the African Alternative Framework to SAPS already alluded to. It was developed after ECA member countries expressed the need to re-examine the policy content of orthodox SAPS - their relevance, adequacy and efficacy. Slowly but surely, the case for an alternative framework is, gaining ground even among western donor agencies and monetary institutions.

In conclusion, it is instructive to put the record about adjustment straight. As stated by Adebayo Adedeji (1989), the question is not whether adjustment is necessary or not. All countries - developed or developing - find it necessary to adjust from time to time to changing economic parameters and circumstances.

The question is what kind of adjustment. In answering this, one must also ask what the structural characteristics of the country are and also what its long term development objectives are. It is clear that any adjustment process that fails to bring about the transformation of the structures that fundamentally serve to aggravate the socio-economic situation, will be self defeating and will ultimately compound the problem. And the sooner this is appreciated by the proponents of conventional adjustment the better.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author would like to express his gratitude to Cedric Pugh of the School of Urban and Regional Studies, Sheffield Hallam University, United Kingdom, for his generous assistance in making available the literature that was found useful in writing this paper and for his valuable comments on the first draft of the paper.

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